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ABSTRACT 
The situation faced by the British Government during the 
Second World War demanded a total effort to fight a total 
war. And a cooperative effort was demanded not only by 
Britain and her allies, but equally of Britain in 
partnership with her empire. The importance of Britain's 
empire to her war effort meant that the British Government 
had to ensure unity of purpose and the mobilisation of 
maximum commitment. British colonies in East and Central 
Africa became increasingly important in supplying raw 
materials, food stuffs, monetary contributions and 
manpower. With advances in mass communications public 
opinion could not be ignored and had to be mobilised to 
support the war effort at home, in the colonies and abroad. 
This involved the British Government in a propaganda 
campaign about the mutually beneficial relationship, to 
explain the war to the populations in the empire and to 
educate the British public about the contributions made by 
the empire to the war effort. A reluctant Colonial Office 
entered into a new field of activity, public relations in 
uneasy cooperation with the Ministry of Information. The 
nature of this official British propaganda changed as the 
war progressed. In Africa it became increasingly apparent 
that 'win the war' propaganda was insufficient, the 
colonies would have to be told why they had a common 
interest in defeating the Axis. With the collapse of 
British power in South-East Asia and the resulting 
criticisms of 
, 
the British Imperial system in general, 
particularly from the United States, it was clear that 
British policy would have to be articulated in a new way. 
The theme adopted was of a new imperial relationship of 
'partnership' to replace the old policy of trusteeship. In 
publicising the positive economic and social aspects of 
'new' Empire through the commitment of the Colonial Welfare 
and Development Acts the British Government hoped to reduce 
criticism and avoid the controversial issues of the future 
political developments in the empire. 
In the post-war period the economic problems faced by 
the Labour Government and the need to mobilise the 
resources of the Empire to support the British economy 
threatened the rhetoric of the 'new' Empire relationship of 
'Partnership' as attempts were made to utilise the 
resources of the African El Dorado to maintain British 
independence and ensure its continued great power status. 
The colonies in Africa were also seen as under threat from 
the new menace of communism and the racial policies of the 
Union of South Africa. Official British propaganda 
continued to project the mutual benefits of 'partnership' 
while realising that the colonies could not be coerced but 
would have to be persuaded to play an active part in the 
imperial relationship. This long-term educative process 
aimed to contain the political aspirations of the Africans 
and the white settler communities in East and Central 
Africa raised as a result of the war within the framework 
of gradual evolution towards self-government within the 
British multi-racial Commonwealth. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this study was to examine the story of 
Britain's intended 'new' empire in Africa by tracing the 
development of the intertwining of policy and propaganda 
represented in this new imperial structure. By examining 
the 'new' empire, defined as a consensual 'partnership' 
between the colonial peoples and the mother country, a 
better general understanding of this period of imperial 
history was sought. 
Why would an examination of the voluminous official 
material generated by the conduct of 'public relations' be 
expected to make anything but a marginal addition to our 
understanding of British colonial policy? In the case of 
the 'old' empire that would indeed have been the case. The 
'old' empire was based on the idea of 'benevolent 
trusteeship'. The people of the colonies were governed by 
Britain in their - and Britain's - best interests whether 
they liked it or not, or saw their own best interests in 
the same light. Articulation or projection of the reasons 
for the policies imposed on them and of the benefits they 
were designed to produce was at best a marginal task. 
There was always military force to quell any expression of 
disaffection. The idea of 'new' empire however was to make 
those reasons and benefits explicit and to persuade the 
people that being in an empire of 'partnership' was in 
their best interests and that they should voluntarily 
remain a part of it. 'Public relations' became therefore a 
central rather than a marginal component of policy, 
indicated by the vastly greater volume of records 
generated, as well as the much higher level of the 
officials and political figures whose views appear in them. 
The cynic might say that the 'new' empire was simply 
an attempt to substitute propaganda for the military force 
which Britain could no longer afford to deploy in order to 
continue her dominion over vast areas of Africa and the 
exploitation of its resources for the benefit of her own 
declining economy. That would be a gross 
oversimplification. It ignores the belief, sincerely held, 
that it was in the African peoples' own interests to be a 
part of a large, stable and rich empire instead, of being 
2 
part of a poor and underdeveloped entity. It would also 
ignore the willingness to commit British resources into the 
creation of viable territories through the development of 
the African colonies (as distinct from merely investing in 
developments of direct benefit to Britain) despite 
Britain's grave economic position at the time. Whatever 
the balance between these views may be, the fact remains 
that public relations was a key element in the plans and 
policies for developing the 'new' empire and that without 
exploring the records of these propaganda activities the 
story cannot be fully understood. 
There is also another reason why these records are 
useful. The idea of a consensus based colonial empire 
meant that policy and propaganda had to develop together. 
Matters of policy had to be considered in terms of their 
presentation and perception. Above all, it meant that 
policy objectives were articulated and recorded to a 
greater extent than ever before. It is a rich and 
revealing body of sources which helps shed light on how 
events and problems were seen as well as how they were 
intended to be seen. 
At the time of planning this study, the prevailing 
view amongst writers on post-war British colonial policy 
was that the concept of a 'new' empire based on new ideas 
of economic cooperation and political 'partnership' rather 
than direct (or indirect) rule of old, evolved at the end 
of the war under the stimulus of the Labour Party coming 
into power. It was rather taken for granted that 
reconstructing the empire must have been a part of that 
general enthusiasm and drive for 'social reconstruction' 
which had brought Labour into power in the first place and 
which was the hallmark of the Labour government period. 
Accordingly, it had originally been envisaged that in 
telling the story from 'new' empire-to 'winds of change', 
from the emergence of the new ideas, policies, and 
techniques of persuasion represented by the former, to the 
reluctant acceptance that maintaining the Africa empire in 
whatever form was no longer feasible represented by the 
latter, the thesis would cover the period 1945-1960. 
Research into the origins of, both the shift in 
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policy/ideas and the means by which they were realised in 
Africa had however shown that linking reconstruction at 
home and in the empire was in fact not merely an 
oversimplification but - to echo von Ranke's famous phrase 
- it was just not 'how it really happened'. A very 
substantial body of evidence, hitherto unexplored, came to 
light which conclusively documents that it was in fact 
during the war, principally between 1939-1943, that this 
far-reaching shift in thinking about the nature of the 
imperial relationship occurred. It also showed that it 
occurred spontaneously within the Colonial Office and that 
shifting the emphasis from administrative and military 
methods onto persuasion, as well as the development and use 
of such techniques was also well under way before the 
change of government in 1945. It is true that in broad 
philosophical terms these ideas of a partnership of peoples 
as well as economic coordination and cooperation echoed 
Labour's rhetoric and indeed deeply held beliefs. However 
the Colonial Office drew their inspiration from that common 
core of ideas which had become intellectually prevalent 
during the war and which made for the consensus politics of 
the next two decades. These changes in approach, policy 
and methods represented by the 'new' empire were not in 
fact a concomitant of Labour coming to power. On the 
contrary, the new ideas and new policies were already in 
place by 1943. 
The emergence of these new ideas and policies amongst 
the normally staid and conservative officials of the 
Colonial Office in London and of the Colonial Service in 
the colonies was in fact the result of their experience of 
the war itself, made urgent during the disastrous period 
from Dunkirk to the loss of Singapore and much of the 
eastern empire with it and which Churchill dubbed 'the 
beginning'. The Colonial Office came to, realise and then 
came face to face with'the fact, that Britain would not 
again have the power and the British public would not again 
have the inclination, to maintain its imperial position by 
coercion. A colonial empire could'only'be maintained from 
now on in a modified form which substantially relied on the 
consent of its peoples, both at home and in the colonies. 
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This consent would have to be gained by active propaganda 
and public relations instead of relying on ex post facto 
acquiesence. Active propaganda and public relations would 
need to be started as early as possible in preparation for 
the transition to the post-war period. 
Despite therefore the assumption that the British 
government and officials would have been fully engaged 
during the war in simply trying to hold onto what they had 
rather than plan a new imperial strategy altogether, it was 
in fact during the war that the major transformation in 
ideas about the relationship between the rulers and the 
ruled took place. It was during, rather than after, the 
war that the concepts of a 'new' empire and of a 
partnership replacing the old empire and benevolent 
trusteeship evolved. This policy was merely continued in 
the post-war years. Even the ideas of multi-racial 
partnership, instead of seeing partnership in terms of the 
white settlers living off the African territories, which 
has been thought to have evolved in the 1950s in response 
to developments in East and Central Africa, had in fact 
already been formulated as a concept before 1945. 
Another new aspect emerged from the research. The 
loss of faith in the feasibility of creating such a new 
empire in Africa also occurred earlier than it had been 
generally assumed. Instead of the mid-to-late 1950s it was 
in the course of 1948 that it came to be recognised within 
the Colonial Office that the dream of the new empire was 
not going to be realised. The strain on Britain's 
financial resources and the economic crises of 1947-8 
increasingly ruled out the level of support and investment 
which might have possibly made it work., The practical 
manifestation of partnership was no longer Britain's 
commitment to develop the African colonies for the benefit 
of the colonial peoples but economic development as a means 
of British economic regeneration. , The further drain on 
British military, political and financial resources which 
the Palestine crisis and then the Cold War brought combined 
with meeting in 1948 for the first time A, frican, nationaliSm 
on a significant scale, turned the era of hope and optimism 
which had characterised Colonial Office thinking up to that 
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point into a period of a 'race against time'. The year 
1948 also marks the end of any new developments in colonial 
propaganda. From seeking to create a 'new' empire, policy 
shifted by 1948 to what had become in reality a holding 
operation. With the failure of the 'new' empire withdrawal 
from Africa became only a matter of time. 
The chronological framework therefore for the story of 
the emergence and failure of Britain's 'new' empire in 
Africa, and in which persuasion would play the central 
role, turned out to be not in the post-war period, but the 
years between 1939 and 1948. 
While the change in the concept and the projection of 
empire had implications for Britain's imperial policy in 
general, East and Central Africa are of particular 
importance because it was in these territories above all 
that Britain expected that the concept of 'new' empire -a 
three-way partnership between Britain, white/British 
settler communities and 'natives' would both require and 
provide the opportunity for such a 'partnership' for an 
especially long period thus providing the basis for a long- 
lasting imperial structure. It was in East and Central 
Africa in particular where the 'new' empire would to come 
into being, would operate most successfully and would 
perhaps become a model for other territories. 
Concentrating on the projection of the 'new' empire in East 
and Central Africa offers therefore an eminently relevant 
locational focus as well as the opportunity for considering 
it in this wider context. 
This study focuses on direct and indirect official 
governmental propaganda and the relationship between 
policy-making and its projection; the 'calculated intent"' 
behind the propaganda produced by the imperial publicists. 
Emphasis is placed on the 'metropolitan' view for it was in 
London that the dynamic for change can be- located, where 
the requirements of wartime mobilisation in the colonial 
empire produced new habits of central' direction,, where the 
2- Philip M. Taylor, The Projection 'of Britain: British 
overseas Publicitv and Propaqanda 1919-1939 (Cambridge, 
1981), P-1 
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debates on the 'new' empire took place, where the 
'partnership' doctrine was adopted and where the new and 
major propaganda initiatives were born. Accordingly, 
relations between the Colonial Office and the Ministry of 
Information (hereafter MOI) will be explored together with 
relations with quasi and unofficial organisations like the 
BBC and the British Council. But this is not, to suggest a 
purely centre-periphery model with all the initiative 
emanating from London. Relations between Whitehall and the 
men on the spot were more complicated than that. ý The way 
in which propaganda objectives were translated by those on 
the spot to suit perceived local needs, as well as local 
initiatives taken and local criticisms of metropolitan 
policies fed back into policy making in London will be 
examined. Unlike other studies produced in the imperial 
propaganda field2 the popular imagery and manifestations of 
the empire are only discussed when there were official 
attempts to mould it. 
The audiences for British propaganda about her 
colonies in East and Central Africa were not limited to the 
populations of these colonies, black and white Africans. 
As the war progressed increasing attention was shown in 
projecting the British empire to the British public and 
promoting an educated public opinion about the empire and 
also the audience with the most potentially damaging 
influence, the United States. 
The argument of the thesis may be summarised as 
follows. The role of official British propaganda about her 
African colonies remained relatively simple until-1942. 
Before 1939 the Colonial Office had been activeý in the 
specific area of commercial propaganda and had been slow to 
recognise that it was necessary to engage -in- public 
relations and 'sell' their policies to the ýpublic, 
therefore little publicity machinery to project Britain's 
colonial policy existed once w4r broke out. Early wartime 
efforts concentrated on getting a publicity organisation up 
2 C. f. John M. MacKenzie, Propaqanda and Empire: the 
Manipulation of British Public Opinion, 1880-1960 
(Manchester, 1988) and his edited collection, Imperialism 
and Popular Culture (Manchester, 1986). 
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and running and propaganda was initially conducted on an ad 
hoc basis by the Empire Division of the MOI, advised by the 
Colonial Office. Debate centred on discussions about the 
nature of propaganda about Africa and the most effective 
methods of projection. Against a background of continual 
quarrels over the control of and responsibility for the 
content of colonial propaganda efforts were made to 
establish improved cooperation between on the one hand, the 
MOI and the Colonial Office, and on the other hand between 
Whitehall and the colonies themselves. The propaganda 
effort about the empire was further hampered by the 
practical considerations not only of a lack of manpower but 
also financial constraints and the competing priorities of 
Britain's propaganda effort in general. 
Between 1939 and 1942 the British war effort 
concentrated on survival. Therefore propaganda reflected 
this overriding objective and was limited to exhorting 
Africans to maximise their contributions to the Allied war 
effort in a common fight against tyranny, to explaining the 
war to Africans in order to maintain morale, to reinforcing 
the belief that Britain could and should win the war and to 
ensuring that the colonial war effort was articulated and 
understood in Britain and abroad. Despite Colonial Office 
warnings about the dangers of limiting propaganda to this 
'win the war' theme, propaganda in the early stages of the 
war was subordinated to the overwhelming need to maximise 
the war effort in the colonies. In this task of making the 
African colonies believe that they were engaged in a common 
struggle, propagandists were aided by the Abyssinian 
campaigns on their doorstep which involved African troops 
from the region. 
The fall of Singapore and the failure of Malaya to 
rally to the British cause against Japan sent shock waves 
throughout the imperial system. 'The myth of colonial 
invincibility was destroyed, and the self-confidence of the 
colonial powers and administrators who sustained this myth 
dissipated. The colonial emperor had no clothes'. 3 
3 Michael Crowder (ed. ), Cambridge Modern History of 
Africa, Volume 8,1940-75 (Cambridge, 1985), p. 2. 
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Britain was forced to come to terms with the fact that the 
support of their colonial peoples could no longer be taken 
for granted. This new factor in policy planning remained 
important ever after. It was no longer sufficient to 
represent the war in terms of a straight fight between 
right and wrong and unrelated to the aspirations and 
experiences of people living far away from theatres of war. 
There was also a growing realisation that the British 
public had to be stimulated into a greater interest in the 
colonial empire as a whole. The entrance of the United 
States of America into the war, which guaranteed victory, 
also raised acutely questions about what kind of world the 
Allies were fighting for. Indeed there were real fears 
that the United States might make the liquidation of the 
British empire a condition of American support. This 
prompted one exasperated official to ask when the United 
States would start, to fight the real enemy and stop 
barracking Britain about her colonial policy: 'it is 
unfortunate that our American friends cannot find a more 
war-like occupation than their badgering the British 
lion'. ' 
A new colonial mission was needed: a new policy which 
would counteract despondency that the British empire's days 
were numbered. The propagandists also had to come to terms 
with the new realities after 1942 and find a more 
acceptable way of articulating British colonial policy to 
the Americans, while also guarding against war weariness 
and complacency about eventual victory and promoting 
continued empire unity. The solution to this combined 
policy and propaganda problem was found in presenting the 
colonial relationship in a new light which reflected the 
Colonial Office's belief 'in the ability of the 
administrative structure to "prepare" a colony for social, 
economic, and even political progress' .5 At Churchill's 
1943. 
PRO, C0875/19/6, Colonial Office minute, 1 December, 
I J. M. Lee, `Forward Thinking" and War: the Colonial 
Office During the 1940s', Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History, 6: 1 (1977), p. 72. 
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behest the general discussion of war aims was forbidden in 
government propaganda. The Colonial Office was also 
determined that they would not be forced by American public 
opinion into committing themselves publicly to 
constitutional reforms which would establish a timetable 
for the African colonies on the path to self-government and 
independence. The new theme of a dynamic 'partnership' 
between Britain and her colonial empire, with an 
implication that this was to be a partnership between 
equals and not the old principle of 'trusteeship' with its 
connotations of charitable paternalism, allowed however a 
commitment to responsible independent government for the 
African colonies to be avoided. From 1943 onwards as 
thought and planning turned towards post-war 
reconstruction, British propaganda was increasingly devoted 
to how this new empire based on partnership would develop 
by projecting not just general hints about 'constitutional' 
advances but promises of practical manifestation in welfare 
and development projects for the colonies. The 
propagandists were aided in this task by the fillip 
provided by the new Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 
1945 which gave the colonies 120 million pounds over 10 
years. This commitment provided the substance to back up 
propaganda and was the high water mark of the policy of 
'new' empire. 
As the war progressed and once cooperation between the 
MOI and the Colonial Office had improved after 1942 the 
imperial propaganda effort became technically, more 
sophisticated. It relied less and less on standard 
material produced for general audiences and became more 
specialised, especially prepared to meet the local needs of 
each individual colony. Unrest and colonial disturbances 
did not feature in wartime colonial propaganda. The image 
of the empire was to be positive, nothing was to deflect 
from an image of total effort and a cooperative 
partnership. In the post-war period the projection of the 
British empire continued as an empire of 'partnership'. 
Britain's commitment to this new mission in Africa in the 
post-war period was also of great psychological importance 
to a weakened Britain after the Second World War. After 
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the loss of India, the jewel in the imperial crown, it 
would symbolise the continuance of Britain's great power 
status and prestige. Although it was realised that the war 
had aroused African expectations, British expectations of a 
continued long-term role in Africa were strong. Indeed, 
Britain looked to their African 'partners' to help them out 
of the post-war economic quagmire as the major support area 
of the British empire providing manpower and raw materials. 
From 1948 however, the gap between expectations and 
reality grew even wider. At home, the total and extremely 
public failure of the East African Groundnuts Scheme 
exposed how unreal had been the expectation that Africa 
could provide a panacea for Britain's economic ills. In 
Africa, however much Ernest Bevin6, the Labour Foreign 
Secretary, liked to claim that the British were no longer 
'imperialists' having abandoned capitalist imperialism, the 
gap between the rhetoric of 'partnership' and the, realities 
of the Labour government's development policies based on 
'enlightened self-interest 17 became all too clear. It 
became increasingly evident for all to see that Britain was 
and likely to be obliged in the foreseeable future to 
derive far more from her African colonies than they could 
hope to receive in return. It was clear to those 
responsible for the colonial publicity that propaganda, 
without at least the minimum of substance to back it up, 
would be bound to fail in the long-run. 
The development and the demise of the idea of the 
'new' empire and the role of propaganda in it has only been 
the subject of two previous studies. Martin Petter and 
J. M. Lee examined its origins and development during the 
war. They concluded that the overriding impetus came from 
the need in the desperate circumstances of 1941-2 to 
everything possible to avoid antagonising American public 
opinion and to find a way to counter its habitual hostility 
r- Hereafter an asterisk * after an individual's name 
denotes an entry in Appendix 1: the Biographical Appendix. 
7 Stephen Howe, Anticolonialism in British Politics: 
the Left and the End --- of 
Empire, 1918-1964 (Oxford, 1993), 
p. 144. 
11 
to the British empire. 0 Whereas this study has confirmed 
that this consideration indeed played a part, there were in 
fact several other considerations, both long-term and 
short-term, which played an important role in its genesis. 
First, a culmination of efforts within the Colonial Office 
to be more pro-active in the area of propaganda, the 
origins of which can be dated back to the pre-Second World 
War period. Second, the realisation that the philosophy of 
trusteeship was tired and a 'new' colonial mission was 
needed which would reflect the principles of the new 
development philosophy of the Colonial Office epitomised by 
the 1940 Colonial Development and Welfare Act. And third, 
a reaction against what was perceived by the Colonial 
Office as the attempts by the 'amateurs' within the MOI to 
take sole control of the projection of the British empire 
thus cutting across responsibilities which were the 
preserve of the Secretary of State for the Colonies. 
Rosaleen Smyth has examined colonial propaganda in 
Northern Rhodesia in her thesis 'The Development of 
Government Propaganda in Northern Rhodesia up to 1953' and 
explored subsequently some broader aspects of propaganda in 
Africa in a number of articles. 9 She argued in her thesis 
that propaganda aimed at the 'socialisation of African 
peoples into Western technological society' and examined 
the contribution made by government propaganda to the 
'awakening of African political consciousness and the 
formation of an African public opinion'. 110 Unlike the 
focus of Rosaleen Smyth's research this thesis is concerned 
13 J. M. Lee and Martin Petter, The Colonial Office, Wa 
and Development Policy: Organisation and the Planning o 
Metropolitan Initiative, 1939-1945, (London, 1982), pp. 115- 
143. 
9 Rosaleen Smyth, 'The Development of Government 
Propaganda in Northern Rhodesia up to 19531, unpublished 
Ph. D. thesis, University of London, 1983; 'War Propaganda 
during the Second World War in Northern Rhodesia', African 
Affairs, 83: 332,1984 and 'Britain's African Colonies and 
British Propaganda during the Second World War', Journal of 
Imperial and Commonwealth Histor , 14: 1, October 1985. 
10 Rosaleen Smyth, 'The Development of Government 
propaganda in Northern Rhodesia up to 19531, unpublished 
Ph. D. thesis, University of London, 1983, pp. 387 and 19. 
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centrally with the development of the metropolitan view of 
public relations and its function in relation colonial 
policy in general, with what it reveals about the attitudes 
of official mind towards the imperial relationship and 
perceptions of British imperial power, with how this policy 
was carried through in East and Central Africa and with how 
the Colonial Office hoped to avoid the creation of 
nationalist forces which Smyth argued were the inevitable 
consequence of engaging in such government propaganda. It 
may well be that the 'transfer of power' in Africa was 
hastened by the war experience of which propaganda was a 
part but it is important to acknowledge that an 
extraordinary effort was made to mould this 'inevitability' 
into a relationship the British could live with, derive 
power from and continue to benefit from, a 'new' empire: a 
partnership for progress. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE COLONIAL OFFICE AND 
CHANGING ATTITUDES TOWARDS PUBLIC RELATIONS3- 
In 1956 the recently retired Deputy Under-Secretary of 
State for the Colonies, Sir Charles Jeffries*, in his book 
The Colonial Office devoted a chapter to the Colonial 
Office's Information Services which he described as 'A 
Modern Necessity'. He wrote: 
Information work in the Colonial Office has a double 
purpose. One side of it is to tell people outside the 
territories about the territories; the other is to 
tell people in the territories about the world 
outside. The interests of the territories are deeply 
involved in both sides of the work. It is important to 
these places that public opinion in the United Kingdom 
and other countries should be well informed about 
them; it is also important to them that their own 
peoples should be well informed about world affairs 
and especially about the aims and policies of the 
United Kingdom. It is important, too, to the United 
Kingdom that the peoples of the territories should 
understand and support British policy, and that other 
countries should have an accurate appreciation of what 
the British have achieved and are trying to achieve in 
the colonial field. 2 
He argued further that the Colonial Office 'would be 
failing in its duty if it did not take some trouble to 
supply these needs'. 3 
Similarly, Sir John Shuckburgh*, former Deputy Under- 
Secretary of State for the Colonies, 1931-42, in his 
unpublished, Colonial-Civil History of the War described 
inter alia the growth of public relations activities in the 
Colonial Office in a matter-of-fact manner. His survey was 
2- Throughout the terms 'information', 'propagandat, 
'Publicity' and 'public relations' will be used 
interchangeably because they were at the time unless 
specified during discussions over what kind of projection 
the Colonial Office was/should be involved in. At times 
the Colonial Office could feel more comfortable in the 
thought they were active in the field of 'commercial 
information' in the pre-Second World War period or in 
advocating the use of 'public relations' in the sense of 
promoting a positive and favourable image of British 
colonial policy, a long-term aim which could be and was 
differentiated from the MOI's short-term war 'propaganda'. 
2 Sir Charles Jeffries, The Colonial office, (London, 
1956), P-182. 
ibid. 
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limited to detailing the progress made in public relations 
during the war. He wrote about the expansion in publicity 
staff. He claimed there had been 'the closest possible 
rapport' between the Colonial Office and the MOI and that 
there had been a general acceptance of the view that public 
relations 'could play a valuable part in Colonial 
administration and development'. 4 In both accounts the 
inter-war internal Colonial Office debate concerning 
fundamental questions about the role and nature of public 
relations, propaganda, publicity and information policy, a 
debate which intensified under wartime conditions, is not 
acknowledged. ' Although the Colonial Office adopted a more 
pro-active position on the question of public relations and 
propaganda with the appointment of Noel Sabine as the first 
Colonial Office Public Relations Officer in July 1940 the 
long-time sceptics remained unconvinced that 'information 
services' were indeed 'a modern necessity'. 
In the first place after the First World War the 
debate over public relations questioned the desirability of 
the Colonial Office being involved in the scurrilous 
activity of 'self-advertisement' which was seen by many as 
largely unacceptable in peacetime. Propaganda had become a 
pejorative word. It was generally thought in the Colonial 
Office that propaganda activity was best left to unofficial 
and quasi-official bodies like the Imperial Institute and 
the BBC. The propaganda officially embarked upon in the 
inter-war years was primarily of a commercial nature, 
supporting empire produce and promoting the theme of 
imperial self-sufficiency through organisations like the 
Empire Marketing Board and later the Colonial Empire 
Marketing Board. Because of its limited, practical nature, 
this was more 'acceptable' within the Colonial Office and 
was justifiable because British economic policy between the 
wars was dominated by the need to promote economic 
4 Sir John Shuckburgh, Colonial Civil History of the 
War, Volume 4, Part VI, (unpublished manuscript, Institute 
of Commonwealth Studies, London), pp. 177,180 and 200. 
5 Perhaps not so surprising in the ' case of 
Shuckburgh's account as it was designed for official 
publication. 
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stability as 'a fourth arm of defence ... without which 
purely military efforts would be of no avail'. 6 In spite 
of these forays in the area of official propaganda, the 
temptation to draw the conclusion that the Colonial Office 
had accepted the value of regularly engaging in official 
propaganda should be avoided; the majority view was that it 
was an unnecessary activity which could only be justified 
if it brought increased wealth to the colonies and to 
Britain by way of commercial publicity. Little attention 
was given to the possible benefits of projecting the idea 
of empire for its own sake. With the approach of war, the 
challenge posed by the totalitarian powers and the higher 
profile colonial affairs received, the Colonial Office came 
to the reluctant conclusion that 'propaganda' was an 
activity which had more than commercial applications and 
that 'prestige' propaganda was needed to answer critics at 
home and abroad although little action was taken to carry 
this conclusion forward. During the war those advocating a 
positive attitude towards propaganda and the establishment 
of a Public Relations Department in the Colonial Office 
were provided with four factors in support of their cause. 
First, the encroachment by the Empire Division of the MOI 
into the Secretary of State for the Colonies' 
responsibility for control of imperial propaganda. Second, 
the experience of handling the thorny problem of the Report 
of the Royal Commission on the West Indies while at the 
same time introducing Colonial Development and Welfare 
Legislation in early 1940. Third, the humiliating impact 
of the reversals in South East Asia and fourth, American 
public interventions in questions of imperial policy. The 
combination of these factors meant that not only a more 
resolute defence of empire was required, but the 
articulation of a new and positive colonial mission. 
Towards the end of the war, as thinking turned towards the 
post-war period the debate moved on. Imperial propaganda 
in time of war was one thing but imperial propaganda when 
r, 'George Peden, 'A Matter of Timing: the Economic 
background to British Foreign Policy 1937-19391, Histor 
1984, p. 16. 
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peace returned was quite another. The last debate fought 
and won was for the permanent place of public relations in 
the activities of the Colonial Office and the Colonial 
Service. 
The debate also raises other important issues about 
imperial policy and questions of responsibility. The 
debate revealed the existence of important fundamental 
differences of opinion about the relationship between the 
governed and the governing and to what extent this was a 
two-way process or a top-downward one at a time when the 
new policy of colonial development and welfare had been 
launched with its implications for a greater governmental 
role in the future of the colonial empire. This had 
important implications for colonial audiences and the idea 
of rule by consent. Not least it was important in terms of 
educating the British public, the tax-payer, on whom in the 
final analysis the ability to keep the imperial show on the 
road depended. Should the British public be educated about 
the nature and purpose of Britain's- trust and 
responsibilities in an era when increasing calls would be 
made to support the colonies financially? 7 Finally, the 
debate on public relations had tremendous significance for 
Britain's colonial position in Africa as Africa was the one 
area in which the Colonial Office anticipated a long-term 
British role and where there was a possible opportunity to 
mould future political developments. Moreover, the 
discussions over public relations, particularly in the 
post-war period were seen almost exclusively in terms of 
the empire in Africa. 
The projection of the British empire and its colonies 
in East and Central Africa did not begin for the first time 
on 3 September 1939. The propagandists engaged in wartime 
publicity efforts did not embark on their activities with a 
I As Sir Charles Jeffries commented, 'anything like a 
forward policy for the development of the resources of the 
colonies and the advancement of their peoples could clearly 
not be undertaken without possible assistance from the 
mother country and such assistance could not be forthcoming 
without the active support of Parliament and the British 
public', Whitehall and the Colonial Service: An 
Administrative Memoir, 1939-56 (London, 1972), p. 16. 
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tabula rasa. The debates which took place in the inter-war 
period influenced the debates which took place during the 
war and the plans made for the post-war period. It is the 
intention of this chapter therefore to place the debate on 
colonial public relations in the general context of 
official attitudes in the Colonial Office towards 
propaganda from the First World War onwards. Only by 
understanding the general debate and the antecedents of 
imperial propaganda can the role and nature of the 
projection of Britain's 'new empire' in East and Central 
Africa be seen in its proper context. 
Antecedents: Means and Messages 
When plans were being drawn up in the 1930s for the 
shadow Ministry of Information by a sub-committee of the 
Committee of Imperial Defence, the planning for the 
Dominions, Colonies and India was organised under the 
auspices of the Royal Institute for International Affairs. 
This task was undertaken by two men who were to play a 
prominent role in the future operations of the Empire 
Division of the MOI in wartime, Harry Hodson*, the editor 
of Round Table and future director of the Division and 
Vincent Harlow*, the Rhodes Professor of Imperial History 
at Kings College London and later in charge of the Colonial 
Section in the Empire Division. As their starting point 
they asked the Colonial Office to provide them with 
information about propaganda conducted in the Colonies 
during the First World War. The results were not 
impressive. 8 The barrenness of the ground, however, is not 
necessarily surprising since 'most documents relating to 
IB PRO, C0323/1660/10, Fass to Parkinson, 13 February 
1939 and minute by Calder, 2 March 1939. The list 
included: 'Papers Relating to German Atrocities and 
Breaches of the Rules of War' (1916); 'Reports on the 
Treatment by the Germans of British Prisoners and Natives 
in German East Africa' (1917); 'Correspondence relating to 
the Wishes of the Natives of the German Colonies and their 
Future Government' (1918); Handbooks prepared under the 
Director of the Historical Section of the Foreign office, 
No. 114 Treatment of the Natives in the_ German C_olonies 
(HMSO, 1920); The Prussian Lash in Africa, by 
'Africanus'(1918) and a pamphlet by the Librarian of the Royal Empire Society, Evan Lewin, German Rule in Africa (1918)- 
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Great Britain's wartime propaganda were either destroyed in 
1920 or else "lost" in the years that followed'. 9 
During the First World War the Colonial Office did not 
possess any public relations or propaganda machinery of its 
own. 10 Instead the General Department of the Colonial 
Office served as a liaison office and as a conduit for 
propaganda produced by other organisations or 
departments. " In previous work undertaken on the British 
propaganda effort during the First World War imperial 
propaganda has not been considered as a separate subject of 
study but as part of the wider propaganda effort. The 
imperial nature of Britain's involvement in the First World 
War was used as evidence of Britain's commitment to the 
Allied war effort. However, the imperial theme required 
careful handling because of the vulnerability of Britain to 
9 Michael Sanders and Philip M. Taylor, British 
Propaqanda durinq the First World War, 1914-1918 (London, 
1982), p. vii. 
10 The Colonial Office had taken an initiative in 
imperial propaganda before 1914, with the establishment of 
the Colonial Office Visual Instruction Committee in 1902. 
It was encouraged by the Board of Education one of many 
organisations involved in developing imperial studies, to 
provide 'the people of the United Kingdom, the Dominions, 
and colonies "a more vivid and accurate knowledge than they 
possess of the geography, social life, and the economic 
possibilities of the various parts of the empire"'. 
Financed not by imperial funds but by colonial and private 
donations, the method the COVIC employed was lectures to 
schools accompanied by lantern slides. This activity 
continued until 1914 when it was transferred to the Royal 
Colonial Institute. One of the reasons resulting in the 
lack of success of this particular venture was 'the 
identification of the COVIC with the Colonial Office', 
MacKenzie, Propaganda and Empire, pp. 162-66. 
11 For the literature on British propaganda during 
the First World War see in particular, Sanders and Taylor, 
op. cit.; Gary Messinger, British Propaganda and the State 
in the First World War (Manchester, 1992); Cate Haste, Keep 
the Home Fires Burning: Propaganda in the First World War 
(London, 1971); James Duane Squires, British Propaqanda at 
Home and in the United States from 1914 to 1917 (Cambridge, 
MA, 1935); Peter Buitenhuis The Great War of __Kords: Literature as Propaganda 1914-18 and After (London, 1989). 
For a more general survey of British imperial propaganda 
from the end of the nineteenth century see Thomas G. 
August, The Selling of the Empire: British and French 
Imperialist Propaganda, 1890-1940 (London, 1985). 
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criticism of its policies in Ireland and India. Pamphlets 
were produced in defense of Britain's position, for 
example, Enqland, Germany and the Irish Question (1917) and 
Lionel Curtis's Letter to the People of India on 
Responsible Government (1918). 12 
The theme of spontaneous empire unity which was to 
play a prominent part in imperial propaganda at the 
beginning of the Second World War can also be found in the 
aims of Home Publicity produced by the National War Aims 
Committee, which had been established in August 1917 to 
counteract war-weariness and the peace movement and 
coordinate voluntary organisations X3: 
To encourage unity and stifle party and class 
dissensions by dwelling insistently on the momentous 
issues at stake, on the gravity of the crisis, on the 
spontaneous cooperation of Oversea Dominions, on the 
moral and material support of America, - on the fact that the cohesion and resolution of the Allies depends 
very largely on the example and inspiration of this 
country, and on the records of history which make it 
impossible to conceive that the people of this country 
will waver in their fixed purpose. 114 
But this theme of empire unity which continued to be pushed 
in imperial propaganda throughout the war flew in the face 
of the facts. Although the experience of the First World 
War undeniably demonstrated the combined power of the 
British empire, with the Allied and Associated powers' 
commitment to national self-determination in 1918 it is 
clear that the First World War provided the catalyst not 
for closer imperial unity, but for Dominion independence-15 
The imperial theme was also seen as a stick to beat 
the Germans with by exposing the methods of German colonial 
administration. This theme formed one of the major 
components of Wellington House's propaganda effort to 
neutral states and in the Dominions. The United States, 
112 Sanders and Taylor, op. cit., pp. 152-4. 
13 Sanders and Taylor, op. cit., pp. 65-70. 
114 PRO, INF4/4A, memorandum on 'Home Publicity During 
the Great War: National War Aims Committee', undated. 
15 Sanders and Taylor, OP. cit., p. 152 and August, 
op. cit., p. 22. 
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for example, was to be approached under five main headings: 
First, the militarist ideal in German life with 
its contempt for arbitration and its malice 
aforethought toward neutral Belgium. 
Second, the war policies of imperial Germany and 
a comparison of these 'damnable practices' 
(atrocities, deportation of workers, submarine 
warfare, etc. ) with Allied methods. 
Third, a comparison of British colonial methods 
with German methods. 
Fourth, the idealistic war aims of the Allies in 
contrast with the German motives for opposing the new 
world-order. 
Fifth, Great Britain's friendship for the United 
States described in the phrase 'hands across the 
sea'. " 
Propaganda for the empire was essentially a news and 
press based effort and aimed to keep the people of the 
empire informed about the war. Official propaganda films 
produced during the war were given empire distribution, but 
the main emphasis of the imperial propaganda effort was on 
the printed word. 117 In these years before the Empire 
Service of the BBC, the main and speediest way of informing 
British settler communities about the war was to keep the 
empire press abreast of war news. The empire press were 
serviced with articles compiled by the War Office special 
propaganda and censorship division M. I. 7 passed on to them 
via the Royal Colonial Institute. By 1918 250 empire 
newspapers were being supplied in this manner. Between 
January 1917 and November 1918 41,891 copies of these 
articles had been issued. 118 M. I. 7 also analysed the 
colonial press and prepared a weekly summary. 19 
11 Squires, OR-Cit., P. 69. 
11'7 PRO, , 
INF4/4A, memorandum, 'British Propaganda 
During the War, 1914-181, undated. As Philip Taylor has 
noted, . 'with broadcasting and the cinema still in their 
infancy, the press became the vital link between government 
and governed', Philip Taylor, 'Publicity and Diplomacy: the 
Impact of the First World War upon Foreign Office Attitudes 
towards the Press', in David Dilks (ed. ) Retreat from 
Power: Studies in Britain's Foreign Policy of the Twentieth 
Century, Vol e 1,1906-39 (London, 1981), p. 43. 
. 18 PRO, INF4/lB, memorandum, 'Military Press Control: 
a History of the Work of M. I. 7,1914-19191, undated. 
119 PRO, INF4/4B, War Office to Treasury, April 1918. 
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The Colonial Office acted as a 'post office' for the 
Official Press Bureau and telegraphed a summary of the news 
received in the preceding 24 hours around the empire. 20 
For reasons of economy, the daily transmission of war news 
was cut to a weekly bulletin in February 1916 despite the 
objections received from British East Africa (Kenya) that 
daily news was of the 'utmost' value, it was republished in 
the local newspapers and in the official government 
Gazette, so that even the most remote areas of BEA where 
Reuters was not received were able to follow the course of 
the war. " 
The Colonial Office also cooperated with the 
Department of Information which had been created at the end 
of January 1917 following a rationalisation of Britain's 
propaganda effort through the absorption of Wellington 
House and existing government press bureaux. The new 
Department of Information provided a special Reuters news 
service for the empire. The Department of Information took 
care of the empire press correspondents in Britain, 
arranging facilities for interviews with prominent 
personalities involved in the war effort and tours to 
armaments factories. These correspondents visited the 
Department of Information on a daily basis. Twice a week 
they had a press briefing with the Director of Information, 
and once a week with, General Maurice, the Director of 
Military Operations, Admiral Hall, the Director of 
Intelligence at the Admiralty and Lord Robert Cecil, the 
deputy Foreign Secretary and Minister of Blockade. Every 
three weeks the Department of Information arranged for a 
group of empire journalists to visit British headquarters 
in France. In addition to this press work with the empire 
correspondents, the Department of Information prepared 
special articles which were despatched to empire newspapers 
direct, arranged for the distribution of pamphlets and 
books through 'non-official' channels and prepared monthly 
1914. 
2-0 PRO, C0323/643, Colonial Office minute, 2 September 
211 PRO, C0323/689, BEA to Colonial Office, 13 December 
1915. 
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letters to Protestant pastors and Catholic priests in their 
mission stations. 22 The African populations of East Africa 
were not forgotten and the Colonial Office worked with the 
Foreign Office in the preparation of a newspaper in Swahili 
in answer to German propaganda which by 1918 had three 
Swahili newspapers running. 23 
When the British propaganda effort came to be 
centralised under a single Ministry of Information in 1918 
the organisation of imperial propaganda was reviewed. It 
was felt that not enough had been done to publicise the 
'greatness, power and resources' of the British Empire to 
neutral opinion who throughout the war had been presented 
with a continuous flow of German propaganda describing 
their empire as 'a model of efficiency' and as 'a tower of 
strength'. Rather late in the day plans were made for the 
MOI to lead a new campaign to rectify this situation and 
publicise the strength of the British empire. The campaign 
would publicise what the empire stood for and what self- 
government meant. It would explain the vastness of empire 
resources and 'our commanding control over a great many raw 
materials'. It would explain Britain's 'success in 
governing alien races' and how Britain had 'built up a free 
commonwealth of nations by freedom instead of by force'. 
In June 1918 Lord Beaverbrook, the Minister of Information 
and proprietor of the Daily Express and Evening Standard 
appointed Lord Rothermere, the proprietor of the Daily Mail 
and the Evening News, Director of the British Empire. " 
As can be seen the imperial propaganda activity during 
the First World War was modest. It concentrated on the 
printed word and keeping the empire abreast of war news. 
This relationship with the War Office was continued in the 
2-2- PRO, INF4/4A, memorandum, 'Great War Propaganda: 
Particular Countries', undated. 
13 PRO, F0395/64 and 164. 
11 PRO, INF4/5, memorandum 
by the Minister of Information 
1918. Empire propaganda was ai 
Wrench, head of the Overseas 
found the English-Speaking Union 
Spectator. 
presented to and approved 
by Robert Donald, 19 March 
ctually managed by Evelyn 
League and later helped to 
and was proprietor of the 
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post-war period. While the Foreign Office managed to 
retain a reduced News Department once the Ministry of 
Information had been disbanded in October 1918, the 
Colonial Office lacked any machinery for the conduct of 
public relations. In 1921, however Winston Churchill*, the 
newly appointed Secretary of State for the Colonies, the 
former- Secretary of State for War and newspaper 
correspondent during the Boer War, arranged for the War 
Office's Press Officer to act for the Colonial Office. 25 
The reason was that the creation of a Middle East 
Department in the Colonial Office following British 
assumption of Middle East Mandates in Iraq, Trans-Jordan 
and Palestine had brought the Colonial Office 'unaccustomed 
press prominence'. " 
Mariel Grant has recently argued that it is rather 
misleading to view the inter-war period as an era of 
official rejection of publicity activities reflecting 'the 
government's distaste for its success at propaganda during 
the [First World] war'. 27 Grant points out that the 
decision to disband the Ministry of Information 'did not 
affect departmental publicity organisations' established 
during the First World War. " This may indeed be true of 
domestic departments like the Post Office, but hardly so in 
the case of the Colonial Office. One Press Officer does 
not make a publicity organisation or prove official 
conversion to the point of view that publicity needed to be 
employed as a means of implementing departmental policy. 
The issuing of information to the press on demand, the 
15 Jeffries, The Colonial Office, p. 182. Between 1919 
and 1929 this officer was David Caird, former journalist 
and Congregational Minister who became Director of 
Publicity for the National War savings Committee and the 
Ministry of Munitions during the First World War. 
215 Marjorie Olgilvy-Webb, The Government Explains: a 
Study of the Information Services (London, 1965), p. 51. 
27 Mariel Grant, Propaganda and the Role of the State 
in Inter-War Britain, (Oxford, 1994), p. 2-3 and p. 34-5. 
2'3 ibid. For example Grant has shown that by 1920 no 
fewer than 47 staff in 11 government departments were 
engaged in unspecified publicity work. 
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pre-Second World War function of the Press Officer in the 
Colonial Office, is also not the same thing as having an 
active press relations policy. Pro-active initiatives were 
seldom undertaken by the Press Officer before the Second 
World War. 'Official bulletins' were not issued unless 
there were grave outbreaks of disorder like the Arab rising 
in Palestine and the West Indian riots of 1938 or events of 
great national importance, such as the coronation of George 
29 VI in 1937. In general the attitude was passive: 
The existing practice is ... not to volunteer 
information to the Press but rather to wait, to see 
whether any enquiry is made by the Press or whether 
anything is published ... Such justification as this 
negative practice possesses lies in the fact that if 
the Press should learn nothing of the matter, the 
world being none the wiser, foreign propagandists have 
no opportunity of broadcasting exaggerated versions 
founded on our own admissions . 30 
Furthermore, a Press Officer is a specialist with a narrow 
range of functions, which ought to be a subordinate part of 
an overall structure for public relations in general, if a 
department is to be regarded as having anything resembling 
a modern approach to the place of publicity in government. 
This was already well understood before the Second World 
War. Sir Norman Scorgie the Deputy Controller of HMSO and 
future Deputy-Director General of the MOI observed in 1938: 
there was a clear distinction between a Press officer, 
whose essential qualification was an intimate 
knowledge of the working of the press and ought 
consequently to be chosen from the press ... and the 
Public Relations Officer who was chiefly concerned 
with the spreading a better understanding of the Civil 
Service among the general public, a post for which a 
civil servant was obviously indicated. This 
distinction was reflected in the degree of 
responsibility enjoyed by these ... officials. The 
Public Relations officer was expected to display a 
high degree of initiative and assume considerable 
responsibility, whereas the Press Officer's work was 
carefully controlled by his superiors. 3m 
29' C. f. PRO, C0323/1496/1 for details of Colonial 
Office preparations to publicise the Coronation. 
30 PRO, C0323/1588/5, minute by Bowyer, 27 January, 
1938 and minute by Ridgway, 24 January 1938. 
1 
3.1- PRO, T162/531/40335/1,3 May 1938, quoted in Grant, 
op. cit., p. 236. 
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As far as the Colonial Office was concerned, it realised 
that the Press Officer needed specialist knowledge of the 
Press, and indeed two out of the three pre-Second World War 
Press Officers were trained journalists. However the 
Colonial Office failed to develop a Public Relations 
Department for the overall conduct of its publicity between 
the wars or even to establish the post of Public Relations 
Officer. In thinking and in organisation of public 
relations the Colonial Office clearly lagged behind the 
times amongst the major departments of Whitehall. " It 
should be borne in mind though that the Colonial Office was 
an old dog gradually learning specialist new tricks in a 
civil service culture and it was not until the Second World 
War that it adopted the functionally differentiated 
departmental structure already developing elsewhere. 33 
A Press Officer with a journalistic background was 
also isolated in the culture of the pre-war Colonial 
Office. His colleagues were not always sympathetic to his 
function of communicating their business to the outside 
world and had been accustomed to conduct their duties in 
the absence of widespread public scrutiny and criticism. 
As Sir Charles Jeffries wrote: 
Parliamentary and public interest in the Colonies was 
only intermittently aroused usually when some riot, 
I 
32 For example, until 1930 when a separate Personnel 
Division was established, most of what could be termed 
'subject', non-territorial and general questions of 
interest to all colonies were dealt with by the General 
Department. Before the Second World War the Economics 
Department and the Social Services Department were the only 
other subject departments created in 1934 and 1938 
respectively. The great blossoming of subjects departments 
occurred during the Second World War: Defence Department, 
1940; Public Relations Department, 1942; Communications 
Department and Welfare and Students Department, 1943; 
International Relations Department and Research Department, 
1944 and Legal Department, 1949, c. f. Lee, 'Forward 
Thinking ... 1, pp. 65-7 for the growth of subject departments in relation to geographical departments. 
33 C. f. Stephen Constantine, The Making of British 
Colonial Development Policy 1914-1940 (London, 1984), p. 9 
for this point in relation to Policy-making and colonial 
development policies in a Colonial Office handicapped by a 
lack of organisation to deal with general economic 
questions before 1934. 
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famine, epidemic or other disaster brought one of the 
territories to the headlines. The general 
indifference was in some ways convenient to the 
Colonial Office, since it enabled much constructive 
work to be done, quietly, uncontroversially in 
building up efficient administrative organisations in 
the territories . 34 
As Press Officer Ridgway became quite exasperated at the 
negative reaction publicity questions produced in the 
Colonial Office and at the attitude shown by officials like 
Sir John Maffey (later Lord Rugby)*, the Permanent Under- 
Secretary of State for the Colonies, 1933-7. In giving 
evidence on behalf of the Colonial Office to the Civil 
Estimates Committee Maffey 'expressed as a statement of 
fact that the Colonies required but little propaganda' and 
that the general Colonial Office view was 'that the less we 
said about our Colonial Empire the better' . 35 It is a nice 
irony that Ridgway himself having chafed under the 
restricted perception of his function as little more than a 
glorified Librarian issuing information on demand, ended up 
as the Colonial Office Librarian in 1940.36 
Wherever possible the Colonial Office preferred to let 
other agencies and organisations publicise the empire. 
Propaganda was largely devoted to the education of the 
British public about the economic opportunities throughout 
the empire, of 'commercial intelligence 137 or to promote 
tourism. Agencies working to this end included the East 
African Trade and Information Office, the Gold Coast 
Government Bureau, the Malayan Information Agency, the 
Travel Section of the Sudan Government London Office, the 
Maltese Government Tourist Bureau, the Office of the Cyprus 
Trade Commissioner in London, the Jamaica Tourist Trade 
Development Board, the Shopping Weeks organised by the 
British Empire League and the British Empire Producers 
34 Jeffries, Whitehall and the Colonial Service 
... op. 16. 
1938.35 
PRO, C0323/1615/16, Ridgway to Locker, 20 June 
36 Parkinson, op. cit., pp. 66-7. 
37 August, op. cit., p. 71. 
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Association. Other propaganda opportunities were provided 
by the annual British Industries Fairs and the exhibitions 
of the Imperial Institute. 
But the Colonial Office could not act as if it were a 
modern-day King Canute and command the consequences of 
developments in mass communications to go away. 
Reluctantly it had, at the very least, to add the 
responsibility for dealing with matters arising from or 
connected with the arrival of the cinema and the radio, the 
two new mass media of the age, to the duties of the 
officials of the General Department. This was not without 
difficulties. In the inter-war period the Colonial Office 
was staffed by officers of the Victorian age, typically 
from the upper-middle classes, who like others of their 
group shared little experience and less empathy for these 
media, especially the cinema. As A. J. P. Taylor remarked 
about the cinema in the inter-war period: 'highly educated 
people saw in it only vulgarity and the end of old 
England'. " The nature of the General Department's 
attitude to publicity issues relating to radio and the 
cinema, like the Colonial Office's attitude to the Press, 
was essentially passive and reactive. Even so the very 
limited extent to which the Colonial Office was involved in 
propaganda was opposed either on grounds of 'principle' -a 
reluctance to become involved in such scurrilous and 
ungentlemanly activity - or financial - that propaganda was 
an expensive luxury. Treasury parsimony was the name of 
the game when it came to the Colonial and Middle Eastern 
Vote. Colonies were expected to pay for themselves and 
become self-sufficient. 
It would seem then that the best known of the inter- 
war imperial propaganda agencies the Empire Marketing Board 
does not fit comfortably into a story of Colonial office 
disinterest in imperial propaganda . 39 However, while the 
36A. J. P. Taylor, English History 1914-1945 (London, 
1979), P. 237. 
39 For an excellent short account of the propaganda 
activities of the EMB c. f. Stephen Constantine, '"Bringing 
the Empire Alive": the Empire Marketing Board and Imperial 
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EMB represented the first government financed large-scale 
organised attempt to promote the marketing of empire 
produce it was not a Colonial Office concern but the 
creation of the Dominions Office and chaired by the 
Secretary of State for the Dominions. The EMB was involved 
with what Leo Amery*, the Secretary of State for the 
Dominions, 1925-9 called the 'selling' of the idea of 
empire4O but this was the selling of the 'old' empire. 
Moreover, the decision to create the body represented the 
adoption of a second best policy alternative to the 
introduction of preferential tariffs for foodstuffs and was 
'the principal organ for non-tariff preferencel., 43- The 
EMB, therefore, did not represent the embracement of 
imperial propaganda Per se. Once the EMB's raison dletre 
had been removed by the 1932 Import Duties Act in the wake 
of the decision to abandon free trade and adopt a policy of 
imperial tariff preference the organisation was dismantled 
and with it official British propaganda about the empire. 
The 'calculated intent' behind the propaganda produced 
by the EMB was economic. Some of the characters involved 
in the EMB campaigns appear later in the story of the 
projection of the colonial empire in the war and 
undoubtedly the experience gained by Gervas Huxley*, the 
future director of the Empire Division of the MOI, whilst 
working for the EMB and in the commercial sector proved 
invaluable. However, that the only experience of official 
pro-active propaganda the Colonial Office had before the 
war was commercial information had important implications. 
Unlike its French counter-part, the Colonial Office did not 
embrace the principle of 'prestige' projection of the 
Propaganda, 1926-33' in MacKenzie, Imperialism and Popular 
Culture, pp. 192-231. See also, August, op. cit., pp. 74-81; 
J. M. Lee, 'The Dissolution of the Empire Marketing Board, 
1933: Reflections on a Diary', The Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History, 1: 1, (1971); Robert Self, 'Treasury 
Control and the Empire Marketing Board: The Rise and Fall 
of Non-Tariff Preference in Britain, 1924-331, Twentiet 
Century British History, 5: 2, (1994) and Taylor, The 
Projection of Britain ..., pp. 103-110. 
40 Taylor, The Projection of Britain .... p. 104. 
41 Self, op. cit., p. 154. 
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empire and had no public relations machinery in place by 
the outbreak of the Second World War. 42 
While the EMB existed the Colonial Office ignored 
propaganda in the knowledge that someone else was 
projecting the empire, albeit the image of a dominions 
dominant empire. The 'best way' of conducting publicity, 
according to the then Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
William Ormsby-Gore (later Lord Harlech)*, was to leave it 
to the EMB. 43 Moreover the Colonial Office was not 
interested even in defending the British colonial 
reputation. For instance at a meeting of the Colonial 
Office conference in 1927, a representative from the 
Forestry Department of British Honduras was perturbed by 
the 'unjustified' attacks made against his colony in the 
British press and the lack of mechanism for redress. 
Ormsby-Gore offered little sympathy: 'British Honduras gets 
off very lightly compared with Kenya, which is the 
whipping-boy of all the Press'. Ormsby-Gore had no 
intention of addressing the public relations issue: 
I think that if you try and deal with these things or 
create machinery to deal with them, you fall into a 
quagmire. 14 
As noted above, in practice the General Department of 
the Colonial Office dealt with questions received by the 
Colonial Office relating to propaganda but this was on an 
ad hoc and reactive basis. While the commercial film 
industry had recognised the value films with empire as its 
subject matter and the absorbed by the inter-war cinema- 
going publics with its 'romantic, adventurous and erotic' 
imageryI5, the Colonial Office did not attempt to utilise 
film to project the colonies itself. Arguably they did not 
need to as they could rely on the films produced by the EMB 
-47- C. f. August, op. cit., passi for this comparative 
approach. 
'43 PRO, C0323/977/6, 
Conference, 1927. 
8th Meeting of the Colonial 
" ibid. 
-45 Jeffrey Richards, 'Boy's Own Empire: Feature Films 
and Imperialism in the 1930s', in MacKenzie, Imperialism 
and Popular Culture, p. 43. 
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and the holdings of the film library of the Imperial 
Institute could do the job for them. 
In one area the attitude towards film was not based 
commercial considerations. The educational value of film 
was recognised as the best way of describing one part of 
the empire to another and as the Imperial Conference of 
1926 concluded as an agent for maintaining and enhancing 
Britain's imperial prestige. The way forward was seen as 
encouraging a strong British film industry for these 
purposes and showing only British films in colonies rather 
than producing films in the colonial empire. 16 The 
Federation of British Industries established an 
organisation to supply films to the colonies and colonial 
governments were encouraged to become members of the 
British Film Institute and use their filMS. 47 But the 
Colonial Office was not prepared to finance the production 
or distribution of films, and films for educational 
purposes were to remain a 'luxury, though a very useful 
luxury'. 48 
The unwillingness to spend money, however desirable it 
may seem, was clearly shown in the attitude towards the 
Bantu Education Kinema Experiment. Originally financed by 
the Carnegie Corporation, when the project came to an end 
the governments of Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda combined to 
apply for a grant from the Colonial Development Fund 
because the value of film particularly in regard to the 
instruction of agricultural methods was recognised. 49 
Uganda later withdrew from the idea of making an 
46 PRO, C0323/974/1, note by Hanns Vischer, Secretary 
of the Advisory Committee on Native Education in Tropical 
Africa, 'The Educational Use of Cinematograph Films', April 
1927; minute by Boyd, 14 June 1927. 
47 PRO, C0323/1091/11 and C0323/1356/3. 
41B PRO, C0323/1169/1, minute by Vischer, 23 May 1932 
following requests from Palestine and the Falkland Islands 
for EMB films to show in schools. It was decided that the 
EMB would supply films on condition that the colonies paid 
for them themselves. 
" PRO, C0323/1421/10, minute by Greenhill, 19 
February 1937. 
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application because it was unimpressed with the personnel 
running the project . 50 However the Colonial Office did not 
fault the idea of films being used in the right context. 
In support of support specific welfare and health 
campaigns, educational films were 
of great use - associated with a Health Campaign 
(anti-mosquito work, etc. ) or with a Baby week (a film 
of how to care for a healthy baby and so on). But to 
force people to shove in a 10 minute film on 'How to 
grow cotton' among a lot of Mickey Mice would only 
lead to yawns. 51 
The General Department also gave advice on film censorship 
questions which in the 1930s appeared to be dominated by 
concern about German and Italian film propaganda in the 
Middle East" and films which could be interpreted as being 
'Pro-native'53 or 'anti-native 154 or which could offend 
local customs. ss 
But there was no question of the Colonial Office 
establishing its own organisation to make and distribute 
films. Moreover while some members of the General 
Department were convinced of the educational value of films 
in the colonies, this did not necessarily extend to the 
commercial cinema. When preparations were being made for 
the coronation of King George VI and Queen Elizabeth in 
1937, the Colonial Office was requested to cooperate with 
the Department of Overseas Trade to facilitate the 
production and distribution of newsreels of the event by 
50 PRO, C0323/1421/10, minute by Bowyer, 28 June 1937. 
" PRO, C0323/1421/10, minute by Flood, 8 July 1937. 
52 For example, c. f. C0323/1421/1 for Italian films in 
Palestine in 1937; C0323/1421/3 for the Italian film Leila 
Daughter of the Desert in Iran and Palestine in 1937 and 
C0323/1421/6 for the banning German films in Palestine. 
53 For example, see C0323/1421/2 on the 'pro-native' 
film Mv Soncr Goes Forth starring Paul Robeson. 
54 For example, c. f. C0323/1421/4, for the attempts to 
ban the film Slave Trader in 1937. 
55 For example, c. f. C0323/1421/7 for the banning in 
Malta of the film The Man Who Could Work Miracles on the 
grounds that it could offend a deeply religious and 
Catholic local population. 
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listing colonial governments who newsreel companies could 
contact. The idea was utterly abhorrent to Sir John 
Shuckburgh who wrote 'the idea of filming a service in the 
56 Abbey is repulsive to my Victorian mind'. 
As with films, imperial broadcasting was also seen as 
a desirable activity by the Colonial Office but again 
financial considerations loomed large. Broadcasting was 
also perceived to be a luxury activity. 57 In April 1930 
the first meeting of the Trade Propaganda Committee under 
the auspices of the Department of Overseas Trade, favoured 
the development of a broadcasting scheme in the colonies to 
increase trade. Again the Colonial Office attitude was 
that such activity, while desirable, was out of the 
question if it depended on colonial government finance 
alone. 58 And Sir Gilbert Grindle*, the Deputy Under- 
Secretary of State for the Colonies, 1925-31, had more 
general reservations: 
I very much doubt any good for trade coming out of 
propaganda by wireless. It would be on a level with 
'British Goods Are Best' on stamps. The only thing 
that really does good is for someone to go round 
59 personally and show the wares and explain them. 
When in 1931 the BBC approached the Colonial Office to 
cooperate with them in giving 'militant publicity' about 
the empire by qualified people in a 'breezy style', Grindle 
minuted that this proposal for broadcasting by permanent 
civil servants would be an 'undesirable' development and 
56 PRO, C0323/1421/15, minute by Shuckburgh, 12 March 
1937. 
57 For the history of the evolution of the Empire 
Service and imperial broadcasting see Asa Briggs, The 
History of Broadcasting in the United Kinqdom Volume II, 
the Golden Age of Wireless (London, 1965), pp. 369-410; John 
M. MacKenzie, 'propaganda and the BBC Empire Service', 
Jeremy Hawthorn (ed. ), Propaganda, Persuasion and Polemic 
(London, 1987), pp. 37-55 and John M. MacKenzie, '"In Touch 
With the Infinite": the BBC and the Empire, 1923-53, 
MacKenzie, Imperialism and Popular Culture-, pp. 165-191. 
58 PRO, C0323/1102/2, minute by Morris, 4 April 1930. 
59 PRO, C0323/1102/2, minute by Grindle, 7 April 1930. 
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'would one day develop into a nuisance'. 60 However, by 
early 1935 liaison with the BBC was clear. Names of 
Colonial Service officers on leave were submitted to the 
BBC and a useful 'informal' arrangement was devised whereby 
the Colonial Office would have 'a chance of advising on the 
text of addresses accepted by the [British Broadcasting] 
Corporation as a quid pro quo for our help'. 6" This 
cooperation continued with some officials clearly flattered 
by being asked to take part in broadcasts. The BBC wanted 
to broadcast talks with themes which would 'make the 
officer in the Colonial Service overseas think he is 
getting something exclusive, even a trifle indiscreet'. 
Sir George Tomlinson*, Assistant Under-Secretary of State 
for the Colonies, 1930-9 and former officer with the 
Nigerian Administrative Service, described with evident 
enthusiasm his experience following his broadcast talk on 
the Empire Service entitled, 'Secrets of the Prison House', 
It is almost too good to be true that my innocent 
babblings to Mr. Cliffe [his interviewer] in a short 
interval between two plays should be so acceptable. 
But the curtain went up before I had time to tell him 
that another title for a talk which I thought would 
come very well from the head of the Personnel Division 
of the Colonial Office was 'Strings and their 
Pullers'. On the other hand I have decided not to put 
forward yet a third title which occurred to me, 
namely, 'Jobbery in its Highest Aspects'. " 
Foreign broadcasting in the colonial empire was monitored. 
The threat posed by Italian and German broadcasting to the 
Middle East and the initiation of BBC foreign language 
broadcasting in Arabic is well-known. 63 In Africa the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies warned colonial 
60 PRO, C0323/1158/13, BBC to Colonial Office, 23 
February 1931; minute by Grindle, 27 February 1931. 
1935. 
611 PRO, C0323/1277/9, minute by McSweeney, 11 January 
62 PRO, C0323/1586/10 Wace to Tomlinson, 18 February 
1938; Tomlinson to Wace, 24 March 1938. Tomlinson had also 
been a member of the Colonial Office Committee on Colonial 
Appointments, 1929-30. 
63 C. f. Taylor, Projection of Britain, chapter 5, 
'The BBC foreign-language broadcasts', pp. 181-215 and the 
official account, Peter Partner, Arab Voices (London, 1988). 
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Governors to be on their guard against German short-wave 
broadcasts covering areas which were not covered by Empire 
Service broadcasts from Daventry. However the responses 
from Africa were rather nonchalant. Kenya and Uganda found 
that these broadcasts did not have a pronounced 
propagandist tendency and in any case believed them to be a 
limited threat as few if any Africans owned radios. " 
In the increasingly tense international climate an 
official noted in July 1939 that 'broadcasting facilities 
have nowadays become more of a necessity than a luxury' for 
both education and the dissemination of news to colonial 
populations" but it was clear there was little money 
available for these kind of developments. Indeed an 
experiment in broadcasting in Uganda, although successful 
brought home to the Colonial Office two lessons 'a full 
dress broadcasting service is - (a) very expensive to 
start, and (b) very expensive and rather difficult to 
run'. 66 
Exhibitions were an obvious conduit for imperial 
propaganda, emphasising 'the notion of the Empire as an 
interlocking economic unit'. 61 Until the New York World's 
Fair in 1939" British participation in international 
exhibitions was economic in character, underlined by the 
fact that it was the Department of Overseas Trade that 
organised official participation at all exhibitions" until 
the creation of the CEMB which became responsible for 
colonial participation 1938-9. That the Colonial office 
judged the success or failure of participation in 
" PRO, C0323/1338/8, circular despatch to Governors 
in Africa, 1 June 1935; Kenya to Colonial Office, 24 July 
1935 and Uganda to Colonial Office, 14 August 1935. 
65 PRO, C0323/1650/7, minute by Bigg, 6 July 1939. 
r>r> PRO, C0323/1650/9, minute by Eastwood, 9 August 
1939. 
r" MacKenzie, Propaganda and-Empire, p. 107 and pp. 97- 
120 for a history of imperial exhibitions. 
"I see below 
69 August, op. cit., p. 141. 
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international exhibitions in economic terms is clear. For 
example, when Roland Vernon*, an economics expert in the 
General Department, who had worked in the Treasury during 
the First World War and had been the financial adviser to 
the government of Iraq, 1925-8, visited the International 
Colonial Exhibition in Paris in 1931. Vernon appeared 
somewhat puzzled at the attitude of French officials. They 
were concerned to educate the French public by 
demonstrating that 'there is such thing as a French 
colonial empire'. He admired the Dutch pavilion as 'a very 
good piece of propaganda' with its 'real educational value 
and a first rate statistical technique'. But he was 
convinced that the decision for the British colonial empire 
not to be officially represented was correct: 
I find it hard to believe that (participation] has 
direct economic results, - that anyone will buy more 
tea or cocoa or sugar or rubber or palm oil or maize 
or serial hemp, for example - because of it. -10 
Similarly, colonial governments were choosy about 
exhibitions they agreed to be represented at and the 
calculation was made largely on the basis of whether it was 
worth the expense in terms of expected increases in trade. 
Colonial participation in exhibitions was not financed out 
of imperial funds. *7" 
The Colonial Empire Marketing Board was established in 
1937 following the recommendations of an inter- 
departmental committee under the chairmanship of the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies to do for the colonies 
what the EMB did for the Dominions. It had its own board 
and office and was financed on the Colonial Office Vote and 
supervised by the Economic Department in the Colonial 
Office. Its aim was to promote the economic welfare of the 
colonial empire in Britain and overseas by 'the better 
marketing of Colonial products by a service of marketing 
officers, publicity, including participation in 
'70 PRO, C0323/1153/27, minute by Vernon, 6 June 1931. 
73- For example, little colonial participation was 
expected at the Empire Exhibition in Glasgow in'1938; C-f- 
PRO, C0323/1393/10, minute by Eastwood, 8 January 1937. 
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exhibitions, and research 17 2 and by 'selling more goods at 
better advantage' . 73 The CEMB included MPs, members from 
the Department of Overseas Trade and the Imperial Institute 
and representatives of commercial and shipping interests . 74 
It began its work in 1938 and its main activity in 
this early stage was investigations into and 
recommendations for improvements in marketing methods for 
particular colonial products. Colonial products were 
considered hard to advertise because frequently they did 
not reach the consumer in their original form. In view of 
this it was thought that propaganda would play a smaller 
part in the activities of the CEMB than in its predecessor 
the EMB. As the Secretary of State for the Colonies 
observed in his speech to the first meeting of the CEMB 
Board: 
Apart from direct contact with possible purchasers, 
you may find a fruitful field of activity in the 
judicious use of publicity; but in this regard I am 
bound to remark that I do not think that most Colonial 
products are of such a kind that their sales can be 
appreciably increased by general advertisement. 75 
In the first instance it was to engage in market 
72 PRO, C0852/115/2, DO to Dominions, 11 May 1937. 
73 PRO, C0852/115/9, draft of the Secretary of State 
for the Colonies speech to the CEMB, October 1937. 
" The Secretary of State for the Colonies was the 
chairman of the CEMB with the Parliamentary Under-Secretary 
of State for the Colonies the vice-chairman. Four MPs from 
the government and the opposition served, along with Sir 
Harry Lindsay the Director of the Imperial Institute, a 
representative from the Department of Overseas Trade, two 
representatives from the Colonial Office and 6 
representatives from the business community, Peter Cadbury 
of Cadbury Bros. Ltd.; Arthur Foster, vice-chairman of the 
Empire Cotton Growers' Association; Sir William Bradshaw, 
president of the Cooperative Wholesale Society; Leslie 
Runciman, director of Runciman and Co. Ltd.; Captain 
Lyttleton, director of Amalgamated Metal Corp. Ltd. and Sir 
John Chancellor, chairman of the Agricultural Marketing 
Facilities Committee. 
'75 PRO, C0852/115/9, draft of speech by the Secretary 
of State for the Colonies to the CEMB, October 1937. 
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survey work . 76 Publicity was to be limited to exhibition 
work and all Colonial Office involvement in exhibitions 
would hence forth be dealt with by the CEMB and not through 
the General Department as previously. 77 The availability 
of finance for colonial produce advertising was dependent 
on the extent to which the industry concerned was prepared 
to spend its own money for the purpose. 78 
By 1938 it was clear that the debate had moved on and 
the Colonial Office was becoming more aware of the need to 
adopt a different attitude towards public relations and 
propaganda. A growing distaste for purely commercial 
propaganda is clear in the discussions which took place in 
the Colonial Office culminating in the decision to adopt a 
'more forward policy in regard to public relations 
generally' just before the outbreak of war in August 
1939.79 This policy was not implemented until July 1940 
with the appointment of a Public Relations Officer and the 
creation of the Public Relations Department in 1942, but a 
change in attitude is discernable as public relations had 
arrived on the Colonial Office agenda. 
This change can partly be explained by the leadership 
expressed by Malcolm MacDonald*, the Secretary of State for 
the Colonies, from May 1938, who had held the post in 1935 
and was the son of former P. M. Ramsay and the Marquess of 
Dufferin and Ava*, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of 
State from 1937, and future Director of the Empire 
Division, MOI, 1941-2, over the question. British 
complacency was shaken by the changed international 
situation in which the Colonial Office was operating during 
the second part of the 1930s. With the emergence of the 
"76 PRO, CO852/115/2, minute by Caine, 8 February 1937. 
-" PRO, C0852/115/3/File. 
78 PRO, C0852/170/16, Colonial Office to Kenya, 28 
February 1938. 
79 PRO, C0323, minute by Eastwood, 11 August 1939. 
Taylor also identifies 1938 as the year in which propaganda 
had become 'a subject considered worthy of serious 
consideration at the highest levels of British governmept', 
Taylor, Projection of Britain, p. 243. 
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'colonial problem' a more positive approach was 
necessitated if the British empire was to be successfully 
defended. In this new situation the British empire was 
under threat from Germany's demands for colonial 
restitution and the appeasement of the Chamberlain 
government which was prepared to entertain the idea of 
adjustments in Africa as late as July 1939. There were 
also the repercussions on Britain's reputation as a 
colonial power of the non-response to Italy's conquest of 
the last 'independent' state in Africa Abyssinia in 1936 
and the threat posed by Japanese expansion in South East 
Asia. 00 Within the empire the colonies had not recovered 
from the effects of the Depression and the price collapse 
in the primary products market which contributed to 
tensions culminating in outbursts like the riots on the 
Copperbelt of Northern Rhodesia in 1935, the troubles on 
the Mauritian sugar estates in 1937, the strikes and riots 
in the West Indies in 1935,1937 and 1938 and the cocoa 
hold up in the Gold Coast and Nigeria in 1937 (by peasant 
farmers protesting against low prices). There was the on- 
going Arab revolt in Palestine and reported bombings in 
Aden. The 'colonial question' had become an Achilles' heel 
of Britain's international reputation to the extent that 
there was reluctance to advertise 'the value of colonial 
trade' in foreign countries. 81 
Just as these factors contributed to the debate on 
reform and helped to produce the new Colonial Development 
and Welfare Act of 1940, similarly in the publicity field 
the Colonial Office began to take public opinion into 
consideration more than hitherto. After the Munich crisis, 
Malcolm MacDonald argued: 
In future, critics of the Great Britain would be 
directed more and more against her management of the 
Colonial Empire, and it was essential to provide as 
little basis as possible for such criticism. It was 
an essential part of her defence policy that her 
60 Michael Havinden and David Meredith, Colonialism 
and Development: Britain and its Tropical Colonies, 1850- 
1960 (London, 1993), p. 193. 
IBII PRO, C0323/1615/2, minute by Eastwood, 14 April 
1938. 
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reputation as a Colonial power should be 
unassailable. 02 
Ridgway, the Colonial Office Press Officer, also added 
his voice to the argument for a more vigorous attitude to 
propaganda. He argued that the Colonial Office's position 
'that the less said about our Colonial Empire the better' 
was 'hardly sound'. Ridgway argued that much depended on 
how 'propaganda' was defined. He deplored the Colonial 
Office attitude -that all 'propaganda' activity was 
'invidious' when the only example provided was 
'Continental' propaganda with its connotations of lex-parte 
statements with the customary suppressions and 
suggestions'. At the very least the Colonial Office could 
give out "accurate and prompt information' on matters of 
public interest particularly when 'distorted or ill-founded 
views or misstatements of fact' were published. He 
continued that the 'British Colonial Empire might seem 
sufficiently large and important enough to preclude any 
hope of imitating the proverbial characteristics of the 
ostrich'. With all the problems faced by the British in 
her colonies 'the right kind of propaganda or information 
pointing to our passionate adherence to the principles of 
trusteeship' was therefore particularly desirable. " 
A more pro-active public relations policy of educating 
the British public about the empire could also aid the task 
of marketing colonial produce by creating a public opinion 
which would be more receptive to the advertising campaigns 
for particular colonial produce and industries. At a 
meeting of the CEMB Board of Directors in July 1938 it was 
decided however to constitute a Propaganda and Publicity 
Sub-Committee. At this sub-committee's first meeting in 
October 1938, Sir William Crawford, the director of 
Crawford's Advertising Agency argued that a public opinion 
which was imperially minded was required before any 
commercial propaganda about the empire could be successful 
82 MacDonald quoted in Havinden and Meredith, 22_. cit., 
p. 200. 
83 PRO, C0323/1615/16, memorandum by Ridgway, 20 June 
1938. 
40 
in Britain: 
the first essential was to create a background as a 
basis for detailed propaganda for this purpose 
(advertising for coffee and fruits] he thought that 
the Board should concentrate on educational propaganda 
designed to stimulate interest and some knowledge of 
the countries composing the Colonial Dependencies, and 
the place which those Dependencies occupied in the 
framework of the whole Empire. 84 
The Chairman of this committee, Peter Cadbury, however, 
summed up the general view of the committee that while this 
long-term educative propaganda would be valuable it was 
more necessary to 'satisfy the immediate requirements of 
the Colonial trade' . 85 
Lord Dufferin, who on behalf of the Secretary of State 
for the Colonies was overall chairman of the CEMB, thought 
that insufficient attention had been given to 'making some 
sort of effective contact with the large consumers and 
potential consumers of Colonial produce'. And while he 
recognised that colonial produce had perhaps little direct 
consumer appeal, he 'attached considerable importance to 
the value of "educational" propaganda' particularly against 
a background of the interest expressed by the public in the 
affairs of the Colonial Dependencies. " However the CEMB 
was not perhaps the forum for the initiation of long-term 
educative propaganda about the British empire. Propaganda 
was still a luxury which would not be paid for out of 
imperial funds. 
It was in one area of the CEMB's activities that the 
two views of the future of imperial publicity came into 
conflict and help us to understand the debate on colonial 
propaganda on the eve of the Second World War. The CEMB 
was responsible for preparing the Colonial empire's exhibit 
for the New York World's Fair in 1939. The Secretary of 
State for the Colonies had made a special request that the 
colonial governments should make a contribution to this 
64 PRO, C0852/171/4, record of the Propaganda and 
Publicity Committee of the CEMB, 13 October 1938. 
'B5 ibid. 
86 PRO, CO852/171/4, meeting of the CEMB, November 
1938. 
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exhibition for reasons of trade and high policy: 
there is some reason to regard participation in the 
New York World's Fair of 1939 in a particularly 
favourable light. The United States of America are 
one of the largest customers of the British Colonial 
Empire, and apart from that there are political 
reasons ... which make it clearly desirable to 
maintain the closest and most intimate relations 
between these two great communities. 87 
The initial reaction of the colonial governments was 
disappointing, but following a second plea by the Secretary 
of State for the Colonies in April 1938 some reconsidered. 
As ever the decision of the colonial governments to 
participate was governed by financial considerations. " 
Moreover the very nature of the colonial exhibit was 
questioned. In July 1938 Dr. Paterson, on leave from the 
Colonial Service in Kenya spoke to Sir Arthur Dawe*, 
Assistant Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies and 
head of the Africa Division, about the need to project 
Britain's achievements not merely in the commercial field 
but in bringing civilisation to the colonies. Paterson had 
been impressed by the United Kingdom exhibit at the Glasgow 
Exhibition which gave prominence to social services at 
home. 89 Dawe agreed there was a good case to be made to 
'illustrate the development of the native through health, 
education and other social services'. 90 Gerard Clauson*, 
Assistant Secretary of State in the Economic Department 
disagreed. Clauson found the U. K. health exhibit at 
Glasgow 'very dull and rather unpleasant'. While he 
recognised that it was the job of the Ministry of Health to 
'sell' health and physical fitness at home and thus to the 
majority of visitors to the Exhibition, there was no 
1937. 
B7 PRO, C0323/1501/4, circular despatch, 4 November 
" PRO, CO852/188/1. 
89 PRO, C0852/188/5, Paterson to Dawe, 22 July 1938. 
Dr. Paterson had recently shown an exhibit of his 
photographs showing his medical work in Kenya at the 
Imperial Institute and was as Parkinson noted 'obsessed 
with this. subject', C0852/188/5, minute by Parkinson, 19 
October 1938. 
90 PRO, C0852/188/5, minute by Dawe, 8 August 1938. 
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'analogy' for the colonial empire. In addition Clauson had 
a practical objection to this kind of propaganda: finance, 
the Colonial Dependencies have little enough money as 
it is to spend on social services. They certainly 
have none to spare to advertise those services in this 
country. It would be absolutely unproductive 
expenditure, sheer waste, and hardly one inhabitant of 
the Colonial Empire would be influenced by it to 
become 'health-minded'. If more money is to be found 
for the social services of the Colonial Empire it can 
only come out of the income of the community, and that 
can be increased only by pushing trade. Thus even 
from the point of view of the social services 
themselves the increase of colonial trade is a 
desirable end to pursue. 93- 
On the other hand, John Calder*, Assistant Secretary in the 
Economics Department and subsequent Crown Agent for the 
Colonies, argued against throwing the baby out with the 
bath water, noting it was all 'a matter of degreel. 92 Dawe 
agreed and put the question into the context of 
international considerations and the help it could provide 
for Britain's case against German colonial claims. He 
argued that a social services exhibit would be useful to 
show to the world that Britain's colonial policy 'covers 
not only commercial development but also the advancement of 
the native through social services'. While he recognised 
there was much to be done in the future, where the Colonial 
Office failed was in not putting across 'to the public mind 
what is being done' already. 93 
To this internal debate was added powerful voices from 
outside the Colonial Office. Lord De La Warr*, the Lord 
Privy Seal and former Parliamentary Under-Secretary of 
State for the Colonies, 1936-7, wrote to Malcolm MacDonald 
to urge the projection of the British colonial empire in a 
more favourable light. Conscious of the public spotlight 
the colonies had attracted in recent times and the 'press 
forecasts' that 'the Colonial Question belongs to 1939' he 
thought the colonial pavilion at the New York World's Fair 
1938.911 
PRO, C0852/188/5, minute by Clauson, 10 August 
91 PRO, C0852/188/5, minute by Calder, 11 August 1938. 
93 PRO, C0852/188/5, minute by Dawe, 12 August 1938. 
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provided the perfect opportunity to present what Britain 
was doing on 'a constructive basis'. It would be a 
corrective to the usual colonial exhibits, like the recent 
one in Glasgow which, he thought, had been 'all trade and 
production'. Not least he feared Britain's case being 
overwhelmed by anticipated demonstrations by the French, 
Italians, Dutch and Americans 'of what blessings they bring 
to their tropical dependencies'. What was needed was 
foresight and vision to 
see beyond sisal and cocoa and realise that in the 
near future it is going to be a matter of major policy 
to present our Colonial Administration in its most 
favourable light. 94 
MacDonald agreed, and minuted 'I think Lord De La Warr is 
absolutely right'. No sooner had Lord De La Warr made his 
interjection another voice was heard in the shape of the 
British Ambassador-designate to the United States, Lord 
Lothian*, which echoed his argument. Lothian, with wide 
experience in Indian affairs and the first editor of the 
Round Table, understood from others' criticisms that the 
colonial exhibit at the Glasgow exhibition, a purely 
commercial display, was 'lamentable. Something different 
was needed in New York, 'of the humanitarian and social 
services aspect of our Colonial Empire' with an eye firmly 
fixed on the American audience with its 'constant 
prejudice' against British imperialism. It would help 
Britain's case in relation to Germany's, 
this exhibition affords a marvelous opportunity of 
bringing home to the Americans that Britain is doing 
in Africa the kind of work of which they pride 
themselves on having done in the Philippines, etc., 
for example, education, health, hospitals, self- 
government - all the things, in fact, which they will 
take for granted that Hitler won't do. 
Lothian wanted the CEMB's exhibitions sub-committee under 
the chairmanship of Sir Harry Lindsay*, the director of the 
Imperial Institute, to abandon their plans for a purely 
commercial exhibit. He suggested they should follow the 
advice of Lord Hailey* whose African Suryey was due out the 
following week and take the lead in planning 'a really 
9,4 PRO, C0852/188/5, De La Warr to MacDonaldip 19 
October 1938. 
44 
valuable piece of propaganda for the British Empire at a 
very critical moment' . 95 
Critics of the 'prestige' type of exhibits maintained 
their reservations on financial grounds. Clauson felt he 
had to 'pipe up' in defence of exhibits of the Glasgow 
variety for 'the idea of using the Colonial tax-payers 
money to advertise the moral grandeur of HMG is quite a 
novel one', and Sir Henry Moore*, former Governor of Sierra 
Leone and Assistant Under-Secretary of State, noted that 
colonial governments had 'lost faith' in the commercial 
value of exhibitions and this led him to believe that if 
exhibitions were to be staged with no immediate and obvious 
financial benefit the colonial governors 'would be inclined 
to say that HMG should foot the bill'. 96 
The 'tone' of the colonial exhibit to the New York 
World's Fair was altered to be a prestige exhibit. Lord 
Dufferin consulted Lord Hailey about themes. "'-' The exhibit 
sent to New York was a composite picture of the colonial 
empire of maps, pictures of social progress., 
administration, schools, hospitals, malarial precautions in 
the form of dioramas and a giant 6 foot by 4 foot book 
which automatically turned the pages, of a frieze of 
colonial badges, of postage stamps, of an information 
bureau with literature on the empire but no exhibits of a 
95 PRO, C0852/188/5, Lothian to MacDonald, 2 November 
1938 also quoted in Nicholas Cull, Selling War: the British 
Propaganda Campaian-Against American Neutrality in World 
War II (Oxford, 1995), p. 27. Lord Dufferin also received a 
letter from Harold Nicolson, apologising for being an 
'interfering cove' and asking him to consider the merits of 
an exhibit in New York emphasising the positive work done 
by HMG in the colonial empire hoping to avoid the 
embarrassment that a Parliamentary Question would involve 
to his friend on the subject. 'Basil' was able to reassure 
him that it would emphasise the 'social' rather than the 
'sisal' side of colonial development, C0852/188/5, Nicolson 
to Dufferin, 1 December 1938 and Dufferin to Nicolson, 15 
December 1938. 
96 PRO, C0852/188/5, Clauson to Moore and Dufferin and 
Ava, 11 November 1938 and minute by Moore, 14 November 
1938. 
9'7 PRO, C0852/188/5, minute by Dufferin, 24 November 
1938. 
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trade or commercial nature. 90 Sir William McLean*, the 
former Egyptian Civil Service Officer, Conservative M. P., 
honorary liaison officer with the Houses of Lords and 
Commons, adviser to the Secretary of State for the Colonies 
on economic and social development and 'safe' pair of 
hands, was to go to New York to sit on an enquiry desk. It 
was significant in the debate over public relations as it 
represented a rare example of the Colonial Office being 
pro-active and non-commercial. As Lord Dufferin commented: 
'the truth is that for once we thought of the idea before 
our critics'. " 
The CEMB had also accepted that in order to maximise 
the purchase of colonial produce by the British public, 
'carefully planned educational propaganda to familiarise 
the public with the Colonial Empire' was necessary. Steps 
taken by early 1939 included an illustrated book in 
'popular' style telling the story of the history and the 
development of the colonial empire. Its purpose was 
to create a greater public knowledge of and interest 
in the affairs of the Colonial Dependencies and to 
prepare the ground for the reception by the public at 
a later stage of propaganda and publicity directed 
solely towards increasing demand for specific colonial 
products. 101 
The CEMB commissioned a film directed by Basil Wright which 
became Men of Africa to act as a 'background' film to 'a 
series of shorter films depicting the life and industries 
of individual dependencies'; it also provided 400 pounds to 
purchase new prints of films held in the film library of 
the Imperial Institute to be made available to schools, 
98 For details on the British pavilion exhibit at the 
Fair c. f. Cull, op. cit., pp. 26-8. As Lord Dufferin 
explained 'no sample tins of pineapples to distract the 
visitor's mind from the thoughts of Empire and 
Responsibility and Democracy', C0852/188/5, Dufferin to 
Nicolson, 15 December 1938. 
99 PRO, C0323/1745/14, minute by Sabine, 3 February 
1940; C0852/188/5, Dufferin to Nicolson, 15 December 1938. 
1100 PRO, C0852/227/11, Report of the work of the CEMB, 
October 1937 to March 1939. 
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educational and commercial bodies..: LO3- 
The decision to contribute a colonial 'prestige' 
exhibit to the New York World's Fair represented an 
important shift away from official colonial trade 
propaganda and a recognition that the Colonial Office no 
longer enjoyed the luxury of conducting its affairs outside 
the public gaze. But this can be regarded as a 'one-off'. 
The Colonial Office had been represented on the Vansittart 
Committee for the Co-ordination of Publicity Abroad'02 by 
Sir John Shuckburgh, but there was little Colonial Office 
input or action taken as the main Colonial Office interest 
in this Committee's activities was limited to the Near 
East. 103 Following a Cabinet decision to initiate in 
peacetime 'a more active policy of publicity overseas' and 
the creation of the Treasury's Overseas and Emergency 
Publicity Expenditure Committee proposals were made to 
strengthen the Foreign Office News Department. The 
Colonial Office was asked to consider its position on 
creating an organisation 'to further publicity measures in 
peace in the Colonial Empire'. Malcolm MacDonald thought 
there was at that time 'no grounds for considering any such 
organisation' and instead the Colonial Office would 
maintain close touch with the FOND and where appropriate 
would use material produced by them to distribute to 
colonial governments to use in countering foreign 
propaganda. "' 
1103- ibid. The film Men of Africa and the book were 
also used at the New York World's Fair. For Men of Africa, 
c. f. chapter three. 
102 C. f. Taylor, Projection of Britain, chapter six, 
'The Vansittart for the Co-ordination of British Publicity 
Abroad', pp. 216-259. Chaired by the government's Chief 
Diplomatic Adviser, Sir Robert Vansittart, this Committee 
announced in the House of Commons in February 1938 
represented an attempt establish a central co-ordinating 
body to bring together all government departments and semi- 
official agencies engaged in propaganda overseas. 
103 PRO# C0323/1615/1, Parkinson to Vansittart, 15 
February 1938 and minute by Bowyer, 28 January 1938. 
104 PRO, C0323/1660/10, CP(39)127,2 June 1939 and 
minute by Lee, 8 June 1939. 
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However quite independently of the decision not to 
create an organisation to project the colonial empire 
overseas and in the colonies themselves, the Secretary of 
State for the Colonies had initiated discussions within the 
Colonial Office to establish a 'Public Relations 
Department' to project the colonial empire to the British 
public. The object would be to 'provide suitable publicity 
for the Colonial Office and the Colonies ... and so create 
informed opinion'. "' This initiative was stillborn 
because of the outbreak of the war and was then initially 
kept on a back-burner until the disagreements with the MOI 
over the conduct of and responsibility for empire publicity 
re-opened the question. 
Planning for wartime publicity itself had begun 
secretly in October 1935 with the establishment of a 
subcommittee of the Committee of Imperial Defence. "' This 
subcommittee of the CID met only six times over the next 
four years and the actual planning was left to another 
subcommittee chaired by Rex Leeper head of the FOND. One 
of the most important decisions taken was to establish a 
separate Ministry of Information for the conduct of British 
propaganda during a future war. Inevitably an element of 
confusion was produced over the relationship between this 
shadow centralised organisation and the publicity agencies 
which already existed in Whitehall. Departments were 
allowed to keep their own Press Officers and parallel 
organisations led to future problems of an administrative 
nature. Preparations were made to establish an Empire 
Division at the MOI which was markedly different to the 
haphazard and uncoordinated work about the empire during 
the First World War. The colonial empire was to be treated 
differently to the Dominions and this was reflected in the 
105 PRO, C0323/1160/10, Parkinson to Waterfield, 10 
June 1939. 
1-06 For details on the establishment of the MOI c. f. 
Michael Balfour, Propaganda in War, 1939-45 (London, 1979), 
pp. 53-71; Taylor, Projection of Britain. pp. 260-292 and 
Temple Wilcox, 'Projection or Publicity? Rival Concepts in 
the Pre-War Planning of the British Ministry of 
Information', Journal of Contemporary History, 18,1983. 
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organisation of the Empire Division where separate Sections 
were planned for India and Burma, the Dominions and the 
Colonies. 107 Within the Colonial Section of the Empire 
Division it was proposed that the colonial empire could be 
grouped into geographical areas with appropriate 
specialists alloted to each area. The Colonial Office 
cooperated with the staff earmarked for the Empire Division 
of the MOI and circular despatches were sent to the 
colonial governments communicating the plans made by the 
shadow MOI. 118 It is interesting to note that the staff of 
the CEMB were not alloted to the Empire Division within 
this shadow MOI organisation and were transferred to the 
Ministry of Economic Warfare once the war broke out. "' 
The Colonial Office urged the colonial governments to 
appoint Information Officers in their colonies and already 
the complicated relationship and division of 
responsibilities which characterised the relationship 
between the MOI and the Colonial Office during the first 
part of the war could be seen. The Information Officer 
would 'be responsible to the Ministry of Information but in 
each territory would act under the authority of, and in 
consultation with, the Colonial Government concernedl. "O 
In order to facilitate cooperation between the MOI and the 
Colonial Office, a Colonial Office official would be 
seconded to the Colonial Section of the Empire Division. 
The Colonial Office and Attitudes to Propaganda 
During the Second World War 
War propaganda will never provide a basis on which to 
reconstruct the world of the future. It may win the 
107 C. f. PRO/INFl/28/file. 
1108 PRO, C0323/1660/10, minute by Lee, 8 June 1939. 
For details of the circular despatches c. f. chapter 1 
below. 
1109 PRO, C0878/26, Establishment Branch notice no. 141, 
13 September 1939. 
1939.3-110 
PRO, C0323/1660/10, circular despatch, 12 August 
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war but it will not win the peace. "' 
Had not the outbreak of the Second World War intervened it 
would be reasonable to assume that Malcolm MacDonald's 
plans for the creation of a Public Relations Department 
would have been carried forward earlier than 1942. As Sir 
John Shuckburgh wrote, the need for supplementing the work 
of the Colonial Office by -the appointment of a Public 
Relations Officer had been recognised 'for some time past 
and was under active consideration during the months that 
preceded the outbreak of the war'. 113-2 However the 
immediate establishment of the MOI following the outbreak 
of hostilities put these plans into abeyance. As far as 
the Colonial Office and the war propaganda effort was 
concerned, the first priority was to establish liaison 
machinery with the Colonial Section of the Empire Division 
of the MOI where the organisation of colonial publicity was 
situated. It was the antagonistic relationship between the 
MOI and the Colonial Office which proved to be a catalyst 
for the creation of a Public Relations Department in the 
Colonial Office. 113 
... PRO, C0875/11/1, 'Colonial Propaganda - Aims and 
Policy' memorandum by Edmett, 6 August 1941, also quoted in 
Smyth, 'Britain's African Colonies p. 73. 
3-112 Shuckburgh, op. cit., p. 180. 
X. 13 Hilton Poynton* of the Defence Department, was 
appointed MOI-CO Liaison Officer and George Seel* was 
seconded to the Colonial Section at the MOI. From January 
1940 the CO-MOI Liaison Officer was Noel Sabine. Little is 
known about Sabine. He does not have a biography in the 
Colonial Office List as it was not printed during the war 
and before the war he would have needed to have served for 
ten years in order to qualify. In September 1939 Sabinewas 
seconded to the Defence Department of the Colonial Office 
from service in Kenya where he joined the Colonial Service 
in 1930 as a Cadet. In 1934 he became a District officer 
and gained administrative experience as an Assistant 
Secretary in the Kenya Secretariat in Nairobi. From early 
April 1940 Sabine became responsible for all Colonial 
Office publicity and public relations questions and Ernest 
Sabben-Clare*, former District Officer in Tanganyika, 
became the Liaison Officer. Sabine's area of work was 
formally recognised when he was appointed Public Relations 
Officer on 22 July 1940, PRO, C0878/26, Establishment 
Branch Notices, no. 146,16 September 1939; no. 1,1 January 
1940; no. 42,9 April 1940; and no. 108,22 July 1940. 
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Almost immediately after war broke out the two 
Ministries were locked in argument over who should control 
propaganda policy. "-2-4 In Colonial Office files a catalogue 
of jibes complaining of the lack of specialist experience 
of the empire publicists in the MOI is evident. For 
example, Professor Harlow had prepared a War Publicity 
Handbook to be distributed as guidance for Information 
Officers in the colonies. It recommended themes for 
speakers which would draw attention to Britain's record in 
suppressing the slave trade and defending political 
freedoms. Britain was to be portrayed as 'the liberator 
and protector of Africans throughout the world', the 
'greatest protagonist on behalf of "Africa for the 
Africans" ... ensuring that the future of Africa will 
ultimately be in the hands of Africans'. Britain's record 
by implication was compared favourably to Germanyls: 'this 
is a war of liberty, a war to save small weak races from 
being absorbed or exploited by Nazi Germany ... Germany has 
clamoured for a colonial empire of her own. Why? In order 
to make money out of it'-1x5 The Handbook produced a 
chorus of disapproval in the Colonial Office. In the 
Social Services Department, John Keith*, a former District 
Commissioner from Northern Rhodesia whose primary expertise 
was in African education, complained that 'all this stuff 
about the slave trade cuts no ice', that comparisons 
between Britain and Germany could be 'easily counteracted 
by stuff about British misdoings' and that any 'talk about 
freedom, especially political freedom, is dangerous stuff 
which could play into the hands of counter- 
propagandists'. "' Sir Arthur Dawe, head of the Africa 
Division, in his usual trenchant style, commented: 
11114 The Colonial Office was not alone in finding fault 
with the MOI, for instance the service departments argued 
with the MOI over censorship questions and the Foreign 
Office over responsibilities for propaganda policy 
overseas, c. f. Balfour, passim. 
1115 PRO, C0323/1660/15, memo. no. 323, 'War Publicity 
Handbook', undated. 
116 PRO, C0323/1660/15, minute by Keith, 16 September 
1939. 
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alien rule is hard to bear and it is not always 
politic for the ruler to ooze with self-righteousness 
... often a mistake in propaganda to put too high a 
moral polish on everything we do. Backward races may 
be ignorant but they are often very shrewd. 
The general propaganda guidelines had been established and 
Dawe preferred to leave the details to the men on the spot 
who 'were best able to handle their people'. More worrying 
was that the author of the Handbook, Professor Harlow, was 
in charge of the Colonial Section. According to Dawe he 
was a total 'misfit' as he was 'high-minded, bookish and 
inexperienced'. 1117 More succinctly Sir Henry Moore stated: 
'the best propaganda we can use is to keep wages up and 
bellies full'. 1118 
Others in the Colonial Office resented being forced to 
run in a 'three legged race' tied to the MOI. 119 As the 
department responsible for British propaganda in the Second 
World War the MOI was the fund-holder for imperial 
propaganda and the Colonial Office only had the power of 
veto in this circumstance because it had to depend on 
persuading the MOI to pursue Colonial Office ends. The 
situation would have been different had the Colonial Office 
established its own public relations organisation before 
the war and secured its. own funding from the Treasury on 
the Colonial and Middle Eastern Vote; this would have, to 
some extent, made it independent of the MOI in wartime. 
Malcolm MacDonald, the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, even proposed the idea of scrapping the Colonial 
Section of the Ministry of Information and suggested that 
its activities should be undertaken by a public relations 
department in the Colonial Office, which in turn would use 
the facilities of the production divisions of the Ministry 
1939. 
X%7 PRO, C0323/1660/15, minute by Dawe, 25 September 
11118 PRO, C0323/1660/15, 
1939. Following Colonial 
Handbook was abandoned and 
Office file containing the c 
account go to the MOV, PRO, 
29 September 1939. 
minute by Moore, 19 September 
Office representations the 
Dawe minuted that the Colonial 
riticisms of it should 'on no 
C0323/1660/15, minute by Dawe, 
2-3-9 PRO, C0875/5/6, memorandum by Edmett, 'imperial 
propaganda', undated. 
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of Information. As the Colonial Office insisted that the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies could not waive his 
responsibility for all questions of policy in colonial 
territories, a compromise (or even a victory given the 
lowliness of the Colonial Office in the Whitehall pecking 
order) was reached whereby he and not the Minister of 
Information would bear the ultimate responsibility for 
colonial publicity policy and be the final adjudicator over 
any point of disagreement. Correspondence between the 
Ministry of Information and Information Officers in the 
colonies would be conducted through the Colonial Office. 
Therefore, although publicity and propaganda activity 
remained the responsibility of the Minister of Information 
in theory no material was sent to the colonies without 
Colonial Office agreement. 1120 
Following the resolution of the 'responsibility' 
question the Secretary of State for the Colonies turned his 
attention to the role of the Colonial Office in initiating 
empire propaganda. In early 1940 Malcolm MacDonald was 
dissatisfied with the essentially passive role the Colonial 
Office had hitherto adopted in propaganda questions; it was 
'not enough' for the Colonial Office to 'help the MOI when 
they ask for it' or to be confined to merely Ivetting' 
material -produced in the MOI. Following a meeting with 
Lord Reith*, the Minister of Information and Lord Halifax*, 
the Foreign Secretary, to discuss the Report of the West 
Indies Royal Commission, MacDonald saw the pressing need to 
intensify the propaganda effort about the empire. Instead 
of its passive function the Colonial Office should have 
ideas of its own as to what would be 'useful propaganda' 
and should bring ideas spontaneously to the notice of the 
Ministry [of Information]1.1121 
MacDonald's dissatisfaction with the present situation 
initiated a Colonial Office review of propaganda activities 
and proposals for the best way forward in the future. Noel 
Sabine the Colonial Office Liaison Officer with the MOI 
120 Shuckburgh, 0R. Cit., P. 179. 
121 PRO, C0323/1740/62, Carstairs to Sabine, 
January 1940. 
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thought the Colonial Office should tread carefully. 
Propaganda, he noted, had been described as the art of 
'casting imitation pearls before real swine' and in the 
present war was judged not on its truth or falsehood, 
but (a) on its power to strike a blow at, or rebut the 
charges of an enemy, (b) on its plausibility and (c) 
according to the manner in which it fits into the 
pattern of general propaganda policy of the government 
concerned. "' 
The Colonial Office should not, argued Sabine, follow the 
German and Italian examples. On the one hand German 
propaganda was negative and attempted to 'build bricks 
without straw' by conveying 'that Germany was successful at 
administering her colonies'. it condemned the 
'imperialistic' actions of its opponents and by doing so 
denied German responsibility 'for promoting the present 
war, by stating categorically and repeatedly that the 
allies provoked it'. Italian propaganda followed German 
lines but also glamourised Italian activities. 
Thus the Italian Abyssinian campaign becomes a kind of 
crusade; and a number of Italian peasants migrating 
(perhaps with some reluctance) to Libya with a grant 
in aid of a few lira and a number of pigs, are 
addressed by a leader from a rostrum shaped like the 
prow of a battleship, and told they are 'fulfilling 
the imperial destiny of greater Italy'. JL23 
British propaganda about the empire should be different and 
realistic; the more far fetched propaganda lies should be 
scotched ruthlessly and be conducted against a background 
of 'positive propaganda telling of our achievements, our 
methods and our problems' (avoiding, it went without 
saying, the posturings and exaggerations apparent in enemy 
propaganda). Realism and the 'putting out of straight 
facts and honest commonsense conclusions' would always be 
more convincing than the fare of enemy propaganda with its 
special pleading, tortuous reasoning and laborious 
historical documentation [which] seeks to prove that 
wrong is right, that war is not war and that 
aggression is pacification, ad nauseam for 24 hours a 
day. 
1940.1122 
PRO, C0323/1740/62, minute by Sabine, 12 January 
X23 ibid. 
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Sabine suggested that even criticism of Britain's colonial 
administration could be turned to good account if handled 
carefully and publicising the freedoms enjoyed by colonial 
peoples under British rule contrasted with the freedoms 
enjoyed by the peoples living under the rule of the enemy, 
for example a hypothetical case for a broadcast 'feature' 
programme was proposed: 
There is in particular great scope for contrasting the 
size, might and dignity of the Empire with its refusal 
to take advantage of these powers to crush opposition 
and stifle criticism ... take the case of a small Colonial Dependency, a few of the more advanced 
inhabitants of which regard a law introduced by the 
Governor as being prejudicial to what they regard as 
their proper liberties; some local agitation may take 
place and some criticism of the Government's policy 
may be ventilated in Parliament. These facts are 
interpreted as hostile propaganda without any 
consciousness or often without any appearance of 
inconsistency as evidence that British rule is (a) too 
tyrannical and (b) too weak and that in any case it 
leads to trouble and unrest; no doubt many people 
believe this. This problem is not the end of the 
story however; the agitators or apostles of liberty 
are not put in concentration camps, called internal 
enemies of the state or even murdered: what may easily 
happen is that they have amicable interviews with the 
Governor or the Secretary of State at which MPs or 
Trade Union leaders may be represented. Eventually a 
compromise, more or less successful is worked out; and 
the moral is that the big power has treated with the 
little power on terms of equality and by the exercise 
of reason and commonsense instead of the use of force, 
of which a large part of this world is heavily sick. 
By the use of this sort of treatment even the 
existence of grievances, out of which the enemy, in 
the absence of effective propaganda, could make 
capital, is turned to good account; and it leads back 
to the theme that while the people of the Empire may 
criticise they know their grievances will be discussed 
and remedied if possible, and they know how to make 
the choice between our own rule and Nazi rule. "' 
In the spirit of Sabine's recommendations MacDonald wrote 
to Reith urging the adoption of the theme of 'constructive 
achievement' in the colonial field: 
We are not oppressors, nor are we weak and inefficient 
administrators; we keep a large number of people over 
a good portion of the earth's surface in a condition 
of good order and contentment; we realize that much 
remains to be done, but we assert at the same time 
that a very great deal has been accomplished in the 
'2' ibid. 
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spheres of administration and justice, education, 
health and general social progress. 125 
Reith promised to discuss MOI plans for long-term publicity 
about the empire and the possible strengthening of 
machinery to conduct this new effort. As far as the 
Colonial Office was concerned the planned appointment of a 
Public Relations Officer would, as directed by MacDonald, 
strengthen the Colonial Office side. 126 
Preparing publicity for the introduction of the new 
Colonial Development and Welfare Legislation in February 
1940 proved to be a valuable learning curve for the 
Colonial Office in the art of public relations. The new 
Act with its promise of five million pounds a year for the 
next ten years broke away from the previous 1929 Colonial 
Development Act with the abandonment of the principle of 
self-supporting colonies and its specific denunciation of 
the 1929 Act's stipulation that its aim should be 'to 
promote the commerce with or industry in the United 
Kingdom'. Instead the new Act had as its 'primary purpose 
... to promote the prosperity and happiness of the Colonial 
Empire'. "' Both the Colonial Office and Ministry of 
Information had been in favour of publishing the Report of 
the West Indies Royal Commission simultaneously with the 
White Paper on development legislation as an earnest of 
British intentions to act on the criticisms contained in 
the Report. The Secretary of State for the Colonies 
himself became involved with efforts to publicise the 
Report and White Paper by trying to arrange for Lord 
Moyne*, the Chairman of the Royal Commission, to broadcast 
on the BBC on the day of publication. "' Sabine 
coordinated the publicity for the Report and the 
1125 PRO, C0323/1740/62, MacDonald to Reith, 17 January 
1940. 
116 PRO, C0323/1740/62, Reith to MacDonald, 25 January 
1940 and minute by MacDonald, undated. 
127 Constantine, The Makinq of -British 
Colonial 
Development .... p. 258. 
1128 PRO, C0323/1651/19, minute by MacDonald, 4 
December 1939. 
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announcement of the new policy. He prepared circular 
telegrams to be sent to the colonies and 'Empaxl 
information telegrams for overseas distribution, he 
organising press conferences and facilities for empire and 
home press, cooperation with the BBC for programmes on both 
the Empire and Home services. Sabine also prepared 
briefing papers for the press conferences on the 'line' to 
be adopted of showing the continuity in colonial policy. 
It would play down the White Paper as a 'revolution', 
emphasise that the policy was being adopted in spite of and 
not because of the war and that it was a worthy commitment 
even though it represented a further drain on Britain's 
already scarce resources, 
it is true that we are facing unprecedented calls on 
our resources. This fact should not prevent us from 
devoting part of those resources to fulfil the 
obligations we have voluntarily assumed ... just 
because we are at war we are not going to be panicked 
out of taking steps to put and keep our house in 
order. 119 
In Cabinet however the Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain 
convinced his colleagues that the publication of the report 
of the West Indies Royal Commission would be dangerous 
because of the effect it could have in the United States 
and other neutral countries 'leading to a general revision 
of opinion among those who had hitherto thought of Britain 
as a leading Colonial Power' . 
130 MacDonald, not content 
with this situation, managed to persuade his Cabinet 
colleagues that the recommendations of the Report could be 
published to allay public suspicions. Privately the Press 
could be told, 'while we would not have objected to the 
Report if taken as a whole, the use by the enemy of 
selected extracts might have been damaging to USI. 131 
The Report of the West Indies Royal Commission was not 
published until after the war in 1945. Its recommendations 
were published on the same day as the White Paper on 
Colonial Development and Welfare with the additional 
'2-9 PRO, C0323/1745/14, memorandum by Sabine, undated. 
130 PRO, CAB65/5, WM(40)27,30 January 1940. 
M31L PRO, CAB65/5, WM(40)42,15 February 1940. 
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commitment to spend 1,400,000 pounds a year in the West 
Indies alone. The Colonial Office could not have asked for 
more in the reception of the White Paper and the non- 
publication of the Royal Commission Report which reproduced 
the government 'line' faithfully. The Daily Mail's report 
was typical of British press reaction: 
Our Colonies need help, and Britain will give that 
help. The war has not been made an excuse for 
postponing necessary measures. 
That is the most encouraging fact in the new 
scheme of Colonial assistance announced yesterday. 
While we are spending colossal sums in the effort to 
beat Germany, we can still spare five million pounds a 
year to raise the standard of living of our overseas 
communities ... Note, too, that these long term plans budget for 
ten years ahead - twenty years in the case of the West 
Indies. This calm faith in our future is enormously 
encouraging at a time when the Empire is facing the 
most perilous days in its history. 
The state of the Colonies, and in particular the 
West Indies has been a reproach to our Imperial name 
... But the Germans can understand neither frankness 
nor our enlightened methods of administration. There 
are no slaves, pogroms or Gestapos, no Polands or 
Bohemias in the British Empire ... The Colonies are helping magnificently in the 
war. But this assistance is not a reward for that 
effort. It would have been given war or no war. 132 
Prior to the appointment of a Public Relations officer 
in July 1940, the Colonial Office discussed the demarcation 
line between what the activities of the Colonial Office 
would be and the work of the MOI. In the wake of the new 
Colonial Development and Welfare Act the time was ripe for 
the Colonial Office themselves to seize the initiative in 
the empire publicity field and rid themselves of their 
previous 'defensive attitude' and pave the way for 'a 
campaign of positive informative publicity'. The Colonial 
Office would need to persuade the MOI that the awakening of 
British pride in their empire was a 'legitimate propaganda 
aim'. Above all, as Sabine noted, the MOI considered 
empire publicity in a very specific context 'as part of the 
country's war propaganda effort'. As part of the war 
propaganda effort the British public were encouraged to 
take pride in the Colonial war effort and overseas would be 
132 The Daily Mail, 21 February 1940. 
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impressed by the humanity, resources and solidarity of the 
British colonial empire and the respect of the principle of 
trusteeship . 133 The projected Public Relations Department 
was to fight the British public's ignorance and 'partially 
informed prejudice'. This was to be a long-term activity, 
'not properly a war measure'. Its work would be more 
'informative' than 'propagandist' and would concentrate 
mainly on publicising the nature of the Colonial empire at 
home. Naturally there would be a degree of overlap between 
the war propaganda and public relations activities of the 
two departments because their objectives were broadly 
similar: 'informing the British public of the work of the 
Empire and bringing about a fuller realization of their 
responsibilities in this regard', was Sabine argued 'a 
valid war aim'. 134 
However in spite of Sabine's recommendations for 
Colonial Office public relations the Colonial Office 
continued, for the time being, to act as little more than a 
'post office' and adviser for the MOI and as a censor of 
propaganda produced by the MOI, this caused frustration in 
the Ministry as their proposals 'were too apt to be turned 
down by the Colonial Office' JL35 In these circumstances 
the MOI tried to obtain Colonial Office acceptance of the 
principle that the MOI had the final authority on all 
questions of propaganda. It wished to correspond with 
Information Officers in the colonies direct instead of 
through the Colonial Office. -3-36 This produced a backlash 
of criticism in the Colonial Office against renewed MOI 
attempts to encroach on areas of the Secretary of State's 
responsibilities and against the Colonial Section's 
inappropriate attitude to propaganda in the colonies. To 
the point as ever, Sir Arthur Dawe wrote: 
1940. 
133 PRO, C0323/1740/62, minute by Sabine, 18 March 
X 34 ibid. 
M35 PRO, C0323/1740/62, Sabben-Clare to Sabine, 27 
June 1940 and Shuckburgh to Sabine, 26 June 1940. 
1940. 
X36 PRO, C0323/1740/62, Shuckburgh to Sabine, 26 June 
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this section is so poor in personnel and so ill- 
equipped that it inspires no confidence. It is really 
impossible for this little group of professors and 
amateurs to be in a position to dictate from 
Bloomsbury to the Secretary of State, the Colonial 
governors and all their experienced officials on 
matters of propaganda in the Colonies. Their ideas 
are hopelessly conventional and commonplace. Their 
main stock-in-trade is the cliches of political appeal 
appropriate to Anglo-Saxon democracy. They seem to be 
quite incapable of making an imaginative leap to 
understand that this sort of stuff is not always 
appropriate to the varied coloured races in the 
Colonial Empire. What we want is something much more 
astute, realistic and forceful. X37 
Shuckburgh was not disposed to echo Dawe's criticism 
and reminded his colleague that there was at least one 
reliable man among the 'amateurs' at the MOI in the person 
of Nicholson a former Colonial Secretary in Cyprus. 
Notwithstanding this quibble Shuckburgh pointed to the 
advantage that a cooperative attitude could bring. As long 
as the principle of the Colonial Office retaining the 
decisive word on colonial propaganda was maintained the 
Colonial Office could have no objections to the MOI 
corresponding directly with the Information Officers in the 
field on routine matters. 138 
As far as public relations in the Colonial Office were 
concerned the Secretary of State was having trouble in 
finding a suitable man to become his Public Relations 
Officer. In the meantime he was 'very anxious to get on 
with the development of the Public Relations side' of the 
Colonial Office and so set up an advisory committee on 
public relations. He invited Gervas Huxley, formerly of 
the EMB and subsequently director of the Empire Division at 
the MOI, Sir Harry Lindsay, director of the Imperial 
Institute and Harold Nicolson*, MP and Parliamentary Under- 
Secretary of State at the MOI to become members. X3 9 This 
advisory committee did not proceed beyond the circulation 
137 PRO, C0323/1740/62, minute by Dawe, 3 July 1940. 
138 PRO, C0323/1740/62, Dawe to Parkinson, 5 July 
1940. MacDonald agreed, C0323/1740/62, minute by Parkinson, 
11 July 1940. 
239 PRO, C0323/1754/4, MacDonald to Huxley, 21 March 
1940. 
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of papers prepared by Sabine in his capacity as the officer 
in the Colonial Office responsible for propaganda and 
publicity questions. Sabine's papers and proposals for 
taking a more positive approach to public relations were 
praised in the Office'40 and seem to have made him the 
obvious, or perhaps the only, choice for Public Relations 
Officer. 
Sabine was duly appointed Public Relations Officer in 
July. 141 This decision then can be seen as the result of 
both positive and negative factors. On the one hand the 
perceived need, articulated by the Secretary of State for 
the Colonies himself, to educate the British public, 
regardless of the war, about their empire and to capitalise 
on the opportunities provided by the Colonial Development 
and Welfare Act. On the other hand the power struggle 
between the Ministry of Information and the Colonial Office 
over the responsibilities for colonial propaganda. 
However the appointment of Sabine as Public Relations 
Officer by no means implied that the Colonial Office had 
committed itself fully to a positive publicity policy or 
that public relations activities had received universal 
support within the Colonial Office. In view of the 
practical dependence on the production organisations within 
the MOI there was only so much that an individual Public 
Relations Officer could achieve independently. He needed 
MOI and Colonial Office support for widening empire 
propaganda to incorporate public relations activities. 
Sir Cosmo Parkinson*, the former Permanent Under- 
Secretary of State, explained the difficulties faced by 
Sabine in his relations ý with other Colonial Office 
officials. The Public Relations Officer seemed to be 
resented by the rest of the Colonial Office and made 'extra 
work' for the other administrative officers. His 
inquisitiveness 'knew no bounds' and wanted to be '"in" 
1140 C. f. for example PRO, C0323/1754/4, minute by Lord 
Dufferin, 25 April 1940. 
142- Shuckburgh, OP-cit-, P-180. But it was to be more 
than two years, before Sabine was given the rank of 
Assistant Secretary and a department of his own. 
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everything of importance, and to be there before things 
come to a head'. Parkinson hinted that Sabine's position 
could even have been a cause for jealousy as he had 'direct 
access to the Secretary of State'; this was necessary if he 
was to be successful in his task, but placed him in a 
'special position different from that of the ordinary 
permanent official'. Parkinson's own ambivalence towards 
public relations was also apparent: 
I remember once saying to the Public Relations Officer 
that there would never be any peace again in the 
Colonial Office until he had reverted to his previous 
job in the Administration of Kenya. For a moment he 
thought this was a serious remark, and he was bereft 
of speech -a rare thing in a public relations 
officer. Actually, there was an element of truth in 
what I said, if 'peace' were understood to mean fewer 
interruptions. But it would not make for a more 
peaceful life for the Secretary of State and the 
Colonial Office, if 'public relations' were closed 
down. They have come to stay in one form or 
another. -I-42 
A year later the Colonial Office was still trying to 
gain support within the Office and cooperation from the MOI 
to implement a long-term public relations campaign 
independent of but supplementary to the MOI's main activity 
of war propaganda. E. R. Edmett, 143 working in the Colonial 
Office as Liaison officer with the MOI, took up the cause 
of public relations and urged the Colonial Office to find 
its own lines of development', warning of the political 
dangers inherent in a failure to do so. L44 Combining both 
his experience as an officer in the field and his 
observations of the workings of the Colonial Office and the 
142 Sir Cosmo Parkinson, The Colonial Office From 
Within 1909-1945 (London, 1947), p. 68. 
143 Little is known about Edmett. He was a 
'beachcomber' from the Colonial Administrative Service in 
the Gold Coast where he had started as a Cadet in 1934, 
becoming a District Commissioner the following year. He 
commenced duty in the Colonial Office on 8 January 1941 as 
a Temporary Assistant Principal and was assigned to the 
West Indian Department. - 
In June 1941 he replaced Sabben- 
Clare as the Colonial Office-MOI Liaison Officer on Sabben- 
Clare's transfer to the Foreign Colonies Department, PRO, 
C0878/27, Establishments Branch Notice, no. 3,9 January 
1941 and no. 67,14 June 1941. 
3-44 PRO, C0875/11/1, memorandum by Edmett, 6 August 1941. 
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MOI he not only dealt with the problems confronting the 
British empire, as he saw them in 1941, and their possible 
solutions, he also identified the very issues which, in 
spite of the subsequent public relations efforts made by 
the Colonial Office, arguably contributed to the end of the 
British empire in Africa. He recommended that the Colonial 
Office should attempt to disassociate themselves from the 
MOI's short-term 'win the war' propaganda. While he 
recognised that war propaganda was the propagandists' 
'bread and butter', Edmett thought that it could not 
'provide a constructive outlook' for the solution of 
Britain's colonial problems. Even this short-term 
propaganda campaign to win the war had been started too 
late. On the outbreak of war propaganda had been 
improvised but 'propaganda to win the war should have been 
started twenty years ago' because it 'takes decades for an 
idea to seep into the consciousness of the public'. 
Propaganda was not a 'stick which can be picked up and used 
at will': its effects were potentially dangerous. The kind 
of war propaganda produced by the MOI could even backfire 
and have future harmful effects because 'the partisanship, 
the reiteration of the enemies's brutalities, are bound to 
affect all but the most equable and objective minds'. 145 
The 'Colonial Office should not, Edmett argued, be 
bound by the constraints and dangers of the MOI's war 
propaganda; it should look to the future in which Britain's 
role in relation to her empire would be evolving. Edmett 
identified Africa in particular, where he had first-hand 
experience, as an area where there would be change. In 
tune with the new thinking within the Colonial Office about 
the purpose of colonial development policy and the 
increasingly interventionist role metropolitan Britain 
would in future adopt in social, economic and political 
developments, Edmett suggested that the British would cease 
to be merely administrators and would become advisers and 
organisers to aid Africans into accepting responsibility 
for their own affairs. Propaganda would have a central 
1145 ibid. 
63 
role to play in bringing about this change. It was not 
that Africans were 'sufficiently unintelligent to run their 
country' but that they simply 'do not understand our point 
of view, they do not undertake their responsibilities 
towards one another', 
Only an educative propaganda campaign over a number of 
years will effect this. But no other method than 
propaganda will attain it, people cannot be 
administered into a state of responsibility, only 
educated to it. "' 
However he was under no illusion that propaganda was 
the universal panacea for colonial problems, as the example 
of the attitude of the enemy proved: 
Do not let us fool ourselves that human beings are 
marionettes to be worked by propaganda. That belief 
has led the dictators to the abyss on the edge of 
which they are now standing. Do not believe that 
propaganda can create goodwill. It cannot. "" 
But propaganda could, he argued, be the means of 
'expressing existing goodwill and of consolidating it'. 
Propaganda could 'put before people persuasively and 
continuously all the facts which it is vital that mankind 
must assimilate in order to deal with its problems'. This 
propaganda should be a continuous and long-term 'education 
in facts', 
We are, as war shows, also at the mercy of our 
emotions and prejudices, and only a continuous 
exposition of all the facts of existence and a human 
sympathy in their presentation, will enable us and the 
races for whom we are supposedly trustee to form a 
balanced judgment without which we can never master 
our environment. 
Perceptively, he laid down the challenge that the future of 
the British empire and even Britain's status as great power 
was dependent on the ability of the peoples of the empire 
to cooperate: 
the races of the British Empire black and white must 
learn to understand, tolerate and respect each other. 
The present war has made this problem ripe for 
solution. Failing this we disintegrate, and the 
leadership of the world will be assumed by the 
American and Soviet federations. Either we solve the 
2-46 PRO, C0875/11/1, memorandum by Edmett, 6 August 1941 
147 ibid. 
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communal problem or we are broken by it. 140 
The ability of the races of the empire to understand each 
other was therefore dependent on this 'education in facts' 
and this should be the public relations mission of the 
Colonial Office. 
Sabine reiterated his urgings of the previous year 
that the Colonial Office should adopt its own public 
relations propaganda, both at home and in the colonies. 
Like Edmett he warned of the dangerous impact the MOI's war 
propaganda could have in the colonies, 
primitive peoples do not look upon the power of evil 
in the same manner as the average Englishman ... in his heart of hearts, an African may regard the power 
of evil as more likely to secure immediate triumph 
than the power of good ... the more evil we make Nazism out to be, the less confidence will the African 
have in our power to defeat it. 1149 
In the future, after the conflict with Germany had ended, 
he feared that 'having been encouraged to hate one branch 
of the white race they [the Africans) may extend their 
feeling to others'. He also viewed the racial problem as a 
key but unpredictable issue of the future, but this did not 
mean that 'native communities' should forever be kept 
'wrapped in cottonwooll. Britain should act now, attempt 
to mould the way in which future developments within the 
empire would be perceived in the post-war period and pre- 
empt the development of nationalist sentiment which took 
its strength from the inequalities between the races of the 
empire. 
When the excuse for hating the Germans has been 
removed, the sentiment may be transferred to what is 
uppermost in the minds of all Africans as they attain 
political and social consciousness, namely the colour 
question. In propaganda it is easy to see the 
beginning of a train of action, but not always easy to 
see the end. "' 
As Edmett argued, the Colonial Office should become 
more proactive, to 'find out' exactly what their propaganda 
policy was and 'use propaganda instead of inspecting it'. 
1140 ibid. 
114'9 PRO, C0875/5/6, minute by Sabine, August 1941. 
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No progress had been made at all in this direction for two 
years. Again he called for an abandonment of the purely 
war propaganda: 
If you give people porridge for breakfast, porridge 
for lunch and porridge for dinner, they will get sick 
of the sight of porridge. To avoid this essential 
dilemma, propaganda must be related not only to the 
war, but to the life of the native, in other words 
with social propaganda and until this fusion takes 
place it will remain unreal and unconstructive, and 
likely to promote 'war weariness'. 151 
A resolution to this war propaganda vs. public 
relations debate between the MOI and the Colonial Office 
was found when the MOI accepted the widening of propaganda 
policy about the colonial empire at a joint meeting held in 
October 1941. In future propaganda would include 'long- 
term publicity designed to increase knowledge and 
appreciation in the Colonies themselves of British Colonial 
policy and its objectives'. In order to strengthen 
cooperation between the Colonial Office and the Empire 
Division of the Ministry of Information weekly meetings 
would be held. "' 
These developments were viewed with satisfaction by 
some within the Colonial Office as they would end the 
'negative variety' of Colonial Office responsibility. The 
Office would have a more active role in 'initiating the 
despatch of propaganda material to the Colonies' by 
'indicating to the Ministry of Information in what form ... 
the material should be presented'. 153 
In spite of this recognition by some Colonial office 
officials, other than the pure propaganda specialist, of 
the necessity of expanding activities in the colonies, 
Edmett argued this alone was not enough. The only way to 
overcome what he called the 'Teutonic outlook' of the MOI 
1151L PRO, C0875/5/6, 'Imperial Propaganda', by Edmett, 
undated. 
1152 PRO, C0875/11/20, minutes of meeting held on 6 
October 1941 to discuss publicity work in the Colonies. 
2.53 P]RO, C0875/5/6, Minute by Sidebotham, 9 October 
1941. Sir Cosmo Parkinson, the Permanent Under-Secretary of 
State, wrote 'I am glad to know of these talks and their 
satisfactory outcome', ibid., 9 October 1941. 
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would be for the Geographical Departments of the Colonial 
Office to take a 'particular interest in propaganda 
machinery in general', and to break down the 'parochial' 
organisation of Colonial Office departments. "' Sir 
Charles Jeffries, Assistant Under-Secretary of State, 
thought that representation at the joint MOI-Colonial 
Office meetings should not however, be automatic. 
Geographical Departments would only attend when their own 
particular business was discussed. 155 
Having persuaded the MOI to incorporate long-term 
public relations into their war propaganda output in the 
colonies the proposals MacDonald had supported before the 
outbreak of the war for public relations to be a permanent 
feature of the Colonial Office's own activities, it was 
decided to expand Colonial Office public relations 
activities to include 'on political grounds' telling the 
people of Britain more about the colonies to be done 
'irrespective of the war' and was necessary not least 
because it was the British people who were 'ultimately 
responsible' for British colonial poliCy. 156 The existing 
state of ignorance was therefore undesirable, as it was 
'not in the interests of either the Colonies or of the 
mother country that Colonial affairs should be in the hands 
of officials who are not subject to the stimulus and check 
157 of public criticism'. At home in war and peace, the 
1154 PRO, C0875/5/6, minute by Edmett, 14 October 1941. 
This 'parochial' attitude can be seen in the reaction of 
George Seel Assistant Secretary in the Colonial Services 
Department and former Liaison Officer with the MOI to the 
suggestion that all departments should be represented at 
meetings on colonial propaganda: 'in British colonies the 
officials of the Colonial Service are themselves 
propagandists in the most direct form, for good or ill 
according to their behaviour, but I do not think the 
manufacture of 'synthetic' propaganda ... is a matter which directly concerns the Colonial Service department', PRO, 
C0875/5/6, Seel to Jeffries, 16 December 1941. 
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British public should be educated in their 
responsibilities: 
the general aim of the publicity effort should be to 
present the Colonies realistically not so much as 
places where various raw materials are produced, 
strange animals are to be found, fantastic tribes live 
in romantic dirt and ignorance, but as communities of 
men, women and children, who are fundamentally not so 
very different from ourselves, whose human problems 
are much the same, who share with us the citizenship 
of the British Empire, and for whose welfare and 
progress we have undertaken the responsibility... It 
should also be shown that the relation between this 
country and the Colonies is mutual. They need our 
moral and material support; but we also need the 
friendship of the Colonial peoples all over the world. 
This friendship has meant a great deal to us in the 
present war and it will mean more as the Colonial 
peoples themselves progressively advance to take their 
place amongst the civilised nations. 1158 
This public relations for the colonial empire should, 
Sabine thought, also support the MOI's main activity of war 
propaganda. Given they would have to produce the material 
using MOI production divisions, the Colonial Office 
emphasised the value of this additional aspect 'to bring it 
home to the people in this country that the Empire is 
supporting them and ... to present to this country and 
in 
other countries a picture of past achievements and a 
forward constructive policy as one part of a great antidote 
of the New Order'. 159 
A circular despatch was sent to all the colonies in 
November 1941 informing the colonial Governors of the 
changes from the 'standardised' Ministry of Information 
'winning the war' kind of propaganda to propaganda of a 
more Ispecialised' nature, and told them that the 'question 
of publicity in the Colonies' was 'under general review'. 
In future propaganda would cover: 
(1) longterm propaganda designed to stimulate 
understanding and appreciation in the Colonies of 
British Colonial policy and its objectives (2) 
material showing more specifically appreciation felt 
in this country of contribution to the war effort made 
'. 5' ibid. 
1159 PRO, C0875/5/6, memorandum by Sabine on 'Colonial 
Office Public Relations', undated. 
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by Colonies in so many ways. 160 
Edmett was concerned that the potential of public 
relations as part of the everyday activities of Colonial 
Service officers should not be overlooked and argued that 
'administrative zeal and devotion to duty' were 'not 
enough'. It would be increasingly necessary to establish 
machinery which would maintain contact with all sections of 
colonial communities in order to implement the new 
development polices. Public relations could help in 
improving the relationship between the governed and 
governing as part of a two-way inter-active process. It 
would no longer be a case of top downwards colonial 
government gazettes merely informing the populations of 
news. Edmett was encouraged by the attitude adopted by Sir 
Henry Moore. Moore became Governor of Kenya in 1940, where 
he had been Acting Governor in 1930, after three years in 
the Colonial Office. Moore seems to have undergone a 
change of heart about public relations since his curt 
outburst against the MOI's propaganda in September 1939. 
He addressed a conference of the East African Information 
Officers in 1941 and said that the role of the Information 
Officer was 'not only to interpret the vagaries of 
Government to a bewildered public but also to interpret to 
a bewildered Government the stirrings of thought in the 
public mind'. 
It is interesting that on the eve of the fall of 
Singapore, Edmett predicted that the failure to solve the 
key question of race and the relationship between the 
governed and the governing could bring catastrophe: 
the stark and obvious fact which the British Empire 
has to face is that four fifths of it is not British, 
and as long as the majority believe the Empire is run 
on a set of values which puts the interests of the 
European minority above those of the alien majority, 
there will be disunity, unhappiness and 
demoralisation. 
If Britain did not take heed of the poets warning, 'on my 
heels I hear / Time's winged chariot hurrying near', Edmett 
wrote, the British empire 'may shortly find itself on 
3-60 PRO, C0875/5/6, circular despatch to all Colonies, 
13 November 1941. 
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evolution's scrap heap, the last name on the list of those 
empires in history which have been tried and found 
wanting'. He thought something more should be done in the 
colonies to take up Moore's lead, 
The decisive factor seems to be that if we fall down 
on public relations at home we shall not lose an 
Empire, but if we fail in the Colonies, we may. "' 
The Colonial Office's relationship with the MOI was 
still problematic throughout 1942. Sabine complained of 
the slow progress of the MOI in carrying through the long- 
term campaign. 112 It was not that liaison was now the 
problem but more generally MOI criticism about the lack of 
'publicity sense' in the Colonial Office. 163 Publicity 
sent out from Britain was often a few months out of date. 
John Sidebotham, Assistant Secretary of State in the 
General Department of the Colonial office, voiced his 
concern: 
it is no use our putting pressure on the Ministry 
unless the machinery of the Public Relations Branch 
here is adequate to provide the Ministry with all the 
information they need from us, and I have suggested to 
Mr. Sabine that he should go fully into this at an 
early date from the Staff aspect, etc. I feel we ought 
to be in position to flood the Ministry with material; 
and then if they do not do their part as our 
machinery, we can properly put the screw on. 3.64 
Sir George Gater*, the Permanent Under-Secretary of State 
for the Colonies, the former Chief Clerk of London County 
Council, who had no experience either of the colonies nor 
of the civil service the most important permanent official 
in the Colonial Office, found fault not in the Colonial 
Office nor in the relationship between the two Departments, 
but in the colonies themselves. He thought that the 
colonial Governments were failing to inform the Colonial 
Office immediately of events which might have an important 
publicity aspect in Britain. He recommended that a 
2.611 PRO, C0875,11/1, minute by Edmett, 30 December 
1941. 
11152 PRO, C0875/14/10, minute by Sabine, 20 July 1942. 
163 PRO, C0875/14/12, minute by Gent, 27 April 1942. 
3-c-4 PRO, C0875/14/10, minute by Sidebotham, 22 july 1942. 
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circular despatch should be sent to all colonies suggesting 
that if they had not already appointed an Information 
Officer they should do S0.165 In a similar vein the 
Colonial Office's Press Officer, A. J. Haler, complained 
about the lack of material from the colonies being sent to 
the British press. One response from Kenya was that, 'one 
cannot "make" news (unless of course, the Press Officers 
are to go out and bite our canine friends)'. JLGG 
With the United States entrance into the war in 
December 1941 victory was assured; a note of quiet 
confidence was apparent. The Colonial Office could now 
devote more of its efforts to the discussion and 
consideration of post-war developments, as the empire's 
future seemed to be secured. Any immediate feelings of 
relief, however, dissipated with the news of events in the 
Far East. The fall of Singapore 'was a rude awakening. 
The disinclination of the colonial wards to come to the 
assistance of the trustee struck at the heart of Britain's 
propaganda in defence of its empire'. 167 It seemed as if 
Edmett's fears were being realised. Elsewhere the British 
empire faced a threat, not from developments within the 
colonies, but from their wartime ally the United States. 
Following the adoption of the Atlantic Charter in 
August 1941 and the consequent debate over whether Article 
Three and its promise to 'respect the right of all peoples 
to choose the form of government under which they live' 
applied to the colonies, the Colonial Office faced pressure 
from the Foreign Office to produce a similar Colonial 
Charter outlining post-war intentions in the interests of 
1165 PRO, C0875/14/12, minute by Sir George Gater, 28 
April 1942. A circular despatch to that effect was sent on 
8 May 1942. Gater was not popular with many of his junior 
officials who were sympathetic to his predecessor, Sir 
Cosmo Parkinson's, unceremonious removal. Gater however 
proved himself to be more sympathetic to the aims of public 
relations and seemed to understand the necessity of 
communicating to the wider world the activities of his 
department. Indeed 'he prided himself on his sensitivity to 
parliamentary opinion', Lee and Petter, op. cit., p. 68. 
1166 PRO, C0875/13/17, Haler to Sabine, 7 September 1942. 
3.6'7 Smyth, 'Britain's African Colonies ... 1, p. 
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Anglo-American relations. The Colonial Office 'began to 
experience in earnest the tension created between its 
recognition that some form of public act of assurance was 
necessary and its determination not to dance to the tune of 
others'. "' Against the Colonial Office's inclinations 
much time was taken up in 1942 discussing the possibility 
of issuing a joint Anglo-American declaration on the 
colonies. This produced further tensions because Colonial 
office officials out of sympathy with the aims of Sabine's 
activities suspected that the requirements of a successful 
propaganda campaign in the United States were becoming the 
source of policy initiatives. As Sabine himself 
recognised, 'the dividing line between public relations and 
policy may be at times dangerously obscure'. -2-69 
In spite of these misgivings the political and 
diplomatic realities faced by a Colonial Office on the 
defensive and the campaigning by the propaganda specialists 
over the previous two years combined to produce a positive 
public relations policy. They had also received 
endorsement from a much respected source, Lord Hailey's 
African Survey. Hailey wrote: 
The proper presentation of government policy ... has 
now become a matter of increasing importance. It is in 
particular necessary to educate public opinion through 
the newspapers and by the extension of radio services, 
and it is to be hoped that the departments Of 
information which have been built up during the war 
will not be abandoned in peace-time. 170 
That the empire needed to be more positively projected 
seemed to be beyond doubt as it had become more urgent than 
ever to show the empire as a dynamic not dying empire. 
Vincent Harlow of the Empire Division of the MOI noted the 
British public was feeling negative towards the colonial 
1168 Lee and Petter, p. 123. For detail on the Anglo- 
American negotiations for a Colonial Charter, Wm. Roger 
Louis, Imperialism at Bay, (Oxford, 1986); J. E. Williams, 
'The Joint Declaration on the Colonies: an issue in Anglo- 
American relations, 1942-1944,1 British Journal of 
International Studies, vol. II, 1976, pp. 267-292. 
169 Lee and Petter, op. cit., p. 139. 
170 PRO, C0875/11/1, Pedler to Sabine, 7 February 
1942. 
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empire and was even bored by it. Although Britain was the 
'leader of a world-wide Commonwealth', she had 'lost during 
a cynical interval its old vigorous and unquestioning 
belief in its civilising "mission"' JL7 11 How had this state 
of affairs come about? Perhaps the EMB and CEMB's chickens 
were coming home to roost. As Harlow commented, 'in the 
popular imagination the Empire has tended to become too 
much identified with Australian wool, Canadian apples and 
West African cocoa'. The new objective would not be to 
'advertise' the British Empire, but 'to re-interpret 
it I. L72 
Indifference to the colonial empire, in Harlow's view, 
was also caused by 'remoteness' from colonial life and 
because, 
the greater part of the original Colonial empire, 
consisting of British settlements, has now grown up 
and passed into the category of self-governing 
nations. Apart from Kenya and the Rhodesias and a few 
island communities, the modern colonial Empire 
consists almost entirely of coloured races. The ties 
of kinship are therefore largely absent. 
But the task of educating British public opinion was not as 
difficult as it would first appear, this would be done from 
an entirely fresh angle: 
There will be nothing in the nature of a 'stunt' about 
this, nor will there be anything artificial in the 
freshness of the presentation. On the contrary, the 
task will be to reveal the Empire or Commonwealth for 
what it really is -a laboratory in which experiments 
in inter-national and inter-racial association of 
unique value and importance are being conducted. "' 
The very nature of Britain's relationship with her 
colonial empire was undergoing a radical transformation: 
'trusteeship is being raised from the "care and 
maintenance" basis to a cooperative guardianship'. As this 
change would be primarily concerned with raising the 
colonial peoples' standard of living a comparison was 
obvious. Developments in the empire could be presented 'as 
3--711 PRO, C0875/14/10, Harlow to Gater containing his 
draft memorandum, 'publicity about the British empire', 3 
September 1942. 
1172 PRO, C0875/14/10, Harlow to Gater, 3 September 1942. 
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an essential complement to parallel ideas at home'. 
Moreover, 'all our hopes for a stable, progressive and 
egalitarian society at home are ultimately dependent on the 
establishment and maintenance of security and collaboration 
on a healthy basis in the world at large'. Planning for 
the colonial empire provided a close parallel with 'similar 
though more advanced social and industrial planning at 
home'. 174 
Sabine agreed in general with Harlow's assess'Ment of 
the task before them in educating British public opinion 
'the point must be strongly made that the public are 
responsible - it is their colonial policy'. Harlow saw the 
Permanent Under-Secretary of State, Sir George Gater, about 
his recommendations and received Colonial Office support 
for any representations he would be making to Sir Cyril 
Radcliffe*, the Director-General of the Ministry of 
Information, as well as to the Treasury for more staff in 
order to tackle the new objectives. 3ý'75 
In October 1942 Sabine presented a memorandum for 
consideration by his senior colleagues, a stocktake on the 
activities of the Public Relations Department to date. He 
argued for an increase in staff and noted that it was 'very 
much smaller than of any other great Department of 
171 State'. Publicity policy would also have to be altered 
as Colonial Office activity on this in the past had been 
'to do not so much propaganda as information 
work... [and]... I think some rather more vigorous 
corrective is needed'. While interest had increased in the 
colonies there was a lack of 'any sense of pride in our 
2.74 ibid. 
2-75 PRO, C0875/14/10, minute by Sabine, 7 September 
1942; record of a meeting between Harlow and Gater, 9 
September 1942; Gater subsequently talked to Radcliffe who 
agreed to give Harlow an assistant and for the time being 
the Colonial Office would have to be content given 
pressures the Ministry of Information faced from the 
Treasury, minute by Gater, 15 September 1942. 
1"76 In October 1942 the staff of the Public Relations 
Department consisted of a Public Relations Officer(Sabine), 
two administrative officers, an administrative 
assistant, two Press Officers and two clerical assistants. 
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achievements in the Colonial sphere. There is still too 
much emphasis on the shortcomings and unresolved problems'. 
It was necessary to move away from the national 
characteristic of reluctance to stress British 
achievements. This could be done through propaganda which 
would compare the colonies when Britain took them over with 
what they were in 1942. The theme was largely based on the 
past, and while Sabine recognised that 'history is not 
news' he thought it was necessary because attitudes today 
were based on an 'imperfect appreciation of the past'. 
This theme could be successful if it were accompanied by 'a 
steady stream of material on what we are doing now'. "' 
The Public Relations Department seemed to have found a 
Messiah in the form of the Permanent Under-Secretary of 
State himself. Sir George Gater was impressed with 
Sabine's 'very interesting Report'; he thought Sabine's 
conclusion about the direction publicity should take was 
'right' and Sabine was to be 'congratulated on the range 
of performance by his small staff'-. Gater also wanted to 
look towards increased efforts in the colonies themselves 
and even suggested that Sabine should visit the African 
Dependencies to 'make personal touch' with the Information 
Officers. The main priority was to formulate a coordinated 
scheme of colonial publicity. 1178 Lord Cranborne*, the 
Secretary of State, found Sabine's memorandum 'Most 
helpful' and while he thought Gater's idea for Sabine to 
make a tour of Africa was a good one, he preferred that 
this should be postponed until some of Sabine's 
recommendations had been carried out. 1179 
At last it appeared that the Public Relations 
Department had received endorsement from the highest levels 
"7-7 PRO, C0875/14/10, memorandum by Sabine, 1 October 
1942 and subsequent minute, 10 October 1942. 
2-'Y8 PRO, C0875/14/10, minute by Gater, 8 October 1942. 
The staff of the Public Relations Department stood at one 
Public Relations Officer, two administrative officers, one 
administrative assistant, one Journalist, one press officer 
and two clerical assistants. 
2-119 PRO, C0875/14/10, minute by Cranborne, 13 October 
1942. 
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in the Colonial Office and agreement had been found in 
principle about the expansion of the terms of reference of 
colonial publicity. It also seemed that by the end of the 
year a 'theme' had been found. Gervas Huxley, husband of 
the writer Elspeth Huxley*, veteran of the EMB and the 
International Tea Expansion Board, joined the Ministry of 
Information as the Director of the Empire Division. 180 
Lord Hailey, Huxley argued, had found the theme the 
abandonment of 'trusteeship' and its replacement with- 
'Partnership'. 
The idea of partnership is one that should harmonise 
with the general aspirations of our people for the 
post-war world aspirations firstly of partnership with 
the other members of the United Nations and secondly 
between all the peoples of the world. It should, 
therefore, be possible successfully to present the 
theme that the people of Britain have a very special 
opportunity of senior partnership with the backward 
peoples of the Colonies, for whose welfare we have, in 
the past, assumed responsibility. It should, further, 
be possible to inculcate a pride in maintaining this 
responsibility in the future, as a facet of our new 
restored belief in ourselves, presenting this 
partnership as an opportunity and challenge. "' 
Not only did this provide a means of increasing 
interest in the colonies in the United Kingdom, it would 
provide a way of answering critics abroad, especially in 
the United States. Moreover, it would also provide a 
necessary articulation of Britain's new imperial 'mission', 
particularly important in public relations in the colonies, 
for the future of Britain's empire in Africa a living and 
growing organism. As Huxley himself wrote, the partnership 
theme, 
can be presented as opening up a very real world of 
opportunity for young men in the post-war world. 
Hitherto there has been a tendency on the part of the 
public to regard the Colonies as a field for 
exploitation by the 'Old School Tie. ' It must be shown 
that there is an opportunity for partnership service 
1180 As Sabine wrote of the new champion of the forward 
publicity policy 'I think we are very fortunate in having 
Mr. Huxley associated with us'. PRO, C0875/14/10, minute by 
Sabine, 24 December 1942. C-f- Smyth, 'Britain's African 
Colonies pp. 69-70. 
1181L PRO, C0875/14/10, memorandum by Huxley, 'Colonial 
Publicity in the United Kingdom', undated. 
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by all classes in the vast province of Colonial 
development - in scientific work, in agriculture, in 
marketing, in transport, in health services, in 
education - in all of which fields the Colonial 
peoples must rely, to a greater or less degree and for 
sometime to come, on outside help, and in all of 
which, while not excluding men of other Nations, we, 
by tradition and experience, are qualified to take the 
major share. L82 
The theme of the 'new empire' of 'partnership' aptly 
captured the mood and optimism of 1943, giving public 
expression to the work of the Colonial Office which had 
begun to throw itself wholeheartedly into the process of 
reconstruction and post-war planning. 
Huxley soon put into practice the agreed 'partnership' 
theme and in a further memorandum on activities undertaken 
by the Ministry of Information in the United Kingdom he 
felt it was again necessary to reiterate the theme's 
importance and value. The British public would not be 
enlightened by an 'advertising' campaign, but by a 
'sustained and long-term effort. in education'. By 
stressing the long-term nature of the campaign, the 
implication was obvious: the campaign would not be over 
once peace came. "' 
Sabine was delighted with the progress in the MOI 
under Huxley's guidance; he had 'transformed the Ministry 
almost out of all recognition' not least because the 
Ministry had someone with 'first hand knowledge of the 
Colonies' where before colonial propaganda had been 
'unreal' and in an 'academic form'. Sabine viewed this as 
only the beginning for there was 'no indication that we are 
handling propaganda weapons with the force and urgency 
which will some time be necessary'. 184 
Sir Thomas Lloyd*, Assistant Under-Secretary of State, 
supervising the Public Relations Department, rising star of 
the development generation of Colonial Office officials, 
who was promoted to Permanent Under-Secretary of State in 
1947 on Gater's retirement over more senior men, hoped that 
Ibid. 
103 PRO, C0875/14/11, memorandum by Huxley, 18 May 1943. 
3.04 PRO, C0875/14/11, memorandum by Sabine, 19 May 1943. 
77 
the Colonial Office would be able to 'make the most' of the 
publicity opportunities Huxley was giving them. Sir George 
Gater also appreciated the change at the MOI. Up until 
recently, he wrote, the Colonial Office had to 'goad' the 
Ministry on. Now a new problem had arisen. The MOI was 
'setting such a rapid pace that our Public Relations 
Department is finding difficulty in keeping in step'. 
Therefore as a 'matter of urgency' he thought that the 
Colonial Office should turn its attention towards 
185 'strengthening the Public Relations Department'. 
For the time being the decision on an increase in the 
staff of the Public Relations Department was deferred. 
Meanwhile, the Public Relations Department officials 
focused their attention on the question of post-war 
requirements, given that the educative process would be a 
long-term one. In the first place it was assumed that 
there would be 'a permanent need in the Colonies for 
officers with experience of and aptitude for public 
relations work'. 186 Second, public relations would have a 
significant post-war political role when the Information 
qua Public Relations Officers in the colonies would be 
increasingly important as 'peace and social and economic 
developments would require expert interpretation'. "' 
Although in many colonies the first time an Information 
Officer had been employed had been for the necessity of 
giving out information during the war, his role would be 
expanded to allow them to 'play a more useful and 
responsible part in the [Colonial] administration'. 
Conceived in these terms the Information Officer would be 
part of a more interactive relationship between the 
governed and the governing, (providing closer liaison 
between the government and the people); the press were no 
longer 'regarded 'as sufficiently representative to provide 
11*35 PRO, C0875/14/11, minute by Lloyd, 20 May 1943; 
minute by Gater, 21 May 1943. Sabine prepared a note for 
the Secretary of State's consideration on the publicity 
activities in Britain in August. 
186 PRO, C0875/5/15, minute by Morgan, 11 June 1943. 
187 PRO, C0875/5/15, minute by Usill, undated. 
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an accurate gauge of public opinion'. The Information 
Officer, 
would not only collect and distribute information but 
would act as a liaison between the administration and 
the public. On the one hand, he would keep the 
Government informed about the state of public opinion 
and its reactions to current events and measures 
proposed or taken by the administration, and he would 
advise as to the most appropriate action to enlighten 
and correct that public opinion. On the other hand, 
as an official listening post and mouthpiece he would 
need the confidence and the cooperation of the 
Government and would be regarded as a responsible 
channel for the dissemination of facts and views that 
the Government wished to put before the public. "' 
And as Sabine argued, public relations could ultimately 
help to hold the imperial line: 
The continuation of these services after the war is 
over is a matter of the highest importance... I 
believe that a good Public Relations service in the 
Colonies may do much if handled in the right way to 
bridge the awkward gap which we may expect between the 
rise of political consciousness and the time, which 
may be far distant, when some of the political 
aspirations aroused can be satisfied. 2-09 
This in turn would have implications for Colonial 
Service recruitment. Sir Ralph Furse*, the Director of 
Colonial Service Recruitment, lent force to the more 
general view that all Colonial Service officers should be 
to some extent public relations men. Furse thought that it 
would be a 'brave man who would sit down now to draw the 
map of the British Empire as it may appear in 1950', but 
one thing he thought important whatever the outcome was to 
'prevent too wide a divergence between the trend of 
colonial policy and that of public opinion at home, if not 
also in the Dominions and in certain foreign countries'. 
Furse used the metaphor of the theatre to explore the 
theme: 
What is the audience? Hitherto the gallery - the 
outer, colonial, ring of the theatre - has been vocal, 
often critical, sometimes abusive. The trouble with 
the stalls has been that, they were empty or apathetic. 
Distinguished foreigners seldom criticised from the 
boxes. All this is changing. The change was coming 
anyhow. Singapore has precipitated it. The gallery can 
108 PRO, C0875/5/15, minute by Morgan, 11 June 1943. 
109 PRO, C0875/5/15, minute by Sabine, 24 June 1943. 
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be relied on for the catcalls and oranges(it will be 
peacetime). But in the future the actors from the 
Colonial Service (and the Colonial Office) will have 
to play more difficult parts under a cross fire of 
criticism from all corners of the theatre; from home, 
the Dominions and foreign countries, as well as the 
Colonies. And until the actors, and the best dramatic 
critics, have convinced the public that the play is a 
good play, and not merely an excuse for putting money 
in the pockets of the promoters, and sincere, much of 
the criticism will be misguided or ill-informed: 
defeatist if not actively hostile. 190 
The Colonial Office discussed whether training in 
public relations should be incorporated into courses run at 
Oxford for Colonial Service candidates. David MacDougall*, 
appointed temporary Principal from Hong Kong serving in the 
Public Relations Department in 1942, transferred to the MOI 
before joining the British Embassy staff in Washington as a 
special advisor on Colonial Affairs, put forward the case 
for public relations training to Furse. It was not the aim 
to 'convert colonial cadet officers into amateurish 
newspapermen, publicity hounds or half-baked advertising 
agents', but rather to implant 'in the minds of officials 
at the start of their careers some notion of the power of 
the modern publicity machine ... (an] inescapable element 
of life in the twentieth century'. Moreover, MacDougall 
noted that in a period of diminishing resources the British 
empire could no longer be governed by the censure of 
military presence: 
As a colonial service we govern by consent. Consent is 
in one sense another name for public relations. If as 
a service we can mobilise public opinion, either 
within or without colonial areas, behind governmental 
policies on a basis of sympathetic understanding, then 
obviously we gain greatly ... by instinct we dislike 
it, but we cannot afford not to understand it, and we 
" PRO, C0967/22, 'An Inquiry into the System of 
Training the Colonial Service - with Suggestions for its 
Reform to Meet Post-war Conditions', a memorandum by Sir 
Ralph Furse, 26 November 1943. Furse, it should be 
stressed, was idiosyncratic in maintaining a belief that 
Colonial Officers should be good all-rounders in spite of 
the increasing tendency towards specialisation in the 
Colonial Service, c. f. his autobiography, Aucupari-u-s. * 
Recollections of a Recruitinq Officer (London, 1962). 
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cannot afford to underestimate it. 1911 
The case for Public Relations Department expansion had 
become somewhat sidetracked by Sir Charles Jeffries's 
suggestion for the establishment of a 'Colonial Council- 
British Council-like' body to promote better knowledge of 
the colonies. "' Sabine in a comprehensive and defensive 
memorandum on public relations, sensing the attack from 
those who thought the activities of the Public Relations 
Department were justifiable in time of war only, appealed 
for support in the face of the hostility the Department had 
faced ever since its inception in 1940. In an incredible 
outburst which even to modern ears seems extreme, let alone 
to those who were fighting to rid the world of fascism, 
Sabine attacked the two types of attitudes to public 
relations that he had found in the Colonial Office. The 
first, in his opinion, 'naive and unrealistic' view, which 
he hesitated to call 'crypto-fascist' held: 
a genuine belief that public interest and public 
opinion cannot and should not be allowed to affect the 
shaping and development of our policy, which is the 
province of the expert. 
The second, 'potentially harmful' view of public relations, 
saw it 
as a means of supplying soothing syrup to the public 
and of imposing a point of view upon them, with a 
cyni'cal disregard of all the principles of democracy. 
He rehearsed all the previous arguments: the important role 
public relations would play in the post-war world; the 
great progress made and the success of the various 
11'91L PRO, C0875/19/9, MacDougall to Furse, 13 August 
1943. Sir Charles Jeffries felt there was merit in this 
suggestion and remarked wryly, 'though Mr. MacDougall does 
not suggest that advertising should become a weapon of 
government, I am afraid it is already so! ' 
1192 PRO, C0875/20/8, memorandum by Jeffries, 15 April 
1943. The details do not concern us here but Jeffries 
argued for its immediate establishment as an 'independent' 
body which would have the advantage of appearing more 
objective and that for internal Political reasons 'it is 
undesirable... that the Public Relations Department should 
be larger than any other single department of the Office. ' 
Sabine, on the other hand, thought that it was necessary to 
maintain 'independence and unity of control of our 
propaganda policy and its execution by the Colonial 
Office', ibid., 4 October 1944. 
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campaigns to date; the battle for control between the 
Colonial Office and the MOI; the improvement of relations 
between the MOI and the Colonial Office and the acceptance 
of the theme of 'partnership' as the basis for the 
projection of the 'new empire'. It was important, he 
argued, that their work should be continued and expanded in 
the post-war period because the 'simple fact' had to be 
faced that 'the future of Great Britain depends on its 
future as an Empire and Commonwealth and not as a small 
island in the North Sea with a population of 46,000,000 
people'. 193 
Thomas Lloyd, Assistant Under-Secretary of State was 
impressed with Sabine's argument. He noted that the 
Ministerial Committee on the Machinery of Government had 
agreed that 'considerable Government publicity would be 
required after the war'; that 'Public Relations staffs of 
appropriate size would still be necessary in many 
Departments after the Ministry of Information has 
disappeared' and that it was likely that some sort of 
common service organisation would be retained following the 
disbanding of the Ministry of Information after the war 
with Japan had come to an end. Previously Thomas Lloyd had 
favoured Jeffries' idea for the establishment of a 
'Colonial Council', but was swayed by the conclusions of 
the Ministerial Committee to support Sabine's 
recommendations for an expansion of the staff of the Public 
Relations Department. "' 
Sabine's recommendations for expansion met a serious 
obstacle, however, in the person of Sir Sydney Caine*, 
Assistant Under-Secretary of State in charge of the 
Economics Division, later Third Secretary to the Treasury 
and Director of the London School of Economics. Caine had 
a lack of sympathy with Sabine's 'basic objectives'. 
Nor did he even support Jeffries' ideas for a Colonial 
Council. He questioned the advisability of extending to 
peacetime the functions of a Department which had grown UP 
193 PRO, C0875/20/8, memorandum by Sabine, 4 October 1944. 
1194 PRO, C0875/20/8, Lloyd to Gater, 16 October 1944. 
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in the particular circumstance of wartime. 195 Caine was 
concerned about the political effects of a Public Relations 
Department creating 'embarrassing expectations which will 
not be possible to live up to'. Instead of an active 
public relations policy Caine preferred the old passive 
methods of responding to enquiries and distributing 
information on request. For until the time, he argued, 
when Britain's colonies 'look better in the shop window, we 
had better not put them there'. 1196 
The matter went before a meeting of the Under- 
Secretaries of State and in the meantime the Public 
Relations Department survived Caine's onslaught. The 
meeting decided that they could agree to 'some additions' 
in the Department's staff. 191 Having won a small victory 
in the Colonial Office that for the time at least the 
future existence of the Public Relations Department would 
not be under an immediate threat. Attention then turned 
towards public relations organisation in the colonies 
themselves. In early 1945 the Colonial Office considered 
Sabine's recommendations following a tour he made of the 
African colonies between November 1943 and March 1944. He 
thought that Africans were in need of 'guidance and 
leadership' and had to be encouraged to 'strengthen their 
connexion with us ... to give them a more conscious sense 
of their association with the Empire and Commonwealth'. He 
defined the future functions of colonial public relations 
as: 
A. To interpret the policy of the government to the 
people, and the views of the people to the government 
in the closest co-operation with the Administration 
and the technical departments. B. To provide 
information about Colonial affairs in Great Britain 
and elsewhere. C. To provide the Colonial public with 
information about developments and events in Great 
Britain; to interpret HMG's Colonial policy to the 
Colonial public. D. To act as an advisory and co- 
ordinating agency for the planning and execution of 
Departmental propaganda campaigns. 
1195 PRO C0875/20/8, note by Caine, 31 October 1944. 
3-96 ibid. 
3-97 PRO, C0875/20/8, minute by Lloyd, 11 November 1944. 
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He then went on to outline the 'profile' of an ideal 
Public Relations Officer in the Colonies. He should be a 
Senior Administrative officer of about 15-20 years service. 
His post should become a Secretariat post, and not part of 
a separate Public Relations Department, so that he can keep 
in close contact with 'current policy' and be available for 
consultation at any time. 198 Here perhaps there is an 
element of unrealistic aspirations given the fierce 
competition locally for the services of such scarce and 
desirable officers. 
A joint meeting between the Colonial Office and the 
Ministry of Information was held in January 1945. It was 
decided that Sabine's recommendations should provide the 
basis of a circular despatch to the colonial Governors. 
Debate arose over whether outside 'publicity experts' had a 
role to play; over who should pay for public relations 
activities in the Colonies and if application for financial 
aid could be made under the Colonial Development and 
Welfare Act. Sabine explained that it had not been his 
intention to imply that the Public Relations Officer would 
not have a staff working under him. The idea that he 
should be part of the Secretariat had been proposed so that 
he could deal 'on equal terms' with the other Heads of 
Colonial Departments. The Public Relations Officer would, 
as Thomas Lloyd explained, be able to follow the kind of 
practice in Colonial Labour Offices whereby the Labour 
Officer employed an expert 'to, spread his expert knowledge 
among the Administration. "" 
The Colonial Office then considered the despatch for 
the colonial Governors based on Sabine's report. It was 
thought that the 'sting', as was so often the case, was the 
question of finance. Colonial Development and Welfare 
funds would not normally be available to finance such 
activities therefore the Governors should be encouraged to 
do what they could and 'Cut their coat according to their 
198 PRO, C0875/20/3, report of Sabine's African tour. 
1199 PRO, C0875/20/3, minutes of a meeting between the 
Colonial Office and the Ministry of Information on 
publicity in Africa, undated. 
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The resulting despatch to the African Governors 
embodied all of Sabine's recommendations. It exhorted the 
Governors to continue and extend their publicity services 
after the war and stressed, 
the urgent need ... of securing the widest possible 
understanding of Government policy and the measures 
which will be necessary to deal with the permanent 
problems of administration and the new problems of 
rehabilitation and development. As a result, direct or 
indirect, of the war, there will be a greater 
receptiveness to new ideas and a greater 
susceptibility to outside influences on the part of 
the large African populations. Colonial Governments 
will be planning and carrying out schemes of 
development on a more ambitious scale than ever 
before. The success of these schemes will depend on 
the ready response and co-operation of the people, 
which is most likely to be secured if knowledge is 
widely spread among those it is intended to 
benefit. 20L 
Oliver Stanley*, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
gave this policy his full endorsement . 202 
In public relations within the colonies a long-term 
post-war commitment had been made. Sabine, however, wanted 
the Colonial Office to make a similar long-term commitment 
to public relations within the Colonial Office itself, 
following on from the discussions of the previous November. 
He was still aware of the 'mistrust of and the distaste' 
for public relations in the Office. He thought public 
relations should not merely be tolerated as 'a disagreeable 
but unavoidable necessity' because this attitude would not 
create the conditions under which it could 'prosper'. He 
argued that they 'could 'no longer afford the luxury of 
doing good work, and letting the facts speak for 
themselves'. On the contrary, 'facts do not speak for 
themselves'. In the past Britain had 'neglected over a 
long period to put our case sufficiently strongly and it 
20'0 PRO, C0875/20/3, minutes by Lloyd, 5 March 1945 
and Cohen, 26 February 1945. 
201 PRO, C0875/20/3, circular despatch, 28 April 1945. 
202 PRO, C0875/20/3, minute by Stanley 21 March 1945. 
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has gone by default'. 203 
Before this issue was resolved the war had been won 
and a new Labour Government had been elected. In these new 
circumstances Sabine's ideas met new obstacles. On the one 
hand, Thomas Lloyd thought that such a commitment could be 
made as long as Colonial Office needs could 'be secured 
(and Mr. Sabine is confident they can) by a comparatively 
small Public Relations Department, making full use of the 
common service organisation [the projected Central Office 
of Information]', this would be the 'best arrangement'. 
Even if the machinery of the Ministry of Information, 
established to help in the task of publicity to British 
audiences still existed in the new organisation, Lloyd 
thought Sabine would still need a Deputy. 204 
On the other hand, opposition within the Colonial 
Office persisted. Caine remained of the same opinion that 
'a permanent policy of actively pressing selected 
information about the Colonies is undesirable'. Edward 
Gent*, Assistant Under-Secretary of State in charge of the 
Eastern Department, countered by arguing that 'nobody is 
advocating a continuance of war time practice' but he too 
thought something on the lines of a quarterly review of 
available material would suffice. Jeffries thought it 
'most desirable' for the British public to take 'an 
intelligent interest in the Colonies', but he came back to 
his idea of promoting this through a Colonial Council 
205 acting as 'an effective unofficial organisation'. 
Sabine reiterated his arguments on the assumption that 
the new Secretary of State would 'wish a progressive and 
energetic public relations policy to be pursued by the 
Colonial Office' and the matter was put to a meeting of the 
Assistant Under-Secretaries of State. It was acknowledged 
that until the intention of the new Government was made 
203 PRO, C0875/20/8, minute by Sabine, 30 June 1945. 
2-04 PRO, C0875/20/8, minutes by Lloyd, 14 july 1945 
and 3 September 1945. 
205 PRO, C0875/20/8, minute by Caine, 15 August 1945; 
25 minute by Gent, 16 August 1945; minute by Jeffries, 
August 1945. 
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clear no final decisions would be made; and that while 
'there was some difference of opinion on the need for a 
vigorous and active publicity policy, there was 
'substantial agreement that if an active policy was to be 
pursued, the proposals made by Mr. Sabine... were generally 
acceptable'. "' 
At last Sabine had overcome the major hurdle in 
getting his ideas for an active, progressive and long-term 
colonial publicity policy accepted in principle by his most 
vocal opponents, his own colleagues within the Colonial 
Office. The implementation of his ideas would have to 
await the decisions of the new Labour Government. 
The campaign designed to enlighten British public 
opinion about the empire would also continue post-war. The 
report of the Official Committee of Government Information 
Services decided that the Empire Information Service of the 
Ministry of Information would continue as a service 
department within the new Central Office of Information 
when it was inaugurated in April 1946. The responsibility 
for policy would be the joint responsibility of the 
Colonial, Dominions, India and Burma Offices. 207 
No substantial changes were made in colonial public 
relations until the appointment of Kenneth Blackburne* in 
May 1947 as Director of Information Services and the 
personal interest shown by the second Secretary of State 
for the Colonies in the Labour government, Arthur Creech 
Jones*. 211 Blackburne was more senior than Sabine and had 
a respected record in the Colonial Service in Nigeria and 
206 PRO, C0875/20/8, note by Sabine, undated; note of 
meeting, undated. 
207 PRO, C0875/21/1, note by the Central Office of 
Information, 1 August 1946. 
7-01B PRO, C0875/22/5, Circular despatch to all Colonial 
Governments, 12 May 1947. Noel Sabine left the Colonial 
office and the Colonial Service altogether but continued 
his commitment to the public relations task of 
communicating to colonial audiences, albeit in the 
commercial field, as Managing Director of Broadcast Relay 
Service (Overseas) Ltd. which operated in the West Indies 
and East Africa, c. f. PRO, C0875/64/3, Colonial Office to 
Kenya, 31 December 1949 and C0875/67/6, Leechman to 
Blackburne, 11 January 1950. 
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Palestine. He had also served as Colonial Secretary in the 
Gambia and as Administrative Secretary to the Comptroller 
of Development and Welfare in the West Indies, territories 
not without a high public profile and surrounded by 
controversy. Creech Jones, despite his role as guardian of 
the interests of colonial peoples and check on the colonial 
policy of the government as the Chairman of the Fabian 
Colonial Bureau, had first hand experience of the dangers 
of ignorance about the British empire when he found himself 
defending Britain's colonial record during a wartime visit 
209 to Canada and the United States. 
Blackburne's appointment coincided with the period in 
which the government decided to intensify the development 
initiative, as much to ease British economic problems as to 
fulfil promises of the 'new empire' of partnership for the 
benefit of all and when the Colonial Office was preparing 
the statement of policy on Local Government. Clearly 
controversial, these initiatives would require careful 
handling when made public. One month after his 
appointment, Blackburne submitted a long memorandum to Sir 
Charles Jeffries, now the Deputy Permanent Under-Secretary 
of State, in which he made suggestions to help equip the 
Colonial Office to meet the public relations challenges. 
Although Blackburne admitted he had no previous experience 
of public relations work, he had received advice from 
Gervas Huxley who had been recently appointed as Honorary 
Adviser to the Secretary of State for the Colonies on 
Information Services. He thought guidance was urgently 
needed because of the feeling in the department 'that we do 
not know where we are going'. His note aimed at 'providing 
not only suggestions to higher authority but also an answer 
to the feeling of doubt in the Department'. Accordingly, 
the Information Department was strengthened and reorganised 
210 with creative and long-term planning sections. 
In order to fulfil Colonial Office Information 
Department objectives on what they were looking for in a 
209 Lee and Petter, OR. Cit., P. 137. 
22-0 PRO, C0875/42/6, memorandum by Blackburne, 11 June 
1947. C. f. Chapter Seven. 
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Public Relations Officer in the colonies, Blackburne wished 
to see the development of 'an esprit de corps' among 
officers serving in existing departments and to encourage 
the exchange of staff between the colonies. 2111 In February 
the following year Blackburne noted the difficulty the 
Colonial Office was experiencing in filling Public 
Relations posts in the colonies. Although risky it was 
thought necessary 'to look to the outside market'. William 
Morgan*, Blackburne's deputy, thought that every effort 
should be made to correct any impression that public 
relations was 'a suitable resting place for "dead-end" 
administrative officers'. Indeed this type of work should 
attract the 'brighter types' since it would add 'a useful 
qualification for high promotion in the political field'. 
As a result a further circular despatch was sent to the 
Colonies outlining Colonial Office attitudes to the 
staffing of Colonial Public Relations Departments-23-2 
The next major change occurred in October 1948 
following the adoption of an offensive anti-Communist 
propaganda campaign earlier that year. Therefore in 
addition to the projection of Britain to the colonies, the 
projection of the colonies to Britain and the projection of 
the colonies to the world, a fourth Cold War objective was 
added to the Colonial Office's Information Department's 
terms of reference. 213 
The Blackburne proposals were now in place, and little 
changed in organisation and terms of reference of the 
Information Department throughout the 1950s. Sir Charles 
Jeffries wrote in 1950 that Blackburne was to be 
congratulated on his 'record of very considerable 
achievement'. "' As has been seen this had been an upward 
23-11 PRO, C0875/22/5, Blackburne to Jeffries, 
October 1947. 
2112 PRO, C0875/22/5, minute by Blackburne, 28 February 
1948; minute by Morgan, 28 February 1948; circular despatch 
to all colonies, 28 April 1948. 
213 C. f. Chapter 7; PRO, C0875/42/7, memorandum bY 
Blackburne, 16 October 1948. 
2.14 PRO, C0875/73/1, minute by Jeffries, 23 February 1950- 
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struggle. The crucial period in which many of the 
subsequent developments had been first mooted had been 
during the war when the inter-war passivity was gradually 
surmounted. Instrumental in this story was the realism of 
Malcolm MacDonald, the persistence of Noel Sabine and the 
confidence inspired by Gervas Huxley. A catalyst proved to 
be the threat posed by the MOI to the responsibilities of 
the Secretary of Sate for the Colonies. The control of 
colonial propaganda had been wrested away from the MOI and 
a policy had been adopt which was not merely concerned with 
the short-term requirement of winning the war and surviving 
the attacks of American opinion. The propaganda 
specialists in the Public Relations Department eventually 
eroded the opposition they faced within the Colonial Office 
and gained acceptance of a permanent role for public 
relations in the activities of the Colonial Office and 
Colonial Service. The criticism that the Colonial Office 
experience of war-time propaganda had left it unable to 
'win the peace' therefore has to be modified. "' It was 
not that Colonial Office publicists had been unwilling to 
try to 'win the peace'. Indeed they were well aware of the 
possible consequences should a forward policy not be 
pursued post-war. Arguably one of the greatest propaganda 
tasks they had faced had been to persuade their own 
colleagues of the value and necessity of public relations 
work. 
71-5 Smyth, 'Britain's African Colonies ... 1, passi - 
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CHAPTER TWO 
WAR PROPAGANDA ABOUT EAST AND CENTRAL AFRICA, 1939-41 
The Second World War had a dramatic impact on the 
course of British history in the second half of the 
twentieth century in all areas of historical study, social 
and domestic, foreign and defence, and economic. Moreover, 
the Second World War represented a watershed in Britain's 
relationship with her colonies, producing 'far reaching 
changes in relations between the governors and the 
governed'. ' As Michael Crowder has written in the 
Cambridae History of Africa, historical debate has 
concentrated more on the nature of this watershed, whether, 
on the one hand, it unleashed new forces or merely 
stimulated forces already in play, rather than on what 
actually occurred in Africa and in Africa's relationship 
with Britain. What can be asserted with confidence, he 
suggests, is that the African colonies were more affected 
by the Second World War than they had been by the First 
World War. 2 It has also been argued in chapter one that 
the war began the process of fundamental change in the 
outlook of the Colonial Office to public relations and that 
'accountability became as crucial an issue for the 
[Colonial] Office as efficiency'. 3 
Despite the hardships of the great depression the 
British imperial system went-to war intact. In 1939 British 
imperialists had every reason to be optimistic. The 
collapse of the imperial system in South-East Asia did not 
occur until 1942 and the political turbulence in the Indian 
subcontinent was not mirrored in Africa. Although 'Africa 
did not experience the dislocation of war as'dramatically 
as did Asia' nevertheless, 'planning for its political 
future was no less complicated for that'. ' By 1939 'the 
3- Andrew Porter and A. J. Stockwell, British_lmperial 
Policy and Decolonisation, 1938-64: Volume 
-1,1938-51, (London, 1987), p. 21. 
Crowder, OP. Cit., p. 2. 
3 Lee and Petter, OR-cit., P-115. 
4 Porter and Stockwell, 02. cit-, p. 35. 
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European powers were as firmly in control of their African 
territories as they ever would bel. 5 Prior to 1939 African 
criticism of British imperialism was largely limited to the 
nature of imperialism rather than to its existence. Early 
prospects for African independence were not on the 
political agenda in 1939. Up to this point the Labour 
Party only had Indian independence on its programme, even 
self-government for African colonies was seen as a remote 
prospect. 6 Even the demands of the emerging nationalists 
were modest in comparison with Asia; in 1943 the more 
politically advanced in comparison with East and Central 
African political leaders, West African Students Union 
called for 'internal autonomy for each of the four West 
African colonies'. 7 
Although little military action took place in the 
African continent south of the Sahara during the Second 
World War, the temptation to view the war as external to 
Africa should be avoided. While it has been argued that 
'Africans experienced the Second World War vicariously 
through war news and propaganda' this misses the point as 
'there was scarcely a level of life, both material and less 
tangible, that was not fundamentally affected from the Cape 
to Cairol. 8 Total war demanded total effort. Moreover a 
cooperative effort was demanded not only of Britain and her 
allies but also of Britain in partnership with her empire, 
be they members of the fighting forces or civilians engaged 
Crowder, op. cit., p. 8. 
r- Crowder, ibid., p. 4. Crowder also quotes the 
statement made by the Labour Colonial Secretary in the 
National Government, Malcolm MacDonald in 1938 on political 
development in African colonies, 'It may take generations, 
or even centuries, for the peoples in some parts of the 
colonial empire to achieve self-government. But it is a 
major part of our policy even among backward peoples of 
Africa, to teach them always to be able to stand a little 
more on their own two feet'. 
7 Quoted in Henri Grimal, Decolonization: the British. 
French, Dutch and Belgian Empires, 1919-1963 (London, 
1978), p. 120. 
8 Rosaleen Smyth, 'War Propaganda ... in Northern Rhodesia', p. 345; David Killingray and Richard Rathbone, 
Africa and the Second World War, (London, 1986), p. 2. 
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in war work, factory workers in London or Nairobi. As the 
war progressed the colonies in Africa were to become 
increasingly vital to the British war effort, particularly 
in supplying the Middle Eastern theatre. They provided 
essential raw materials and food stuffs, were a source of 
manpower and made direct monetary contributions. For 
example, by the end of 1943 Northern Rhodesia was 
contributing a staggering 3.4 million pounds to the war 
effort, compared with its estimated annual revenue of 2.6 
million pounds in 1942.9 By mid-1941 91,000 Africans had 
been mobilized to fight in the East African campaign and by 
1945 86,740 African Tanganyikans had been conscripted. 10 
Products from East and Central Africa included Tanganyikan 
sisal, gold, pyrethrum, tobacco, millet, cotton and beef,, 
Kenyan sisal, gold, maize, coffee, cotton, tea, beef; 
Ugandan cotton, millet, coffee and beef; Nyasaland tea and 
coffee; Southern Rhodesian gold, asbestos, copper and 
chrome ore and Northern Rhodesian zinc, copper, cobalt, 
millet, maize and vanadium. " During the war the African 
colonies dramatically increased the extraction of raw 
materials and also began to process them, not merely export 
them. The war also witnessed the development of the 
infrastructure in Africa with the expansion of the ports of 
Mombasa and Dar-es-Salaam and the growth of towns like 
Nairobi. 
But these benefits to Britain's war effort also 
brought new factors and hardships into play. Cooperation 
was at times grudging. Britain became vulnerable to 
accusations of exploiting her African colonies which had to 
accept new conditions imposed by exchange controls, rising 
inflation, restrictions on trade with non-sterling 
countries, import and export quotas, price control and 
rationing, of labour conscription. The novelty of direct 
metropolitan intervention into the economies of the African 
colonies and large scale planning had inevitable 
9 Porter and Stockwell, OR. cit., p. 22. 
10 Killingray and Rathbone, OV. cit., p. 147. 
. I. ' PRO, INF1/245/file. 
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consequences for the post-war relationship between Britain 
and her colonies. The direction of colonial economies 
created new habits and responsibilities undertaken by the 
metropolitan government which were not altogether 
relinquished in the postwar period. It was hoped that the 
Imodernisation' of the African economies which brought 
rapid increases in the standard of living for Africans 
could be 'sold' as advancement. It was also clear that 
'development was a major item on the political agendal. 12 
Britain responded with a new commitment under the Colonial 
Development and Welfare Act in 1940 of 5 million pounds for 
development projects, a 'testimony to the values for which 
Britain was fighting and a sign of her confidence in 
victory' . 13 It was hoped that this commitment would have 
the additional advantage of 'buying off' all 'but the most 
extreme activists and at the same time would remove the 
underlying social conditions that gave nationalism "street 
credibility"'. " 
With hindsight it is possible to argue that British 
optimism as to the future ofý-their position in Africa was 
unrealistic. The war, created new problems which were not 
tackled in a comprehensive way in the course of the war. 
The question of the constitutional development of the 
African colonies was largely suspended, as all efforts were 
subordinated to the task of winning the war. The situation 
faced by Britain in East and Central Africa was further 
complicated by the existence of vocal white settler 
communities who, because of manpower shortages in the 
colonial service, had achieved new positions of 
responsibility. This, in addition to their important role 
in war production, would mean that they were even more 
unlikely to accept a return to their pre-war position. In 
turn, this led the British government to make promises, 
albeit vague, to consider increased settler participation 
in government. However the picture provided by official 
112 Killingray and Rathbone, OP-cit., p. 7 
X3 Porter and Stockwell, op. cit., p. 20. 
14 Killingray and Rathbone, OP. cit., p. 7 
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British propaganda about the British empire in East and 
Central Africa during the Second World War was notable for 
the absence of these controversial questions. A positive 
image of empire and its prospects for the future was 
projected and although there was an inclination within the 
Colonial Office to own up to past mistakes in the context 
of promising a better future one is hard pressed to find 
mention in government propaganda of the controversial 
issues of the day: segregation and the colour bar, forced 
labour, riots in the Copperbelt in 1940, labour unrest in 
Kenya in 1943, riots in Uganda in 1945, settler agitation 
for amalgamation in Central Africa and Closer Union in East 
Africa, the future of European settlement or produce price 
fixing. 
All had become vulnerable because of improved 
technical developments in mass communications and in 
African education. This had two major effects, first, 'a 
much larger segment of the African population was aware of 
the issues involved' and second, by bringing the Africans 
irrevocably into the mainstream of international politics, 
'the forces stirred in Africa by the Second World War were 
aimed at securing control of the houses the Europeans had 
built'. 15 The way in which this effort was mobilised by 
British propaganda in East and Central Africa and the 
manner in which East and Central Africa were projected in 
the course of the Second World War to various audiences, to 
the Africans, Indians and Europeans living in these 
territories; to the British public; and to American and 
'world' opinion will be explored. Armed conflict in an age 
of mass communications meant that everyone was on the 
front-line in the propaganda war. Given the propinquity of 
Italian enemy territories in Italian Somaliland and 
Abyssinia, the British territories in East and Central 
Africa were directly vulnerable to any propaganda offensive 
mounted by the enemy. 
Organising the propaganda arm 
in East and Central Africa 
15 Crowder, op. cit., p. 2 and pp. 18-20. 
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In September 1939 machinery for the conduct of 
propaganda in and about Britain's African colonies was in 
its infancy. As has been seen until this point the 
Colonial Office's publicity organisation was limited in the 
person of a single Press Officer who was shared with the 
Dominions Office. In the pre-war period the colonial 
empire was not well supplied by news from the outside world 
depending in the main on commercial agencies. For a record 
of day to day events the main channels of communications 
were Reuters, a limited number of colonial newspaper 
correspondents and the Empire Service of the BBC. " The 
development of internal broadcasting arrangements even in 
the larger colonies left much to be desired. L7 In February 
1939 detailed planning began for the establishment of a 
Ministry of Information on the outbreak of war. No 
separate machinery was envisioned for the Colonial Office, 
which would work with the Colonial Section of the Ministry 
of Information's Empire Publicity Division in conducting 
propaganda in the colonies. An officer from the Colonial 
Office would be seconded to the MOI for the duration of the 
war to ensure close liaison between the two Ministries. 
In the African colonies the colonial governments were 
faced with the task of creating publicity organisations 
from scratch. As in London, little attention had been paid 
before the outbreak of war to the need of these colonial 
governments to articulate their policies to the populations 
in their territories by establishing Information offices, 
beyond the personal contacts the District and Provincial 
Commissioners had with the populations in the territories 
for which they were responsible. The outbreak of the 
Second World War forced the colonial governments to engage 
in propaganda activities of which they had little 
experience. Thus the story of the propaganda efforts made 
by the Empire Division of the MOI, the Colonial Office and 
the colonial governments in the first part of the war 
116 For Reuters and the empire, c. f., Donald Read, 
'Reuters: News Agency of the British Empire', Contemporary 
Record, 8: 2, Autumn 1994. 
117 Shuckburgh, op. cit., p. 177. 
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reflects the problems and improvisations associated with 
this new activity. There were disputes between the MOI and 
the Colonial Office. There were difficulties in financing 
and staffing propaganda. There was the problem of trying 
to resolve the paradox of ensuring uniformity in propaganda 
because of the necessity of speaking with one voice in all 
British wartime propaganda output whilst also acknowledging 
the regional diversity of the colonial empire and the 
adjustments that would be necessary to appeal to particular 
audiences. There were choices to be made over type and 
content of propaganda. If the result then appeared to be 
haphazard this was not surprising. The publicists were 
learning on the job. 
The empire was recognised as crucial to the war effort 
and this was reflected in the priority it was given by pre- 
war planners. The order of priority was as follows: 1(l) 
Home, (2) Empire, (3) Allies, (4) Forces in the Field, (5) 
USA, (6) Enemy, (7) Neutrals other than the USA'. The 
reasoning was: 
if the Home front goes, everything goes; if the Empire 
front goes the Empire disintegrates; if the Allies 
front goes the chances of victory are greatly 
diminished; of all the neutrals the USA is likely to 
be the most important. "a 
Publicity in the British empire was founded on four 
principles: 'information should be truthful and 
straightforward', it was to be 'expressively adapted to the 
country or group of countries for which it was intended' 
and the 'maximum devolution both in the distribution and in 
the final preparation of material of all kinds'. 
Territories would, it was envisioned, be grouped together, 
co-ordinated and supervised by a Regional Information 
Officer, possibly a retired colonial service officer. 
Responsibility for formulating policy in respect of empire 
propaganda and for preparing necessary central propaganda, 
like all British wartime propaganda lay with the MOI and 
responsibility for the execution of policy, distributing 
material in the colonies and adapting material to meet 
110 PRO, INF1/709, MOI Publicity Division - Central 
Organisation, memorandum by Rhodes, August-September 1938. 
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local requirements laid with the colonial Governments. 19 
It is noteworthy that at this stage the Colonial Office had 
no objections to the principle of MOI responsibility over 
policy for propaganda in the colonial empire. Perhaps it 
took the actual experience of dealing with the consequences 
of this decision to change attitudes towards the question 
of responsibility before action was taken. The principles 
of devolution and specialisation proved to be a little 
optimistic. The issue of financing propaganda issued by 
the colonial governments, albeit based on MOI material 
customised to local needs was not addressed. 
This was, however, for the future. The colonial 
governments were sent a highly secret despatch in May 1939, 
even before the House of Commons was told that a MOI would 
be established in the event of war on 15 June 1939. This 
despatch informed the Governors that a MOI would be 
established in the event of war, asked for their 
cooperation with its work and suggested ways of helping the 
planning for the imperial propaganda effort. The colonial 
governments were asked to furnish London with information 
about the press in each territory, including political 
affiliations and organisations with which each newspaper 
was connected, size of audience and its 'utility' as a 
propaganda channel in time of war; information about the 
broadcasting facilities in each colony including 
suggestions for improvement;. information about the 
distribution and display of films in the territories, 
including the films' origin, popularity and whether 
additional means of display were required like the 
provision of cinema vans; information about the existence 
of private or semi-official bodies which could be used to 
disseminate information, like the churches, clubs and 
British firms; information about the activities of foreign 
powers and lastly the broad nature of propaganda desirable 
in the event of war. Once the war had begun the colonial 
governments would be expected to provide the MOI with 
119 PRO, C0323/1660/10, memorandum no. 230, 'Publicity 
in the British Empire', Publicity Division of the MOI: 
Planning Section, 20 June 1939. 
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reviews of the press, broadcasts and films, periodic 
suggestions about the kind of publicity which would be 
suitable for each particular colony, an assessment of the 
effect of British propaganda on the populations and 
assessments of the impact of the war on the 'psychology' of 
the population. To facilitate these new tasks, the 
colonial governments were urged to appoint an Information 
Officer. 20 
As part of preparations for the war, the Treasury 
proposed to give the Colonial Office an additional 30,000 
pounds on the Colonial and Middle East Services vote for 
the purchase of equipment such as cinema vans in peacetime. 
The Economic Department of the Colonial Office was 
incredulous. Propaganda was not on their list of 
priorities, 
it is rather ironic that HMG is prepared to provide 
free of cost to Colonial Governments equipment for 
which they have not asked and which many of them do 
not want, whereas Colonial Governments are themselves 
required to pay for essential weapons and military 
211 
equipment for which they have been asking for years. 
The surveys from the colonies which were the result of 
the circular despatch reveal that the potential of 
broadcasting does not appear to have been recognised in the 
colonies, as we saw in chapter one the expense involved in 
establishing government-controlled stations was 
prohibitive. Indeed, colonial governments were reluctant 
to embark on any new activities which required new 
budgetary commitments in peacetime let alone war. In 
addition, there seems to have been an overemphasis on the 
press and written materials as the major conduit of 
propaganda. While of course this medium was more permanent 
and suitable for the Europeans and educated audiences, 
account does not seem to be taken of the literacy levels of 
the African audiences in East and Central Africa even if 
materials were produced in the vernacular. The importance 
of radio and film however was increasingly recognised as 
20 PRO, C0323/1660/10, circular despatch to all 
colonies, 15 May 1939. 
211 PRO, C0323/1660/10, minute by Lee, 26 July 1939. 
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the war developed as non-printed materials were 
increasingly favoured. As far as content of propaganda, 
the recommendations reflect two attitudes: first, to leave 
the African as undisturbed as possible, continuing good 
administrative practice and second, if any propaganda at 
all was necessary, to emphasise the evils of Nazism. It is 
also important to note that observations on the suitability 
of the various medium for communication to the African 
populations would have been based largely on personal 
observations and anecdotal evidence rather than the result 
of any kind of scientific examination. Indeed the 
assessments of the unsuitablilty of sound film as a 
propaganda conduit was underestimated because African 
audiences were seen as too 'unsophisticated' or 'backward' 
appears to contemporary audiences patronising. 
Kenya asked for guidance on propaganda techniques to 
advise a publicity committee under the Director of 
Education. Copies of Lasswell's Propaganda Technigue in the 
Great War and Rogerson's Propaganda in the Next War were 
sent to Kenya in May. 22 Kenya voiced initial reservations 
about embarking on or making the financial commitment to 
innovative schemes to transmit propaganda. Although Kenya 
was one of the few territories with its own radio station, 
broadcasting to the African was not thought to be a 
'practical proposition' or at this stage even likely to 
serve 'any particular purpose'. While the largest European 
settler population of East Africa was understandably well 
catered for by the press in Kenya, Africans posed the 
greatest difficulty. " The majority of Africans were non- 
literate, and even those who were literate did 'not pass on 
to others such printed information as is available to 
them'. Plans were, however made to establish a government 
controlled publication. Personal contact with Africans was 
viewed as being important and it was felt that it would be 
22 PRO, C0323/1663/7, Kenya to Colonial Office, 16 
March 1939; Colonial Office to Kenya, 10 May 1939. 
23 The African to settler Population in Kenya was 
roughly 200 to 1 at this time while the Indian population 
was roughly double the European population. 
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'vital' for Administrative Officers to organize and address 
native meetings in wartime. While travelling cinema vans 
were regarded favourably, Kenya did not possess facilities 
of their own. 24 
The most important English publication in Kenya, 
indeed in East Africa in general, among the Europeans and 
educated Africans and Asians was the East African Standard, 
which also owned the Mombasa Times and had a controlling 
share of the Tanqanvika Standard. It had a close 
relationship with the Kenyan government, strongly supported 
European settlement, at times in opposition to Indian views 
and was tolerant and encouraging to 'native aspirations', 
not necessarily compatible attitudes it could be argued. 
The Kenya Daily Mail was a bi-lingual English and Gujerati 
newspaper. It was widely read by Indians and some 
Europeans particularly in the coastal region of Kenya and 
strongly supported the political rights and privileges of 
the Indians but seldom expressed extreme views. Weekly 
periodicals included the, Enqlish Sunday Post was read by 
Europeans and educated Indians throughout East Africa. It 
strongly supported European settlement and was often 
critical of government policy. The Kenva Weekly News was 
devoted to settler interests and was widely read by 
Europeans and the farming community in particular. The bi- 
lingual English and Gujerati Colonial Times was linked to 
the Labour Trade Union of East Africa, the Indian 
Association and the East African Indian National Congress. 
It was an important medium through which the activities of 
the Indian political bodies were made known to the Indian 
communities in East Africa. As such it strongly supported 
Indian rights and privileges. African vernacular 
publications included the independent Luo Maqazine read by 
the Luo peoples of the region, passed from one to another 
in towns and in the Native Reserves. Of 'considerable 
importance', and a publication to be monitored carefully in 
the future, was the Kikuyu Central Association's monthly 
paper Muiqwithania. Its London representative was Jomo 
24 PRO, C0323/1663/7, Kenya to Colonial Office, 6 July 
1939. 
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Kenyatta. It strongly supported African, and particularly 
Kikuyu, rights and privileges and had a 'slightly 
communistic flavour from time to time through Jomo 
Kenyatta's association with the Communist Party in the 
United Kingdom'. Its Monthly circulation of 1,200 belied 
its true importance. It was estimated that as many as 50 
people saw each copy and it reached an even wider audience 
as its contents were often spread by word of mouth. Other 
periodicals included trade, school, church and police 
magazines, and the Nazi Party monthly Ost Afrika Warte. 25 
The cinema had been popular with the African 
populations in Kenya, in particular, cartoons and the films 
made by the EMB. The concern voiced in Britain before the 
war about the dominance of foreign films in the colonial 
market appears to be justified; only 25% of films came from 
Britain, the vast majority were of American origin. The 
most popular films in the Indian community were those 
depicting Indian life. The major problem was that the 
government lacked facilities to display films themselves. 
Kenya for its climate and scenery was thought to be almost 
as 'ideal as Hollywood for production purposes' and it was 
surprising that 'no British company has yet realised the 
value of the conditions existing in Kenya'. 16 
The former German colony and League of Nations 
mandated territory with a small European population less 
well-entrenched than its Kenyan neighbour, Tanganyika 
thought that the kind of propaganda desirable in wartime 
would be '(a) protective and (b) of a tranquilising 
character'. The most effective means of Itranquilising' 
the Africans would be 'the least possible dislocation of 
the British policy of trusteeship... if normal education and 
medical facilities were to be kept in operation there is 
little doubt they would exert a valuable and beneficial 
influence in maintaining the morale of the African 
population'. Tanganyika it can be seen did not favour 
widespread or aggressive publicity, particularly as far as 
25 ibid. Kikuyu political activities were suppressed 
on security grounds during the war. 
26 ibid. 
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the African populations were concerned. 27 The smaller 
settler population than Kenya was reflected in the range of 
periodicals produced in the territory. Tanganyikans read a 
lot of newspapers from areas outside Tanganyika, for 
example the South African papers, the Natal Mercury and the 
Johannesburq Star and papers from India, the Illustrated 
Weekly of India and the Bombay Chronicle. Of the 
newspapers produced in Tanganyika the only English language 
paper was the Tanqanyika Standard which while claiming to 
be non-political and devoted to the interests of Tanganyika 
was nevertheless owned by the Kenyan group of the East 
African Standard. Its circulation in northern Tanganyika 
was restricted anyway because for geographical reasons the 
East African Standard from Nairobi arrived more quickly. 
The Indian community was served by two bi-lingual English 
and Gujerati newspapers the Tanqanyika Opinion and the 
Tanganyika Herald. The Opinion was a pro-Gandhi and pro- 
Indian nationalist paper, liberal but inclined to the left 
and was also read by Indians in Uganda and Kenya. The 
Herald claimed to be non-political and to be interested in 
protecting the interests of Indians in Tanganyika. The two 
most important vernacular papers for the African 
populations were the Swahili monthly Mambo Leo and the bi- 
lingual Kwetu. Mambo Leo was government owned and 
controlled and was seen as the 'most valuable newspaper for 
communicating information to the African population' as 
literate Africans read the paper to non-literate Africans. 
Kwetu was produced every 18 days and was pro-British, 
aiming to stimulate the Africans 'to better themselves'. 20 
Tanganyika did not have a broadcasting station of its 
own. Programmes were supplied by the nearest station in 
Nairobi. Kenya and South Africa supplied Tanganyika with 
commercial films and newsreels. The majority, 68% of 
feature films shown in Tanganyika were American in origin, 
while only 22% came from Britain. The type of film most 
favoured by the Africans seemed to be musicals and 
27 PRO, C0323/1663/7, Tanganyika to Colonial Office, 
15 july 1939. 
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historical films like Victoria the Great and any film 
featuring Deanna Durbin was 'assured of a large 
audience'. 19 
Uganda, the 'black man's country' of the three East 
African territories had few European settlers, and the most 
significant immigrant population was Indian. Uganda also 
had a more educated African population than the other 
territories. The Bugandan people with their own king, the 
Kabaka and 'parliament' the Lukiko dominated a tribally 
diverse territory. The Governor of Uganda, Sir Philip 
Mitchell*, had spent all his career in East and Central 
Africa and was later Governor of Kenya, was sympathetic to 
the role of propaganda in the event of war. He thought 
that the Ugandan government could expect the cooperation of 
the Missionary societies, the Native Authorities and the 
native government of Buganda. Propaganda most desirable 
during the war would be the 'provision of regular and 
reliable news, with particular stress upon the part played 
by British African and Indian combatants'. References to 
any enemy anti-Islamic action would be of help in 
propaganda for the Muslim communities. Other useful themes 
would be allusion to the vital role of Ugandan cotton and 
other products in the Imperial war effort and personal 
messages from and news about the Royal Family. Above all, 
however, he thought that as little disturbance to the 
African way of life as possible would be the best 
propaganda, 'the maintenance of produce markets would... be 
far more effective and reassuring than any other form of 
propaganda'. ` 
In Uganda as far as the press was concerned, the East 
African Standard was the leading English newspaper read by 
all communities 'particularly in times of crisis'. The 
other English language publication was the Uganda Herald, 
an 'independent weekly, but pro-British'. The Herald was 
thought to be 'a very useful medium' whose proprietors were 
willing to place the resources of the firm at the disposal 
29 ibid. 
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of the government in time of need. Uganda produced no 
Indian publications of its own, but 43 Indian publications 
from other sources were read in Uganda. The African 
community was served by a number of publications in 
Lugandan. A useful medium for propaganda was the weekly 
Matalisi or the 'Messenger' which was read by the majority 
of Africans and was independent. However, the twice weekly 
Musale or 'Leader' serving the Catholic community of 
Ugandans, was not considered a reliable medium because of 
the uncertainty of the owner's political and local outlook. 
It was felt that the thrice monthly Tula-Nkunn-yonnyole or 
'Sit down and I will Explain' could possibly be induced to 
publish government communications. The twice weekly Dobozi 
Iva Buganda or 'Uganda Voice' was totally unreliable as the 
then editor had been prosecuted twice for 'libellous matter 
directed against the Buganda government and Ministers'. 
The fortnightly Munyonyozi or 'Reporter' which was founded 
in 1922 and the Gambuze or 'Ask Me What News' were also 
seen as cooperative with the government . 33. 
For financial reasons Uganda had postponed the 
implementation of a broadcasting scheme which had been 
tested in the pre-war period. In any case few Africans 
owned wireless sets of their own. Instead the Ugandan 
government was willing to consider broadcasting daily 
bulletins through the establishment of a public address 
system. Uganda possessed no cinema vans but in the cinemas 
in towns the kind of films most favoured in the Indian 
community were either historical, mythological or 'so- 
called "modern life" with a moral attached'. Films in 
English would only appeal to a minority of Africans. But 
it was felt that action films would find the greatest 
favour like Robin Hood, Tarzan or Sanders of the River. 
Films of the modern European comedy variety were not 
considered suitable for the African. While the African 
liked to be amused he 'must understand the film to 
appreciate itt. 32 
31 ibid. 
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The Provincial Commissioner in the Northern Province 
of Uganda thought that propaganda should not be over-active 
as the Africans in his area were 'very excitable and 
warlike'. He suggested a number of suitable themes: 
a) contrast between pre-war German methods and British 
methods 
b) rape of Abyssinia and its consequent misery 
c) the benefits accruing from British administration 
d) the aims of Nazism and Fascism, and their effect on 
African life if introduced 
e) should not be confined to local problems only 
f) should not be associated with religion since it is 
our policy that religion is a matter for a man's 
conscience and not for the state. 
He thought, however, that reference to Abyssinia should be 
handled with caution because 'in the minds of some of the 
Africans we are not free from blame for what has 
occurred' . 31 
The government of Zanzibar thought it would be 
difficult to define a propaganda line peculiar to Zanzibar. 
Zanzibar's population was Arab rather than African, but as 
a trading territory had economic links with the East 
African coastline. The Resident, Sir John Hathorn Hall*, 
subsequently Governor of Aden and Uganda thought the 
inhabitants of Zanzibar were 'normal' in their outlook and 
would only be stirred into action if their Islamic religion 
were threatened. Therefore, he recommended that attention 
could be drawn to the 'Nazi system of state worship' and 
the repression of religious worship in Germany which would 
'doubtless be extended to Islam if that stood in the way of 
Nazi aspirations for world domination'. Hall thought that 
propaganda should show Britain had 'been forced into a war 
to call a halt to further aggression and the swallowing up 
of small nations'. As far as Italy was concerned her 
recent occupation of Albania 'could be turned to good 
31 account'. 
The main conduits for propaganda in Zanzibar would be 
the press and pamphlets. The main newspaper was the English 
and Arabic weekly, the Al Falag or 'Dawn' read by the Arab 
33 ibid. 
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community in particular. Although the tone of Al Falaq 
tended to be anti-Indian traders and was somewhat critical 
of the Government, it was on the whole loyal. The English 
and Gujerati weekly, Zanzibar Voice, was read by an 
influential section of the public, but it tended to be 
'intolerant' of British rule mainly because the editor had 
been imprisoned for the misuse of public funds when he was 
a government employee in 1927. The English and Gujerati 
Samacher weekly was more moderate than the Zanzibar Voice. 
The Samacher was read by well-to-do Indians upon whom the 
uneducated depended for a lead and thus had influence 
beyond its actual circulation of 1500 a week. The African 
weekly Kiswahili newspaper Zanzibari had only been 
published for a month but the proprietor was keen to 
'further the objects of the Government' and wished to 
institute propaganda for health, hygiene and education, and 
counter any bazaar rumours which came to his attention. 35 
Broadcasting in Zanzibar was limited as there was no 
station in Zanzibar itself and the few who owned their own 
radio sets listened to broadcasts from Kenya. In the 
towns, however, many listened to German and Italian 
broadcasts. German propaganda to the Arabs was at times so 
violent that there had been protests in the local Arab 
press. Although propaganda was an area in which Germany 
was perceived to excel and was listened to keenly it was 
not thought to have an appreciable affect as it was 
Irealised that it is propaganda' . 36 
Zanzibar was supplied with films from Nairobi and 
South Africa. Cinema owners reported that the taste of the 
people of Zanzibar was 'very low' as they preferred 'stunt 
films, singing, dancing, a good rough and tumble fight, 
thrillers and tap dancing'. Drama was not popular mainly 
because the majority could not understand what was being 
said. 37 
In Northern Rhodesia, where the Copperbelt was crucial 
35 ibid. 
36 ibid. 
37 ibid. 
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empire's war effort, but vulnerable to industrial disputes, 
the government thought that propaganda could emphasise to 
the government's advantage what would happen if the 
territory came under the control of Germany or Italy and 
how such an eventuality would be to the detriment to the 
inhabitants of Northern Rhodesia, 'indirect rule would 
cease and all the Native Authorities would cease to 
exercise power', higher taxation and forced labour might be 
exacted. The main propaganda channel was again to be the 
press. The English weekly, the Livingstone Mail was 
limited in its circulation to the European population and 
reported the views of its proprietor Leopold Moore who was 
an elected member of the Legislative Council. Another 
newspaper with a small circulation was the 'independent' 
English weekly, Northern Rhodesia Advertiser which was read 
mainly in the mining area of the territory, and would be of 
importance during the war as copper from mines in Northern 
Rhodesia would be a vital raw material. The twice weekly 
English Mine Workers' Union Bulletin could also be used as 
a channel of propaganda particularly in matters which 
concerned the miners. Started in the wake of the African 
Copperbelt strikes of 1935, Mutende was the official 'non- 
political' government publication for the African 
population of the territory; a monthly in English, Bemba, 
Tanga, Lozi and Nyanja. With a circulation of 5,500 it was 
considered a valuable, if slow, channel of communication. 
The government would also be keeping a careful eye on the 
Watch Tower movement, the Jehovah Witnesses. Although 
there was no organised German propaganda in Northern 
Rhodesia, there was a suspicion that the Watch Tower might 
be utilised for German propaganda purposes. 38 Films for 
European audiences in cinemas and works canteens were 
supplied by Johannesburg. Northern Rhodesia, however, did 
not possess any travelling cinema vans of its own to show 
films to Africans. As far as broadcasting to the Africans 
was concerned Northern Rhodesia looked to London to provide 
30 pRO, C0323/1663/8, Northern Rhodesia to Colonial 
office, 23 June 1939. 
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12 public address systems . 39 
The broad nature of propaganda desired for Nyasaland 
would be that which was designed to inculcate a 'full 
appreciation of the unity and might of the British 
Commonwealth of their Majesties the King and Queen as the 
head of this free association'. The Nyasaland government 
thought the task would be eased because there were 'no 
demands for constitutional advance which account need be 
taken'. The best method of disseminating propaganda of 
this nature to African audiences would be through use of 
the cinema accompanied by running commentaries in the 
appropriate vernacular. With few Europeans, a handful of 
settlers and officials the propaganda effort would be 
concerned primarily with African opinion. The problem of 
producing material in the vernacular was compounded by the 
existence of several linguistic groups in Nyasaland, 
speaking Chinyanja, Chimanglanja, Chichewa, Chitumbuka, 
Chitonga and Chiyao. Although the Lao peoples professed to 
be Islamic it was not felt that they would be influenced to 
any appreciable extent by Islamic propaganda 'of whatever 
colourl. Films for the Africans were supplied from 
Johannesburg but the government of Nyasaland did not have 
any facilities for either producing or displaying films 
themselves. It was, however, hoped that the cinema vans of 
the Tea Marketing Expansion Board could be utilised in time 
of emergency. " 
The press in Nyasaland included the twice weekly 
English Nyasaland Times. This paper had no political 
leanings or affiliations and was owned by the Nyasaland 
Motor General Insurance Company, the Nyasaland Railway, the 
Trans-Zambesi Rail Company and Imperial Tobacco. The 
Nyasaland Times was widely read by the few Europeans, a few 
Asians and Africans in Nyasaland and also in North and 
South Rhodesia. It could also be stated 'with confidence' 
that in an emergency the full resources of the Nyasaland 
39 PRO, C0323/1663/8, Northern Rhodesia to Colonial 
Office, 21 June 1939. 
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Times would be at the disposal of the government. The 
Nyasaland Times also owned the monthly Chinyanja and 
English Nkhani za Nyasaland, which had a circulation among 
the African and Asian populations of 2,000. This 
publication received a government subsidy, which meant to 
all effective purposes it was under government control and 
would have 'certain, if not great utility' in time of war. 
In addition, Nyasaland received the English papers the 
Rhodesia Herald from Salisbury, the Sunday Times from 
Johannesburg and the East African Standard from Nairobi and 
the vernacular Mutende from Northern Rhodesia and Bantu 
Mirror from Salisbury. 411 
No local broadcasting service existed in Nyasaland, 
and while it was conceded that the distribution of wireless 
sets might be of some value, it was thought by the 
government that any effort along these lines was unlikely 
to produce 'outstandingly useful results'. The problem was 
that even Africans with a good knowledge of official or 
commercial English found it difficult to understand 
broadcast English because it tended to be too rapid and 
used unfamiliar words. The sound of the King's voice, 
however, would make a deep impression for 'although his 
words may not be understood, it is worthy of remark that 
His Majesty's deliberate and distinct tones are more easily 
understandable by the educated African listener than the 
generality of voices heard'. No foreign governments were 
believed to be trying to specifically influence the people 
of Nyasaland, although German, Italian, Portuguese and 
French radio broadcasts were received in Nyasaland and were 
listened to by the Europeans they were not thought to have 
any effect. 4' It seems then that broadcasts in the 
vernacular were not even considered. 
A circular despatch was sent to the African colonies 
from the Colonial Office on the 2 September 1939 asking the 
colonial Governors to appoint immediately a full time 
Information Officer and also set out principles for their 
-43- ibid. 
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guidance. Publicity would be 'truthful', 'objective' and 
disseminated with speed. The first object of British 
publicity was: 
(to] emphasise the ethical aspects of the struggle, 
showing Britain as the champion of smaller and weaker 
peoples, asking only the right to lead their own 
lives. 
And the second objective was to stress 'the material as 
well as the moral strength of the allies'. 43 Initial 
emphasis would be on truthful news publicity about the 
course of the war. 
Planning was also based on the additional principles 
that the publicity produced would be 'expressly adapted' to 
the territory for which it was intended; that there would 
be the maximum possible 'devolution both in the 
distribution and in the final preparation of material of 
all kinds'; that to the greatest extent possible private or 
commercial distribution channels would be used. As will be 
seen the instinct to devolve the preparation of propaganda, 
although sound in the desire to cater to individual 
audiences did not happen until much later in the war. 
Devolution implied local production organisations. But 
planning was undertaken without due consideration of how to 
finance activities in the colonies. As a result unless 
there was a willingness on the part of the colonial 
governments to finance propaganda, the colonies would have 
to rely on the more general material supplied to them by 
the Empire Division of the MOI. 
Significantly it was desired that the colonial 
dependencies would be grouped together regionally, i. e. 
there would be an East African grouping of Kenya, Uganda, 
Tanganyika and Zanzibar and a 'Rhodesian' group of North 
and South Rhodesia and Nyasaland. This regional approach 
was evident in the way in which the Colonial Section of the 
MOI's Empire Division was initially organised and staffed. 
The economic interdependence and the geographical 
contiguity of the Central African territories and the ease 
of treating the European populations of the combined 
43 PRO, C0323/1660/10 circular despatch to all 
colonies, 2 September 1939; Shuckburgh, op. cit., p. 178-9. 
ill 
territories (almost five times that of Kenya) suggested the 
regional approach was best. The idea of a separate 
'Rhodesian' group, however, was soon abandoned, because the 
territories were at different stages in their political 
development. Southern Rhodesia was a Crown Colony which 
had enjoyed full responsible government in domestic affairs 
since 1923 and came under the supervision of the Dominions 
Office when the Colonial Office and Dominions Office were 
divided in 1925. Southern Rhodesia had a European 
population of 60,000 while the Crown Colonies of Northern 
Rhodesia with its European population of 10,000 and 
Nyasaland, inhabited 'almost entirely by natives' were both 
under the supervision of the Colonial Office. The Colonial 
Office was already concerned that the racial policies of 
Southern Rhodesia were creeping northwards and was 
sensitive to the political implications of encouraging the 
idea that the three Central African territories would be 
treated as a unit, particularly if a Regional Information 
Office was located in Salisbury. Instead, Southern 
Rhodesia was covered under Dominions Office arrangements 
with the MOI. Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland were later 
incorporated into the East African group under the post of 
the MOI's Principal Information Officer in Nairobi. 44 
Based on the information received from East Africa the 
Ministry of Information drew up their regional propaganda 
plan. In view of the fact that British East Africa formed 
one continuous block of territory, it was thought that 
there were obvious advantages in having a group publicity 
officer to supervise the activities of the territorial 
information officers (this, in spite of the reservations of 
Tanganyika and Uganda about the Closer Union question, of 
dominance by Kenya which, it was feared, meant in real 
terms domination by the European settlers). The publicity 
machinery already in existence in these territories would 
be utilised in time of war. For example in Tanganyika, 
44 PRO, C0323/1660/10, MOI Publicity Division 
memorandum, 'Publicity in the British Empire', 20 June 
1939; PRO, C0323/1663/8, MOI, Empire Division, Memo. 
No. 341, Southern Rhodesia, northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 
September 1939; minute by Poynton, 7 September 1939. 
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there was the 'Central Publicity Committee' chaired by the 
General Manager of Tanganyika railways which had been 
established to aid the Government in encouraging tourist 
traffic to Tanganyika. It was anticipated that missionary 
societies would cooperate in helping to keep the Africans 
informed about the war, particularly in Uganda where there 
was an 'exceptionally high proportion of converts to 
Christianity'. It was hoped, perhaps optimistically, that 
the colonial Governments could rely on the cooperation of 
the local leadership. In the Ugandan Province of Buganda 
where the ruler, the Kabaka, appointed all chiefs and 
exercised legislative authority subject to the approval of 
the Governor, it was hoped that the Kabaka would cooperate 
with the colonial Government. In Kenya it was hoped that a 
local committee of 'selected Africans' could be established 
to cooperate with the Information Officer. The Indian 
Advisory Council and the Arab Advisory Council in Kenya 
were also seen as bodies which could advise and assist in 
organising wartime propaganda. " It was assumed that the 
East African German populations, particularly the 3000 in 
Tanganyika, would be interned during the war. Thus the 
problem of enemy activities in the territories themselves 
would be controlled46 but not, however the impact of enemy 
broadcasts. 
For many purposes the European populations of East 
Africa would be treated as an extension of the white 
populations of South Africa and the Rhodesias and supplied 
by press material from London. This would be of particular 
importance in the kind of propaganda produced for Kenya 
which had a sizeable settler population. In planning 
publicity for the African populations it was of prime 
importance to avoid anything 'at all liable to disturb 
instead of reinforcing patriotic sentiment'. Here local 
District officers would be a major method of contact 
'45 Again rather optimistic when the common view of the 
Kenyan Indian attitude towards the war was disinterest and 
business as usual. 
46 PRO, C0323/1663/7, MOI Publicity Division: Planning 
Section, Memo. No. 240, East Africa, 8 June 1939. 
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between the Governments and the Africans through the medium 
of lectures. 47 In printed material, it was proposed that 
local regional differences would be catered for by 
producing publicity in the vernacular of each area. 
Regional differences would also be acknowledged in 
pictorial propaganda, for example in Tanganyika a poster 
designed for the 'war-like Masai might well be undesirable 
for a less robust people such as the Rundil. But when the 
territories relied -on London's output this ambition was 
necessarily abandoned for the Empire Division produced for 
a general audience. Similarly, the greater literacy of the 
Ugandans had to be taken into account. In the event of war 
it would be necessary to keep the vernacular press supplied 
with more advanced type of background material than in 
other parts of Africa. As an island, Zanzibar would also 
have special treatment and stress would be laid on the 
'ability of British sea power to afford protection'. 48 
The lessons of the 'Bantu Educational Kinema 
Experiment' which showed films to Africans in 1937 were 
recognised. Film was considered to be one of the most 
valuable means of influencing African opinion. It was 
thought that only films of a high photographic quality 
would be effective. The sound film was considered to be 
too rapid for the 'native mind' to be effective. For this 
reason silent films would be shown, accompanied by a 
running commentary by word of mouth on the part of a 
commentator 'who really teaches'. It was hoped that such 
films could be produced locally. A great emphasis would be 
placed on providing the territories with cinema vans from 
Britain to show the films to the Africans. 49 But again 
this would require finance. 
47 ibid. But as one District Officer in a remote 
district of Barotseland, Northern Rhodesia found this was 
easier said than done: 'trying to talk about the war with 
Africans was like trying to talk to deaf mutes about 
conditions in Mars', Rosaleen Smyth, 'War Propaganda ... in 
Northern Rhodesia', pp. 350-1. 
48 PRO, C0323/1663/7, MOI Publicity Division: Planning 
Section, Memo. No. 240, East Africa, 8 June 1939. 
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As previously noted, few Africans owned their own 
wireless sets. Even in Kenya out of a population of 19,200 
Europeans, only 1,833 (in December 1937) had taken out 
licenses for receiving sets. Therefore, in urban areas 
clubs, hotels and cinemas would be induced to equip 
themselves with loudspeakers to transmit radio broadcasts. 
Similarly, the territorial governments would be encouraged 
to provide public address systems in market places and town 
50 
squares where the public could gather at stated hours. 
As with film the financial implications of carrying through 
such projects was a major factor against the implementation 
of such plans. 
The appointment of Information Officers posed initial 
problems in the territories. In wartime conditions 
suitable candidates were thin on the ground and the 
territorial governments tended to give their Education 
Officers the additional task of Information Officer. This 
development was not favoured by the Colonial Office because 
it would add a further burden to their duties and there 
were obvious dangers in so public an association of 
'education' with 'propaganda'. 
The Colonial Office also objected to the appointment 
of certain individuals to such positions. For example, the 
case of the appointment of an unofficial settler, Major 
Ewart Scott Grogan, as the Chairman of the Kenyan Central 
Information Committee illustrates not only the manpower 
shortages faced by the colonies, but also the ever present 
frictions in the relationship between the Colonial Office 
and settler ambitions. Truly a legend in his own lifetime 
Grogan, born in 1874 this art-school drop out was the first 
European to walk from the Cape to Cairo, an expedition he 
undertook to prove to his prospective in-laws his worth as 
a husband for their daughter. As one of the original Kenya 
pioneers, he and his wife settled in Kenya in 1904. Grogan 
was a fine orator and flamboyant rival to Lord Delamere and 
powerful leader of the settler community. In 1907 he was 
elected President of the Colonists Association but lost 
this position after a notorious incident in which he 
50 ibid. 
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publicly flogged three Kikuyu following an attack on his 
sister. In 1910 he became the President of the Convention 
of Associations (the settlers' parliament), was opposed to 
Indian immigration, was a member of the war council of 
Kenya during the First World War and saw service in German 
East Africa in 1917. He was active in Kenyan politics 
throughout his life he retired form the Legislative Council 
in 1956 at the age of 82.5-L A consistent thorn in the 
Colonial Office's side, Sir Arthur Dawe, head of the 
African Division, was amazed when Grogan was appointed 
Chairman of the Central Information Committee, 
the appointment was fantastic... the whole objective 
of publicity in Africa during the war is to guide 
native opinion in the right direction: and the 
selection of Major Grogan for this role is really 
shattering. He is a dyed-in-the-wool reactionary: and 
incidentally hated by Indians. He is now 65 years old 
and he struck me as definitely senile when I saw him a 
year ago. 
The Secretary of State, Malcolm MacDonald, agreed but the 
matter required careful handling as Grogan was the Governor 
Sir Henry Brooke-Pophamls* personal appointee. Brooke- 
Popham came back to London in October for consultations 
with the Colonial Office. While he was on his way back to 
Kenya the Secretary of State took advantage of his absence 
by cabling the Officer Administering the Government of 
Kenya, in charge during the Governor's absence, suggesting 
the removal of Grogan, by doubting his suitability and by 
underlying the importance of gaining the 'support of the 
52 native communities'. 
Grogan was removed from the Committee and his place 
was taken by Lacey, Kenya's Education Officer who until a 
more suitable candidate could be found, became Director of 
Information. In the future only those 'with a knowledge of 
natives and the best methods of transmitting news to them' 
51 Errol Trzebinski, The Kenya Pioneers (London, 
1986), pp. 59,62,86,95-7,120,126-9 and 154-7. 
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would be chosen to serve on the committee. 53 
At first the East African governors favoured the 
Ministry of Information's plan for the establishment of the 
post of Regional Information Officer, but the problem 
developed over where the regional office should be located 
and who the Officer should be. Lacey, the Education 
Officer in Kenya, was suggested but not only was education 
in Kenya in a 'bad way', it was also not considered politic 
for the Officer to be based in Kenya where he might not be 
able to be 'independent in face of the sectionalist 
interests' i. e. white settler interests, which were vocal 
in Nairobi. Instead it was decided that for the time being 
the machinery of the East African Governors Conference 
could be used to ensure regional coordination . 54 
War Propaganda During the 'Bore War': Relations Between the 
MOI and the Colonial Office 
Following the outbreak of war and in accordance with 
the Reithian maxim for all British propaganda that news was 
'the shocktroops, of propaganda', propaganda was primarily a 
news based effort to keep African opinion 'informed as to 
the progress of the war, the objects at stake and their 
relation to local conditions etc, and to stimulate and 
maintain local sympathy with those objects'. 55 
To help the Information Officers in the colonies in 
their task the MOI transmitted three kinds of telegrams. 
The 'Guido' series was for the governors' eyes only 
containing guidance on matters of importance relating to 
the war. It was a matter of the governors' personal 
discretion if information contained in Guidos was to be 
used in propaganda. The 'Empaxl series of telegrams were 
material of a non-confidential nature, including 
information about the progress of the war, military 
53 PRO, C0323/1663/7, Kenya to Colonial Office, 7 
October 1939. 
54 PRO, C0323/1663/7, Minute by Poynton, 21 September 
1939; minute by Pedler, 22 September 1939. 
55 PRO, C0323/1660/11, 'Note on Colonial Section, 
Empire Publicity Division, MOII, by Seel, October 1939. 
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achievements, daily political events with press comment and 
parliamentary criticism, in such a way to allow textual 
reproduction. The third series, 'Datel' was introduced 
later on in the war to provide the Information Officers 
with 'inspired background' (or what we would call the 
'spin' today) in order for them to advise the local 
press. 56 
A major problem was that there was little news to 
publicise in terms of actual fighting during the 'phoney 
war' or what was described as the 'bore war' period. 57 The 
outbreak of war did not bring an enemy airborne attack of 
the British Isles; the war was not 'running to type' and 
there was not 'the amount of news available which is 
expected in time of war'. 51 Consequently there was little 
to publicise apart from justifications for why the British 
empire was at war. 59 In the absence of war news the 
material the MOI sent to the African colonies which was 
also designed to explain the nature of the enemy, used what 
one official dubbed the 'immortal work', Hitler's Mein 
Kampf. One African governor found this good propaganda for 
the 'black' population of his colony, particularly in the 
passages in which Hitler referred to them as '... "semi- 
civilised apes ...... The Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, Malcolm MacDonald, agreed and felt it should be 
56 Shuckburgh, op. cit., p. 183. 
57 Phillip Knightly, The First Casualty: the War 
Correspondent as Hero, Propaqandist and M th Maker, 
(London, 1982), p. 208. See also the dedication to Randolph 
Churchill in Evelyn Waugh's Put Out More Flags, (London, 
1943), p. 7 which satirises the exploits of Basil Seal and 
Ambrose Silk in 'the odd, dead period before the 
Churchillian renaissance, which people called as the time 
the Great Bore War'. 
58 PRO, C0323/1652/35, minute by Bigg, 10 November 
1939. 
59 The Empire Division prepared 3,500 copies of a 
pamphlet explaining the war, 'The Outbreak of War' to the 
colonies, PRO, C0323/1663/2, Hodson to Colonial Office, 28 
September 1939. 
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used 'for all it is worth' in Africa. 60 The Colonial 
Office helped the BBC to put them in touch with people who 
were in the colonies at the outbreak of war in order to 
broadcast the initial reactions in the colonies to the 
war. 61 
The Colonial Section of the Empire Division sent a 
steady stream of printed and photographic material to the 
colonies during the first months of the war. 62 This 
material was a mixture of specially commissioned pieces: a 
Chatham House offprint, 'The Political and Strategic 
Importance of Turkey', Great Britain, France and the War' 
by Paul Reynaud, 'Anglo-French Plan for Economic 
Collaboration' by Donald Tyemer, 'The Deeper Causes of the 
War and the Issues Involved in It - the Herd Instinct: For 
Good and Evil', by Gilbert Murray and 'The War and the 
Crisis for the Spirit of Man', by W. R. Matthews, Dean of 
St. Pauls; MOI standard fare: 'The Resources of the 
Empire', 'Why the Navy Guards Her Secrets', 'India's 
Future: the Minority Problem', 'The Truth About German 
Society', 'Viscount Halifax -a Personal Study', 'Who began 
the War', 'Britain's Roads in Wartime', 'The British Army 
is Fitter Than Ever', 'Australia Makes Munitions', 'New 
Methods of Dealing with Magnetic Mines' and 'Britain Will 
Fight to the Last Man'; articles from British newspapers: 
in particular from the Observer 'Hitler, Stalin and the 
Duce' and 'Himmler's Bomb Plot'; transcripts of radio 
broadcasts: from the BBC's 'War Commentaries' and the 
series 'Matters of the Moment', the texts of speeches made 
in parliament on the war situation, all explaining the 
60 PRO, C0323/1660/11, 'Poynton to Seel, 18 September 
1939; PRO, C0323/1663/2, British Guiana to Colonial Office, 
13 September 1939. 
1939. 
62- PRO, C0323/1651/19, Seel to Poynton, 8 September 
'52- By the end of the war the 
distribution of photographs reached: 6,500 
photographs for 33 colonies, 1,000 prints 
photographs for 20 colonies, 200 prin, 
photographs to 20 colonies, 10,600 sets 
gravures to 11 colonies and 7,235 wall 
colonies, Shuckburgh, OP. cit., pp. 183-4. 
MOI's monthly 
prints of news 
of exhibition 
ts of feature 
of coloured 
sheets to 21 
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causes and the nature of the war but hardly inspirational 
matter. 63 Indeed, as Aneurin Bevan's caustic remark 
captured it, 'the impression is now universal that if the 
Germans do not manage to bomb us to death the Ministry of 
Information will bore us to death'. 64 
Three thousand photographs a week were sent to the 
colonies by the MOI and a special portrait poster of the 
King for colonial audiences was prepared. There was a 
Colonial Office-MOI dispute about the slogan to accompany 
it. The Colonial Section recommended, 'In Defence of 
Freedom and all that we hold dear, I call upon my Peoples 
to stand firm and United until Victory is won'. Sir Arthur 
Dawe in another one of his rants about the 
inappropriateness of the MOIIS typically Anglo-Saxon 
cliched phraseology for colonial audiences, noted that 
'many colonial peoples will be tempted to say that they 
have not much freedom to defend'. Others in Africa might 
remember Abyssinia when Britain's 'zeal for freedom was not 
so markedly displayed'. There was much to be said for a 
little 'intellectual honesty', Dawe argued, as Britain was 
fighting for her existence and her interests and 'the talk 
by us of freedom is certainly widely regarded by people of 
non-British race as simply a piece of British humbug'. He 
appealed -for the abandonment of the use of the word freedom 
and to end the conduct of propaganda on the assumption that 
colonial peoples thought the same as the British: 
Not all peoples in other latitudes understand what is 
meant by this abstract conception: nor do they feel 
any particular impulse to fight for it. Again what is 
'all that we hold dear". ) Who are 'we". ) A lot of 
things that we hold dear in this country are not held 
dear by people in the Colonies: and vice versa. What 
we want is not sloppy verbiage but something with an 
edge on it which strikes clearly and forcibly on the 
mind. " 
The Colonial Office alternatives were hardly better, the 
63 PRO, C0323/1663/3/file. 
164 Quoted in Ian McLaine, Ministry of Morale (London, 
1979), p. 41. 
155 PRO, C0323/1663/6, Harlow to Poynton, 21 November 
1939; C0323/1663/5, Harlow to Poynton, 9 December 1939; 
minute by Dawe, 13 December 1939. 
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meaningless 'Hold fast to all that is just and of good 
report' and the 'Life is a great adventure, and everyone of 
you can be a pioneer, blazing, by thought and service, a 
trail to better things'. The latter recalled the early MOI 
poster designed for British audiences: 'Your courage, your 
cheerfulness, your resolution will bring us victory', with 
the patronising inference that 'sacrifices would be made by 
the many for the few'. 66 The Colonial Office's preferred 
slogan was adapted to 'everyone can be a pioneer, blazing, 
by thought and service, a trail to better things' even 
though John Calder thought it was a slogan which would 
'defy translation into any African language'. The issue 
was finally resolved by a decision to have the words 'send 
him victorious' over a blank panel for the colonial 
Information Officers to fill in as they saw fit. 61 
The MOI as is well known came in for almost universal 
criticism about its propaganda, personnel and leadership. 
Not until the arrival of Brendan Bracken* as Minister of 
Information in July 1941 with his inside knowledge of how 
the Press worked and support of the Prime Minister and 
Cyril Radcliffe as Director General in December 1941 with 
his 'incisive mind ... and firmness'68 that the MOI was 
rehabilitated. 69 As far as the imperial propaganda effort 
was concerned this rehabilitation did not occur until even 
later. It was only in mid-1943 that imperial propaganda 
found a successful dual combination of inspirational 
leadership and a new mission. In the meantime the MOI was 
the object of derision and inter-departmental bickering. 
In a short story written by Graham Greene in 1940, 
'Men at Work', Greene satirised the problems of the MOI and 
its relationship with other government departments. He 
wrote a fictional account of a meeting of the 'Book 
6r, PRO, C0323/1663/5, Poynton to Harlow, 22 December 
1939; McLaine, op. cit., p. 31. 
r>'? PRO, C0323/1663/5, minute by Calder, 2 January 1940 
and Sabine to Harlow, 10 January 1940. 
08 Balfour, opecit., p. 65. 
69 McLaine, op. cit., p. 243. 
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Committee' attended by 'Lewis' of the Empire Division. A 
pamphlet on the British empire had been commissioned for 
distribution at public meetings. However, 'all sorts of 
tactless phrases' had been discovered by 'the experts', 
India objected to a reference to Canadian dairy herds, 
and Australia objected to a phrase about Botany Bay. 
The Canadian authority was certain that mention of 
Wolfe would antagonize French-Canadians, and the New 
Zealand authority felt that undue emphasis had been 
laid on Australian fruit farms. Meanwhile the public 
meetings had all been held, so that there was no means 
of distributing the pamphlet. Somebody suggested that 
it might be sent to America for the New York World's 
Fair, but the American Division then demanded certain 
cuts in the references to the War of Independence, and 
by the time those had been made the World's Fair had 
closed. " 
Greene's observations would have found a receptive ear 
in the Colonial Office which was dissatisfied with the 
MOI's direction of colonial propaganda. Later in the war 
Kenneth Grubb*, Controller of the Overseas Division of the 
MOI, 1941-6 recognised that the 'handicaps of leadership' 
had been responsible for the 'low reputation' of the Empire 
Division in the first half of the war. 71L 
Criticism was manifold. The Empire Division was 
criticised for duplicating the work of the regional 
specialists in the Colonial Office where the Colonial 
Section's specialists knew considerably less than the staff 
of the Colonial Office's Geographical Departments. The 
MOI's machinery was criticised for being too large given 
that it was not even responsible for providing news to the 
colonies. The MOI as a separate channel of communication 
"70 Graham Greene, 'Men at Work' in Twenty-One Short 
Stories, (London, 1977), pp. 66-7. 
-111 PRO, INF11110, Grubb to Woodburn, 18 November 1944. 
The directors of the Empire Division prior to the 
transformation that the appointment of Gervas Huxley 
brought to the division were either frustrated in their 
task, like Harry Hodson, considered 'too young and 
inexperienced' to pull the Empire Division out of its 
difficulties in that field, although experienced in the 
ways of the Colonial Office in the case of Lord Dufferin, 
or completely overwhelmed by the task, resigning due to 
ill-health in the case of Edward Rawdon-Smith, PRO, 
INF11111, minute by Radcliffe, 1 October 1941; PRO, 
INF11110, office notice, 4 April 1943. 
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to the colonies was criticised for being a rival to 
Colonial Office responsibility over policy in the colonies. 
As George Seel, Colonial Office Liaison Officer working in 
the Colonial Section of the Empire Division of the MOI, 
noted: 
propaganda, however "objective" in intention, cannot 
be conducted amongst the native populations in 
colonial dependencies without direct repercussions 
upon administration, and in the last resort the 
responsibility for publicity in such areas must rest 
with the Secretary of State (for the Colonies]. " 
Implicit in Colonial Office criticism was the charge that 
the MOI was staffed by amateurs and that anything which may 
impact on the African populations should be left to 
specialists, i. e. the Colonial Office. 73 
Seel also doubted the suitability of the kind of 
propaganda produced by the Colonial Section. He argued 
that the colonies only needed a limited amount of 
propaganda. What was required was first the local 
dissemination of reliable news and second, the kind of 
'propaganda' which had been recommended by some of the 
colonial governments in response to the pre-war survey, the 
minimum dislocation of life in the colonies and the 
continuation of British colonial policy and the 
implementation of development and welfare plans. There 
1939. 
'72 PRO, C0323/1660/11, report by Seel, No. 73, October 
73 PRO, C0323/1660/11, minute by Seel, 2 October 1939. 
For example Seel's criticism of the head of the Colonial 
Section at the MOI, Vincent Harlow, 'No one can doubt 
Professor Harlow's enthusiasm and sincerity of purpose, but 
he conveys the impression that the war is to him the 
opportunity of conveying uplift on a large scale to 
colonial populations. His outlook is, as might be expected, 
academic and I imagine his direction will be a kind of 
university lecture series. He appears to be quite 
inexperienced in administration and this coupled with the 
provision of a "scratch" staff of assistants, has so far 
prevented the Section from setting down any coherent plan 
of working or any well-defined objective'. Seel was more 
impressed with H. S. Scott*, responsible for the East 
African group who was a former Director of Education in the 
Transvaal and Kenya, who had registered for National 
Service and was 'somewhat non-plussed at finding himself in 
this heterogeneous company and by no means convinced of the 
necessity for his employment'. 
123 
should be, he argued, 
concentration upon measures designed to maintain, and 
increase wherever possible, the economic prosperity of 
the Colonies, and to develop social services, as and 
when the funds make it possible, upon the lines which 
were in contemplation before the outbreak of the war. 
Seel thought that anything more than this was superfluous 
and not worth the expenditure involved. Additional 
material like films and feature articles should only be 
used when 'really suitable material was available'; 
material like the MOI's 'A Day in the Life of an Air Raid 
Warden' would not in Seel's opinion have 'any substantial 
result in affecting African or Asiatic opinion'. The 
colonial governments were the best placed to judge the 
suitability of material for colonial audiences and the only 
machinery required was a small Public Relations Department 
within the Colonial Office itself. 74 It is clear that 
Seel's experience of liaising with the Colonial Section can 
account for his jaundiced view of the MOI's colonial 
propaganda effort and indeed it appears that the criticisms 
of the suitability of the kind of general propaganda 
produced by the MOI were justified. However there is also 
a sense that there was a general lack of sympathy with the 
object of not merely telling colonial audiences about the 
war, but explaining it to them. 
The dissatisfaction with the Colonial Section led to 
the suggestion by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
Malcolm MacDonald, to simplify the machinery radically by 
abolishing the Colonial Section of the Empire Division of 
the MOI andcreating a Public Relations Department in the 
Colonial Office which would take over its functions and 
work in cooperation with the producer departments of the 
MOI. 75 
Harry Hodson, the director of the Empire Division at 
the MOI, was incensed at the suggestion to abolish the 
Colonial Section at the MOI. He objected on the grounds of 
'7,4 PRO, C0323/1660/11, report by Seel, No. 73, October 
1939. 
75 PRO, C0323/1660/11, MacDonald to Macmillan, 16 
October 1939. 
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the need for economy. Duplication of work should be 
avoided because of the fact that propaganda did not 'stop 
at frontiers' and the importance of 'speaking to the whole 
world including our own people, with a single voice on 
Britain's war aims and the British war effort' was immense. 
He was irritated that the Colonial Office had not mentioned 
in the previous six months its intention to establish a 
Public Relations Department and in any case did not feel 
the Colonial Office was capable of conducting colonial 
propaganda itself. He dismissed the Colonial Office 
argument about the Secretary of State's 'responsibility': 
to maintain, as Mr. MacDonald appears to maintain ... 
that because action under the authority of one 
Minister may affect the responsibilities of another, 
the latter should takeover the field of action from 
his colleague, would mean that all functions of state 
would be concentrated in one office. 76 
The solution was a compromise. Lord Macmillan*, the 
Minister of Information, agreed to reorganise the Empire 
Publicity Division, but would retain a reduced Colonial 
Section by abolishing regional specialists and the post of 
Colonial Office Liaison Officer. He agreed to the 
principle that the Colonial Secretary was 'responsible for 
deciding what should be the general policy underlying and 
covering publicity measures which may be undertaken by 
individual Colonial Governments' and that the Colonial 
Office would be the sole channel of communication to the 
colonial empire. 77 Sir Arthur Dawe, erstwhile critic of 
the Colonial Section was delighted: 
it is clear that Mr. Hodson and Professor Harlow are 
both in a very much chastened frame of mind and that 
the first rapture of being dressed in a little brief 
authority has worn off. " 
The Colonial Office was not slow to realise that by 
winning the battle for control of propaganda, the Colonial 
Office was to be the sole channel of communication to the 
70 PRO, INF1/28, Hodson to Macmillan, 19 October 1939. 
77 PRO, C0323/1660/11, Macmillan to MacDonald, 27 
October 1939. 
70 PRO, C0323/1660/11, minute by Dawe, 4 November 
1939. 
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colonies would involve extra work and this added to the 
arguments in favour of creating a Public Relations 
Department for in order to fulfill this new function staff 
would be needed to carry it through. What was important to 
the Colonial Office however, was that the 'principle' of 
their control had been firmly established. In order to 
minimise work involved in overseeing what the MOI sent to 
the colonies, Vincent Harlow, head of the Colonial Section, 
would send only samples of what was sent to the colonies. 
For example, the Colonial Office did not think it necessary 
to vet every photograph sent to the colonies, except 
perhaps 'one that might give rise to the colour question, 
e. g. white German prisoners in charge of black troops or 
guards'. Even in that case it was felt that it would be up 
to the individual colonial government to decide the 
appropriateness of using such a photograph. 79 
Propaganda against the British empire continued to be 
a consistent theme of Nazi propaganda. 80 Nazi allegations 
about the dissatisfaction of the colonial peoples with 
British rule could be countered by publicising the unity of 
the empire's response to the war. For example, the desire 
of the 'natives' of Southern Rhodesia to assist the empire 
in its struggle against Nazism by voluntary and non- 
solicited contributions in money and crops. This had even 
more significance because the contributions originated from 
areas which had opposed European domination in the Matabele 
and Mashona rebellion 43 years ago. This loyalty to the 
King would be proof 'that natives had since come (to] 
appreciate [the] benefits of British rule and [were] 
determined to do all in [their] power [to] aid Britain in 
[the] war against aggression realising what would be their 
79 PRO, C0323/1669/11, minute by Poynton, 10 November 
1939. 
13c' See further Willi A. Boelcke, The Secret 
Conferences of Dr. Goebbels, October 1939-March 1943, 
(London, 1967), p. 61 and 68; Robert Herzstein, The War That 
Hitler Won, (London, 1979), p. 325 and pp. 344-9 for his 
analysis of the film Ohm Kruger which attacked Britain's 
imperial policy and the war in South Africa against the 
Boers, showing British cruelty and British concentration 
camps. 
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fate under Nazi rule'. 81 This colonial contribution to the 
empire's war effort was used throughout the war as evidence 
of contentment with the British imperial system, in spite 
of the contrary evidence of events in South East Asia in 
early 1942. Cooperation from other departments was secured 
to honour the colonial contributions; the Air Ministry 
ensured air squadrons were named after colonies which 
provided the cost, similarly the War Office named tanks and 
the Ministry of Food took charge of a fleet of mobile 
canteens which was purchased with colonial money and named 
were on active service throughout the blitz, the first of 
which were formally accepted by the Queen on the forecourt 
of Buckingham Palace at the end of 1940.82 
In addition to these kind of positive measures to 
counter-act enemy propaganda, censorship was employed to 
prevent these kind of views from being aired in the first 
place. As was seen in chapter one, in the inter-war period 
colonial governments gained experienced in this area, 
particularly in the area of film censorship. During the 
war the colonies were instructed that 'subversive' 
newspapers like the communist party's Daily Worker and the 
fascist Action would not be given export licenses and that 
any copies found in the colonies should be confiscated by 
the colonial governments. 03 As far as other censorship 
issues were involved, the Colonial Office received 
complaints about the procedure adopted by the MOI. For 
example, Charles Watney, the London correspondent of the 
East African Standard, the Mombasa Times, and the 
Tanganvika Standard, complained that the MOI had refused to 
pass one of his 'London Letters' even though the 
information it contained had already appeared in the News 
03- PRO, C0323/1665/2, circular despatch, 4 December 
1939. 
02 Shuckburgh, op. cit., p. 181. 
83 PRO, C0323/1793/2, circular despatch to all 
colonies, 15 May 1940. 
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Chronicle. 84 In the Colonial Office it was noted that 
Watney was an 'inveterate grumbler' and that in any case 
the Press and Censorship Bureau of the MOI did not censor 
from the point of view of probable effect in the colonies. 
Watney was told to refer back to the MOI. The MOI wrote to 
the Colonial Office explaining what had happened. The main 
problem was that there was no compulsory press censorship 
in wartime Britain: 
Mr Watney has a peculiar nose for items in the British 
press which have not been submitted here for 
censorship and which if they had been submitted would 
never have been allowed to be published. 
Details about troop movements, even if published once, 
85 
could not be allowed to be 'confirmed by repetition'. 
Other empire journalists represented by the Empire 
Press Union also complained to the MOI that their work was 
being handicapped by what they saw as this 'double 
censorship'. Their reports were censored once in Britain 
by the MOI and then censored again by censorship machinery 
when their reports reached the colonies. Therefore the 
Colonial Office asked colonial governments 'to agree not to 
censor messages' which had been passed by the Press 
Censorship Bureau of the MOI. 16 Problems continued to 
arise because the London correspondents sent their editors 
details about the timings of air raid alerts and all clear 
signals as background information and 'it was too much to 
expect an editor to refrain from using its contents unless 
further censorship was applied'. Therefore the Colonial 
Office told the censors in the colonies to stop the 
84 PRO, C0323/1793/1, Watney to MacDonald, 5 January 
1940. The offending article which appeared in the News 
Chronicle stated, 'Large numbers of the two million men due 
to be called up in the next few months will be sent abroad 
for training. The places chosen include France, Africa and 
Palestine. This will not only relieve the billeting strain 
at home but will provide extra forces at many strategic 
points. Many skilled men will go straight to their trades 
on joining up. There is no question of using them in place 
of ordinary workmen in arms factories or workshops'. 
IB5 PRO, C0323/1793/1, minute by Poynton, 6 January 
1940; Lyall to Sabine, 10 February 1940. 
015 PRO, C0323/1792/10, minute by Calder, 7 October 1940. 
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publication of times when the 'Alert' and 'All Clear' were 
sounded. 87 
In the early part of the war as far as colonial 
publicity was concerned a 'judicious balance' had to be 
held between 'the countering of apathy, amid which factious 
criticism flourishes, and the discouragement of undue 
martial ardour, which might prove embarrassing in view of 
the obstacles to the general use of colonial troops'. 18 
But it was also questionable whether the mere issuing of 
war news, what little there was, and highlighting how evil 
the Nazis were was required as Mein Kampf had quickly 
become 'dead as mutton'. " 
The beginning of 1940 saw attempts to achieve a more 
systematic and efficient distribution of material to the 
African colonies, to iron out early problems and to provide 
a greater variety to the kind of material produced. A 
major difficulty was the necessity for propaganda to speak 
with one 'voice' while trying to accommodate regional 
variations. In practice this, together with the need for 
economy, often meant that the original hope that material 
could be adapted for specific audiences was subordinated to 
the distribution of more general propaganda. As Hodson 
noted, the problem of producing propaganda for the British 
empire was that the people it was designed to appeal to 
varied widely from 'sophisticated pacifists in North 
America to warlike and even bloodthirsty African 
tribesmen'. One theme which aimed to address this 
difficulty was to emphasise the unity of the empire in the 
wartime struggle. This theme could acknowledge that while 
differences between the various communities existed they 
were united in the task of defeating the enemy. 
Arrangements were made to stress the theme of empire unity. 
For example, cinema vans were sent to Kenya; 3,200 pounds 
was allocated to posters portraying the strength of the 
07 PRO, C0323/1792/10, minute by Pugh, 30 October 
1940; circular despatch to all colonies, 2 November 1940. 
1940.00 
PRO, INFI/3, progress report, January-February 
*19 PRO, INF1/163, Nicholson to MacGregor, 5 July 1940. 
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Empire; material such as 'Matters of the Moment' and 'the 
Empire at War' were sent to the colonies through the BBC's 
Empire Transcription Scheme. 90 
The BBC and broadcasting about the British Empire 
The BBC's Empire Service celebrated its seventh 
anniversary on the outbreak of war. 9: L As we have seen 
'reliable' news was seen as a major component of the 
wartime publicity effort in the colonial empire and the BBC 
in war as in peace would have an important role in this 
respect. In view of the practice of 'cross-listening' 
between the various services of the BBC it was vital that 
the BBC spoke the same 'truth' to all its audiences thereby 
maintaining its credibility as a source of reliable news. 
The MOVs News Division maxim 'to tell the truth, nothing 
but the truth and as near as possible the whole truth"' 
was translated in respect of BBC news broadcasts to mean 
that as far as possible adverse news would not be covered 
up. The war tested the BBC's own pre-war maxim of telling 
the truth land nothing but the truth, even if the truth is 
horrible' for while the BBC remained constitutionally 
independent of the government during the war it had agreed 
that it would act under government instructions as far as 
would be necessary in matters that concerned the national 
interest and the conduct of the war. 93 
The Empire Service was to play an important part 
during the war. First, it continued to provide a sense of 
unity within the empire by maintaining contact between 
90 PRO, INF1/3, Progress Report, January - February 1940. 
'9'3- On 21 January 1941 the Empire Service was 
incorporated into the General Overseas World Service. For 
details of the revised World Service schedule see: BBC 
Written Archives at Caversham Park (hereafter WAC), 
E2/452/file. The new organisation consisted of the General 
Overseas, North American, African, Pacific and Eastern 
Services. In 1944 the General Overseas Service incorporated 
the General Forces Programme. 
92 Quoted in McLaine, op. cit., p. 26. 
93 Asa Briggs, The History of Broadcasting in the 
United Kingdom, Volume III, the War of Words, (London, 
1970), pp. 89-91 and 77. 
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Britain and the rest of the empire. Second, it would 
continue to counter Axis radio propaganda which was heard 
in the empire. Third, it would serve the large number of 
men from the empire serving in the armed forces. Asa 
Briggs has argued that the Empire Division of the MOI 
'exercised far less control over Empire broadcasts to 
Europe', but it will be seen that there was cooperation 
between the MOI and the BBC on the one hand and the 
Colonial Office and the BBC on the other hand throughout 
the war on specific campaigns and when problems arose over 
programming. " Right from the beginning of the war staff 
of the Colonial Office were told to cooperate as fully as 
possible with the BBC during the war by notifying the BBC 
of service officers on leave who could broadcast on 
colonial matters and by suggesting topical subjects for 
95 talks and commentaries. 
As the war progressed the BBC became increasingly 
committed to providing programming of a regional nature. 
This was all the more important during the war because 
proposals for the development of a large scale 'Empire 
Broadcasting Network' of local short-wave relay stations in 
the colonies had to be deferred. Instead the war witnessed 
the continuation of 'unplanned and uncoordinated growth' of 
broadcasting in the colonies. 96 In the pre-war period the 
development of local colonial broadcasting was recognised 
to be an expensive undertaking made even worse under 
wartime financial constraints. The BBC wanted to undertake 
a survey of broadcasting activity in the colonies and the 
machinery of consultation between the Colonial Office and 
the BBC was revived in the Colonial Office's Broadcasting 
Sub-Committee. 97 The BBC was keen that progress towards 
the establishment of an Empire Broadcasting Network should 
1939. 
94 Briggs, The War of Words..., p. 491. 
95 PRO, C0878/26, office circular No. 223,7 December 
96 ibid. p. 494 and 496. 
97 WAC, E2/92/2, minute by Clark, 15 August 1940. The 
BBC was also encouraged by the enthusiastic approach to the 
subject shown by Sabine. 
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be considered during the war so that when peace-time 
conditions returned 'the voice of the British Empire as a 
working democratic association of nations should be clearly 
and insistently heard throughout the world'. 98 The BBC's 
Research Unit which provided information to the Overseas 
Divisions of the BBC to help in planning 'long-run 
propaganda' also cooperated with the MOI's Reference 
Division. " 
The person most associated with BBC broadcasts to 
Africa during the war was the English and Afrikaans speaker 
the South African John Grenfell Williams, the African 
Programme Organiser and Deputy Director of Empire Services: 
Grenfell Williams believed that his task as fourfold. 
First, he had to describe what was happening in the 
war as vividly as possible to people who knew little 
of the circumstances in which it was being waged. 
Second, he had to project the United Kingdom to the 
Colonies as faithfully as he could. Third, he had to 
ensure that the BBC made a contribution to the 
solution of colonial problems ... Fourth, he just had 
to be friendly. 3-00 
In 1943, under Grenfell Williams' guidance the BBC 
developed more specialised programmes with the inauguration 
of separate Forces programmes for troops in North and East 
Africa led to the special programme for East Africa. LO3- 
Part of the BBC's activities in empire broadcasting 
was the Empire Transcription Scheme which had been set up 
by the Joint Broadcasting Committee and the Empire Division 
of the MOI. 101 It was designed to supplement the BBC's 
Empire Service which was considered to be too limited and 
left colonial stations many hours to fill with their own 
'98 WAC, E2/360/1, Internal BBC Memorandum, 'Empire 
Broadcasting Network', 15 December 1941. 
99 WAC, E2/453, BBC memorandum, 'Research Unit 
(Overseas) - Organisation, 26 July 1941. The BBC Research 
Unit's contact person in the MOI was Miss Horsfall who 
advised on the Empire's war effort, Colonial Policy and 
social and political questions. 
11100 Briggs, The War of Words .... pp. 513-4. 
101 ibid., pp. 514-6. 
1102 For details about the Transcription Service see 
further, -ibid., pp. 185-6 and p. 344. 
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programmes. The Empire Transcription Scheme produced 
scripts in London for broadcast by local stations in the 
colonies and supplied records of speeches and music. it 
was thought that the European communities could largely be 
'ignored' either because their loyalty was taken for 
granted or because they were negligible in size. The 
appeal was to be 'entirely to native communities and non- 
British immigrants' in their own vernacular. 103 Kenneth 
Bradley*, the Information Officer in Northern Rhodesia, 
writer and future Director of the Imperial Institute, 
complained however that greater cognisance of the audience 
BBC scripts were intended for had to be taken. Even within 
the same script, he argued, the language employed was in 
part too simple and in part too sophisticated for the 
African to understand. For example, a script by the 
novelist Elspeth Huxley on farming explained ploughing 
which was already a familiar process in Northern Rhodesia 
and casually mentioned clover and other things unknown in 
the colony. Similarly, a talk by an African on his ARP 
experiences was too sophisticated, and worse 'introduced 
the colour question', which Bradley was 'glad to say does 
not yet arise in the minds of most of our listeners'. "' 
Although this seemed nit-picking it is hard to dispute that 
language needed to be simple if it were broadcasts were to 
appeal to more than a highly educated and minority audience 
and the subject matter needed to be something which 
Africans could relate to as part of their everyday lives, 
which was questionable in the case of the activities of an 
ARP warden. 
other complaints were that by the time items such as 
background newsletters reached the colonies they were out 
of date due to the slowness of the airmail service. 105 The 
East African Governors Conference in Nairobi even opposed 
103 PRO, INF1/165, Joint Broadcasting Scheme in the 
colonies, undated. 
104 PRO, INF1/163, Bradley to Macgregor, BBC Liaison 
Officer, 26 July 1940. 
105 PRO, INF1/163, Wisdom, Tanganyika, to Macgregor, 
16 July 1940. 
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the principle of broadcasting to Africans from London 
because 'unless those responsible are in constant touch 
with African listeners and can ascertain their reactions, 
broadcasts may produce results the reverse of those 
intended'. Proposals for Nairobi to improve local 
broadcasting would be considered at a regional conference 
of East African information officers later in 1941.1106 
Here perhaps we have a case of resentment at being told 
what was suitable for their own peoples. Just as the 
Colonial Office thought it knew the colonies better than 
the Colonial Section of the MOI, the colonial governments 
thought they knew better than London. 
The BBC colonial liaison officer to the Empire 
Transcription Scheme, J. C. S. MacGregor, was equally aware 
of the potential for creating problems in the colonies. In 
particular, care would have to be taken in publicity about 
the treatment of Africans fighting under British command. 
MacGregor noted that there was concern about an 'unhappy 
lingering memory in East Africa of the fate of Africans who 
were used upon the lines of communication in the last war'. 
The Colonial Office, however assured MacGregor that 
official instructions had already been sent to the colonies 
the previous summer that the term 'carrier corps' should 
not be used in broadcasts. The Colonial Office doubted 
that unhappy memories existed on a wide scale, probably 
only in the minds of a 'few "old timersl''. JL07 
The contents of Empire Transcription Scheme scripts 
would have to be carefully monitored to avoid embarrassment 
through ignorance of local conditions and developments. 
For example, in one script in Fisher's series 'London 
Letter' he had, much to the irritation of the Colonial 
Office, implied that Nigeria was well on the road to 
Dominion status. In another on the subject of 'Freedom', 
Fisher had suggested, rather unfortunately, that 'a wise 
man accepts these limits to his personal freedom as the 
price he has to pay for greater freedom'. Furthermore, 
-1106 PRO, INF1/163, EAGC to Colonial Office, 23 March 1941. 
110'7 PRO, INF1/163, MacGregor to Nicholson, 4 July 
1940; Nicholson to MacGregor, 5 July 1940. 
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Fisher argued: 
Britain keeps her Empire today because she realises 
the tremendous strength of the desire in every 
community to control its own destinies as far as 
possible, she keeps her Empire because in every part 
of it wise men realise that only in cooperation with a 
great Empire is there real freedom for the individual 
to be found. Freedom? Rather safety in these days when 
the Wolf is abroad. 
MacGregor objected to the central argument that 'freedom 
increases with the size of the unit' which could draw the 
conclusion that as the 51% of the world was under Nazi rule 
'the rest of us ought to join in for the sake of greater 
freedom'. Any talk of giving 'freedom' to the colonies was 
especially dangerous at this time 'when Africa is 
threatened' and Britain 'ought not to boast of nailing our 
columns to so wobbly a mast'. Instead Britain should talk 
about what had been achieved and tell the world that 
'democracy is not only nicer but can be effective! '-LO8 
Subjects to be included in the revamped Empire 
Transcription Scheme were: 'What Britain is Fighting For', 
a series on the empire with items such as how East Africa 
became British i. e. by the abolition of slavery; 'What 
Britain is Fighting Against' covering life under Nazi rule, 
Gestapo methods, race theory; 'Leaders of Britain', 
focussing on figures like Halifax, Eden, Chamberlain and 
Churchill; 'Germany and the colonies', statements from 
chiefs in Tanganyika remembering life under German rule; 
'the Aims of British colonial policy' with greater stress 
on actual examples like the development of medical, 
education and agricultural services rather than general 
statements of policy; 'Tales by Natives' would be written 
entirely by natives consisting of personal talks 
'describing their own country, its outlook, industries and 
daily life', flattering the colony from where the speaker 
came from, creating an impression of 'the size and 
diversity of the Colonial Empire'; and topical talks on the 
war which, it was felt, would be 'immensely popular' with 
"16 PRO, INF1/163, MacGregor to Wrong, 12 December 
1940; Fisher's script, undated; MacGregor to Wrong 4 May 
1941. It was decided that Fisher's services would not be 
required in the future. 
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the 'natives' who 'received little news beyond the BBC 
bulletins'. 109 
The Empire Service tried to provide a balance between 
'news' and talks on the one hand and entertainment on the 
other hand. Talks featured broadcasters already well known 
to Home Service audiences. For example, the former editor 
of the Times, Wickham Steed presented 'World Affairs' while 
J. B. Priestley, well known for his 'Postscripts' on the 
Home Service was a regular presenter of 'Britain Speaks'. 
The News Chronicle journalist, Vernon Bartlett, also 
presented 'Britain Speaks' and 'Questions of the Hour'. 
Herbert Marshall, the BBC's pre-war sports commentator and 
later the correspondent of 'War Report' on the D-Day 
landings, presented 'London Log'. Other talks series 
designed to maintain contact between Britain and the empire 
included 'Background to the News', 'Matters of the Moment', 
'In England Now', 'Cards on the Table' and 'News From 
Home'. In the entertainment field, in addition to concerts 
by the BBC's Empire Orchestra, the Empire Service broadcast 
popular Home Service programmes like 'In Town Tonight', 
1ITMA1 and the 'soap', 'Frontline Family', as well as a 
special programme for Africa 'Song Time in the Laager'. 
Listeners in the empire were encouraged to write to 
the BBC with their comments on Empire Service programmes 
which were printed in the Empire Service's magazine 
equivalent of the Radio Times, London Callinq. A listener 
in Northern Rhodesia was critical of the Empire Service's 
entertainment programmes: 
I honestly think that if you took an all-round census 
of opinion in Southern Africa you would find that 
people just didn't bother to listen, as the musical 
items are so utterly dreadful. I feel that you imagine 
us to be a small group of highbrows who like any 
amount of discord so long as there is no suspicion of 
a melody., Tonight I have been listening to a 
programme of madrigals and they simply resembled a 
cats, concert. "' 
A listener in Southern Rhodesia, however, was full of 
2-09 PRO, INF1/165, Joint Broadcasting Committee, 
'Broadcasting in the Colonies', undated. 
2.110 London Callin , 11 May 1940. 
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praise for the Empire Service and its part in uniting the 
people of the empire with Britain in difficult wartime 
conditions, highlighting both the premium placed on 
receiving news from home and confirmation of the BBC's 
reputation for reliable news: 
Special thanks for the Sunday afternoon services; 
length of service and style are to our way of thinking 
absolutely right. Talks, talks, talks are what we 
clamour for; it is so interesting to get first hand 
knowledge of all sorts of subjects pertaining to world 
affairs today - Richard Dimbleby and naval experts 
keep us right on the spot. The Male Choir, too is a 
joy; they never seem to get coughs or colds. Finally 
I'd like to say that the BBC means more to us now even 
than in peacetime; it is our one sure, truthful link 
with home, and one relies on you whether it be for 
relaxation, education, church services or a sense of 
companionship with Home, and not leaving out the ever 
important news it is impossible to measure the 
importance of the BBC in daily life. 113-2 
In a similar vein, a listener from Tanganyika praised the 
news on the Empire Service, vindicating the emphasis placed 
on the need for a reliable news service as the best means 
of propaganda, at least with European audiences: 
We have just heard the news. It included a record of 
an air-raid, complete with noises off. We called the 
House Boys to listen; their mouths hung open, their 
eyes popped with excitement, and devout Mohammedan 
prayers issued at intervals in grunts. I write out the 
news bulletin daily and it goes the rounds. Oh, thank 
Heaven for the wireless. What people overseas went 
through in the last war I cannot think. 1112 
The BBC monitored audience reactions in Africa based 
on information it received from its 'observer scheme', 
periodic questionnaires, general correspondence, Press 
references and official and commercial reports. These 
reports helped the BBC to improve its service overseas and 
tended to reinforce the opinions of the correspondents 
whose letters were published in London Callin : that the 
BBC could be relied upon for truth about the war. For 
example, in an African Service Audience Reaction Report a 
major criticism was that there was 'overmuch talk' and 'too 
little music and entertainment'. A listener in Southern 
-'3-' ibid. 
11112 London Calling, 5-11 January 1941. 
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Rhodesia complained about 'a most regrettable dearth of 
good music, orchestral, vocal or chamber music at 
convenient times. Few people listen after the 8 o'clock 
news'. A listener in Nyasaland commented, 'you broadcast 
far too many talks. Some are extremely interesting, but a 
lot of them are not'. There was, however, praise for news 
presentation. As a listener in Southern Rhodesia wrote, 
'the whole of my circle of friends is completely satisfied 
with the presentation of the B. B. C. It is always regarded 
as being reliable and truthful. A little late sometimes, 
but none the less if we get it from the B. B. C. we believe 
it is true'. 2-'LO 
The Empire Service had always used the Royal Family as 
a symbol of unity of empire, and this proved to be even 
more important during the war when the people of the empire 
felt distanced from events in Europe. 1114 Empire unity, the 
favoured theme of the Empire Division of the MOI was 
employed by the Queen when she broadcast to the women of 
the empire on Armistice Day 1939. In this morale-boosting 
broadcast the Queen paid tribute to the war effort, big or 
small, of the women of the empire and presented the war as 
a war of sacrifice of all the people: 
... The call has come and from my heart I thank you, the women of our great Empire, for the way you have 
answered it. The tasks that you have undertaken, 
whether at home or in distant lands cover every field 
of National Service, and I should like to pay my 
tribute to all of you who are giving such splendid and 
unselfish help in this time of trouble ... 115 
The King's Christmas Day broadcast in 1939 echoed the 
unity theme and paid tribute to the spontaneous 
contributions made by the men and women of the 'far-flung 
Empire', the 'family of nations' which is prepared to 
sacrifice in a 'spirit of freedom', 
Such is the spirit of the Empire, the great Dominions, 
IX3 WAC, E171/2, BBC Empire Service Intelligence 
Memorandum, 'African Service Audience Reaction Report', 16 
March 1942. 
114 C. f. MacKenzie, 'In Touch with the Infinite 
passim. 
11115 London Callin , 18 November 1939. 
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of India, of every Colony, large or small. From all 
alike have come offers of help, for which the mother 
country can never be sufficiently grateful. Such unity 
in aim and in effort has never been seen in the world 
before. 1116 
The King's Empire Day broadcast in 1940 warned against 
the war aims of the enemy which sought the 'complete and 
final' overthrow of the empire and 'everything for which it 
stands'. Moreover, 
There is a word which our enemies use against us- 
imperialism. By it they mean the spirit of domination 
and the lust of conquest. We free peoples of the 
Empire cast that word back in their teeth. It is they 
who have evil aspirations. Our one object has always 
been peace; peace in which our institutions may be 
developed, the condition of our peoples improved, and 
the problems of government solved in a spirit of 
goodwill. 227 
At home in the early stages of the war the BBC's 
coverage of the British empire was largely limited to 
programmes about the contributions made by the empire to 
the war effort. Programmes on empire subjects were never a 
high priority on the Home Service where they would have to 
compete with more important war news, entertainment for 
morale-boosting or campaigns like those of the Ministry of 
Food. Therefore empire programmes were limited and 
concentrated initially on the theme of unity. For example, 
a half hour programme on the Home Service on 6 October 1939 
before the main news at nine o'clock, 'The Empire Answers', 
devised and produced by Laurence Gilliam and A. L. Lloyd was 
a 'dramatic chronicle of the entry of the nations of the 
Commonwealth into the war' which portrayed how the 
challenge of the war came and the Empire's answer to that 
challenge. 118 The BBC produced a special series, 'Dominion 
Commentary', to remind the British audiences again of the 
contribution made by the empire to the war effort. The 
broadcast of 2 December had an African flavour with a talk 
11116 London Calling, 6 January 1940. 
117 London Calling, 13 July 1940. 
-1111B Radio Times, 1-7 October, 1939. 
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by Morris Broughton on South Africa. "9 The programming 
for Christmas Day 1939 included an afternoon programme, 
'The Empire's Greetings', which showed how the 'great 
British family will once again be reunited by radio' 
comprising Christmas with the Forces, Christmas in the 
British Isles and Christmas in the Commonwealth overseas, 
with messages from Newfoundland, Canada, New Zealand, 
Australia, the Colonial Empire (for 1939 represented by a 
Malayan Naval Rating serving in Singapore), India and South 
Africa. 110 
In the entertainment sphere, as opposed to Imorale- 
boosting' programming, the empire was represented by 
occasional plays and musical programmes. For example, a 
play written by Val Gielgud, 'Africa Flight', was broadcast 
on 4 January 1940 and Roger MacDougall and Allan 
MacKinnon's 'King of the Kongo' was broadcast on 28 May 
1939, both with African backgrounds. 'The Empire Sings' on 
18 February 1940 was a 'pot pourril of music from all parts 
of the empire and on 14 August 1940 'Here We Come, 
Britain! ' featured camp concerts given by empire troops. 
Again on 19 September 1939 'Empire Review' provided a 
'romantic review of the British Empire in music, song and 
story' presented by Mike Meehan known to listeners as the 
presenter of 'In Town Tonight'. ` 
During 1940 as part of the effort in the wake of the 
Colonial Development and Welfare Act to publicise more of 
what the British were doing for the empire the BBC included 
talks on larger colonial issues as well as programmes on 
the contribution of the empire to Britain's war effort. 
For example, in the series which followed the nine o'clock 
news, 'Tonight's Talk', of 28 July, the Governor of the 
Straits Settlements and the High Commissioner for the Malay 
States, Sir Shenton Thomas, gave a talk on 'How the 
Colonies Go To It'. On 14 August Sir Geoffrey Northcote*, 
1-119 Radio Times, 26 November -2 December 1939. 
112 0 Radio Times, 24-30 December 1939. 
3-211 Radio Times, 31 December 1939 -6 January 1940; 26 
May -1 June 1940; 18-24 February 1940; 11-17 August 1940; 
15-21 September 1940. ' 
140 
the then Governor of Hong Kong and future Principal 
Information Officer in East Africa, gave a talk on 'Our 
Aims in Colonial Government'. The Minister of Information 
and regular government broadcaster, Duff Cooper*, gave 
'Children's Hour' special talk to the children of Britain 
and the empire as did Princess Elizabeth on 13 October. 
Harry Hodson, Director of the MOI's Empire Division led a 
discussion in the series 'Taking Stock' on the future of 
the British Commonwealth which discussed the part played by 
the self-governing dominions and dependencies during the 
war and raised issues, albeit in general terms, of the 
possible future of the Commonwealth as a nucleus for 
collective security in the future and whether there were 
any lessons to be learnt from the experience of the empire 
fighting together during the war which could help to solve 
post-war administrative problems. The Secretary of State 
for the Colonies and Chairman of the British Council, Lord 
Lloyd*, gave the first talk by a Secretary of State on the 
Home Service during the war on 'The Colonial Empire and the 
War' in the series 'Tonight's Talk' on 15 October and 
repeated on 7 December. 122 A feature programme on the life 
of David Livingstone and a play, 'Builders of Empire', 
about the life of Cecil Rhodes were broadcast in 
December. X23 Again the Christmas day broadcasts by the BBC 
were seen as an opportunity to promote the idea of empire 
unity with the programme 'Christmas Under Fire' calling the 
empire. 121 
In 1941 there appears to have been a dropping off in 
programmes about the empire. Empire programmes were 
confined to, a series 'Palm and Pine', celebrations for 
Empire Day 24 May and a tribute to the contribution of the 
troops of the empire in the defeat of the Italian armies in 
East Africa. In 'Palm and Pine' men from the Dominions and 
the Colonies spoke about their trades and lives before they 
1122 Radio Times, 28 July -3 August 1940; 11-17 August 
1940; 1-7 September 1940; 13-19 October 1940; 1-7 December 
1940. 
X23 Radio Times, 8-14 December 1940; 15-21 December 1940. 
124 Radio Times, 22-28 December 1940. 
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left their homes to fight in the war. For Empire Day there 
were two major programmes. The Empire Day concert included 
Dyson's song of unison, 'Motherland', setting William 
Watson's 1892 poem 'England and her Colonies' to music 
which featured the lines: 
Children of Britain's island breed, 
To whom the Mother in her need, 
Perchance may one day call. 
An hour long programme, 'Brothers in Arms', was the story 
of the empire at war from May 1940 to May 1941. On 8 
September the collapse of the Italian empire in Africa was 
celebrated in a programme 'End of an Empire' which paid 
tribute to the joint efforts made by British, Imperial, 
Free French and Belgian forces fighting in the East African 
campaign. 115 
Colonial Propaganda and War Aims 
The picture of the British empire portrayed by the BBC 
Home Service like that of colonial propaganda in general in 
the first two years of the war was fairly limited to 
programmes about the colonial war effort and of a win the 
war type of morale-boosting. That the theme of imperial 
unity was the only fare is not entirely surprising given 
Winston Churchill's attitude to the discussion of war aims. 
A' central problem confronting all British 
propagandists was the ban Churchill had placed on the 
public discussion of war aims and reconstruction in any 
other than general terms. As Churchill himself had 
expressed in the House of Commons on his first day as 
Prime Minister, 13 May 1940: 
You ask, What is our aim? I can answer in one word: It 
is victory, victory at all costs, victory in spite of 
terror, victory, however long and hard the road might 
be; for without victory there is no survival. 126 
In the dark days of 1940 following the fall of France and 
the Battle of Britain- this was justifiable as the very 
survival of Britain let alone the British empire, was in 
112 5 Radio Times, 18-24 May 1941; 7-13 September 1941. 
1126 Peter Hennessy, Never Again, Britain 1945-5 
(London, 1992), p. 25. 
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doubt. MOI propagandists, however, were alive to the 
problems this reluctance to discuss war aims, particularly 
as far as the British empire was concerned. Hodson 
expressed doubts about the value of continuing to portray 
the war as a struggle against 'evil things', 
If this war is prosecuted as a war against evil things 
rather than Germany, we shall be reminded where 
charity begins. Though we can boast freedom of the 
person, of speech and faith, throughout the Empire, 
economic freedom is admittedly relative and 
incomplete. There is no burking the fact that large 
bodies of opinion in the overseas Empire are 
suspicious of class motives in British policy and for 
this reason it is most necessary that for the purposes 
of Empire propaganda our expression of war aims should 
be linked with an avowal of faith in a better world 
that we can build when the war is won. 227 
This continual emphasis on what the British empire was 
fighting against would naturally lead on to questions about 
what the British empire was fighting for. 
Problems continued because what the propagandists 
considered would make 'good' propaganda they were not 
allowed to publicise. Many within the MOI, including the 
Minister of Information himself, Duff Cooper, and other 
figures like the deputy Prime Minister, Clement Attlee*, 
and the Chairman of the Home Affairs Committee of the 
Cabinet, Arthur Greenwood*, all favoured the broadcast of 
British war aims, not least because it was considered to be 
good propaganda in itself to discuss matters in wartime 
which would not be tolerated in totalitarian regimes. 
Moreover as Greenwood pointed out to Cooper, it would be 
useful to prepare British public opinion 'as to some of the 
immensely difficult problems we shall have to deal, and in 
setting out the positive elements in our own working 
Democracy - by way of counter to the Nazi New Order'. 
Subjects Greenwood thought could be properly discussed 
included nationality, control of armaments, the colonies, 
unemployment, education and social services. 128 One BBC 
official also added that broadcasts on these subjects, 
2.27 PRO, INF1/165, Hodson, 'Propaganda in the Empire', 
undated. 
3-213 PRO, INF1/177, Greenwood to Cooper, 19 March 1941. 
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which he called 'the Brave New World' talks, would have the 
advantage of providing a 'safety valve' and that reaction 
to them would enable Ministers to have clues to the way the 
public was thinking about matters 'on which Government 
policy may still be in the making'. 112-9 As far as British 
propaganda towards the United States was concerned, there 
would be the further advantage of discussing British plans 
for the future of the empire because, 
an argument constantly used by the more moderate 
section of the isolationists is that the United States 
is preparing to enter the war on behalf of an Empire 
whose objects apart from self-preservation are only 
defined in the vaguest manner. X30 
Opposition to the broadcast of peace aims was 
vociferously articulated by Churchill. As Harold Nicolson, 
Parliamentary Private Secretary at the MOI, explained to 
Duff Cooper the problem was that any discussion of war aims 
would either be 'colourless or controversial'. It would be 
'controversial' because any discussion of a new world order 
could not avoid 'a leftish tendency', and would be 
'colourless' because as no pacifists, communists or 
fascists would be permitted to broadcast there would not be 
an open forum. It would also not be fair to the BBC, 
argued Nicolson, to expose it to a possible 'tempest' 
without first obtaining Cabinet approval. 131 Such 
broadcasts may have had a detrimental effect on American 
opinion, for if a series were seemingly innocuously titled 
'Where are we going? ' the answer would probably be 'still 
further towards Socialism' X3 2 Therefore while the empire 
propagandists were not able to directly publicise detailed 
129 PRO, INF1/177, Ryan to Nicholson, 20 March 1941. 
130 PRO, INFI/177, Charles Webster, Royal Institute of 
International Affairs to Cooper, 24 June 1941. 
X33L PRO, INF1/177, Nicolson to Cooper, 15'January 
1941; Nicolson to Ryan 21 March 1941. 
132 PRO, INF1/177, Maconachie (BBC) to Nicolson 16 
March 1941. A BBC series later that year 'Making Plans' 
raised some of the issues the BBC had wanted to broadcast 
about but these were domestic subjects, not the future of 
Britain's foreign or colonial policies. See further, 
Briggs, The War of Words ..., pp. 322-3. 
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British war aims in relation to the empire the Empire 
Transcription Service was given a directive to discuss the 
war aims theme in terms of Britain's record of supporting 
the causes of small nations; fighting for a better world 
with social progress on the ruins of Nazi aggression; and 
the meaning of the British Empire. M33 
Despite the absence of specific war aims for the 
empire in Africa, there was one area in which the British 
government could show its commitment to the colonial empire 
and the kind of empire it aimed at creating for the future. 
This was accomplished by the passage of the new Colonial 
Development and Welfare legislation in February 1940 which 
earmarked 55 million pounds over ten years for projects in 
the colonies from the British exchequer. This legislation 
was the result of a long battle with the Treasury to change 
their philosophy from seeing the colonies as merely 
contributing to imperial coffers to a new responsibility to 
develop the colonies for mutual benefit and in the 
interests of colonial welfare. As was seen in chapter one 
the new Act would, it was thought, be good propaganda and 
help divert attention away from the failure to publish the 
Report of the West Indies Royal Commission. In the absence 
of formal war aims for the British empire its timing was 
extremely opportune. 
The Colonial Office judged the reception of the Act as 
a success, especially by the conservative press. The 
Manchester Guardian, previously an object of Colonial 
Office suspicion that the inter-war policy of the paper had 
been to publish 'any information concerning the Colonies 
which may suggest exploitation' X34 greeted it 'with 
enthusiasm'. 135 The Times, under the editorship of the 
former Round Table editor, Geoffrey Dawson 'a true 
imperialist who had worked under Chamberlain at the 
Colonial Office and with Milner in South Africa' thought 
X33 PRO, INF1/165, Themes for the Empire transcription 
Service, Hodson, 14 May 1941. 
13 4 August, op. cit., p. 93. 
x35 PRO, C0875/12/22/file. 
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that Britain could 'feel proud of the Imperial spirit as 
one of the major forces working even in the stress of war, 
for the liberation and ordered progress of mankind' . 
3L31-5 In 
the absence of specific war aims, the Manchester Guardian 
embraced it as a declaration of the kind of world for which 
Britain was fighting for, 'the resetting, for that is what 
it amounts to, of our attitude towards the colonies is in 
itself an affirmation of our war aims'. The paper, East 
Africa, echoing Joseph Chamberlainesque images of 
constructive imperialism and the development of undeveloped 
great estates, likewise hailed the new act as: 
the definition in practical terms of that modern 
Imperialism of which the race has every reason to be 
proud... Never was a sounder blow struck at the old 
gibe that the Colonial Office tended to regard the 
Colonies as territories to be administered instead of 
estates to be developed. 3.3'7 
The Manchester Guardian went even further by warning that 
Britain should take notice of the growth in expectations 
aroused by the war and encouraged by the 1940 Act: 
There runs through the comments of the African papers 
on the war a spirit which it is well to take notice. 
The hatred of the Nazis and their racial fanaticism is 
combined with a general expectation that British rule 
is going to be greatly improved ... We have to discover for Africa and the rest of the dependent 
Empire, the kind of conscience that gave a start to 
the modern social services in Britain with the great 
liberal victory in 1906. M38 
This was not, however, merely a one-sided 
relationship. The empire's war effort was continually 
publicised. The MOI produced a survey of the first year's 
mobilisation of the Colonial empire's energies in September 
1940 in the series 'Matters of Fact'. It was important to 
show the British people that the colonies, far from being a 
drain on the British war effort, made a substantial 
contribution of their own. For example, it was explained 
that Africa bore the majority of the cost for its own 
defence, as it had done in 1939, while the British 
IL3 6 The Times, 21 February 1940. 
237 East Africa, 29 February 1940. 
11: 319 The Manchester Guardian, 14 December 1940. 
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government paid only 25%. The individual colony's military 
efforts were detailed including the flying school at Nakum, 
Kenya, the Volunteer Reserve Force in Uganda, the 
Tanganyika Naval Volunteer force, Northern Rhodesia's 
African Motor Driving School and Zanzibar's Field Ambulance 
Company. The colonies also contributed economically. An 
East African Economic Council was established mirroring 
similar government intervention at home. Mine workers in 
Northern Rhodesia who in spite of their desire to join the 
forces had been persuaded to remain and work in the vital 
war industry produced copper, lead and zinc. This survey 
also detailed the monetary contributions of the individual 
colonies Uganda and Tanganyika had both contributed 100,000 
pounds, Northern Rhodesia 200,000 pounds in general and 
38,000 pounds specifically for aircraft, Nyasaland 20,000 
pounds in general and 32,850 pounds for aircraft and 
Zanzibar sent 20,000 pounds for two fighter aircraft the 
'Zanzibar' and the 'Pemba'. 131 
Although there was a brief mention of the 'floating of 
the East African war loan through the issue of war bonds 
and the establishment of the East African War Supplies 
Board in the press"40 the Colonial Office was disappointed 
that the press had not taken up the story of colonial war 
contributions. Apart from The Times few papers seemed to 
think that this story merited much editorial space. 141 The 
Times noted in a summary of the colonial war effort that 
perhaps the contributions from the African colonies 
are as remarkable as any, for they are made by rulers 
and races who are considered to be among the more 
backward of mankind, and yet they show the same 
spontaneity and true understanding of the issues 
involved as do the more Europeanised communities of 
the Asiatic and American continents. 1-42 
Two months later it summarised the wartime 
M39 PRO, C0875/12/17, 'Matters of Fact', 6 September 1940. 
1140 For example The Times, 5 September 1940 and 28 
November 1940; the Daily Telegraph, 30 October 1940. 
"'3- PRO, C0875/12/20, note on publicity for war 
contributions, 6 November 1941. 
142 The Times, 13 January 1940. 
147 
relationship between the colonies and the mother country, 
with reference to MacDonald's policy statement: 
The Crown Colonies have rallied to the general cause 
of the alliance against Hitlerism with a unanimous 
loyalty to the governing Power which is the more 
gratifying because few of them have known much 
prosperity in the past troubled decade ... Although in 
some cases the enlarged demand from the Old World has 
stimulated production, the general effect on colonial 
economies is necessarily adverse ... It was 
unavoidable also that the Government in Whitehall 
should temporarily tighten its hold upon the reins of 
administration. The more opportune therefore was Mr. 
MacDonald's recent statement of colonial policy, in 
which he both offered early help to colonial finance 
and defined afresh the firm intention to lead the 
colonies after the war steadily towards self- 
government. X43 
In the English and settler paper, the East Africa and 
Rhodesia, the desire to make a full contribution to the 
Empire war effort was made apparent, but in terms of their 
own political agenda and different to the desired Colonial 
Office line. Responsible government free from the 
constraints and direction of London but also without black 
African participation, was 'superior' to that of colonial 
government: 
British Africa realises that it stands high on the 
list of priorities of Hitler's aims, and it burns to 
engage in its own defence, for which it can properly 
supply inexhaustible numbers of excellent African 
troops and first class white leadership. The creation 
of great African armies seems to be a foregone 
conclusion ... Governments in East, Central and West Africa ... have in recent weeks called, and called 
confidently, for further contributions in manpower and 
in money. This was not regimentation from the top 
downwards as in totalitarian countries, but the 
expression of acknowledged spokesmen for their people 
uttering the common wish and will - in no single case 
in advance of public opinion, but in every case after 
it had been impatiently voiced by other public men 
impelled by the apprehension that their government was 
too patient, too cautious about imposing new 
sacrifices. As in almost all democratic states in 
recent years, there has been in the Rhodesias and East 
Africa a marked disposition to look to the public 
purse for succour in difficulties, now in these days 
of peril has come the awakening, and there is an 
143 The Times, 6 April 1940. 
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ardent and universal anxiety to give, not to get. L44 
The point was made explicitly a few weeks later in the 
same paper: 
By comparison the contribution of the East African 
territories to the North has been dilatory and 
measured - not, it must be insisted, because they are 
or were less ready to do all that lay in their power 
but because not being self-governing, they have been 
impelled to put a rein upon their enthusiasm and to 
travel at the leisurely pace pursued by Whitehall. 1145 
The settler paper, the East African Standard, based in 
Nairobi also posed a similar potential problem for the 
propagandists and used its editorial column to complain 
about the Information Office and its lack of activity in 
the area of news provision (representing, perhaps, the 
'leisurely pace' of Whitehall in the person of the colonial 
government's Information Officer). The Information Officer 
in Nairobi, Mervyn Hill was thought to be doing his best. 
For example, he contributed a weekly commentary to the 
paper under the pseudonym 'Signifier'. Hill wanted a 
Press Officer to be appointed on the grounds that Kenya had 
a war front of its own, that news received was often out of 
date and that papers like the East African Standard had to 
compete for MOI material which was often broadcast over the 
radio first. 146 
Edmett, seconded from the Colonial'Service in the Gold 
Coast, where he would have had no first hand experience of 
administration against a background of the 'settler' 
problem working with Noel Sabine, on publicity in the 
Colonial Office, thought there was little point in 
pandering to settler interests -as represented in the East 
African Standard. Edmett expressed the progressive view 
that, as long as the African had no responsibility for any 
of the government in Kenya, the African would be little 
interested in what Kenya did as part of her war effort. He 
"' PRO, C0875/12/20, East Africa and Rhodesia, 25 
July 1940. 
1145 PRO, C0875/12/20, East Africa and Rhodesia, 12 
September 1940. 
146 PRO, C0875/6/16, Hill to Colonial Office, 11 
February 1941. 
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thought that an Information Officer could not redress the 
balance and regretted that the Information Officer seemed 
to have become the 'handmaiden' of the GOC in Nairobi. As 
Edmett consistently arguedIL47 he wanted to look beyond the 
short term necessities of the war and recommended the 
establishment of the post of Public Relations Officer 
'with a definite policy of associating black and white' 
which could obtain public backing by 'looking forward to 
the new millennium'. 1148 
David Watherston of the East African Department of the 
Colonial Office, formerly of the Malayan Civil Service and 
subsequently Chief Secretary to the Federation of Malaya, 
1952-7 did not agree. He thought that the basis of the 
East African Standard's attacks on the Kenyan Information 
Officer was the desire for the 10 to appeal to the 'idle' 
African, to get him 'out of the reserve and work for the 
European farmers' benefit'. 119 As the chief secretary to 
the government of Kenya wrote, what was needed was the 
sending of 'rapid directives' and that in future much of 
long term material produced should be done locally. 1150 
Following the success of the publicity for the 
Colonial Development and Welfare Act both the Colonial 
Office and the MOI made plans for an empire publicity 
campaign which would be aimed at 'stirring pride in our own 
people in Imperial achievements, as well as defending 
ourselves against attacks abroad' . 15 1 At home Noel Sabine 
the soon to be appointed Public Relations Officer'suggested 
that the main points of British colonial policy of 
'trusteeship, the gradual education towards self- 
government, must constantly be brought home, a nd the 
process of the application of this policy must be made 
117 C. f. chapter one. 
11413 PRO, C0875/6/16, minute by Edmett, 10 October 1941. 
3-4'9 PRO, C0875/6/16,, minute by Watherston 4 January 1942. 
3-50 PRO, C0875/6/16, Gurney to Colonial Office, 16 
September 1941. 
11511 PRO, C0323/1754/4, Reith to MacDonald, 26 March 
1940. 
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dramatic and real'. In order to capture the imagination of 
the British population, argued Sabine, something more than 
the usual MOI imperial propaganda fare would be needed: 
'the object before us must be to bring the Colonial Empire 
to everyone's notice by the really popular media', radio 
plays rather than radio talks and 'first class, dramatic 
and interesting filMS1.151 This proposal for a new 
initiative in colonial propaganda, ambitious and beyond the 
resources of the Colonial Office and the MOI at this time. 
The war situation in Europe was so grave that it would have 
been hard to imagine that the projection of the British 
empire would have been a major priority in wartime 
propaganda at this point. However, Sabine's comments are 
noteworthy in that they point to a central problem for the 
colonial propagandists, to get the British public to 
'think' empire a big splash was necessary for while 
pamphlets, radio talks and leader articles in the 
broadsheets had their place this was pandering to an 
audience whose interest in colonial affairs already 
existed. 
The fall of France in June 1940 changed the context 
within which these on-going plans for an empire publicity 
campaign was discussed. Now that the British empire stood 
alone the empire was arguably the only strength the British 
could draw on. There was an even greater need to show the 
contributions of the empire to the war effort and bring 
comfort to the British people that they were not alone. 
Therefore the MOI decided to intensify the empire campaign 
'more especially by means of a press and poster advertising 
campaign"53 in addition to existing measures in leaflets, 
broadcasts and lectures. The campaign was kicked off by a 
press conference given by the Minister of Information, Duff 
Cooper: 
the first purpose of the campaign is to drive home the 
fact that Great Britain does not stand in this 
struggle alone, but as a partner in a world-wide and 
immensely powerful family of nations. The British 
1152 PRO, C0323/1754/4, note by Sabine, undated. 
M53 PRO, C0323/1754/12, Hodson to Sabine, 7 August 
1940. 
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Commonwealth of nations has vast reserves of strength, 
both of man power, of industrial equipment and of raw 
materials and food stuffs. After a year of steadily 
growing war effort, these reserves have been mobilised 
to the point at which they must soon become a vital 
factor in winning the war ... the aim of the Empire 
campaign of the Ministry of Information is to 
encourage people to look not only at the present 
strength of the British Commonwealth, but also at its 
immense capabilities for the future welfare of the 
human race. 154 
While this campaign would not be linked to war aims 
per se, the campaign would have the advantage of helping 
'to prepare the public for the emergence of war aims' at a 
later date by stressing that 'the strength of the Imperial 
war effort was derived from its freedom of choice'. Lord 
Davidson, head of the General Production Division at the 
MOI, pointed out that criticism would be forthcoming from 
those who had long since argued that the 'Imperial idea' 
itself was 'a bad thing' and that such a campaign would 
also be useful in clearing away 'the misconception in the 
public mind about the status of the Dominions and 
Colonies'. "' 
In spite of the laudable intentions behind the 
campaign the advertisement part of it was not a success. 
The brainchild of Harry Hodson, the 'Empire Crusade' 
adverts taken out in the Press over a ten week period 
variously depicted the empire as 'a family of free 
nations ... men and women of every colour are working out 
their own destiny... in this war they are fighting shoulder 
to shoulder of their own free will' and imparting a dynamic 
faith in its strength: 
The Greatest Crusade. 
We, who are members of the British Commonwealth, 
hold in our hands the future of the world. 
By fostering the spirit 
, 
of liberty we are 
building self-reliant nations of free men. 
We are the builders at grips with the destroyers. 
We stand for healthy unhampered growth, fighting the 
disease of tyranny ... 
Tyranny is the oldest disease of the human race. 
1154 PRO, C0323/1754/12, Duff Cooper's statement to the 
press, 4 October 1940. 
1155 PRO, INF1/550, Directors meeting in the Ministry 
of Information, 1 October 1940. 
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For thousands of years men have been tempted by 
visions of world conquest to sell their souls to a 
tyrant. Under the thin disguise of new catch-words, 
the Nazis have started the old futile game of building 
a slave empire. 
The British Empire is exactly the opposite. 
There has been nothing like it in the world before; it 
is a commonwealth, a family of free nations - linked 
together by a loyalty to one king. It stands for 
progress; it is the hope'of the future. 151 
According to a Mass Observation Report this kind of 
advertising was not popular with the British public. Only 
29% of a sample of one thousand had even noticed the 
campaign. The most frequent comments were, 'I agree with 
them, but I think it is rather a waste of paper that sort 
of thing. I think there are more important things' and 
'they're not at all bad really, though there's too much in 
them'. One even thought the campaign was 'something to do 
with A. R. P. workers'. 1157 
The Minister of Information, Duff Cooper himself 
wondered if the campaign was necessary and Harold Nicolson 
his Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State objected to it 
because he did 'not think we should spend large sums on 
anything which is not essential' . 1158 The Secretary of 
State for the Colonies, Lord Lloyd felt it was 'an entirely 
deplorable piece of prose but innocuous I think except for 
those possessed of literary tastel. 3-59 
Such private misgivings behind the safety of closed 
doors were one thing but the campaign elicited the 
criticism of the Labour peer Lord Olivier*. Lord Olivier 
was a maverick who with the Webbs, George Bernard Shaw and 
Graham Wallas was a founder member of the Fabian Society. 
He had combined political activity with a distinguished yet 
controversial career in the civil service in the Colonial 
Office, in the Colonial Service as Governor of Jamaica and 
1151 The Observer, 13 October 1940 quoted in McLaine, 
op. cit., p. 223. 
157 Mass Observation Reports Nos. 518 and 528, 
December 1940. 
3-58 Quoted in McLaine, OP. cit., p. 223. 
159 PRO, C0323/1754/12, minute by Lord Lloyd, 7 
October 1940. 
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as a minister as Secretary of State for India in the first 
Labour government of Ramsay MacDonald. Never a mainstream 
Fabian (he resigned from the Executive of the Society in 
protest against Fabian justifications of the Boer War) he 
was always outspoken and a 'champion of the under-dog'. He 
followed his conscience even when it was inconvenient to 
his party, for example his appointment to the West Indies 
Sugar Commission in 1929 led to his public attack on the 
Labour government's free trade policies which caused 
embarrassment to the Labour government. 1160 With this 
pedigree it is not surprising then that Lord Olivier would 
feel it was his duty to expose British hypocrisy, even in 
wartime. The New Statesman published a letter from Lord 
Olivier which criticised the Empire Crusade press 
advertisements. Olivier argued that the people of the 
empire, far from being 'free', as was suggested by the 
advertisements' talk of such things as liberty, were still 
subject peoples and that some 'natives' in North and South 
Rhodesia were even being flogged. While he agreed that the 
MOI was right that in the case of Southern Rhodesia 
although 'not-as yet an equal partner, controls its own 
affairs', he pointed out that this was only true as far as 
the white minority was concerned as the 'natives' had no 
democratic rights or representation. He argued that 'only 
when these people are free will we really stand as the 
opposite of the Nazi system which the Ministry's [MOI] 
statement rightly condemns'. "' 
Reaction to Lord Olivier's outburst was furious, with 
minutes suggesting that the Colonial Office felt it had 
been betrayed by one of its own. Sir Cosmo Parkinson, the 
Under-Secretary of State at the Colonial Office, while 
stating his opinion that Lord Olivier was 'senile' (Olivier 
was 81), thought that the letter was intolerable, 
represented no less than anti-British propaganda and 
3-r>O For an appreciation Of Olivier's career and his 
contribution to Fabian thought, c. f. Francis Lee, Fabianism 
and Colonialism: the Life and Political Thought of Lord 
Sydney Olivier (London, 1988). 
11153- PRO, C0875/11/6, Olivier's letter in the New 
Statesman, 21 December 1940. 
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questioned Lord Olivier and the New Statesman's interest in 
winning the war. Parkinson argued that 'when we are 
struggling for existence can we hope to have all peacetime 
ideas of progress and development carried on as if no one 
had ever heard of such a thing as war? '. Moreover, the 
wartime legislation, the Colonial Development and Welfare 
Act, had been ignored by Olivier's criticism which galled 
Parkinson even more because it represented a 'triumph for 
the Colonial Office as it revolutionises the agelong 
Treasury attitude towards colonies'. 162 
The Secretary of State for the Colonies and 'intense 
imperial patriot' X63 , Lord Lloyd, thought that it would be 
possible to ignore the letter as 'no one who knows Lord 
Olivier would pay attention to him'. The danger was 
according to Lloyd, that too many people did not know 
Olivier. 161 
Sabine, the Colonial Office's Public Relations 
Officer, thought that the letter would have little impact 
as the New Statesman was a left wing intellectual 
publication with a small circulation. He felt the answer 
lay in publicising an 'expose of our colonial policy and 
some of the steps which have been taken even after the 
outbreak of the war'. 3165 
The experience of actually conducting propaganda about 
the British colonial empire under wartime conditions proved 
to be rather different from the assumptions made by the 
shadow MOI in the pre-war period. In this initial part of 
the war machinery was hastily improvised. The 
propagandists both at home and in the colonies had to make 
do with what already existed and survived on a diet of 
generalised propaganda output from London until the 
adaptation of propaganda material to particular territorial 
1162- PRO, C0875/11/6, minute by Parkinson, 30 December 
1940. 
3-63 John Charmley, Lord Lloyd and the Decline of the 
British Empire (London, 1987), p. 2. 
1164 PRO, C0875/11/6, minute by Parkinson, 30 December 
1940; minute by Lloyd, 31 December 1940. 
1165 PRO, C0875/11/6, minute by Sabine, 28 December 1940. 
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requirements. The staples of propaganda output was but 
news, posters and pamphlets. The relationship between the 
MOI and the Colonial Office did not help matters either, as 
the Colonial Office was unimpressed by the expertise of the 
Colonial Section of the Empire Division and what they 
considered to be suitable propaganda about the empire. The 
theme of colonial propaganda was scarcely more imaginative 
than stressing 'unity' against the universal enemy Nazism 
and praise for the colonial contribution to the war effort. 
Despite a move away form this kind of simplistic morale 
boosting propaganda with the publicity produced for the 
introduction of the Colonial Development and Welfare Act, 
and the hopes for a long-term educative propaganda about 
the empire in general, little improved as the ill-advised 
'Empire Crusade' showed. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF 'PUBLICITY SENSE' ABOUT EMPIRE: 
EXPANSION IN PROPAGANDA, 1941-42 
During 1941 the projection of British empire to Africa 
and the projection of the British empire at home was 
gradually improved and developed. The Colonial Office 
began to acquire a 'publicity sense'. Liaison with other 
bodies improved and the Colonial Office took care in its 
handling of sensitive areas of propaganda to the United 
States and race relations. Propaganda techniques in the 
colonies were reviewed and the use of broadcasting and film 
assumed greater prominence. 
The problem of divided responsibility between the MOI 
and the Colonial Office however remained with two 
conflicting ideas of what propaganda in the colonies should 
be. As we saw in chapter one, this_was the period when the 
public relations specialists in the Colonial Office, Sabine 
and Edmett voiced their increased concern about the MOI's 
'win the war' propaganda. They urged the adoption of a 
long-term campaign of public relations, both at home and in 
the colonies. By stimulating an understanding of British 
colonial policy, they argued, propaganda could help to 
provide constructive solutions of Britain's colonial 
problems and would reflect the new colonial mission 
embodied in the Colonial Development and Welfare Act. In 
fact some of the Information Officers in the colonies had 
also come to the conclusion that a diet of war propaganda 
was insufficient fare for colonial audiences and had begun 
the first steps in conducting public relations in their 
territories. By the end of 1941 the MOI agreed to 
incorporate long-term propaganda into their war propaganda 
output. 
The Colonial Office Public Relations Officer, Noel 
Sabine was anxious that the Colonial Office should make 
headway in its own efforts to educate the British public 
about the empire. As part of this the Colonial Office 
learnt to b, e more responsive and pro-active in its 
relations with the Press. Under wartime conditions of 
paper rationing the colonial empire had to compete with 
other more exciting war stories. Therefore any interest 
157 
shown by the Press in the empire was something to be 
encouraged. The Colonial Office received more and more 
requests from the both the regional and national British 
press for interviews by the Secretary of State. 3- While 
this can be seen as evidence of an increased press interest 
in colonial affairs it also led to a new consideration by 
the Colonial Office of their relations with the press. 
Under the two previous publicity-minded Secretaries of 
State, Malcolm MacDonald and Lord Lloyd the matter of 
requests from individual journalists had not arisen as they 
both had 'a good deal of personal contact with the Press 
and saw them privately'. 2 
The Deputy Under-Secretary of State, Sir John 
Shuckburgh, recommended that the new Secretary of State, 
Lord Moyne, should refuse all requests because it would 
lead to a situation in which all press correspondents would 
want personal interviews. As Chairman of the West Indies 
Royal Commission, Lord Moyne would have been aware of the 
need for the positive projection of the British empire. 
Lord Moyne, overruled Shuckburgh and in principle agreed to 
see individual journalists interested in colonial affairs 
He wanted each request to be judged on its own merit and on 
the condition that there was the understanding that no 
publicity would be given to the fact that an interview had 
been granted. 3 
The Public Relations Officer, Sabine, also recommended 
that press conferences should become a more regular part of 
Colonial Office procedure. The Secretary of State, Sabine 
suggested, should hold- briefings with four groups of 
journalists: Lobby correspondents, American journalists, 
the Empire Press Union4 and correspondents of specialist 
3- PRO, C0875/11/7, For example, requests in November 
1941 from the Manchester Evening News, - the Star, and the Eveninq Standard. 
PRO, C0875/11/7, minute by S'abine, 25 No, ýember 1942. 
3 PRO, C0875/11/7, minute by Shuckburgh, 26 November 
1941; minute by Moyne, 3 December 1941. 
4 PRO, INF1/73, by 1943 the Empire Press Union 
represented 120 Empire correspondents in London. 
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publications. He recommended that it was preferable to see 
these groups individually as they had different interests 
and certain subjects would appeal to only some of them. 
The Lobby was considered to be a 'close corporation of 
political correspondents' with whom confidential matters 
could be discussed without fear of disclosure. Moreover, 
it was the practice of other Ministers to see the Lobby 
separately and the Lobby was 'jealous of this privilege'. 
American correspondents were highly paid land would not 
take kindly to the idea of being included in any mass 
conference'. It was also thought advisable to see the 
Americans separately as they were likely to ask 'difficult 
questions'. The Empire Press Union represented largely the 
Dominion and Indian press and did not like other non- 
members attending their conferences. They would be 
interested in the 'Imperial aspect' of colonial questions. 
Finally, representatives of the specialist press like the 
Crown Colonist and individuals such as Rudolph Dunbar of 
the Associated Negro Press in London and Rita Hinden* of 
the newly established Fabian Colonial Bureau should be seen 
separately as they were 'often concerned with small 
domestic details as well as larger questions'. The 
alternative was for the Secretary of State to see the Lobby 
and the rest could be catered for in a 'free for all at the 
Moil. Sabine was keen for the Colonial Office to control 
the transmission of information to the Press and did not 
favour the MOI approach as 'many of these journalists who 
attend these MOI conferences are not of a very high 
standing'. Sabine was not in favour of creating a 
precedent of meeting journalists except under the 'Colonial 
Office roof'. ' 
Sabine's suggestions encountered traditional Colonial 
Office antipathy towards public relations. Shuckburgh 
thought that the specialist correspondents would simply 
have to fit in elsewhere and cautioned the Secretary of 
State that 'truckling to the Press like most other things 
5 PRO, C0875/12/12, minute by Sabine, October 1941. 
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can be taken too fart. 6 
As Sabine himself admitted his suggestions were hardly 
revolutionary. Since February 1941 when Moyne became 
Secretary of State he had only held three conferences, one 
with the Lobby, one with the Empire Press Union and one 
with American correspondents. He did not suggest that 
Press conference should take place on a regular basis, but 
approximately three or four times a year and only when 
there was something 'really important to say'. In view of 
their projected rarity, Acting Permanent Under-Secretary of 
State, Sir Cosmo Parkinson, agreed that the Secretary of 
State could see all four groups as proposed .7 
The possibility of producing a stock of photographs to 
illustrate any articles that might be written by press 
correspondents was also explored. Hodson, Director of the 
Empire Division of the MOI thought that an application 
could be made to the Treasury for a grant of 6,000 pounds 
to 'fill in gaps', noting the successful result of the 
despatch of two photographers to East and South Africa to 
provide material for a special addition the Picture Post 
produced about the empire. Ernest Sabben-Clare, the 
Colonial Office-MOI Liaison Officer thought it would be 
cheaper to use local talent. When East Africa was asked to 
provide local, photographs, however, they were advised that 
there were no local facilities available to produce quality 
photographs, but added East Africa would welcome a visit by 
MOI photographers. 8 The scheme was abandoned due to paper 
shortages which made articles about the colonies a luxury. 
Stories about the empire had to compete with other war news 
and this meant that there was 'little or no demand for 
photographs from the colonies'. 9 
1941.6 
PRO, C0875/12/12, minute by Shuckburgh, 16 November 
7 PRO, C0875/12/12, minute by Sabine, 25 November 
1941; minute by Parkinson 27 November 1941. 
13 PRO, C0875/11/17, Hodson to Colonial Office, 19 
February 1941; minute by Sabben-Clare, 14 March 1941; East 
African Governors's Conference to Colonial Office, 23 May 1941. 
9 PRO, C0875/11/17, minute by Wilson, 25 June 1941. 
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Propaganda in Britain would concentrate on informed 
opinion, a 'long term education policy' rather than a 
'blitz campaign'. One method suggested was to improve the 
contacts between colonial troops stationed in Britain and 
the public through a public lecture series which would be 
aimed at 'informed opinion'. This would help to avoid the 
creation of stereotypes on both sides: 'The English, and it 
is not a question of class, regard the colonials as rough, 
rude men, while the latter increasingly regard the English 
as snobs'. By introducing a 'more exotic element of a good 
black or brown speaker into such communities might raise 
considerable thought and talk'. The result was intended to 
lead to such comments as 'black as your hat he was, but I 
must say he spoke a lot lof sense'. 
It was thought 
preferable to introduce colonials by this method rather 
than to follow the suggestion proposed by Kenneth Clark's 
War Artists Committee to mount an exhibition of 'native' 
paintings. Such an exhibition would be a costly 
undertaking and could be a future project as such an 
exhibition would have a 'novelty' value and could 
'stimulate a certain amount of enquiring interest'. 
Posters on the colonial theme in Britain were thought to 
have dubious value unless connected to the theme of 
reconstruction which at the time would have been 'contrary 
to government policy'. " 
The nomenclature of the British Commonwealth of 
Nations received attention because of the sensitivity of 
using the correct descriptive terms and to ensure 
consistency was observed. All those involved in government 
publicity about the empire were circulated with a list of 
'dos and dont's'. Getting the terminology right was seen 
as important in a war where 'imperialism' was used by the 
enemy in its most pejorative sense. This list is so 
revealing that it is worth quoting in full: 
DONTIS 
1. Don't use 'British' when 'United Kingdom' is meant, 
e. g. when you wish to identify troops coming from the 
United Kingdom only, use the phrase 'United Kingdom 
troops'. 'British troops' is the phrase which covers 
2-0 PRO, C0875/11/20, Molesworth of the MOI, October 1941. 
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troops from all parts of the Empire. 
2. Don't use the adjective 'IMPERIAL' at all. It is 
commonly used to mean three quite different things and 
in addition is disliked in certain parts of the 
British Empire. Thus its use is undesirable because it 
creates both confusion and prejudice. 
3. Don't use 'BRITISH EMPIRE' when you mean the Colonial 
parts of the Empire as distinct from the United 
Kingdom, self-governing Dominions and India. 'BRITISH 
EMPIRE' includes the United Kingdom. 
DOS 
Do use 'UNITED KINGDOM' as an adjective, e. g. United 
Kingdom troops. This enabled a clear distinction to be 
drawn between troops from the Home Country and troops 
from the Overseas Dominions, Colonies, etc. Here Axis 
propaganda has benefited from past confusion in 
nomenclature. Many nouns are used as adjectives 
nowadays, however improper it may be. 
Do use the phrases 'BRITISH EMPIRE' or 'BRITISH 
COMMONWEALTH' when you are speaking of all parts of 
the British Empire, i. e. the United Kingdom, the 
Dominions, India and the Colonies. The phrases are in 
practice interchangeable though there are contexts in 
which one will be more appropriate than the other. "' 
Great care was also taken in the treatment of the 
'race' issue in guiding the media. The Colonial Office 
took the lead in the usage of the 'correct' terms to 
describe colonial peoples. For example, a Colonial Office 
Press Officer who managed to 'inspire' a series of articles 
in the Dailv Express about the colonial war effort in the 
hope that it would be followed up in other papers in the 
'age old habit of newspapers following each other in news 
and features' had to impress upon the journalist to use the 
term 'African' as opposed to Inegrol. 3-2 
Similarly, Lord Moyne, the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, tried to play down the issue of the colour bar in 
Africa in a press conference he gave to the Empire Press 
Union. He said: 
In East Africa he did not think the problem of the 
colour bar was so acute as in the West Indies. He had 
found that the colour bar was worse between those 
people with some European blood and pure Africans than 
II: L PRO, C0875/14/14, Whelan to Keating, 13 March 1943. 
12 PRO, C0875/11/12, Collins to Sabine, 19 March 1941; 
Collins to Morley Richards (Daily Exprgss), 19 April 1941. 
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it was between Europeans and native populations. He 
did not believe there was any substantial coloured as 
distinct from African population in East Africa. He 
had also found in Africa that the native populations 
were very much more backward and still had their own 
way of life and in many cases did not want. to take 
part in European life. X3 
There were also complaints about the repeated use of 
the word Iniggerl in BBC broadcasts which led to complaints 
from African colonies. " The Colonial Office censured the 
BBC: 
We can imagine items in which Iniggerl might be 
inevitable and appropriate, e. g. a dramatic scene 
featuring a bad probably Teutonic white man, but if 
this was not the case [we] hope you will take the 
matter up and intensify the war against Inigger as 
against native' in Empire broadcasts. 15 
The BBC assured the Colonial Office that they would inform 
both the Home and Empire Services of the BBC, hoping they 
would not 'blot our copy book in this respect again'. 16 
Ivor Cummings, the first black man to work in the 
Colonial Office as a Welfare Officer seconded from Sierre 
Leone complained about the unfortunate use of the term 
Iniggerl in a MOI film the Night Watch. He pointed out 
that this film would be shown both at home and in the 
empire and that at one point the principal actress 
'referring to the arduous rescue efforts of a Civil Defence 
worker said, "He worked like a niggerl''. The MOI was duly 
informed. '-' 
Race and Empire 
The issue of 'race' both in Britain and in the 
colonies received attention at the highest policy level 
'3 PRO, C0875/12/12, Moyne's Press Conference, 5 June 
1941. 
114 PRO, C0875/18/5, Gold Coast to Colonial Office, 14 
January 1941. 
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17 PRO C0875/18/5, minute by Cummings, 8 July 1941; 
minute by Sabine, 8 July 1941. 
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during the war. This led to an examination of the 
possibilities of introducing race relations legislation and 
a long term education campaign to promote equality between 
the races. This episode is significant for the light it 
sheds on contemporary attitudes towards race and the extent 
to which the Colonial Office was concerned about this 
contentious problem. 
While the colour bar and racial prejudice existed in 
the British colonies, it could be argued that the British 
Isles were relatively free from the problems of race 
relations. Britain circa 1939 was a predominantly 'white' 
country. Probably no more than 8,000 black people lived in 
Britain and were mainly concentrated in the port areas of 
Cardiff, Liverpool, London and Newcastle. The war brought 
a new influx of black people from the colonies, about 1,000 
to Edinburgh and 350 to Merseyside. This new influx was 
designed to be an emergency wartime measure only. In 
January 1942 a Foreign Office official noted that 'the 
recruitment to the United of coloured British subjects, 
whose remaining in the United Kingdom after the war might 
create a social problem, was not considered desirable'. 18 
However small the number, the Colonial Office took a 
strong line against any racial intolerance during the war. 
Ways were explored to overcome any manifestation of racism 
both as a matter of policy, protecting the interests of 
colonial people working for the war effort and studying at 
British Universities and, it seems, resulting from genuine 
feelings against discrimination on the basis of race. 
Lord Moyne, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
wrote to Herbert Morrison*, the Home Secretary, to voice 
his concerns about the 'colour feeling' in Britain. Moyne 
thought this was particularly deplorable during the war 
'when Africans, West Indians and other coloured people 
throughout the Empire are throwing themselves so 
wholeheartedly into our war effort'. Moyne noted that a 
major area in which colour prejudice was rife was in public 
houses and inns. He understood that there was a common law 
IL8 David Reynolds, Rich Relations: the American 
Occupation of Britain, 1942-1945 (London, 1995), pp. 216-7. 
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obligation for innkeepers to provide accommodation and 
refreshment to travellers but recognised the weakness of 
enforcing this obligation as any enforcement would have to 
be carried out by a civil action. It was also possible 
that the innkeeper could argue that he had no rooms 
available. Moyne therefore wondered whether it would be 
'Practicable' to 
pass a statute defining and, if necessary, enlarging 
this common law right and providing simple means 
whereby it could be enforced. 
Moyne illustrated the problem with reference to a specific 
case of an Assistant Welfare Officer in the Colonial Office 
who was recently refused accommodation in a hotel in the 
north of England 'but when the management learned that he 
was an employed by the Colonial Office they changed their 
ground'. Moyne suggested a meeting between representatives 
of the Colonial and Home Offices to consider this 
question. 19 
A meeting was duly held at the Colonial Office which 
considered two options, 1) 'declaratory' legislation 
stating that it was illegal to discriminate against a 
British subject and 2) a codification of the existing law 
without specifically mentioning colour which would make 
refusal of admission 'a 'summary offence'. The meeting 
noted that the common law applied only to 'inns' and not to 
hotels or boarding houses where it would be most needed. 
The meeting concluded that it would not be 
desirable for a Bill to be introduced as a political 
gesture on the part of the Government, as indicating 
its views on the question of colour prejudice, and as 
a means of educating public opinion. 
A similar Colonial Office suggestion that the government 
should make a statement of its views on the subject was 
rejected on the grounds that it would not have more than an 
'ephemeral effect'. The ýmeeting concluded the best 
'remedy' lay in the 'steady education of public opinion'. 20 
The 'negative' conclusions of the meeting discouraged 
2-9 PRO, C0859/80/7, Moyne, to Morrison, 27 June 1941. 
2-0 PRO, C0859/80/7, minutes of a meeting at the 
Colonial Office, 14 July 1941. 
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many in the Colonial Office. John Keith of the Social 
Services Department of the Colonial Office with his 
experience in African eduction in Northern Rhodesia and of 
the territory's informal colour bar, sincerely believed in 
racial equality as an ideal for the British empire. He was 
sorry that the proposed legislation had been thrown out 
merely because it would not apply to all establishments: 
I think it is a matter of high policy that Colonial 
people should not be insulted, and legislation, 
although largely "declaratory" in character, ought to 
have the desired effect in that regard. 
Jesse Paskin*, the Principal Private Secretary to the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies, agreed, and urged 
Moyne to proceed 'in spite of the fact that its effects 
would be psychological rather than practical'. " Sir 
Charles Jeffries, Assistant Under-Secretary State 
supervising the Social Services Department, was also 
'rather shaken' by the objections raised at the meeting as 
he had been thinking along the lines of an act similar to 
the Sex Equality Act for women. Harold Beckett*, Assistant 
Secretary of State in the East African Department of the 
Colonial Office with wide experience of the problems of the 
West Indies was not surprised by the response of the Home 
Office and thought that-any legislation in this area should 
be 'brought in line with modern conditions' without special 
reference to 'colour'. 
In general, hotel-keepers govern themselves according 
to the presumed prejudices of their regular class of 
clients and are most likely to be 'choosy' if there is 
a residential element of snobs. In some places a wet 
and dirty 'hiker' has about as good a chance as a 
coal-black mammy. 
He agreed that the remedy lay in the steady but 'intensive' 
education of public opinion. " 
Owen Williams*, Assistant Secretary of State, feared 
that the enacting of a law which would be 'so patently 
ineffective' could have the opposite result than that 
intended. There was a danger that legislation would 
211 PRO, C0859/80/7, minutes by Keith, 22 August 1941 
and Paskin, 27 August 1941. 
22 PRO, C0859/80/7, minutes by Jeffries 27 August 1941 
and Beckett, 28 August 1941. 
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exacerbate colour prejudice and would be hailed as 'further 
evidence of our national hypocrisy'. He gave an honest 
appreciation of the problem as he saw it: 
As for educating public opinion (including my own 
prejudices) into a more tolerant attitude, I am all 
for it, but how is it to be done? We must have some 
kind of snobbery to keep us going and the more 
levelling there is of class distinctions the more 
racial distinctions are likely to acquire snobbery 
value. 23 
Sir Alan Burns* lent his support to Colonial Office 
indignation on this subject. Burns had wide experience of 
the British empire and attitudes of the Colonial Service 
during a career of service in Nigeria, as the former 
Governor of British Honduras and was later Governor of the 
Gold Coast. He had been was seconded to the Colonial 
Office as an Assistant Under-Secretary of State where he 
had negotiated the bases for destroyers agreement with the 
United States in March 1941. Burns was a progressive. 
Later as Governor of the Gold Coast he had taken the lead 
by appointing Africans to his Executive Council and was 
used to cutting through red tape and getting on with 
24 things. He believed that a Governor had the power and 
responsibility to lead by example, for 'personal example 
and the kind of life he leads have a greater influence on 
the colony than is commonly recognised' . 25 Burns thought 
that colour prejudice resulted largely from bad manners: 
It is a matter for slow but steady education of the 
British public rather than for legislation, as I doubt 
whether we can improve people's manners any more than 
their morals by passing laws. If our manners were 
better we would have less political trouble in the 
Colonies. 
He added that he had tried to make this point in a book 
that he had not been allowed to publish . 26 
Sir Alan Burns eventually published his book Colour 
Prejudice in 1948. 
lIt 
is clear why Burn's book would have 
23 PRO, C0859/80/7, minute by Williams, 29 August 1941. 
24 Parkinson, op. cit., pp. 108-9. 
25 Alan Burns, Colonial Civil Servant (London, 1949), 
p. 169. 
PRO, C0859/80/7, minute by Burns 29 August 1941. 
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been controversial, particularly coming from the pen of a 
governor of a British colony. For while he wrote about the 
benefits of Pax Britannica for the populations of the 
empire, he also drew attention to the impact of the white 
man in Africa, taking land away form Africans and 
criticised the racial policies of South Africa and the 
United States. Burns did not believe in the inferiority of 
black people or that colour prejudice was natural and 
inherent in man. He felt it was borne out of economic fears 
on the part of white men. As he argued in 1941 behaviour 
was the key. He recommended that it was possible, 
without much expense and without much trouble, to 
remove one of the most potent causes of racial 
discord, by an immediate change in our attitude to 
those of coloured blood. It is not to suggest that 
Englishmen should abandon their traditional reserve 
(even if they were capable of doing so) and make 
violent demonstrations of brotherly love; such 
demonstrations would certainly be misunderstood and 
quite unwelcome to the Negroes. But it is suggested 
that we should avoid, in manner, speech and writing, 
an attitude of disdain for everyone who does not 
possess a white skin, and that we should show to such 
people a simple courtesy. Such courtesy would be in 
accordance with our professed Christian belief, and 
would be a better hall-mark of civilisation and 
culture than any material progress that may have been 
made. " 
Writing to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
Sir Cosmo Parkinson the acting Permanent Under-Secretary of 
State, stated that the only way to get rid of colour 
prejudice was by education, and education would take 'at 
least a generation'. This was not an argument for 
prevarication, however. 'There must be a beginning some 
time', he argued, 'why not now? ' He therefore recommended 
that the Colonial Office explore the issue with the Board 
of Education. 28 
Paskin cautioned against any Ivery obtrusive 
propaganda' in Britain because of the political 
implications this would have' in the colonies. For while 
the problem of colour prejudice was manifest largely on the 
2'7 Alan Burns, Colour Pre-judice (London, 1948), 
pp. 149-50. 
28 PRO, C0859/80/7, Parkinson to Moyne, 29 August 1941. 
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social plane in Britain, in the colonies, particulary in 
Northern Rhodesia and Kenya, it was 'bound up with 
questions of high political importance'. Therefore he 
recommended that before the Colonial Office embarked on 
'obtrusive propaganda', it was important to 'consider the 
possible political repercussions in such Colonies and the 
Union of South Africa'. Unless a cautious approach was 
adopted to the education of the British population on 
racial equality, the Colonial Office might find itself 
'involved in controversy over such matters as the Highlands 
policy in Kenya and the policy of setting aside residential 
areas for occupation by Europeans there and elsewhere'. 23' 
In many ways the Colonial Office's educational 
solution can been seen as part of their general long-term 
attempts to educate the British public about the empire. 
The Colonial Office wanted to incorporate the issue of 
racial tolerance into geography and imperial history 
lessons in schools, in special lectures and in the schools 
broadcasts of the BBC. Colonial peoples could be 
represented in 'a human and sympathetic light', which 
recognised their value as 'individuals' as well as 'fellow 
citizens of the Empire'. , The Colonial Office presented 
its case Board of Education rather optimistically: 
Colour prejudice is largely a question of good manners 
and we feel that if a lead could be given to children 
to look on the coloured person as a fellow human being 
rather than as a figure of fun or a bogey, many of the 
absurd prejudices which make for unhappy racial 
relations would tend to die out. 30 
The Board of Education's response was lukewarm. The 
Board thought it might be possible to include something on 
the subject in a pamphlet on colonial studies but the 
general attitude was circumspect. The subject 
"was 
considered a 'thorny' one and could 'provoke passions in 
much the same way as do questions of religious education 
and sex education'. The Board argued that the attitude of 
parents had to be considered because 'in certain districts 
29 PRO, C0859/80/7, minute by Paskin, 16 September 1941. 
30 PRO, C0859/80/7, minute by Keith, 11 December 1941; 
Keith to Dunkley, 26 September 1941. 
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... e. g., the large ports, parents may very justifiably 
hold very strong feelings on the idea of the mingling 
together socially of coloured peoples and their own 
people'. 3X It was not enough to aim to educate the 
children without educating adults. 
During a meeting between the BBC and the Colonial 
Office the subject of schools broadcasts about the colonies 
was considered. In particular, they discussed: 
(a) the need to tackle the colour bar problem ... (b) the need to give children information designed to 
make them respectful of other peoples' cultural 
values, sympathetic to them and interested in them. 
(c) the need to present modern problems of Colonial 
development, and not the savage dancing round the tom- 
tom. 
No direct appeal had been made to schoolchildren to behave 
politely towards 'coloured strangers' beyond getting 
educated Africans to give schools talks. It was noted that 
tackling the colour bar problem in the colonies involved 
difficult political issues but that the BBC would be 
presenting an artificial picture of life in the colonies if 
programmes merely concentrated on aspects like 
'geographical resources'. The BBC agreed to explore the 
possibility of introducing the problem in debate form in 
programmes for older children, and 'Elspeth Huxley, or some 
other enlightened exponent of the settler point of view, 
might put the case in argument with an educated African'. 
In order to educate schoolchildren about the value of 
African culture and to respect Africans it was agreed that 
there should be an increase in programmes about the lives 
of individual Africans as 'ordinary people' and talks on 
African art and folklore. The BBC admitted that there was 
a problem in trying to present modern problems of colonial 
development instead of 'the savage dancing round the tom- 
tom'. Roy McGregor of the School Talks department at the 
BBC explained that, 'each course had. actually contained one 
talk on the modern problems of different geographical 
regions' but the audience 'tended to remember elephants and 
dances, and not the enlightened Central School and the 
Leper Colony'. The School Talks department said they would 
31 PRO, C0859/80/7, Dunkley to Keith, 11 October 1941. 
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welcome a 'lead' in the form of a letter from the Colonial 
Office which would help to overcome possible objections 
within the BBC against the discussion of such 'political' 
matters. 31 The Colonial Office agreed to write a letter to 
the BBC in support of new programmes about colonial 
development. 33 
The Colonial Office was similarly concerned with the 
problem of colour prejudice in the Colonial Service as well 
as in the colonies in general. Considerations were very 
different then. This was the period before the principle 
of the 'Africanisation' of the Colonial Service had been 
introduced by the post-war Labour government. While the 
Colonial Office was sure that colour prejudice had not been 
a factor in its appointments to the Colonial Service, Sir 
Charles Jeffries was aware that in practice the Colonial 
Office could be found guilty of exercising a 'colour bar' 
on the grounds of what he called 'efficiency': 
if we do not send a coloured West Indian to a senior 
appointment in Kenya, it is not because we have any 
prejudice against coloured West Indians, but simply 
because we know that the environment in which he would 
find himself in Kenya is one in which he could not be 
happy or do his work effectively. 
Jeffries deplored the attitude on race that he had come 
across in his conversations with Colonial Service officers 
and their wives and thought it was up to the Colonial 
Office to give a lead to senior Colonial Service officers 
on this question. It was these officers, argued Jeffries, 
who often had 'the power to determine the tone of local 
society'. 34 
The issue of the colour bar and prejudice in the 
colonies came to the attention of the Colonial Office with 
the publication of Norman Leys' critical book The Colour 
Bar in East Africa in which he suggested that in certain 
East African colonies colour bars were as numerous as those 
found in South Africa. Questions about the discriminatory 
32 PRO, C0859/80/7, notes by Audrey Richards on a 
meeting with the BBC, 29 April 1942. 
33 PRO, C0859/80/7, minute by Keith, 8 May 1942. 
34 PRO, C0859/80/13, minute by Jeffries, 9 May 1941. 
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treatment of West African troops stationed in East Africa 
at European cinemas in Nairobi had also been asked in 
Parliament .31 Leys had sent the Colonial Office a copy of 
his book asking for Colonial Office criticisms and argued 
that 'treason and rebellion in East Africa are inevitable 
unless British policy is changed in time' .36 The Colonial 
Office thought it impolitic and time-consuming to comment 
on his book but recommended that this 'important' book 
deserved 'serious examination' and should be read by the 
departments concerned in the Colonial Office . 37 
When the Colonial Office debated what to do about the 
colour bar in the colonies, John Keith cautioned against a 
premature declaration on the subject as it would 'cause 
unprofitable controversy', would be resented by white 
settlers and would 'certainly be misrepresented by Dr. 
Goebbels' . 38 Despite this 
he thought the problem should 
be tackled in some colonies like Northern Rhodesia and 
Kenya because 'if these problems are allowed to simmer they 
will become acute'. Keith recommended that the Colonial 
Office should discover the extent of the colour bar problem 
before taking any action against it by asking the colonial 
Governors to undertake a survey of colour discrimination in 
their colony. What was wanted was a more balanced view 
than was gained by reading Leys' book . 39 
Frederick Pedler*, Principal in the Colonial Office, 
and soon to be -Chief British Economic Representative in 
Dakar, had been Lord Hailey's secretary when the latter was 
compiling his African Survey argued that the problem of the 
colour bar in the colonies was not merely that of 'social' 
discrimination through pass laws and separate housing which 
35 For the correspondence on the discrimination 
suffered by West African troops in Nairobi cinemas see PRO, 
C0859/80/15, file. 
36 PRO, C0859/80/14, Leys to Hall, 4 December 1941. 
37 PRO, C0859/80/14, minute by Dawe, 12 December 1941. 
38 PRO, C0859/80/13, memorandum 'Colour Discrimination 
in the United Kingdom', by Keith, undated. 
39 PRO, C0859/80/13, minute by Keith, 30 August 1941. 
172 
could benefit from government propaganda and re-education, 
but was 'economic' discrimination. This 'economic, 
discrimination had already become a 'thorny problem' in 
Central Africa 'in regard to the employment of natives on 
the Copperbelt where the European miners would undoubtedly 
like to see the South African and Southern Rhodesian ideas 
established'. Moreover, any strong line adopted by the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies or a Governor in Kenya 
where the Highlands were reserved for white only settlement 
would lead to charges of hypocrisy. Although Pedler agreed 
that the first step should be a 'dispassionate review' of 
the problem, he doubted that the colonial governments, 
particularly those in East Africa, could do so objectively. 
Instead he recommended that an independent body like 
Chatham House should be asked to do the work . 40 
Nevertheless Assistant Under-Secretary of State, Sir 
Charles Jeffries thought that something could be done if 
the Secretary of State for the Colonies made a declaration 
of 'one basic policy for dealing with all colour 
questions'. He argued: 
nothing short of absolute equality of all men before 
the law will serve, either to satisfy the aspirations 
of the inhabitants of the Colonial Empire or to 
justify our existence as a Colonial power. 
Such a declaration should be made as soon as possible 
together with an undertaking to review the whole of 
colonial administration in the post-war period with the aim 
of all discriminatory laws and practices. The survey of 
colour bar legislation should be commenced forthwith. 
Jeffries was not naive enough to believe this would be 
easy. Indeed, he was well aware of the reaction of the 
white settler minorities 'who depend for their existence 
upon the artificial protection afforded by discriminatory 
laws'. But this was no reason for inaction. The Colonial 
Office should proceed Ifortier in rel but Isuaviter in 
modol (forcibly in deed, gentle in manner). 41 
However, while the Permanent Under-Secretary of Statd, 
'40 PRO, C0859/80/13, minute by Pedler, 26 September 1941. 
4L PRO, C0859/80/13, minute by Jeffries, 8 October 1941. 
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Sir George Gater agreed with Jeffries' sentiments that 
colour discrimination should be 'eliminated', he did not 
think that a declaration should be made before a careful 
review had been made of the present situation. He thought 
that much could be done by the 'personal example' of the 
colonial Governors and the officers of the Colonial 
Service. " Thus for the time being Jeffries would have to 
be content with the decision to survey the existing 
situation first before any steps were taken. The Colonial 
Office arranged for the present position of discriminatory 
laws in the colonies to be examined by Sir Mervyn Tew, the 
legal expert and former Chief Justice of Sierra Leone, 
1929-32.43 While the issue was temporarily put on 'hold', 
later in the war the Colonial Office met a new obstacle to 
a forward policy on racial discrimination: the entrance of 
the United States into the war and the new problems caused 
by the segregationalist 'Jim Crow' policies of the American 
armed services. " 
Sir Charles Jeffries concluded that there was probably 
less colour prejudice in Britain than ever before. In his 
opinion this was due to-! (a) to the presence of Colonial 
people in this country for -war work [and] (b) to the 
reaction caused by the attitude of the Americans'. As the 
Colonial Office and the MOI were proceeding with their new 
initiative in educating the British public about the 
colonies this initiative would 'incidentally help to reduce 
colour prejudice' and would be more, useful than 'direct 
propaganda on the question of colour'. 45 
Relations with Other Bodies 
Cooperation between Ministries in the colonial 
propaganda effort became more apparent. For example, the 
Air Ministry gave priority to the naming of a Ugandan air 
squadron following the 83,000 pound contribution made in 
42 PRO, C0859/80/13, minute by Gater, 20 October 1941. 
43 PRO, C0859/80/13, 'minute by Jeffries, 26 November 1941. 
44 C. f. chapter five. 
45 PRO, C0859/80/7, minute by Jeffries, 30 September 1942. 
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1941 by Uganda for the purchase of aircraft. This was 
thought to be good propaganda for Uganda as it would show 
that their efforts were appreciated and Uganda's 
contributions were further reported in the British press as 
part of propaganda for empire unity. 46 
The Army was also singled out for a publicity effort 
as part of the campaign to educate Britons about the 
colonies in cooperation with the Army Bureau of Current 
Affairs which had been set up in September 1941. Soldiers, 
especially conscripts, were to have a great interest in 
learning about and discussing current affairs. Sir John 
Dill, the Commander in Chief of the Imperial General Staff, 
had said, 'the soldier who understands the cause for which 
he fights is likely to be a more reliable soldier than one 
who doesn't'. The Colonial Office was keen to ensure that 
the Army would include discussions about the colonies and 
it was thought that W. E. Williams of Penguin books and the 
director of the ABCA was someone it would pay the Colonial 
Office 'handsomely to cultivate'. 47 
The Colonial Office also thought it would be useful to 
cultivate the newly formed Fabian Colonial Bureau. The 
Colonial Office explored the possibility of establishing a 
relationship with Dr. Rita Hinden, the South African born 
economist, the editor- of their publication, Empire and 
Secretary of the FCB, who was later given the soubriquet of 
'Rudyard Hardie' by Denis Healey for her work for colonial 
freedom. " Coinciding with the introduction of the new 
colonial policy encapsulated in the Colonial Development 
and Welfare Act, the FCB was established in October 1940 to 
provide the Fabian Society with a department which would 
deal with the problems of the dependent empire from a 
socialist viewpoint- Part of the FCB's work would be to 
46 PRO, 
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act as a clearing house for colonial information and 
research in Britain and publicity about colonial affairs in 
the press and Parliament. The FCB was therefore working, 
albeit from a particular political standpoint and 
tradition, towards similar aims as the Colonial Office: 
educating the British about their empire. A representative 
from the Colonial Office attended their July 1941 
conference in order to assess the FCB view point on 
colonial affairs and to understand the possible criticisms 
of colonial policy which the Colonial Office might expect 
in the future. Particular attention was given to 
Dr. Hinden's welcome of the new Colonial Development and 
Welfare Act and the praise for the government's initiative 
and liberal policy and her criticism that not enough 
capital had been committed to carry the new policy through. 
Arthur Creech Jones, the Labour MP, Chairman of the FCB and 
future Secretary of State for the Colonies, gave the 
introductory speech in_ which he outlined the conflicts 
contained within the expression of Britain's 'sacred 
trust': 
there was the segregation of natives in Southern 
Rhodesia, stagnation in the Protectorates, a system of 
indirect rule in Nigeria, white paramountcy in Kenya, 
and colour discrimination in Northern Rhodesia. In all 
colonies the standard of social and economic 
conditions was deplorable. 
The only good developments he could see were the new 
Colonial Development and Welfare Act and labour 
legislation. 49 The Colonial Office's Public Relations 
Officer Noel Sabine arran"ged for the African Information 
Officers to receive the FCB's Empire so that they could 
anticipate criticism, particularly on labour legislation. 50 
The Colonial Office continued to monitor the 
activities of the FCB throughout the war. For example, the 
head of the Colonial Office's Reference Division, Sir 
William McLean attended the FCB's conference 'the Colonies 
in the Post-War World' in July 1942. Although the FCB was 
49 PRO, C0875/12/13, Wilson's report on the 18-20 July 
1941 Fabian Colonial Bureau Conference, 22 July 1941. 
50 PRO, C0875/5/11, minute by Sabine, 27 October 1941. 
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criticised for getting things 'badly distorted' their 
interest was seen on the whole as a 'healthy sign'. 
McLean's Reference Division maintained contact with the FCB 
and provided the Bureau with 'factual information' . 511 
The BBC was also interested in appointing Rita Hinden 
as their colonial correspondent. News -about the colonies 
intended for the Dominions, the United States and the 
colonies themselves was not reaching the BBC through normal 
press agency channels. Before the BBC proceeded, however, 
they wanted to ensure that Hinden was a 'person thoroughly 
grata' at the Colonial Office . 52 Sabine favoured the 
appointment, for even though Hinden was in his view a 
'socialist with rather advanced views about the colonies' 
and at times was 'critical', Sabine felt she was 'genuinely 
anxious to help'. - Moreover if Hinden were appointed it 
would give the Colonial Office 'some opportunity of 
controlling her activities' . 53 Acting Permanent Under- 
Secretary of State, Sir Cosmo Parkinson objected to the 
proposed appointment on two grounds. He doubted that the 
appointment was necessary in the first place as he assumed 
that the Empire Division in the MOI supplied the BBC with 
that kind of material, and second, because the 'BBC tends 
excessively to the "Left"' anyway . 54 Sabine disagreed. 
The Empire Division, he argued, did not provide 'news' to 
the colonies but 'propaganda' and colonial news broadcast 
on the BBC's Home Service was not the kind of news that the 
BBC wanted for their Empire Service. For example, the 
Empire Service would require more detailed news than the 
Home Service. Similarly, an item on 'native' housing in 
Nairobi would only be of interest to the more specialised 
press in Britain but would be-ideal for the Empire Service. 
5" PRO, C0875/15/1, Thomas to Benson and Lloyd, 3 
December 1943. 
52 PRO, C0875/11/10, BBC to Sabine, 25 November 1941ý 
53 PRO, C0875/11/10, minute by Sabine, 2 December 
1941. Morgan confirms Sabine's view of Hinden, often 
misleadingly labelled a 'Utopian socialist' her approach 
was in fact more 'common-sense Fabian', op. cit., p. 239. 
54 PRO, C0875/11/10, minute by Parkinson, 9 December 1941. 
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In any case Sabine thought that the BBC had 'been 
criticised in certain quarters for not allowing persons 
whose views about the war were perhaps suspect to speak on 
subjects quite unconnected with the war or even to take any 
part in BBC musical programmes'. The Colonial Office could 
assume a form of control if it provided Hinden with the 
information on which to base broadcasts. It was also wise, 
he thought, not to look the BBC gift horse in the mouth. 55 
Sabine, however, was overruled. Deputy Under- 
Secretary of State, Sir John Shuckburgh with his usual 
suspicion about Colonial Office involvement in propaganda 
activities, had no enthusiasm for the proposal and was wary 
of the BBC. In Shuckburgh's opinion, the BBC had 
'consistently misled the public over the war news (not 
their fault I daresay) that little credit attaches itself 
to their statements on any subject'. Furthermore he did 
not think that 'a Fabian lady doctor acting through so 
tainted a medium will do much to persuade the world of the 
excellence of our colonial poliCy'. 56 It was not until 
1943 that the BBC got its colonial correspondent in the 
person of Elspeth Huxley. 
There is a case to be made for the objections to the 
appointment of Hinden by cautious elements within the 
Colonial Office. On political grounds, the Colonial Office 
may have found the appointment embarrassing, particularly 
if they had endorsed it and may have been open to 
accusations of partisanship. It is then perhaps ironic 
that the FCB and the work by Creech Jones in formulating 
the Labour 'Party's 1943 statement on the colonial empire 
The Colonies reflected what had become by then Colonial 
Office orthodoxy. In 1943 both the Colonial Office and the 
FCB argued that political developments on the road to self- 
government in the British colonies had to be preceded by 
social and economic developments first. But there is also 
a definite sense that 'Sabine's enthusiasm for appointing 
Hinden was overruled on the grounds of a general lack of 
55 PRO, C0875/11/10, minute by Sabine, 13 December 1941. 
1941.56 
PRO, C0875/11/10, minute by Shuckburgh, 15 December 
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sympathy with what the BBC, with the support of the 
propaganda specialists in the Colonial Office, was trying 
to do. 
It could be argued that the subsequent appointment of 
Elspeth Huxley as colonial correspondent at the BBC was 
hardly neutral or without controversy. Daughter of white 
settlers in Kenya, Elspeth Huxley was well known for her 
two volume biography of Lord Delamere which 'was critical 
in establishing in the public mind not only the stirring 
and romantic nature of white settlement but the pure and 
chivalrous intentions of white settlers towards 
Africans' . 57 To the Colonial Office Elspeth Huxley 
represented the acceptable face of settler interests and 
someone with a wide experience of Africa .5B As the wife of 
Gervas Huxley who became the director of the Empire 
Division of the MOI in 1943, there was a practical working 
advantage in this husband and wife team at the centre of 
colonial propaganda. But to others Elspeth Huxley was a 
product of her background and was not impartial. In a 
review of her 1941 book East Africa which appeared in the 
FCB journal Empire, she was criticised for discussing the 
problems of East Africa 'with some degree of complacency' 
and for glossing over 'the injustices brought by white 
59 settlement'. 
Empire Publicity in the United States 
No less controversial than the issue of race and the 
political motivations of the colonial correspondent for the 
BBC was the part propaganda could play in educating 
Americans about the British empire. Anti-imperialism was 
just one aspect of American attitudes towards Britain. 
American attitudes were complex, a mixture of love and 
hate; 'every current of anglophilia seemed to be matched by 
57 Kathryn Tidrick, Empire and the English Character 
(London, 1990), p-143. 
56 Or as we saw earlier in the discussions of schools 
broadcasts on 'race', 'the enlightened exponent of the 
settler point of view'. 
59 Empire, 4: 3, September 1941. 
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a countervailing surge of anglophobial. 60 When the key to 
Britain's future survival was the attitude adopted by the 
United States, it was clearly in the interests of the 
British to maximise anglophilia and minimise anglophobia. 
In the pre-Pearl Harbour period it was axiomatic that 
Britain should be sensitive to American public opinion. 
Indeed the British Ambassador to Washington, Lord Lothian 
felt it was a 'vital factor', writing to the Foreign 
Secretary, Lord Halifax in February 1940, 'in this country 
owing to the consitutional equality of status of the 
Executive and the Legislature, it is public opinion itself 
which is continually decisivel. r-11 The anglophobia 
confronting the British had many dimensions, historical 
tradition and economic factors. Nicholas Cull has vividly 
portrayed the various facets of American anglophobia: 
It flowed from the historic struggle to be free from 
tyrannical redcoats and a profligate king. Moreover, 
Britain's rigid class system seemed to represent the 
epitome of everything America had rejected in 1776. 
The scale of such feeling varied from region to region 
and from community to community ... German- and 
Irish-Americans had ample reason to despise London and 
saw themselves as having absolutely no stake in a war 
to save the British Empire. The farmers of the 
American interior recognized Britain's role in 
financing the railroads that bled them dry, and hence 
the British joined the plutocrats of Wall Street and 
the White House as central figures in the political 
demonology of the Prairies ... Even the enemies of 
Hitler were not necessarily admirers of Britain. 
American Jews knew who ruled Palestine, and American 
Communists knew who continued to refuse aid to the 
Republican side in Spain. Any American untouched by 
such ethnic or political allegiances could contemplate 
Britain's failure to pay its war debt or the 
commercial injustice of its system of imperial 
preference in trade. 62 
Even though Britain had her admirers in the United States, 
it was clear that some of these attitudes had to be 
overturned if Britain was to achieve her aim of American 
entry into the war. However caution dominated 
so cull, opecit., p. 6. 
61, Quoted in Christopher Thorne, Allies of a Kind, the 
United States, Britain and the war against Japan, 1941-1945 
(oxford, 1978), P-106. 
62 Cull, OP. Cit., pp. 6-7. 
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consideration of an active propaganda campaign win American 
support. Following the experience of British propaganda in 
the First World War (or, more correctly, the perceived 
success of British propaganda) Americans feared any 
activity which smacked of attempts to mould their opinion. 
Up until Pearl Harbour Britain's official line on publicity 
in the United States was 'No Propaganda'. In spite of the 
objections of the British Embassy in Washington and the MOI 
the Foreign Office remained staunch in its defence of this 
principle. 63 Even with this limitation the British were 
not inactive. " 
It was thought that the root of American anti- 
imperialism was American ignorance. As far as propaganda 
about the British empire was concerned the British effort 
therefore consisted largely of correcting American 
misapprehensions about Britain's colonial policy, for 
example with the British Library of Information in New York 
on hand to answer queries. As we saw in chapter one, the 
British exhibit at the New York World's Fair of 1939 was 
designed to show the benefits Britain had brought to her 
empire. Sir William McLean, head of the Colonial Office 
Reference Department, was the Colonial Office 
representative at the Fair in 1939. McLean also undertook 
a lecture tour of the United States and dared to draw 
attention to American involvement in the British empire by 
thanking the Carnegie and Rockefeller Trusts for 
underwriting welfare schemes in the colonies. This 
produced headlines in the American press like, 'U. S. Cash 
Saving Native Masses in British Colonies' . 65 
In 1940 Lord Lloyd, the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, wanted to repeat the experiment and asked the 
Treasury for funding for a representative to serve at the 
British Colonial Exhibition of the New York World's Fair in 
63 ibid., pp. 10 and 29. 
64 Cull demonstrates exactly was achieved in ensuring 
that the British case did not fall by default, ibid., passi - 
65 ibid., p. 27. 
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mid-1940.11 In 1940, William Simnett*, the editor of the 
Crown Colonist, went to the United States as the Colonial 
Office's representative at the Fair. Between May and 
October 1940 he also undertook other publicity work 
including public lectures to bodies like Columbia 
University, the Phelps-Stokes Institute and the Carnegie 
Trust. He made broadcasts and wrote articles on the social 
services provided by colonial governments in the 
dependencies aimed at American opinion-makers. 
Simnett's report on his activities in the United 
States highlighted the problems faced by colonial 
propagandists in America. He thought that it was of the 
utmost importance that, as the war was 'inevitably' 
bringing Britain and the United States closer together that 
they should be 'accurately informed of our policy and 
ideals'. There existed many misconceptions about ideas of 
'Empire' and 'Imperialism'. 
Even those intelligent Americans entirely favourable 
to our cause, who grant that we are fighting for the 
same ideals of freedom and democracy that they hold, 
still suspect a strong strain of 'Imperialism' with 
which they dislike to be associated. Educated people 
do more or less realise that the Dominions are now 
free peoples, but apart from India, which is a subject 
for constant criticism, they still think of us as an 
Empire with many 'possessions' which we are determined 
to hold and exploit to our own advantage. 
It was this view that he took pains to contest by urging 
Americans that, that form of Imperialism was now 'dead'. 
He explained that Britain's declared policy was 
trusteeship for Colonial peoples, to fit them for 
eventual self-government. This has always been the 
most eagerly welcomed part of my many speeches and 
talks, and has obviously been 'news' to Press and 
public alike, for not only have they apparently no 
information about it from us, but the opposite view is 
being assiduously cultivated by the other side for 
obvious reasons. 
He recommended that something 'adequate and permanent' be 
done about this by way of supplying the press, educational 
and other institutions with information about the empire 
66 PRO, F0371/24228/A2891, Caine to the Treasury, 21 
May 1940. 
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and by active lecturing. " 
The Colonial Office agreed that something more needed 
to be done. Up until this time it had to abide by the 
Foreign Office's rule that Ino political or cultural 
propaganda should be done' in the United States. 68 Hodson, 
head of the Empire Division of the MOI wanted to see the 
appointment of a colonial specialist to the British 
Information Service organisation in New York who would 
concentrate on propaganda to the lintelligentsial. 69 At a 
joint Colonial Office-MOI meeting in March 1941 the idea of 
appointing a colonial specialist to the British Embassy in 
Washington was proposed. Sabine thought that at that 
moment such a move was undesirable because of the ongoing 
talks about West Indian bases7O and the issue of trade in 
wartime and exchange control in London. Despite this 
Sabine thought it would be possible to explore the idea of 
establishing a chair in colonial studies at an American 
university. " 
Sabine thought that American support was so important 
that 'any and every source of misapprehension or 
misunderstanding should be resolutely attacked'. He 
warned, however, that it should not be done in a haphazard 
manner. - If it was to be done at all it should be done 
'ambitiously and well'. -12 Caution would have to be adopted 
because of the danger that open and forcible propaganda 
67 PRO, F0371/24228/A2891, report by Simnett, 27 July 
- 25 August 1940. 
6a PRO, F0371/24230/A3561, Lloyd to Whyte, 29 July 1940. 
69 PRO, C0875/11/13, Hodson to the Colonial Office, 13 
January 1941. 
'70 Following the destroyers for bases deal of 
September 1940. The talks about the possible establishment 
of an Anglo- American Caribbean Commission in the West 
Indies also contributed to the need for a cautious approach 
on the subject of colonies. 
1941. 
'71- PRO, C0875/11/13, Sabine at the meeting of 28 March 
72 PRO, C0875/11/13, minute by Sabine, 28 April 1941. 
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could backfire with an 'undesirable re-action'. 73 Doubt 
was expressed by Deputy Under-Secretary of State, Sir John 
Shuckburgh who thought that it was not in 1941 that the 
British had to make its colonial case to the American 
public, but in the post-war period when American opinion 
might 'count for more than anything elsel. 71 Sir Arthur 
Dawe thought it was a question of policy not for the 
Colonial Office but for the Foreign Office. 75 
The Colonial Office and Empire Division of the MOI had 
to await the outcome of the discussions about the 
organisation of British propaganda in the United States in 
general which had been the subject of debate since the 
summer of 1940, preceding a more 'positive' direct 
publicity effort. Frank Darvall* head of the American 
Division of the MOI told the Colonial Office that for the 
past six months there had been a 'grand inquest' by the 
Foreign Office and MOI into British propaganda in the 
United States and that a more forward lecture policy had 
been agreed upon. Kenneth Grubb, head of the MOI's Foreign 
Publicity Directorate said that the Foreign Office 
supported such a move and that the main aim would be to 
'dispel the widespread suspicion and misapprehension of the 
way in which our Empire is administered' . 7r> 
Sir Gerald Campbell*, the director of the newly 
reorganised British propaganda agency in the United States, 
the British Information Service, informed Sabine that they 
would proceed slowly until it was seen 'how information 
about colonial affairs will fit into the general 
picture'. 77 Furthermore, the empire publicists would have 
to wait even longer to discover the impact of the American 
73 PRO, C0875/11/13, minute by Calder, 8 May 1941. 
74 PRO, C0875/11/13, minute by Shuckburgh, 13 May 1941. 
75 PRO, C0875/11/13, minute by Dawe, 16 May 1941. 
'716 PRO, C0875/11/13, Darvall to Colonial Office, 15 
April 1941; Grubb to Colonial Office, 10 July 1941. For the 
files on the future of British publicity in the United 
States see further, PRO, F0371/24227-24232 and 26183-26188. 
'7" PRO, C0875/11/13, note by Sabine on a conversation 
with Campbell, 21 July 1941. 
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entrance into the war on British propaganda in the United 
States. 
But even if the colonial propagandists had been given 
a free rein in educating the American public about the 
facts of British treatment of her colonies it is hard to 
see how this could have had any real impact in combatting 
anti-imperialism. After all, as Simnett noted, even 
educated Americans suspected ulterior motives behind 
British possession of colonies. The task of 'educating' 
American public opinion about the British empire was made 
even more difficult when the object of the campaign became 
the American administration itself. Indeed the anti- 
imperialist attitude was so ingrained, with the British 
seen as the prime offenders in this respect in the popular 
eye, that the American public was quite able to ignore its 
own record. Therefore it is hard to see how a rational 
appeal to modify what was essentially an emotional response 
to the British empire could have succeeded. 
Propaganda in East and Central Africa 
After two years of experience of conducting war 
propaganda in the African colonies the MOI undertook a 
review of the service provided from London. The views of 
the colonial Information Officers were sought by the Empire 
Division. As a result of the replies to an MOI 
questionnaire sent to the colonies in East and Central 
Africa at the end of 1940 the type and content of 
propaganda sent to the colonies was adjusted. Greater 
efforts were made to improve propaganda for the African 
audiences in East and Central Africa. It was decided that 
there would be a proportional increase in the amount of 
pictorial material over printed material sent to Africa in 
future. " Pictorial images could be understood by a 
greater proportion of Africans than the written word. The 
African colonial governments thought that they were 
receiving too much printed material which was not 
specifically relevant to their individual territories. 
Press cuttings were received too late to be useful or 
'78 PRO, C0875/9/14, minute by Edmett, 8 December 1941. 
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topical. Kenya thought that feature articles were too long 
and out of date on arrival. Kenya and Uganda wanted 
articles to be more factual and simpler in style. For 
example, Kenya wanted more articles on weaponry and 
Nyasaland wanted more articles which would stimulate 'pride 
in the Empire' and show 'how each colony contributes'. 
Feature articles were more useful as a basis for radio 
broadcasts than for the press. Relations with the press 
were generally good, the Information Officers liaised on a 
personal basis with individual newspapers and not through 
press conferences. " 
There were requests for vernacular translations of 
illustrated brochures sent to the colonies by the MOI. 
Pamphlets in the Oxford and Macmillan series were useful 
not so much for direct propaganda to the Africans but as 
background for broadcasts. Therefore, more of these were 
wanted, particularly by Tanganyika. Leaflets were 
occasionally useful; Northern Rhodesia, Uganda and Zanzibar 
thought because they often arrived too late to be of great 
use it would be better if they were produced locally. 
Weekly War Commentaries produced in London were distributed 
to the press and formed the basis of leader columns in 
Uganda and were broadcast direct to the listening public in 
Northern Rhodesia. 80 
Photographs proved useful not for publication in the 
press but in making displays. Kenya and Nyasaland wanted 
more photographs 'depicting African troops; the point being 
that 'the native mind is more impressed by numbers than by 
isolated numbers of the forces'. In general more 
photographs were required showing the King and Queen, 
African troops and the colonial war effort. 81 
Some territories - received transmissions of the 
government controlled British Overseas Wireless service. 
This service operated like the Reuters news agency in that 
79 PRO, C0875/9/14, replies to circular despatch of 23 
December 1940. 
60 ibid. 
IBI ibid. 
186 
it provided more up-to-date information from London than 
the colonies received in guidance material from the MOI. 
The BOW's cables were taken down by Information Officers, 
were distributed to the press, were used in government 
publications and formed the basis for public lectures. 
Similarly, the BBC Empire Service broadcasts were taken 
down by the Information Officers and used in the same way 
and even translated into the vernacular to be used in local 
broadcasts. The BBC Empire Service was considered to be 
82 
'by far the most important vehicle for information'. 
This was important because the BBC provided what was 
considered objective news and 'their equally powerful, if 
subtle, propaganda influence is not noticed'. 83 
In printed material produced in London for use in 
Africa there was an increasing desire for the MOI to send 
briefer notes. These could then be adapted to meet local 
requirements by the local Information Officer once it 
reached Africa who had 'understanding of African sentiment' 
and 'an eye to translation'. Moreover, there was an 
increased desire, especially in Tanganyika, for long-term 
propaganda. " 
The work undertaken by the Information Officers on 
their own initiative had also increased in scope and 
variety. The Information Officers not only undertook the 
task of explaining the war in East and Central Africa but 
some also took the opportunity provided by the war to 
embark on a more positive and long-term propaganda campaign 
to improve the social and economic welfare of Africans. 
The adoption of long-term public relations activities was a 
natural development. As Edmett predicted back in London 
the staple diet of MOI war propaganda had proved to be 
limited. Africans needed a few carrots too. Taking the 
lead offered by the 1940-Colonial Development and Welfare 
Act the Information Officers found that publicising the new 
02 ibid. 
83 PRO, C0875/9/14, minute by Edmett 9 July 1941. 
04 PRO, C0875/5/9, EAGC to the Colonial Office, 19 
December 1941. 
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constructive trusteeship policies of the British government 
offered more fruitful lines of development. 
In Kenya, Mervyn Hill, the Information Officer 
regularly supplied and managed to get published MOI 
material to the East African Standard, the Mombasa Times, 
the Sundav Post, the Kenya Weeklv News, the Kenva Dail 
Mail and the African paper, Baraza. He had cooperated in 
the film War Comes to Kenya which was due for release later 
in 1941. Each week he arranged for talks to be given 
covering a wide range of subjects beyond purely war related 
issues, including why there is a war, how Germany rules, 
prevention of the plague, grass planting and the value of 
forests. He also arranged for Africans to speak to fellow 
Africans, as it was thought that it was more effective if 
Africans were addressed by their own countrymen in a series 
of talks on subjects like municipal native affairs, pig 
keeping and soil erosion. The Indian community was also 
singled out for special treatment in order to increase 
their war effort. 85 
A special African section of the Kenyan Information 
Office was established. It was apparent that the novelty 
of the war had by this time worn off. The African section 
had success involving African chiefs. The chiefs were 
encouraged to give talks on the local radio service which 
broadcast twice weekly for half an hour in several 
vernaculars in addition to the daily half hour broadcasts 
in Swahili at a time convenient to ensure the maximum 
number of African listeners after they had finished work in 
the reserves or in towns. As the war zone receded from the 
African continent, news concerning the war had 
correspondingly decreased from twenty to eight minutes a 
day. Therefore, broadcasts concentrated more on general 
subjects to improve conditions like poultry farming and 
malaria. Providing entertainment programmes was more 
difficult as Africans involved at times liked to give 
'impromptu' performances making censorship difficult when 
the Information Officer had little idea of what they were 
05 PRO, C0875/16/6, Hill's report for March - July 1941. 
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about to say next. 86 Of course this was the price the 
Information Officer had to pay for 'cooperation'. African 
audiences were more likely to understand and respond to 
broadcasts made by their own chiefs. It also reflected the 
realities of the situation in Kenya. The colonial 
government relied on the chiefs as leaders of the Native 
Authorities to help administer the country. During the war 
the colonial government relied on both the settler 
community and the traditional power base in African society 
represented by the chiefs. This left little room for the 
educated African elites and revealed the limitations of 
Indirect Rule unless it could be modernised to incorporate 
the new political forces. 
The African section of the Kenyan Information Office 
had success in inserting a page of photographs into Baraza 
every month. Officers on tour from the Information Office 
also tried to increase sales of Baraza, which it was 
pointed out, was of course 'in no sense under the control 
of the Information Office'. The two African papers Dholno 
and Luhanga were also supplied with weekly news summaries. 
During 1941 the mobile cinema van audiences averaged 
three thousand showing films of the 'loyal propaganda 
type'. Titles included Royal Review, Empire at Work, and 
Guns in the Desert. Also shown comic films and films of 
social and economic benefit. Kenya hoped that in the 
forthcoming year it would be able to increase its visual 
work, feeling that the supply of 'suitable' films were 
probably best made in Africa, as 'many more are needed of 
an education value'. The section also hoped to expand its 
activities to telling the European population more about 
the Africans. 67 Sabine was a 'little concerned' that the 
Kenyan Information Office seemed to be thinking of making 
its own films and was not using the output of the Colonial 
Film Unit. 88 Kenya was therefore informed that the 
86 PRO, C0875/16/6, report by Davies on the African 
Section, 12 September 1941. 
0' ibid. 
88 See below. 
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Colonial Film Unit was to expand its production and warned 
that any efforts made by Kenya in that respect would 
probably be merged with the Colonial Film Unit at a later 
date. 09 On the whole, the Colonial Office accepted the 
view that 'long-range propaganda material for African 
consumption could be better done locally'. 90 
A report on public opinion in Northern Rhodesia was 
critical of the BBC's Empire Service news programmes which 
indicated that there was a feeling that the white 
population of Northern Rhodesia was not being told the 
truth about the war; news about the destruction caused by 
air raids meant that Britain faced greater military 
problems than were admitted. Impatience at 'cheap gibes 
against the Germans' was also apparent. The Information 
Officer thought that one of the problems was that Northern 
Rhodesians did not understand that they were not 
sacrificing their standard of living like the British. 9" 
The white population in Northern Rhodesia continued to feel 
that bad news was being suppressed by the BBC and that 
optimism contained in BBC news broadcasts was premature. 92 
The BBC assured the Colonial Office that steps were being 
taken to guard against this kind of criticism but it had 
also received conflicting criticism that their reports were 
, too gloomy'.,, 
Nyasaland reported that in addition to films received 
from London they also received films for natives from 
Johannesburg. " The Colonial Film Unit's An African in 
89 PRO,, C0875/16/6, Sabine to Dawe, 29 November 1941; 
Dawe to Gurney, 15 January 1942. 
11 PRO, C0875/16/6, Dawe to Gurney, 15 January 1942. 
108 PRO, C0875/7/11, report on public opinion in 
Northern Rhodesia, December 1940. 
92 PRO, C0875/7/11, report from Northern Rhodesia of 
March 1941. 
93 PRO, C0875/7/11, Barkway to Sabine, 20 June 1941. 
94 PRO, C0875/7/15, Nyasaland report for November 1940. 
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London received a successful reception. 95 But it was also 
found that it was difficult to show Africans the British 
Council newsreel, British News. European clubs would not 
admit Africans unless they were guaranteed against losses 
and only if the Africans sat on the floor. Cartoons were 
required in order to balance the programme for African 
audiences. " The Colonial Office deplored the attitude of 
the European club owners and could not understand why the 
Local Committee did not think that British News was not 
considered suitable for showing to Africans, particularly 
when it was shown to Africans in Northern Rhodesia. 97 
Nyasaland replied that operators had said that British News 
of inferior quality and unsuited to the tropics" but was 
eventually shown to African audiences by February. 99 
Although the African population enjoyed cartoons, two, 
The Greeks Had a Word For It and Backs Aqainst the Wall, 
had been destroyed. Their subject material was considered 
to be inappropriate because of the small Greek population 
in Nyasaland and the implication of these cartoons was that 
Greece would be defeated 'or at any rate lose most of her 
land'. 3LOO 
In general Nyasaland also wanted more printed material 
in the vernacular and had cooperated with Northern Rhodesia 
to produce material in Nyanja. One District Officer 
complained to the Information Office about the affect on 
Africans of material from the Bible Society and the 
Jehovah's Witnesses which, in his view, did more than 
anything to 'Jaundice the outlook of readers'. This 
District Commissioner, while applauding the African paper 
1941. 
1941. 
1941. 
95 PRO, C0875/7/15, report for Nyasaland for August 1941. 
96 PRO, C0875/7/15, report for December 1940. 
97 PRO, C0875/7/15, minute by Sabben-Clare, 4 March 1941. 
98 PRO, C0875/7/15, report from Nyasaland for January 
99 PRO, C0875/7/15, report from Nyasaland for February 
1100 PRO, C0875/7/15, report from Nyasaland for January 
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Nkhani za Nyasa, was convinced that more simple, 
government-produced books and pamphlets were needed because 
his ability to travel around his district and direct 
contact was limited. To this end the Information Office 
had arranged for the publication of Nkhondo Ya Cif Wamba, 
or The War of Robber written by an African and published 
under his own name which explained the war to less educated 
Africans. 1101 Five thousand copies of this pamphlet were 
distributed and the author wrote a further pamphlet in 
Nyanja 16 Months of War. X02 A pamphlet in Chinyanja, The 
British Empire and its Part in the War, was also produced 
by the Information Office. M03 
In 1941 the main event in Nyasaland was the fiftieth 
anniversary of the proclamation of Nyasaland being under 
formal British protection. Considerable publicity was 
given to this event in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia 
as well as in Nyasaland itself. 1104 In addition, the 
message from Lord Moyne, the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, on the Empire Service of the BBC marking the 
anniversary was used as an opportunity to pay tribute to 
Africa's war effort and to reiterate Britain's commitment 
to the empire demonstrated by the 1940 Colonial Development 
and Welfare Act and also to restate the reasons why 
Britain, together with the empire was fighting the war. 
Moyne reviewed the progress made as a result of British 
administration in the previous fifty years: 
A man may now travel by air and road and rail east and 
west and north and south throughout Africa. By thus 
opening up the country we have been able to bring 
settled administration and justice, besides social 
services such as health and education. It is an 
achievement of which we may justly be proud. I say 
this is in no spirit of complacency. Much remains to 
be done, but who can deny that materially and 
spiritually the foundations of a better life have 
1103- PRO, C0875/7/15, report from Nyasaland for 
December 1940. 
1102 pRO, C0875/7/15, report from Nyasaland for January 
1941. 
103 PRO, C0875/7/15, report from Nyasaland for March 1941. 
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already been laid? 105 
It was these kind of benefits the war was being fought to 
defend, said Moyne, who gave a warning about the dangers of 
losing the war for, 
This war involves the future of Africa as well as of 
Europe. If the Nazis won, the hope for civilisation in 
Africa would be at an end and its peoples would be 
thrown back into slavery under German taskmasters. 1106 
Moyne thanked Africans for their war contributions in men, 
money and produce, urged the African colonies to make an 
increased war effort and reaffirmed Britain's commitment to 
welfare and development policies: 
War or no war, we cannot allow anything to depress 
their conditions where they have no luxuries or 
superfluities to give up. On the contrary, we hope 
despite the war to do something to raise these 
conditions. The British Empire must not be deflected 
from its civilising mission even by the greatest war 
in history. We intend to go ahead with local manpower 
and local resources with the policy of development and 
welfare contained in the Act of Parliament passed last 
year. 107 
Moyne included a special reference to the officers of the 
Colonial Civil Service to thank them for their work: 
I want to assure you that it is a very real job of war 
work that you are doing. You are upholding the 
reputation, the very precious reputation, of the 
British Empire for enlightened government of its 
Colonial Empire. That reputation must be maintained. 
In conclusion Moyne used Nyasaland to illustrate the theme 
of the broadcast: 
Fifty years ago Nyasaland took as its motto the words 
'Light in Darkness'. Nyasaland was then a beacon of 
civilisation in the darkness of Tropical Africa. 
Tropical Africa is dark no longer but there is today 
another kind of darkness brooding not over Africa 
alone. What Nyasaland was then, the British Empire, in 
Africa as outside it, is today and will remain for 
long years to come -a beacon of civilisation 
throughout the whole world. 1108 
The actual situation in Africa was less reassuring 
105 PRO, 'C0323/1849/7484/1941, transcript of Moyne's 
broadcast on the BBC's Empire Service, 14 May 1941. 
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however. In Tanganyika the African population was 'quiet' 
but in some areas it had been reported that Africans 
remained 'bewildered by the fact that Europeans who have 
suppressed inter-tribal war in Africa are unable to settle 
their own affairs without recourse to arms'. The news in 
January 1941 of the Greeks repelling the Italians was 
welcomed but it surprised Africans who were inclined to 
overestimate Italian prowess. The propagandists, however, 
were aided in their task by the bad experience of the 
Italians; 'the unprovoked assault on Abyssinia, the use of 
mustard gas and other atrocious deeds placed the Italians 
outside the pale from the African point of view'. 3-09 In 
the view of the Information Office, the subsequent news of 
Allied reverses in North Africa and Crete were borne with 
fortitude by the Africans who displayed 'no depression and 
no loss of confidence that everything will come right in 
the endl. ýLILO 
Relations with the press were good in Tanganyika. The 
Tanqanvika Standard, the leading English language 
newspaper, cooperated with the government and the editor 
helped in other areas in support of war charities. By May 
1941 the Tanqanyika Herald had ceased to exist owing to 
financial difficulties. A new newspaper, the African 
Sentinel, had begun production. It was mainly for the 
Indian population and was supported the Aga Khan. According 
to the Information Office, it was well-produced and 
controlled, and gave very staunch support of Britain's 
policy in India. There was also a growth in vernacular 
publications. The Information Office's monthly Swahili 
paper, Mambo Leo, enjoyed increased distribution, 
particularly among African troops. The Information Office 
had also begun a newsheet, Habari za-Vita, 15,000 copies of 
each edition were distributed free. ]L3L3. 
1941. 
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The Information Office's broadcasts from a travelling 
van in the major centres of Dar-es-Salaam were 'much 
appreciated' by the population. The van broadcast daily 
news in Swahili and weekly in both Gujerati and Hindustani. 
Radio Nairobi was also received in Tanganyika in addition 
to the BBC Empire Service. 112 
Due to the higher literacy of Africans in Uganda the 
Information Office concentrated on producing printed 
material. The Uqanda Herald and vernacular newspapers 
regularly published material supplied by the Information 
Office. Bi-weekly news summaries were produced in English, 
Lugandan, Swahili and Acholi and weekly newsletters in 
English and Lugandan were produced for the troops. In 
general it was thought by local officers that these news 
sheets were effective as they were considered to be a 
'source of truthful informationl. x'3 
Censorship in Africa 
While the Information Officers in the African colonies 
were engaged in 'positive' propaganda, the colonial 
governments also engaged in censorship activities and 
checked the dissemination of anti-British propaganda. As a 
precaution, Italian missionaries in colonial Africa had 
been interned, despite continued representations made on 
their behalf by the Vatican. "' Of particular concern were 
the German and Italian broadcasts. The government of 
Tanganyika was worried about enemy broadcasts in Swahili 
and Arabic and sought the Colonial Office's advice on a 
proposed defence regulation which would prohibit listening 
to enemy broadcasts or broadcasts from enemy-occupied 
countries in public places. Tanganyika was wary of 
introducing this regulation as it was aware that 'stress 
has been laid in Great Britain on the contrast between our 
1941. 
11112 PRO, C0875/8/5, report from Tanganyika for January 
113 PRO, C0875/8/9, report from Uganda for 1941. 
ILI"' PRO, C0323/1824/4 and 1824/5. Missionaries were 
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own willingness to allow enemy broadcasts to be received 
and the German's unwillingness' . 115 
The Colonial Office discovered that the BBC was 
unaware of the existence of broadcasts in Swahili and asked 
Tanganyika to provide further details. 113-6 While it was 
recognised that Tanganyika's proposed regulation had no 
parallel in Britain, it was thought to be warranted because 
of 'the ignorance of Tanganyikan native listeners'. IX7 
Furthermore, Sir Arthur Dawe, thought that because enemy 
radio propaganda would be intensified in Africa the 
prohibition should be extended to cover all broadcasts in 
'native languages', not merely from enemy and enemy- 
occupied territories but interestingly from unoccupied 
France because it was 'under strong enemy influence'. "L8 
The Colonial Office referred Tanganyika's suggestion to the 
MOI but they had no objection. Local security 
considerations took precedence. The Colonial Office 
approved Tanganyika's proposal and also informed the other 
East and Central African governments in case they wished to 
introduce similar regulations. "' 
More controversial was the decision made by Sir John 
Maybin*, the Governor of Northern Rhodesia and a former 
3-2-5 PRO, C0323/1805/1, Tanganyika to Colonial Office, 
7 October 1940. The British public were not prohibited from 
listening to enemy broadcasts during the war. For example a 
BBC Listener Research Report of January 1940 found that one 
out of six adults listened regularly to the broadcasts of 
Lord Haw-Haw, Balfour, op. cit., p. 141. See further PRO, 
INF1/265 on Lord Haw-Haw's rumours and W. J. West, Truth 
Betrayed, (London, 1987), chapter 8. 
11116 PRO, C0323/1805/1, Colonial Office to Tanganyika, 
12 October 1940. 
117 PRO, C0323/1805/1, minute by Sabben-Clare, 18 
October 1940. 
1118 PRO, C0323/1805/1, minute by Dawe, 24 October 
1940, emphasis added. The telegrams were sent to the 
'Morton Committee' on Foreign (Allied) Resistance. For 
details on the Morton Committee see further PRO, 
T160/1056/Fl7878, unfortunately the majority of the papers 
and discussions of this committee remain closed. 
3-19 PRO, C0323/1805/1, Hodson to Sabine, 4 November 
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Police Magistrate in Ceylon, to ban the Watch Tower Society 
(the Jehovah Witnesses) on the grounds of sedition. Their 
literature, including bibles and hymn books, had already 
been confiscated. The Colonial Office received complaints 
from the Society protesting against the ban. It was noted 
by the Colonial Office that the Society had not been banned 
in Britain because conscientious objection to the war on 
religious grounds was recognised. Furthermore, there was 
no evidence thai the Society held pro-Nazi sympathies. As 
one Colonial Office official remarked, 'a religious 
movement cannot be suppressed without resorting to torture 
2.20 and the stake'. It was also noted, however, that the 
findings of the Commission of Enquiry into the Copper Belt 
disturbances in 1935 described the Society as 'dangerously 
subversive' and that it had been 'an important cause' of 
the disturbances. X21 
Northern Rhodesia was asked to make a full report. 
Following the death of Maybin, the Acting Governor of 
Northern Rhodesia explained that the Society's publications 
contained passages 'apparently attacking all recognised 
authority in the form of secular governments and also 
recognised religions, in particular the Roman Catholic 
Church'. These attacks were thought 'likely to have a 
deleterious effect upon the untutored minds of Africans'. 
Moreover the Society's activities were having a 
'considerably adverse influence upon the successful 
recruitment of African soldiers'. The Northern Rhodesia 
government accused the Society of spreading the following 
rumours: 
(a) all natives will be called upon to join the forces 
and even be forced to join by the police, and that 
only those shall be free from service who have a 
certificate from the Society's European representative 
at Lusaka. 
(b) if the Germans become rulers of the country all 
taxes will be done away with and the land at present 
held by. Europeans will be given to the Africans and 
better education will be provided for their children. 
(c) if the Germans win all Africans will be allowed to 
11210 PRO, C0323/1824/7, minutes by Calder, 24 January 
and 1 March 1941. 
122- PRO, C0323/1824/7, minute by Lambert, 8 March 1941. 
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rule themselves as the American negroes do now. 
(d) the Chiefs are evil and working for government 
money and they will be destroyed when Christ returns 
to earth. 
(e) the Government fears to suppress the Watch Tower 
preachers. "' 
The controversy, however, did not end there. Two Africans, 
Gibson Chembe and Lamond Kandama, had been arrested and 
imprisoned for refusing to burn their Watch Tower 
publications. The Superintendent of the prison, Nissen, 
and the local Magistrate, Rawstone, had ordered them to be 
publicly flogged for this refusal. Although the local 
District Commissioner had condemned the action as 'unwise', 
the Northern Rhodesia government insisted on describing 
what had occurred as repression and not as persecution. 
This incident created consternation in the Colonial Office. 
Sir Grattan Bushe*, the Colonial Office's legal advisor and 
subsequent Governor of Barbados, thought their punishment 
had been 'illegal' and that Rawstone was 'unfit to exercise 
magisterial powers'. Bushe concluded that, 'it is an 
episode which I should not have thought possible under 
British administration'. 123 Harold Beckett, Assistant 
Secretary in the East African Department was equally 
outraged. He commented that 'we do not seem to have 
advanced much since the days of the early Roman Empire'. 
Moreover, Beckett feared the problem was even more deep- 
rooted than this incident would suggest: 
Now if Mr. Rawstone and Mr. Nissen were the only 
officials in Northern Rhodesia who were blind to the 
lessons of history in the matter of religious 
persecution the remedy would be quite simple. They 
would be sacked for incompetence: and a purged, 
enlightened civil service would get on very well 
without them. Unfortunately I see no reason to suppose 
that they are anything but typical. 
The Northern Rhodesian government was now caught 
between Scylla and Charybdis, either 'backing down' or 
Imartyrising' Watch Tower Society followers. If Rawstone 
was sacked he in turn would become a 'martyr' in the eyes 
of other officers in the Colonial Service and the Society 
2.7-2 PRO, C0323/1824/9, Logan to Moyne, 28 April 1941. 
3.23 PRO, C0323/1824/9, minute by Bushe, 5 July 1941. 
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would 'gain face to an amazing extent'. He recommended 
that the two offending officers should be at least told of 
the Secretary of State for the Colonies's 'grave 
displeasure'. "' 
The question became what action the Colonial Office 
should take next. Proposals to give publicity to the 
Secretary of State's displeasure were rejected as there 
would be enough local publicity about the incident and it 
was thought that it was 'not necessary to go out of our way 
to pillory the officers concerned'. -112-ý, Therefore'Lord 
Moyne wrote to the ex-Governor of Barbados, the new 
Governor of Northern Rhodesia, Sir John Waddington*, in the 
strongest terms saying that what he found 'particularly 
disquieting' about this incident was 
that both the Commissioner and the Acting Governor 
himself seem to have looked at the affair from the 
purely administrative angle and gave no indication 
that the procedure adopted amounted to nothing less 
than a flagrant case of religious persecution. There 
can be no excuse for ordering men to burn with their 
own hands books- which in their eyes are sacred. If 
this is the attitude of the men at the top, what can 
we expect from their subordinates? ... your recent 
arrival in the Colony will I hope give you an 
opportunity to make it clearly understood that 
neither you nor I will stand for religious persecution 
in any territory for which His Majesty's Government is 
responsible. "' 
Broadcasting in Africa 
In addition to the Empire Service of the BBC, local 
government broadcasting to the Africans became a more 
important part of the propaganda effort in the African 
colonies. As the war progressed, it assumed a greater 
priority in propaganda activities than had been first 
projected when the initial plans for propaganda in Africa 
had been drawn up in 1939. On the basis of experimental 
broadcasts in Uganda undertaken in 1939 it was seen that 
'the African takes to broadcasting as a duck takes to 
124 PRO, C0323/1824/9, minute by Beckett, 30 July 1941. 
1125 PRO, C0323/1824/9, minute by Beckett, 31 July 1941. 
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water'. 112'7 This was hardly surprising given the oral 
tradition in African societies. 
In Kenya broadcasting to the Africans was seen as a 
'one of the most important functions of the Information 
Office'. Its aim was to provide 'accurate and 
comprehensive news of the war'. A Broadcasting Committee 
had been established which ensured that the African was 
given a balanced programme of listening consisting of half 
news and half entertainment. The Cable and Wireless owned 
medium and short wave station, Radio Nairobi, served beyond 
Kenya to the region as a whole, broadcast six times a week 
in five vernaculars, Swahili, Kikuyu, Likamba, Dhoulo and 
Hindustani. A typical programme consisted of fifteen 
minutes of news, a ten minute talk and five minutes of 
songs. 121 
During the May 1941 conference of Information Officers 
from both East and Central Africa which was held in Nairobi 
steps were discussed to improve broadcasts. It was agreed 
that a wider range of programmes would be made and that 
there would be a greater inter-change of material between 
the Information Officers and Nairobi to ensure each 
territory had its particular colony represented in the 
output. 129 
The BBC was also anxious to improve its service to the 
colonies. The Colonial Office asked the Information 
Officers to provide information which would help to ensure 
that the colonies were listening on the correct wavelengths 
and to find out what, if anything, was being done by way of 
advance programme information. X30 Following the 1941 BBC 
plan to combine the Empire and Foreign Services to produce 
a general Overseas Service the BBC was thinking about 
2-7--l PRO, C0875/11/1, minute by Edmett, 6 August 1941. 
128 PRO, C0875/2/1 Kenya to Colonial Office, 28 
January 1941; PRO, C0875/4/17, Latham to Smith, July 1942. 
-1129 PRO, C0875/2/14, record of a meeting of the sub- 
committee of the conference of information officers to 
consider broadcasting policy and practice, May 1941. 
1130 PRO, C0875/3/3, circular despatch to all colonies, 
19 April 1941. 
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expanding its activity in Africa so that the new World 
Service would carry broadcasts in vernacular languages and 
specially adapted programmes to serve regional audiences. 
The BBC therefore wanted to send three representatives to 
Africa to gather information about what kind of service the 
colonies would require. X33L While the East African 
governments did not object to a visit by BBC 
representatives, the desirability of the BBC engaging in 
vernacular broadcasts from London was questioned. The BBC 
wanted to begin to broadcast a weekly vernacular newsletter 
in Swahili to East Africa. "' The East African governments 
and Northern Rhodesia had two objections to this proposal. 
First, they thought that those who had responsibility for 
those programmes should be in direct contact with Africans 
and second, they questioned the desirability of 
broadcasting in Swahili as there was no one single 
vernacular covering the region. X33 Nevertheless, the BBC 
wanted to proceed. They proposed a weekly broadcast of 
fourteen minutes by the MOI's Sir Herbert Scott, former 
Director of Education in Kenya. He would not, the BBC 
assured the Colonial Office, tread on dangerous ground and 
would give background information and explanations which 
would be easily understood by the African. 3L3,4 The mere 
mention of Scott's name, however, was 'like a red rag to a 
bull' as far as the Governor of Kenya, Sir Henry Moore, was 
concerned. M35 In any case, Radio Nairobi was already 
broadcasting in the vernacular and in more languages than 
just Swahili. Also as the war zone had receded from Kenya 
the interest of the African's in war news had decreased. 
x3l PRO, C0875/3/7, OEPEC paper no. 735, 'BBC Empire 
and USA Intelligence Service', 7 April 1941; circular 
despatch to all colonies, 3 May 1941. 
X32 PRO, C0875/3/6, Grenfell Williams to Sabine, 20 
January 1941. 
X33 PRO, C0875/3/6, EAGC to Colonial Office 23 March 
1941; EAGC to Colonial Office, 25 March 1941. 
134 PRO, C0875/3/6, Grenfell Williams to Sabben-Clare, 
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Radio Nairobi was now adding a greater general talk and 
entertainment content to their broadcasts. From Kenya's 
experience it was thought that they, and not the BBC, 
should continue to provide vernacular broadcasts to 
Africans as it now formed part of its efforts to educate 
Africans which they wanted to continue. Indeed, it was 
even thought that it would be dangerous to reverse this 
development after the war ended. 13 6 The BBC did not mean 
to criticise the local Information Officers but thought the 
BBC was more experienced and could provide better news 
summaries. A further warning was added that if great 
strides were not taken during the war, the colonies may be 
missing their chance. M37 
Film Propaganda 
As with broadcasting the value of film as a suitable 
medium of propaganda for African audiences was increasingly 
recognised. Films were judged to be popular with African 
audiences, particularly the British Council's newsreel 
compilation British News and MOI documentaries. The 
British Council was not active in the African colonies 
during the war beyond providing bursaries to enable 
colonial students to study in Britain and distributing 
cultural and instructional 35mm. sound shorts. The British 
Council's primary contribution was the service it provided 
in arranging from June 1940 for the distribution of the 
newsreel, British News, which had first been made for the 
British exhibit at the New York World's Fair. The British 
Council produced British News on an 'agency basis' for the 
MOI and Colonial Office, which was sent to 28 colonies a 
week and cost seven hundred pounds. This newsreel was 
composed of extracts from the five British newsreel 
companies in cooperation with the Newsreel Association of 
Great Britain and was highly regarded in London not least 
M36 PRO, C0875/3/6, Prof. W. M. MacMillan, 
'Broadcasting in Kenya', 4 December 1941. 
X3-7 PRO, C0875/3/6, Macmillan BBC to Colonial Office, 
9 December 1941. 
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because it was the only completely British newsreel . 130 
This was important given the dominance of foreign and 
American films in particular in the African market. 
The showing of films, however, was hampered by the 
lack of provision for theatrical display, by the difficulty 
in reaching the widely scattered populations and by delays 
in shipping films to Africa. There were nine cinemas in 
Kenya, two in Uganda, four in Zanzibar, three in Nyasaland, 
three in Tanganyika, and eight for Europeans and nine for 
Africans in Northern Rhodesia. X39 
One of the important lessons learned by London about 
the kind of films that they were sending to the African 
colonies was that while the European communities were well 
served by the same kind of films shown to the audiences at 
home, the African needed more specialised treatment. 
Already Information Officers substituted the English 
soundtracks with commentaries in the regional vernaculars. 
It was also a common view that 'a modern film' was 'much 
too fast for unsophisticated audiences'. -1140 
The British Film Institute wanted to apply for a grant 
of fifteen thousand pounds under the Colonial Development 
and Welfare Act to carry out simultaneous investigations in 
Malaya, the West Indies as well as East and West Africa 
into 'the use of films among the native races' and to make 
'effective recommendations for its development, in 
conjunction with the press and wireless'. -11411 The Colonial 
Office was not altogether impressed with the BFI's 
proposal. While it was recognised that some form of 
138 PRO, C0859/80/20, British Council's summary of 
activities in the colonies, 28 March 1941; PRO, BW4/1, 
A. J. S. White to Randall, 19 August 1940. On the British 
Council and film activities in the colonies see PRO, 
C0875/17/1, 'Note on the British Council Film Activities', 
unsigned and undated. On distribution of 'British News' in 
the Colonies see BW4/11 and BW4/12. 
1139 PRO, C0875/9/14, replies to circular despatch of 
23 December 1940. 
"' PRO, C0875/9/14, minute by Edmett, 9 July 1941. 
11411 PRO, C0859/46/10, Capt. Sir William Brass 
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investigation would be useful it was suggested that such an 
investigation could be undertaken by Colonial Service 
officers in the field. Moreover, it was noted that 
relations between the BFI and MOI were not congenial 
because of rivalry of production of instructional films; 
'Mr Bell [the Secretary of the BFI] did not by any means 
see eye to eye with the Films Division of the MOV. 111 Sir 
Charles Jeffries thought that the proposal was important 
but not a priority and did not want the Colonial Office to 
be rushed into a decision. "' 
The BFI was told that its application would be 
deferred not only because of the procedure for 
consideration of their application but also because the 
Colonial Office wanted to examine the information it had 
received from the colonies about the reaction of 'natives' 
to films. 1144 Undeterred the BFI returned to the charge and 
revived their application for the grant. They noted that 
the Secretary of State for- the Colonies, Lord Cranborne, 
had referred to the value of film for colonial audiences in 
a speech in the House of Lords. Indeed, the BFI argued 
that they could provide 'more information about films than 
any other body in the world' . -145 
By this time events had overtaken the ambitions of the 
BFI as the Colonial Office and the MOI had cooperated to 
establish a central organisation: the Colonial Film Unit. 
In order to meet the specialised requirements of African 
audiences the Colonial Film Unit had been established in 
October 1939 under William Sellers* at the GPO unit as part 
of the Film Division of the MOI. "46 
Sellers had been seconded from Nigeria where he had 
run a rural health propaganda unit and undertook and was a 
pioneer in this field. Sellers had toured all around 
1142- PRO, C0859/46/10, minute by Paskin, 14 August 1941. 
143 PRO, C0859/46/10, minute by Jeffries, 6 November 1941. 
144 PRO, C0859/46/10, Paskin to Brass, 17 January 1942. 
145 PRO, C0859/46/10, Brass to Stanley, 17 December 1942. 
1146 PRO, INF1/30, Waterfield to the DG MOI, 10 
November 1939. 
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Nigeria in a travelling cinema van. The Colonial Office 
247 considered his work 'excellent'. 
The initial aim of the Colonial Film Unit had been to 
produce propaganda films of the 'projection of Britain' 
type suitable for unsophisticated African audiences. The 
Colonial Film Unit worked in cooperation with the GPO film 
unit of the MOI which provided technical staff when 
required. "' George Pearson who had experience making 
films for Africans joined the unit in April 1940. Early 
work consisted of making silent versions of MOI shorts. 1149 
When the GPO unit moved to Pinewood in March 1941, the 
Colonial Film Unit remained at Soho Square. The Colonial 
Office had wanted the Colonial Film Unit to remain at Soho 
Square in order to ensure the continuation of close 
consultation with the Colonial Office in Whitehall. 
Furthermore, it was thought that the Colonial Film Unit 
needed to be located in central London to be near Aggrey 
House, the residence of African students studying in London 
who might be called upon to act as extras in films made by 
the unit. IL50 
In 1941 Sellers sought complete separation from the 
GPO unit (now the Crown Film Unit). Sellers argued that 
11,47 PRO, C0323/1651/19, Eastwood to Wace, 21 June 
1939. Before the war Eastwood, head of the General 
Department, recommended Sellers to the BBC as a suitable 
person to broadcast on colonial affairs, but added 'he is, 
I think of quite humble origin and his accent may not be 
all that it should be'. 
3-48 PRO, INF1/30. Sellers was responsible to the 
Director of the Films Division who were until December 
1939, Joseph Ball, until June 1940, Kenneth Clark and from 
June 1940 was Jack Beddington. For the GPO Unit see 
further, Ian Dalrymple, 'The Crown Film Unit, 1940-431, in 
Nicholas Pronay and D. W. Spring, (eds. ), Propacfanda, 
Politics and Film-1918-45, (London, 1982). 
119 PRO, INF1/57, memorandum by Fletcher, 26 July 
1940; MOI films converted into silent films by the Colonial 
Film Unit included: Shipbuilders, Into the Blue, Silage, 
War and Order, Kill that Rat, How to Di , Food Convoy, 
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and Plantin , Hints on Gardening, Minelayers. Empire's new 
Armies and RAF in Action. 
3-50 PRO, INF1/144, Sellers to Mercier, 23 April 1941. 
205 
the production of films for Africans should not be mere 
amateurish versions of films made for European audiences 
but should be specially produced for Africans. 151 The 
Colonial Office supported this development 15 2 not least 
because of the public relations benefits of establishing a 
distinctly recognisable output of films for the African 
colonies under the Colonial Film Unit label. Indeed the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies viewed some films 
produced by the Colonial Film Unit and was impressed by 
what he saw. 153 Sellers desire to make specialised films 
for Africans was mirrored by the increased demand from 
Africa for specially produced films, particularly for 
African troops. A compromise was reached whereby the MOI 
agreed that the staff of the Colonial Film Unit would be 
increased, in practice separate from the Crown Film Unit in 
all but accounts. 154 
Colonial Film Unit activities expanded throughout 
1941. The Colonial Film Unit adapted films held in the 
Central Film Library for colonial purposes as it was found 
that there was a three fold greater demand for silent, 
rather than sound films. By 1942 the Colonial Film Unit 
was producing more films than the Crown Film Unit and had a 
production programme of fifty films a year. In addition to 
this activity, the Colonial Film unit had begun to produce 
a fortnightly newsreel called African News Film. This 
newsreel was a compilation which was made by editing 
existing stock and material given to the Films Division by 
newsreel companies-"' 
3-53- PRO, INF1/144, Sellers to Mercier, 25 May 1941. 
3-52 PRO, INF1/144, Sabine to Harlow, 7 May 1941. 
153 PRO, INFI/144, Moyne to Monckton, 7 May 1941. 
3-54 PRO, INF1/144, minute by Fletcher, 5 June 1941. 
1155 PRO, INF1/144, Campbell to Steele, 15 January 
1942. By February 1942 the following films had been 
completed by the Colonial Film Unit: Mr. English at Home, 
The British Army, The RAF, English 
- 
and African Life, THe 
Story of Cotton Guns in the Desert. Progress in the 
Colonies, An African in London, This is a Searchlight, This 
is a Special Constable, Africans' War Effort, This is a 
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The Colonial Film Unit also received demands for a 
different kind of film to be produced other than merely war 
propaganda and background films about Britain. For 
example, although the Mombasa Times in Nairobi applauded 
the films shown by Kenya's travelling cinema van for 
sounding the right 'patriotic note', the Information 
officer in Kenya showed films which portrayed not only war 
propaganda films, but also those which depicted social 
welfare subjects which would have a more long term 
educative role helping the African in every day problems 
such as dealing with soil erosion. 156 
The Colonial Office supported these views and proposed 
that the activities of the Colonial Film Unit should be 
extended into a second unit which would be able to make 
films 'to show now and build up for peacetime showing to 
backward audiences a library of films that are not war 
propaganda'. Mercier of the Films Division of the MOI 
agreed with the Colonial Office point of view which argued 
that: 
a) the value of film as a medium of propaganda and 
instruction to backward audiences has been proved 
conclusively; 
b) there is a danger in soaking native audiences, as 
at present, in war propaganda designed to show the 
might of the British and her Allies when the news has 
nothing to show but setbacks; and 
c) when peace returns and war propaganda films are 
useless, the elaborate organisation for display will 
come to an abrupt stop. "' 
Barraqe Balloon, These are Paratroopers, This is an ARP 
Warden, This is-an Anti-Aircraft Gun, Our Indian Soldiers 
Self Help in Food, These are London Firemen, Gold Coasi 
Timber, Mobile-Canteens, With Our African Troops (Early 
Trainingi, With Our African Troops (On Active Service), 
Soldiers' Comforts from Nigeria, These Are british 
Soldiers, Bren Gun Carriers and Tanks, Harvest Festival, 
Barbad; s Day in Portsmouth, Uganda Police, These Are ATS 
and WRNS, Feeding the Army, ' Alakiji, Honduras Record, Home 
Guard, Training the Blind, and Air Raid Precautions, 
ibid., Sabine to Beddington, 11 February 1942. 
1941. 
156 PRO, C0875/6/18, report for December 1940 - March 
157 PRO, INF1/144, Mercier to Beddington and Lord 
Dufferin, 6 February 1942. 
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In fact the Colonial Film Unit was already making 
background films 'to show the African what references to 
Britain, of which he knows nothing, really mean, e. g. that 
in the United Kingdom there is a counterpart to his life in 
Africa'. '" 
In addition to the increased terms of reference for 
the films which the Colonial Film Unit would produce, 
Sellers, sensible to the need to cut down on costs, also 
wanted to encourage amateur film makers in the Colonial 
Service to shoot material with raw stock provided by the 
Colonial Film Unit and send it to London for editing by the 
Unit. To ensure that the highest possible standard of 
material was shot he recommended that the Colonial Film 
Unit should institute a course of instruction for visiting 
officers from the colonies home on leave. Further 
technical support and information about films in production 
would be given to those interested by subscribing to a 
proposed monthly bulletin, Colonial Cinema. The stock of 
existing film libraries would also be examined to discover 
if any could be 'made suitable' for colonial audiences. 
Although there was increasing interest in Britain in the 
Colonial Film Unit's output and suggestions that in view of 
their simple technique the material would be suitable to 
instruct children in schools, Sellers did not wish to see 
the films made for Africans being shown to children without 
substantial re-adjustments. In view of the programme he 
proposed he did not think there would be enough time to 
adapt films for Africans to be shown to British 
schoolchildren. Film output would also be increased under 
the new terms of reference from 52 to 100 a year. 15 1 The 
Colonial Office strongly supported Seller's recommendations 
and that he should be given a staff increase. 1160 
The Treasury had initial doubts that such an extension 
of the Colonial Film Unit's activities could be undertaken 
1942.158 
PRO, INF1/144, Cameron to Lord Dufferin, 12 March 
11" PRO, INF1/144, Memorandum by Sellers, 3 March 1942. 
160 PRO, INF1/144, Sidebotham to DG MOI, 15 May 1942. 
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in the middle of the war. Ultimately the Treasury 
authorised the additional expenditure because the proposals 
were 'in line' with the Government's new development 
policy, but only on condition that they did 'not conflict 
with war-time activities proper of a short-term nature and 
more immediately important'. Furthermore, it had to be 
acknowledged by the Films Division of the MOI that the 
proposed work would have a 'low priority' of future war- 
time allocation of extra technical staff and 
accommodation. 1161 
At home, audiences were shown the film Men of Africa 
which had been produced before the war by Strand films for 
the Colonial Empire Marketing Board for display at the New 
York World's Fair. The MOI obtained film footage discarded 
by Strand from the finished film which was later used by 
the Colonial Film Unit to produce films for Africans. 
Seventy five cans were delivered by Strand to the MOI by 
the beginning of 1945.161 This film showed the audiences 
the benefit of British rule in Africa in the context of 
British colonial policy of development and welfare paid for 
by the British taxpayer. This was, as the narrator 
explained, 'striking proof that even in the midst of war, 
Great Britain does not shirk her responsibilities to the 
Colonies'. The British in Africa had brought 'peace' where 
there had once been a life of 'fear and uncertainty' for 
the African. There was still a 'long battle to be fought 
with ignorance, poverty and disease' but much could be 
achieved with the money and 'the initiative of the white 
man'. The rest of the film showed the practical steps 
already undertaken by the British in the health, education 
and agricultural fields and the steps being taken to give 
responsibilities of local government to the Africans. 163 
The British Council indicated that they would be 
IL63- PRO, INF1/144, Tucker to Welch, 18 June 1942. 
2-67- PRO, INF1/200, Anderson to Gardiner, 16 January 1945. 
163 Rosaleen Smyth, 'Movies and Mandarins: the 
Official Film and British Colonial Africa', in James Curren 
and Vincent Porter (eds. ) British Cinema History, (New 
Jersey, 1983), p. 132. 
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interested in making a documentary film about empire 
'solidarity' in conjunction with Louis Jackson the 
principal of British National Films and Anglo-American 
Distributors. '" While the Colonial Office thought that 
the newsreel, British News was 'excellent', doubts were 
expressed about the value of the British Council's 
instructional and cultural shorts which were 'intelligible 
only to the highly educated and sophisticated with a good 
background of world knowledge and of knowledge of Britain 
in particular'. Moreover the Colonial Office was aware 
that there existed 'very considerable feeling' between the 
MOI's Films Division and the British Council which make 
cooperation on colonial films difficult. 165 Indeed the MOI 
had an 'uneasy' relationship with the British Council and 
saw no reason for the Council to expand its activities in 
the colonial field, particularly' as there was no European 
rival to British culture in the empire in Africa. 3-66 
Apart from the work of the Colonial Film Unit and its 
work for African audiences, the Colonial Office sought to 
cooperate further with the Films Division of the MOI to 
produce more films about the colonies. This would include 
all types of film produced by the MOI, including: feature 
films, theatrical shorts, MOI five minute propaganda films. 
The Colonial Office hoped that the Films Division would be 
able to send a film unit out to the colonies to film 
footage for these types of films. Sabine was encouraged 
that Jack Beddington*, former head of publicity at Shell- 
Mex and B. P., director of the MOI's Films Division, had 
given the impression of 'being interested in the subject of 
3-64 PRO, C0875/17/1, Kearney to Sabine, 5 January 1942. 
... PRO, C0875/17/1, 'Note on British Council Film 
Activities', unsigned and undated; Sabine to Sidebotham, 21 
January 1942. For the problems between the MOI and the 
British Council see A. J. S. White, The British Council: the 
First 25 Year, 1934 1959, (London, 1965), Chapter 3. 
"Is PRO, INF1/444, Hodson to DG, 30 September 1940. 
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colonial films'. 116-7 
Sabine had for along time been keen to 'bring the 
Colonial Empire to everyone's notice by the really popular 
media' which would reach a larger audience than radio 
talks, pamphlets and posters. 1166 As a result of 
discussions between the MOI and the Colonial Office, the 
Films Division employed the author and BBC film critic Mrs. 
Arnot Robertson*, to write 'suitable material to make 
scripts on colonial subjects'. She came up with several 
ideas for both shorts and feature films. Her ideas for 
feature films included 'Hail, the Conquering Hero Goes' 
about the Zulus, 'Obeah' about Jamaica, 'White Ants' about 
witchcraft and an idea for a film about the life of the 
explorer Mary Kingsley. Her ideas for shorts included 
'Tuppence Coloured' about trades unions in West Africa, 
'Cost of a Road' and one on 'Colonial Administration'. -169 
Robertson's suggestions were circulated to the 
regional specialists in the Colonial Office for their 
comments. Their reactions were not encouraging. Her ideas 
were criticised on the grounds that the resulting films 
would give an inaccurate picture of conditions in the 
colonies. The reactions also showed a prejudice against 
the 'movies' in general. For example, one official 
commented 'I regard all this kind of thing with extreme 
distaste, but then I have never really liked the 
pictures'. "' Sabine, however, encouraged Robertson to 
continue working on her ideas, but it was not until later 
in the war that this cooperation produced tangible results: 
a feature film, Men of Two Worlds which would at last give 
the colonial empire the kind of exposure Sabine had worked 
116-7 PRO, C0875/17/1, minutes of a meeting with the 
MOI, 7 January 1942; Sabine to Sidebotham,. 12 January 1942. 
PRO, C0323/1754/, 4, confidential note by Sabine, 
undated. 
11119 PRO, C0875/17/1, minute by Sabine, 17 February 
1942 and Beddington's 'Memorandum on Colonial Film 
Material', 14 April 1942. 
11'10 PRO, C0875/17/1, minute by Hibbert, 2 June 1942. 
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towards. 17L 
As we have seen in the developments in propaganda in 
East and Central Africa and in the work of the Colonial 
Film Unit there was an implicit agreement with Edmett's 
warning that the MOI's war propaganda would not 'win the 
peace'. The war provided the opportunity to expand 
colonial public relations activities, looking to the long- 
term and beyond the requirements of winning the war. In 
practice a more forward propaganda policy had been adopted 
in the colonies which would look to the future relationship 
between Britain and her colonies centering on the new 
policy of Colonial Development and Welfare. 
By the end of 1941 the MOI caught up with these 
developments. Weekly meetings between the MOI and Colonial 
Office were also instituted in order to improve the 
relationship between the two departments. The Colonial 
Office would take a greater responsibility in initiating 
propaganda and overseeing its despatch. The propaganda 
specialists would bring in regional specialists from within 
the Colonial Office to sit in on discussions where 
necessary. It was also decided that material produced 
would come under one of two categories, first, general 
material about the progress of the war, and second, 
material of special interest to the colonies. Two themes 
would be particularly highlighted, the practical affect of 
the British government's policy on the colonies and 
material which showed that 'what the colonies were doing in 
the war was appreciated here' . 17 2A more concerted effort 
was made to publicise the British empire to the British 
population, long-term public relations, with the aim of 
getting the public to understand the responsibilities they 
had towards the colonies which would continue after the war 
was over. This meant a widening of the terms of reference 
to include a long-term propaganda educative effort beyond 
telling the British public about the contributions made by 
11711 C. f. chapter six. 
11-12- PRO, C0875/5/6, minute by Sabine on meeting 8 
October 1941; circular no. 277,13 November 1941. 
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the colonies to the war effort. IL73 
What is striking is the apparent confidence that it 
would be business as usual in the empire in the post-war 
period. In spite of the military setbacks of 1941 it is 
clear that the propagandists in the Colonial Office and in 
the colonies were not disheartened but were anxious to 
seize the initiative and attempt to win the peace while the 
war was still being fought. The impact of Pearl Harbour 
and the collapse of British power in East Asia seemed to 
endorse the need for a positive propaganda policy and 
served to consolidate efforts into a coordinated campaign 
around a new theme of 'partnership'. 
173 PRO, C0875/11/20, meeting 6 October 1941. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
FROM 'TRUSTEESHIP' TO 'PARTNERSHIP' 
COLONIAL DECLARATIONS 
The MOI-Colonial Office agreement on the incorporation 
of long-term propaganda was not implemented immediately. 
The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour, the entrance of the 
United States into the war on the side of the Allies in 
December 1941 and the collapse of British power in South 
East Asia in February 1942 transformed the context in which 
colonial propaganda was conducted. The British government 
tried to make sense of the devastating events in South-East 
Asia and the impact on British prestige and status as a 
world power. But this was not to be a review behind the 
safety of closed doors. British colonial policy was 
subjected to a barrage of criticism at home and abroad. 
Demands were made for a new statement on war aims about the 
British empire. The air was alive with the talk of 
charters. Both the Labour Party and the American 
administration demanded a 'Colonial Charter', a statement 
of principles about the British empire. 
For nearly two years after Singapore the Colonial 
Office fought off attempts to produce an all-embracing 
statement on British colonial policy. The Colonial Office 
opposed the idea of any statement which did not take into 
account the diversity of the dependent empire, forcing the 
pace of political progress in the colonies beyond which 
their social and economic structures could support. The 
Colonial Office refused to let public relations and the 
appeasement of critics dominate the consideration of such 
fundamental questions of imperial policy. This is not to 
argue that the Colonial Office drew no lessons from events 
in South-East Asia. Nor was the idea of a re-statement of 
Britain's colonial mission dismissed out of hand. What is 
clear, however, is that the Colonial Office worked hard to 
retain the initiative and to articulate British colonial 
policy in a way which, in their view, was a true reflection 
of reality. As will be seen that while there was 
frustration that the new agreed policy to conduct long-term 
propaganda about the empire was put on hold, this was, 
paradoxically to the benefit of the colonial propagandists. 
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The conduct of policy at the high and international level 
resulted in a statement by Oliver Stanley in July 1943. 
Old-fashioned 'trusteeship' was replaced with modern 
'partnership' and the full implications of the new Colonial 
Development and Welfare policy were embraced. As a result, 
the new principle of 'partnership' provided a new theme for 
colonial propaganda and gave ample scope for the colonial 
propagandists and their long-term propaganda campaign, who 
were reinvigorated with a new sense of mission. 
Following the entrance of the United States into the 
war ultimate victory was assured. It appeared the Colonial 
Office could devote more energy to the task of planning 
post-war reconstruction. This optimism was short-lived. 
Shortly before the setbacks in South-East Asia a warning 
had been made that colonial propaganda should become more 
forward-looking and positive: 
The British Empire, like Queen Elizabeth, has solved 
most of its problems by a system of peaceful 
procrastination. This formula does not always stand 
the test of events when the pace of human progress is 
accelerating. ' 
The fall of Singapore was considered 'the worst moment 
for the Colonial Office' during the war. 2 Notwithstanding 
the Colonial Office's desire to view the South-East Asian 
setback as a purely military defeat, the unwillingness of 
the colonial peoples to come to the aid of Britain was 
perceived as a failure of British colonial administration 
and had major implications for the future of the empire as 
a whole. The events in South-East Asia produced a period 
of introspection when fundamental questions were asked 
about Britain's colonial policy of trusteeship. 
Events in South-East Asia could not have come at a 
worst time for the colonial propagandists. Just when the 
11 PRO, C0875/11/1, minute by Edmett, 30 December 1941. 
2 Lee and Petter, op. cit., p. 121. The Political scene 
at home was also troubled with dissatisfaction with 
Churchill's refusal to create an independent minister of 
defence. These domestic difficulties continued until 
November with the victory at El Alamein. Churchill had 
called and won a votes of confidence on 29 January and 2 
July. A. J. P. Taylor, English History, 1914-1945, (London, 
1979)pp. 658 and 673. 
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MOI and the Colonial Office had at last agreed to 
supplement the war propaganda diet by embarking on long- 
term educative propaganda about the nature and purpose of 
Britain's colonial policy, the collapse of British power in 
South-East Asia placed British colonial policy under the 
spotlight of public scrutiny. The Colonial Office was on 
the defensive as never before. The fall of Singapore 
exposed the weakness of the empire unity theme and the 
claims about the spontaneous contribution of the colonies 
to the war effort. Singapore also seemed to vindicate the 
arguments made by Edmett and Sabine in favour of colonial 
propaganda in support of Britain's forward constructive 
colonial policy. Lord Listowel*, the Labour peer and Party 
Whip in the House of Lords and later Secretary of State for 
India and Burma and Minister of State at the Colonial 
Office in the post-war Labour government, was certain that 
new efforts had to be made in the colonial propaganda field 
to 'arm' the 'minds' of colonial peoples 'as well as their 
bodies'. He called for a re-articulation of Britain's 
colonial policy, for a Colonial Charter, which would 
contain a statement of war aims about the empire. 
Hitherto, he argued, colonial propaganda had missed the 
mark: 
It is not enough to point out that if the British 
Commonwealth is defeated they will become enslaved by 
the strongest Axis Power. They cannot be certain that 
this is a black as well as a white man's war unless 
they can be persuaded beyond all doubt that the peace 
which follows it will be a black as well as a white 
man's peace. 3 
Critics,,. not least those in the. United States,, called 
for a new beginning. Any remaining vestiges of British 
complacency about its empire had been shattered. The age 
of imperialism was dead it was declared, and the 
possibility of the liquidation of the European empires was 
on the international political agenda. 
In German broadcasts the loss of Singapore was 
'compared and contrasted with Dunkirk'. The Germans 
emphasised that it was a mistake 'for the British to point 
out that they often lose the early battles in war but win 
3 Hansard, 20 May 1942, vol. 122, col. 1088. 
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the last one. The eclipse of the British Empire was 
inevitable, part of an inexorable historical process'. 4 
Churchill, on the other hand, tried to draw strength, 
unity and faith in eventual victory from the disasters in 
South-East Asia, broadcasting to the nation on 15 February: 
This ... is one of those moments when the British race 
and nation can show their quality and their genius. 
This is one of those moments when it can draw from the 
heart of misfortune the vital impulses of victory. 
Here is the moment to display that calm and poise 
combined with grim determination which not so long ago 
brought us out of the very jaws of death. Here is 
another occasion to show - as so often in , 
our long 
story - that we can meet reverses with dignity and 
with renewed accessions of strength. 
He reminded his audience that they also had the reserves of 
their new Allies to call upon: 
We must remember that we are no longer alone. We are 
in the midst of a great company. Three-quarters of 
the human race are now moving with us. The whole 
future of mankind may depend upon our action and upon 
our conduct. So. far we have not failed. We shall not 
fail now. Let us move forward steadfastly together 
into the storm and through the storm .5 
According to Harold Nicolson this broadcast was not a 
success, 'the country is too nervous and irritable to be 
fobbed off with fine phrases'. 6 Indeed only 65.4% of the 
potential radio audience listened to Churchill (compared to 
77% in 1941,71.3% on VE Day and 81.3% on D Day). Of this 
65.4% he only achieved, a 62% approval rating, which was 
'low for Winston'. A social worker in Leeds noted that 
this was the first broadcast by Churchill which had 'failed 
to convince and inspire'. 7 
Criticism was even articulated in The Times, usually a 
staunch supporter of Britain's colonial policy. A leader 
of the 14 March. expressed the feeling that some of the 
4 Briggs, The War of Words ..., p. 409. 
5 Churchill quoted in Martin Gilbert, Road to Victory: 
Winston S. Churchill, 1941-1945 (London, 1986), Pp. 58-9. 
' ibid., p. 59. 
*7 D. J. Wenden, 'Churchill, Radio and Cinema', 'in 
Robert Blake and Wm. Roger Louis (eds. ) Churchill (Oxford, 
1993), p. 224. 
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lessons in colonial government as a result of the East 
Asian setbacks were so grave immediate action was 
necessary: 
The defect of the British colonial system, and the 
essence of then challenge which it has to meet, is 
that it has been too long and too deeply rooted in the 
tradition of a bygone age, and that it has retained 
too much of that 'stratified spirit' of inequality and 
discrimination, whose last strongholds are now being 
rapidly attacked and eliminated in our contemporary 
society. To break down the barriers - economic, 
political and psychological - which still sharply 
divide colonial communities is a task calling for both 
intense determination and infinite patience. Misguided 
conceptions of racial prestige and narrow obsolete 
interpretations of economic interest are grave 
obstacles. But they must be surmounted if democracy is 
to have any meaning or appeal for the colonial 
peoples. The price of failure is the perpetuation of 
those 'plural' societies whose fissiparous tendencies 
and inherent weaknesses, luridly revealed by the 
Japanese assault, make them unfit for survival in the 
modern world. ' 
The Times also printed two articles on 13 and 14 March 
by Margery Perham* inspired by the crisis, 'The Colonial 
Empire - the Need for a Stocktaking and Review' and 'The 
Colonial Empire - Capital Labour and the Colour Bar'. 
Margery Perham was the eminent writer, lecturer and adviser 
to the government on African affairs. She had travelled 
widely in Africa and was the first woman fellow of Nuffield 
College, Oxford. She. was an influential figure in colonial 
administration. She ran courses to Colonial Service 
probationers and was the Director of the Oxford Institute 
of Colonial Studies, 1945-8. In spite of her credentials 
as an adviser to the British government and a trainer of 
Colonial Service cadets9, Perham was nonetheless a colonial 
reformer and events In South-East Asia appeared to confirm 
her views of the need for reform. Perham was emphatic in 
her belief that Britain's very 'survival as a Great power' 
depended on the ability to learn the lessons of the 'last 
few weeks'. In her view, the lessons that needed to be 
The Times, 14 March 1942. 
9 C. f. Ronald Robinson, 'Margery Perham and the 
Colonial Office', in Alison Smith and Mary Bull (eds. ) 
Margery Perham and British Rule in Africa (London, 1991). 
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learnt were that it was wrong to perpetuate the 
stratification of colonial societies in separate 
development and that there was a need for education because 
'elsewhere peasants and workers, almost if not quite so 
ignorant and backward as those of our colonies have fought 
as men fight only for a cause they recognise as their own'. 
'This', argued Perham, 'forces us to ask the long range 
question whether British rule does develop that solidarity 
which society needs for health in peace as for strength in 
war'. 10 
The BBC's response to the events in Singapore is 
evident in its Empire News directive. News presentation 
would need careful handling as the 'eyes of the world' both 
enemies and allies will be turned on Britain to see 1(l) 
How we stand up to this latest in a long series of 
disasters (2) How we respond to the Prime Minister's call 
for unity'. The answer to the first task was to try to 
'recapture our mood after Dunkirk and in the early days of 
the battle of Britain. In other words we realise the 
gravity of things ... We have sold the world the story that 
we are tough and can take it once. We must do so again'. 
The second task required circumspection. The BBC 
should 'remember one golden rule' that they were 'not 
leaders of opinion', but 'only reporters and reflectors of 
it'. However there were dangers in taking the task of 
reporting too far: 
We in this country rightly look upon a good smashing 
newspaper editorial attacking the government as an 
exercise of our rights as citizens of democracy. But 
listeners abroad don't see it in the same light as 
ourselves, and for them to hear the BBC voicing 
unidentified criticism is simply to be presented with 
a picture of complete confusion. 
For example, while they felt they could report 
Parliamentary criticism, they did not want to follow the 
newspaper practice and 'put views in the mouth of the man- 
in-the-street and then talk of them as expressions of 
public opinion'. With an eye to overseas opinion the BBC 
would continue to stress that 
it is that in this moment of adversity we can expect 
'LO Margery Perham in The Times, 13 March 1942. 
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unity from the people of these isles. For the present 
we must err on the side of emphasising this aspect. "' 
A Mass Observation Survey in March 1942 on 'Feelings 
about the British Empire' attempted to capture the general 
trend of British public at this point. The report noted 
that feelings about the empire were 'often ambiguous and 
complicated' therefore no statistical analysis was 
attempted as it would be difficult to categorise the 
results. 
At present the sense of guilt about the past and 
present of the Empire has produced in many people a 
state of mind which is quite undynamic. The idea of 
the 'bad' Empire disintegrating before peoples' ideas 
of how it can be made 'good' have been put into 
practice is emotionally tiring and from the point of 
view of war-effort and war enthusiasms, negative. A 
lost Malaya produces self-recrimination as well as 
leader recrimination. " 
It concluded that 'a gesture towards reform', like the 
granting of 'some kind of freedom to India' might make a 
considerable difference to the present state of feeling as 
well as 'relieving a certain amount of emotional tension'. 
Such a gesture could even 'produce a switch over of feeling 
towards more constructive ends'. " 
The case therefore, for a statement on British 
colonial policy seemed to be irresistible, but not to 
everyone.. Following the -adoption of the Atlantic Charter 
In September 1941 and the undertaking to respect article 
three in which the 'right of all peoples to choose the form 
of government under which they live', Churchill had told 
the House of Commons that this apparent commitment to 
self-determination for all did not apply to the colonies 
but only to Europe. As Churchill explained to the House of 
Commons on 9 September 1941: 11 
At the Atlantic meeting, 'we had in mind, primarily the 
restoration of the sovereignty, self7government and 
national life of the States and nations of Europe now 
under the Nazi yoke, and the principles governing any 
13- WAC, E2/129/1, Bernard 
Directive, 16 February 1942. 
3-2 Mass Observation Report No. 
the British Empire', 16 March 1942. 
Moore's Empire News 
1158, 'Feelings About 
13 ibid. 
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alterations in the territorial boundaries which may 
have to be made. So that is quite a separate problem 
from the progressive evolution of self-governing 
institutions in the regions and peoples which owe 
allegiance to the British Crown. We have made 
declarations on these matters which are complete in 
themselves, free from ambiguity and related to the 
conditions and circumstances of the territories and 
peoples affected. They will be found to be entirely in 
harmony with the high conception of freedom and 
justice which inspired the Joint Declaration. " 
In view of the developments in South-East Asia, however, 
this was no longer considered to be a sufficient statement 
on the future of the colonies. Britain faced increasing 
pressure to produce a Charter for the Colonies from both 
the United States and from critics in Parliament. The idea 
of producing a Colonial Charter to explain how the Atlantic 
Charter would be applied in the colonies remained an issue 
in Anglo-American relations until mid-1943. Whatever the 
outcome of high-political deliberations between London and 
Washington, the implication for Britain's propaganda about 
the colonies was clear. The colonies could no longer be 
merely implored to make a maximum war effort. They now had 
to be told why. 
The Colonial Office wanted to avoid the application of 
the Atlantic Charter to the colonies and also any 
commitment to responsible government for the colonies. 
Instead Lord Hailey's new vision for the future was adopted 
the replacement of 'trusteeship' with 'partnership'. 
Lord Hailey was not the first to question the 
applicability of 'trusteeship' as an accurate definition of 
British colonial policy. Trusteeship was old-fashioned and 
out-dated. It did not reflect 'the new philosophy of 
British colonial policy of Colonial Development and Welfare 
and the new pro-active nature of Britain's relationship 
with the dependent empire. Back in April 1940 when the 
Colonial Office discussed Sabine's suggestions for a public 
relations campaign to educate British public opinion about 
its colonial empire, Lord Dufferin, the Parliamentary 
114 PRO, C0323/1848/7322/1942, extract from Churchill's 
speech to the -House of Commons in a minute by Gent, 21 
August 1942. 
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Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, had urged the 
omission of the word 'trusteeship' from any British 
propaganda about the empire: 
may I suggest as the first shot in this campaign for 
educating the public that we all agree to abandon the 
use of the word trusteeship as definition of our 
colonial policy? To the British public a Trustee is 
always indolent and usually dishonest. Moreover he is 
solely concerned with material prosperity and with 
keeping things as they are. I don't think we want any 
of these conceptions attached to our colonial 
poliCy. 15 
At the time, the Secretary of State, Malcolm MacDonald did 
not agree'6 but in the aftermath of the fall of Singapore, 
attacks against 'trusteeship' were renewed. Not only was 
'trusteeship' an inaccurate reflection of British colonial 
policy, it had not proved to be sufficient enough to 
inspire the colonial peoples of South-East Asia to defend 
the British empire. 
Lord Hailey had a lifetime of experience in the 
British empire behind him, as an administrator in India and 
as the surveyor of the european empires in Africa. He was 
'the high priest of the development ideal and a 'leader of 
the colonial reform movement' . 17 In a speech delivered in 
the House of Lords he outlined how the traditional policy 
of 'trusteeship' had become static. The original 
conception of trusteeship looked to the state as a 
protector of rights, as a trustee of colonial peoples' 
interests against economic exploitation. It was a negative 
concept which implied paternal protection and the 
safeguarding of colonial rights. It did not meet the 
modern requirements of development and welfare. The 
state's role had changed and it had become the chief agency 
for public welfare and economic development. Traditional 
definitions of 'trusteeship' were therefore no longer 
" PRO, C0323/1754/4, minute 'by Lord Dufferin, 25 
April 1940. 
1940.116 
PRO, C0323/1754/4, minute by MacDonald, 25 April 
17 Lee and Petter, op. cit., p. 157 and John W. Cell, 
Hailey: a Studv in British Imperialism, 1872-1969, (London, 
1994), p. 263. 
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appropriate: 
It is true we have a new interpretation of it ... we have now everywhere, as part of the background of all 
our domestic thought, the conception of the State as 
the chief agency for social welfare. It is that 
conception which is now forcing its way from domestic 
into Colonial politics, and which is giving us a new 
and, as I hold, a more constructive and more 
beneficial interpretation of trusteeship. There is no 
lessening of its moral quality, but there is, I think, 
a very substantial gain from this new conception, a 
gain of which we have already seen some of the proofs 
in the passing of the Colonial Development and Welfare 
Act, and of which I have no doubt that we shall see 
further evidence as time passes on. 110 
In another speech in the House of Lords, his second 
within two weeks, Hailey advised against making sweeping 
generalisations about British colonial policy in the light 
of events in South-East Asia. He deplored the American 
tendency to talk about the bankruptcy of British policy. 
He resisted arguments which called for an all-embracing 
statement on the future of the colonies. The colonies were 
at different stages of development and were not all 
inhabited by 'primitive' peoples. He developed his theme 
of his previous speech that there should be a new 
interpretation of trusteeship for it had outgrown its 
purpose and was seen as patronising by the people of the 
empire: 
No one can deny that the sentiment of trusteeship has 
played a great and most beneficent part in the 
development of our system of civil administration in 
the Colonies, but, ... trusteeship has to-day a new 
and more positive meaning for us, which had already 
been expressed in our legislation here and will need 
to be expressed still further as time goes on. And 
there is another point. The use of the term is 
irritating to the Colonial people. It was intensely 
unpopular in India. It is becoming equally unpopular 
in the Colonies, for it has implications on which it 
is unnecessary to enlarge but which, if I were a 
native of the Colonies, I should equally resent. 19 
'Partnership', suggested Hailey should replace trusteeship: 
If we need to express ourselves in a formula at all, 
let our relations be of those of senior and junior 
partners in the same enterprise, and let it be said 
that our contract of partnership involves the 
118 Hansard, 6 May 1942, vol. 121, cols. 919-920. 
. 19 Hansard, 20 May 1942, vol. 122, col-1095. 
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progressive increase of the share which the junior 
partners have in the conduct of the undertaking. 20 
While it was one thing for Lord Hailey as the 
'mouthpiece of enlightened officialdom'21 to respond to 
calls for a new statement on British colonial policy, it 
was clear the government would have to respond too. This 
job was given to Harold Macmillan*, the newly appointed 
Colonial Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State. Macmillan 
had no previous experience or knowledge of the colonial 
empire and had not relished his move from the Ministry of 
Supply to the Colonial Office. He commented it felt like 
'leaving a madhouse in order to enter a mausoleum'. " With 
his old school and university friend Lord Cranborne in the 
House of Lords as Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
Macmillan was the government spokesman on colonial affairs 
in the House of Commons. Macmillan developed, Hailey's idea 
of 'partnership' in the House of Commons on 24 June 1942.23 
This debate on colonial affairs was the first full supply 
debate on the subject since June 1939 and also represented 
the first official reaction to Singapore. In spite of 
Macmillan's lack of experience in colonial affairs he 
produced an admirable defence of British colonial policy. 
Macmillan described the Colonial Office's task during the 
war which would continue in the aftermath of what he was 
careful to call a military defeat in the South-East Asia. 
This task, he suggested, was 'the mobilisation of all the 
potential resources of the Colonial Empire, both of men and 
of materials, for the purposes of war'. 24 Having dealt 
with the short term requirements of empire cooperation to 
win the war, Macmillan chose to look to the future, because 
'in the midst if the hurly burly of war it is refreshing 
20 ibid. 
23- Leonard Barnes, Soviet Light on the Colonies 
(London, 1944). p. 127. 
22 Harold Macmillan, The Blast of War, 1939-1945 
(London, 1967), P. 161. 
23 Lee and Petter, OR-cit., p. 126. 
24 Hansard, 24 June 1942, vol. 380, col. 2003. 
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and stimulating to lift one's eyes occasionally to a 
further horizon'. Macmillan took pains to describe the new 
principle of 'partnership' as an evolutionary continuation 
of the 'strong strain of idealism and humanitarianism 
running through British thought' which had been 'expressed 
in practical form in the policy of the British 
Government'. 15 If the British empi3ýe was to last it would 
have to continue to show its capacity for change: 
The Empires of the past have died because they could 
not change with the times. They were rigid. They 
conformed to a fixed pattern. By contrast our Empire 
has had the great quality of adaption. By that it 
lives. 
The relationship between the mother country and the 
colonies could also be of a 'lasting character', it would 
not wither and die once the colony had reached maturity, 
but would continue within the framework of the Commonwealth 
because of mutual dependency: 
The war has shown us certain inescapable facts, of 
which we will learn the lesson. Self-government 
without security means nothing. Independence without 
defence is vain. It is in the light of these events 
that we should think of our future relationship with 
the Colonies as a permanent and not a transitory 
thing. 26 
Having declared that the relationship between the colonies 
and Britain would be 'permanent', Macmillan then produced 
his vision for the future: 
The governing principle of the Colonial Empire should, 
therefore, be the principle of partnership between the 
various elements composing it. Out of partnership 
comes understanding and friendship. Within the fabric 
of the Commonwealth lies the future of the Colonial 
territories. According to different needs and 
different conditions there will be the greatest 
divergence of local responsibility, but, however far 
these may be developed, there are broad Imperial. 
problems which only admit of corporate resolution. " 
The new principle of 'partnership' was immediately 
seized upon by Labour members of the Supply Committee who 
wanted to know whether this represented a new statement of 
" ibid., cols. 2013-2014. 
26 ibid., col. 2015. 
27 ibid., cols. 2015-2016. 
225 
policy: was it the Government's interpretation of the 
'appropriate Clause in the Atlantic Charter'? Was this 
meant to be a real 'partnership' or 'just another form of 
words to delude people"2' After all, it was argued, the 
real relationship between the Colonies and the Mother 
Country was not one of 'partnership' but Isubordination'. 28 
Macmillan denied that this was a new statement of 
policy but an enunciation of policy based on 'the 
impressions' he had formed after his comparatively short 
tenure of office. Like Hailey, Macmillan went on to 
elaborate his view of the changing role of the state as an 
agent of change and prosperity: 
The Colonies depend upon capital development. Before 
the passing of the Colonial Development and Welfare 
Act there was too much tendency to think of each 
Colony as a separate financial proposition instead of 
thinking of the show as a whole. Some Colonies are 
poor and some are rich. The estate must be considered 
as a whole ... The Colonies are poor. Why are they 
poor? Because of capitalist exploitation, or because 
of insufficient capital? Because they are too much 
governed, or too little governed? Because we interfere 
too much, or too little? Because there are too many 
white planters and settlers, or too few? Because there 
are too many European traders, or not enough? No. They 
are poor because they are Just beginning. They are 
four or five centuries behind. Our job is to move 
them, to hustle them, across this great interval of 
time as rapidly as we can. 29 
Creech Jones, the Lab our MP and Chairman of the Fabian 
Colonial Bureau thought that Macmillan's survey did not go 
far enough in addressing the 'idea of status' and political 
reform in the colonies. He wanted a commitment to a new 
imperial relationship which 
admits for no race superiority, no inherent or 
permanent inequality between ourselves and the 
peoples, and no divorce between Government and the 
peoples of the territories. 30 
In this relationship. Britain would 
do everything possible to accelerate the process of 
self-government, that the'whole process of government 
is geared to the supreme purpose of fitting the 
21B ibid., Maxton and Haden Guest, col. 2016. 
29 ibid., Macmillan, cols. 2016-2017,2020. 
30 ibid., Creech Jones, Col. 2043. 
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Colonial peoples for political responsibility. 
The 'misapprehension' which had been created following 
Churchill's exclusion of the colonies from the Atlantic 
Charter, had not been clarified by Churchill's assurance 
that comprehensive declarations on colonial policy already 
existed. Creech Jones wanted these declarations to be 
published in the form of a White Paper as a 'supplementary 
charter - in realistic and convincing terms, pointing out 
the way to freedom, equality, responsibility, the 
311 reconstruction of colonial economic and social life'. 
Following Macmillan's speech in the House of Commons, 
the Public Relations Department in the Colonial Office 
received enquiries about the possibility of a broadcast by 
the Secretary of State for the Colonies on the subject of 
'partnership'. It was noted that the Daily Telegraph had 
taken up the 'partnership' theme and that this description 
was welcomed as going a long way towards being the 'much 
looked for successor to the word "trusteeship"' . 32 The 
time was not considered right for a broadcast on 
'partnership' because discussions about a colonial 
declaration were proceeding. Furthermore, such a statement 
would require the Prime Minister's authority. 33 'Although 
the idea of a broadcast to specifically amplify the 
'Partnership' theme was, for the time being, put to one 
side, a follow up broadcast on the House of Commons 
Colonial Estimates was arranged on the BBC's Home Service 
on 28 July. 34 
The pressure for the government to make some kind of 
authoritative declaration on the future of colonial policy 
intensified. On 1 July Creech Jones asked Macmillan to 
promise to publish the 'comprehensive set of declarations' 
31 ibid., Creech Jones, col. 2044. 
32 PRO, C0323/1849/7484/1941, Keating to Sidebotham, 
29 June 1942. 
33 PRO, C0323/1849/74/84/1941, Sidebotham to Gent, 30 
June 1942. 
34 PRO, C0323/1849/7484/1941, minute by Thornley, 10 
July 1942. 
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made on colonial poliCy. 35 The Colonial Office hoped that 
a declaration in the form of a White Paper could be made on 
the basis of past statements. This led the Colonial Office 
to search for the past declarations which Churchill in his 
speech in September 1941 had confidently said already 
existed. The results were limited and did not seem to 
represent enough to present to the House of Commons. 
Christopher Eastwood*, head of the General Department 
thought that the resulting White Paper would expose the 
Colonial Office to unwanted criticism. Sir Arthur Dawe, 
head of the African Division agreed and advised against 
giving such proclamations any further publicity because 
they called attention in a 'pretentious way to the bareness 
of the land' and were likely to arouse the antagonism of 
colonial populations abroad .36 The East African Department 
in the Colonial Office was particularly anxious about the 
publication of a White Paper as it would include statements 
made in the past on issues like native labour and land 
policies and the proposals for 'Closer Union' between 
Tanganyika, Uganda and Kenya. The fear was that, 'however 
judicious a selection is made', the result would 'rekindle 
old controversies, which might have dangerous political 
results, especially while the war has still to be 
fought' 
. 
37 It would also invite unwanted 'comparison with 
our record of actual performance'. 3a Gater recommended 
that the only way out of the impasse would be a personal 
appeal by Macmillan to Creech Jones to drop the issue. 39 
Macmillan himself was appalled by the declarations 
previously made by the government on colonial policy as 
they were not 'complete in themselves' or 'free from 
5 Lee and Petter, op. cit., p. 126-7. 
36 PRO, C0323/1848/7322/1942, minute by Eastwood, 5 
August 1942; minute by Dawe, 27 August 1942. 
37 PRO, C0323/1848/7322/1942, minute by Seel, 30 
August 1942. 
38 PRO, C0323/1848/7322/1942, minute by Seel, 26 
August 1942. 
39 PRO, C0323/1848/7322/1942, minute by Gater, 2 
September 1942. 
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ambiguity'. They were 'scrappy, obscure and jejune': 
We have no complete list of our pledges and 
commitments. In private life this leads inevitably to 
bankruptcy. 
Macmillan could only conclude that Churchill's 'sweeping 
claim' of 9 September 1941 had been written 'more or less 
on his own'. In these circumstances the proposed White 
Paper could not be published. Macmillan agreed with Gater 
that the only possible course was to make a personal appeal 
to Creech Jones on the grounds that it would 'bad manners' 
at a time when the British government was discussing the 
future of the Pacific with the United States as well as 
'very bad tactics' to disclose 'our hand prematurely, 
before a Peace Conference'. " 
Proposals for an Anglo-American Declaration 
on the Colonies 
In the meantime the British Ambassador in Washington 
and former Viceroy of India, Lord Halifax, ensured that the 
Colonial Office would not be able to deal with the issue of 
a British statement on the colonies as a purely domestic 
political matter. On 24 August, during a meeting with 
Cordell Hull, the American Secretary of State and exponent 
of 'Cobdenite free trade internationalism', 41 Halifax 
prematurely disclosed that the British government was 
considering issuing a Colonial Charter on Britain's 
responsibilities towards her colonies. Hull immediately 
proposed a joint Anglo-American declaration which he 
thought would have greater weight than a unilateral 
statement by the British government. 42 
This unwelcome intervention by the United States into 
the colonial question reflected the realities of the 
wartime relationship. The unprecedented and successful 
cooperation achieved between two sovereign states has been 
noted elsewhere. But the Anglo-American relationship was 
PRO, C0323/1848/7322/1942, minute by Macmillan, undated. 
41 Thorne, opecit., p. 142. 
42 Williams, ovocit., p. 274-275; PRO, 
C0323/1858/9057/1942, Halifax to FO, 24 August 1942. 
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increasingly a partnership of lunequals'. While Churchill 
believed that 'a complete understanding between Britain and 
the United States outweighed all else' '43 this did not mean 
that differences did not exist. British interests were 
defended. 
Undoubtedly there was a great deal of mutual suspicion 
about each other's war aims. In chapter three American 
pre-Pearl Harbour American anti-imperialism was examined. 
Now, as an ally, the United States had the opportunity to 
make it clear that the United States was not fighting to 
save the British empire. President Roosevelt liked to 
emphasise the anti-imperialist credentials of his own 
administration and cited the American guarantee of 
independence for the Philippines by 1946 as a model for 
other empires. In the long-standing American tradition of 
support for self-determination Roosevelt espoused his anti- 
imperialist creed to journalists: 
there never has been, there isn't now and there never 
will be any race of people on earth fit to serve as 
masters of their fellow men ... we believe that any 
nationality, no matter how small, has the inherent 
rights to its own nationhood. 44 
on a more pragmatic level the United States perceived 
the British empire as a trading rival and were opposed to 
imperial preference. Instead the United States advocated 
open door policies and free trade. Suspicion of economic 
imperialism was also mutual. Indeed British officials 
often deplored what they considered the hypocritical 
posturing of a state whose own 'empire' extended to Guam, 
Samoa, Haiti, Puerto Rico, the Dominican Republic, the 
Panama Canal, who dominated Latin America economically and 
denied rights of representation to its own black citizens. 
In 1942 Gandhi reminded Roosevelt of his own hypocrisy when 
he spoke 'of the suppression of the blacks in the United 
States in the same breath as attacking the imperial rule of 
the United Kingdom'. 45 
43 Thorne, oR. cit., pp. 699 and 122. 
44 Roosevelt quoted in Thorne, op. cit., p-103. 
45 Thorne, op. cit., pp. 145-6 and 727. 
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If the American administration was critical of the 
British colonial record it reflected a general attitude 
towards the European empires as a result of Japanese 
conquest in South East-Asia. According to the American 
Under-Secretary of State, Sumner Welles: 
it was the general opinion that the Dutch have made 
the best administrators, and the British the second 
best, in parts of their Empire. Portugal would 
certainly come lowest on anybody's list, while France 
and Belgium would come somewhat higher on the scale. 46 
The French came in for particular condemnation, they had 
collaborated with the Germans in Europe and had given the 
Japanese airfields in Indo-China in 1940. Roosevelt had 
grave doubts about post-war colonial restitution for the 
French, particularly in Indo-China, where the 
Administration 'saw the French collapse as the final 
illustration and outcome of the historical decadence of 
European power'. " But the British could take little 
comfort from being better than the French. They were still 
an empire and according to the United States in need of 
reform. 
Apart from general anti-imperialist statements, 
American criticism of the British empire was essentially a 
reaction to British policy in India and China. Little was 
known of or commented on about the British dependencies in 
sub-Saharan Africa. But this lack of knowledge and 
interest about Africa did not mean that American calls for 
a joint Anglo-American statement on the colonies made 
British Africa immune from the discussions at the inter- 
governmental level. A Colonial Charter would have 
universal application. 
Lord Cranborne, the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, was not enamoured by the idea of a joint 
declaration. As the only Secretary of State for the 
Colonies who carried any weight in the wartime coalition 
46 Quoted in Louis, op. cit., p. 237. 
11 Louis, OP. cit-, p. 28 and Donald Cameron Watt, 
Succeeding John Bull (Cambridge, 1984), pp. 222 and 237. 
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government" and in spite of his friendship with the 
Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden*49, Cranborne stood up to 
Foreign Office attempts to make a sacrificial lamb out of 
the empire on the alter of Anglo-American relations. As 
heir to one of the country's most prominent aristocratic 
and imperial families, he felt that the 'British Empire was 
the concern of the British, not the Americans, and he saw 
50 no reason whatsoever to be apologetic'. With the 
American predisposition to declarations of independence, 
any document 'which eventually emerges from the State 
Department is likely to be very different and almost 
certainly far more embarrassing' than any which Britain 
would draw up. Cranborne recognised, however, that the 
British government was in an embarrassing situation anyway, 
and that a joint declaration might be 'the way to get out 
of it', especially as it seemed probable that Hull would 
'press his proposal strongly'. -5-L 
Hull's proposal for a joint declaration was considered 
by a group of interested British Ministers which included 
Cranborne, the Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, the 
internationally minded Dominions Secretary, Clement Attlee, 
and, in initial stages, the Secretary of State for India 
and former Secretary of State for the Colonies, Leo Amery. 
Discussion centred on the possible contents of a Colonial 
Charter which would be acceptable to Britain. The issue 
was complicated by the political necessity, on the one 
hand, for the British government to obtain American support 
over Far Eastern military strategy during the war and for 
collective defense arrangements in the post-war period, and 
on the other, to clarify the organisation of a joint Anglo- 
American Pacific regional council. The aim was to involve 
the Americans in colonial issues 'without threatening 
0 Lee and Petter, OP. cit., p-69. 
49 Cranborne was a staunch supporter of Eden and his 
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign 
Office had resigned with him in 1938. 
50 Louis, OP. Cit., p. 187. 
511 PRO, C0323/1848/7322/1942, minute by Cranborne, 4 
September 1942. 
232 
internal British poliCy'. 52 
It was noted that discussions with the Americans about 
colonial and trusteeship issues were handicapped by an 
'intellectual difference' in each country's approach to the 
question. While the British were 'accustomed to proceed 
from the particular to the general' the Americans 'do just 
the opposite'. 53 Due to the great variety of conditions 
which existed in the colonial empire and the differences 
between the colonies in the progress of their political 
development, the British were reluctant to make any 
universal statement on the application of the Atlantic 
Charter to colonial territories. While Cranborne was 
willing to accommodate American and British Labour Party 
objectives for the internationalisation of colonial 
questions to the point of suggesting the creation of 
consultative non-executive committees in all areas, he 
sought to exclude the United States from regions like 
Africa where 'she had no clear-cut interests' . 51 In so 
doing, Cranborne sought to retain the principle of 
continuing British responsibility for the administration of 
her colonial empire and its gradual progress in social and 
economic development according to the conditions which 
pertained in each colony. 
Throughout the autumn of 1942 ministerial discussions 
continued in order to produce a draft Anglo-American 
declaration on the colonies. Interdepartmental discussions 
were held in the hope of achieving a consensus about the 
contents of the draft declaration before it was presented 
to the Cabinet for its agreement at the end of the year. 
The interests of the departments concerned had to be 
balanced. For political reasons, a major Foreign Office 
consideration was to reduce all potential areas of tension 
within the Anglo-American relationship and to achieve the 
maximum agreement possible between the two countries while 
2 Lee and Petter, OP. cit., p. 131. 
!" Louis, OP-cit., p. 176 quoting Lord Halifax to Eden, 
23 April 1943. 
54 Lee and Petter, OP. cit-, p. 132. 
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protecting British interests. Conversely, the Colonial 
Office sought to limit any concessions to the American 
point of view; any declaration would impact on British 
colonial policy as a whole and was not seen solely in the 
isolation of the Anglo-American relationship. For example, 
the Colonial Office wanted to ensure that a joint 
declaration did not go beyond the partnership ideal. the 
Colonial Office was also vehemently opposed to mention of 
timetables for 'independence' or even the very word 
'independence' in the British draft. 
The differences in the priorities of the Colonial and 
Foreign Offices can be seen in Cranborne's comment on a 
Foreign Office draft of the joint declaration. Cranborne 
was appalled to find that the Foreign Office had included a 
phrase about colonies who were 'unable to bear the full 
burden of complete independence': 
We all know in our heart of hearts that most of the 
colonies, especially in Africa, will probably not be 
fit for complete independence for centuries. To use a 
phrase of that kind is hypocritical: it will-encourage 
them to keep up a simmering agitation. I am 
responsible for the colonies. I could not agree to a 
phrase which is likely to have such deplorable 
effects, just to placate the Americans, who do not 
understand the conditions under which we have to 
55 work. 
Discussions continued between the departments to 
produce a British draft. ý In public Churchill made it clear 
that any American attempt to turn a joint declaration into 
statement which implied the dissolution of the British 
empire would be unacceptable. In his Mansion House speech 
of 10 November Churchill was explicit when he told the 
audience that he had 'not become the King's first Minister 
in order to preside over the liquidation of the British 
Empire'. 5' 
55 PRO, F0371/31526/Ul292, Cranborne to Eden, 28 
October 1942; c. f. Lee and Petter, op. cit., pp. 130-1. 
56 Lee and Petter, OR-cit-, p. 135. American press 
reaction to this speech5 was not universally unfavourable. 
As a Foreign Office weekly media report, 21 November 1942, 
noted the speech had resulted in seven press comments, five 
of which were favourable to the Prime Minister. For 
example, the Chicago Daily News of 12 November wrote, 'One 
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The Colonial Office propagandists were frustrated that 
they were unable to embark on a positive campaign about the 
colonial empire because of the on-going discussions about 
the Anglo-American joint declaration. Sabine wanted a 
comprehensive campaign which would counter the Singapore 
effect and tackle the 'defeatist feeling about the Empire' 
by showing 'the credit side of our record'. 57 He pointed 
out that 'history' was 'not news' and that it was essential 
to develop a publicity sense and to overcome the attitude 
that Britain 'as a nation' was not 'very keen ... on 
talking about what we have done'. To do this it was 
necessary to produce a 'steady stream of material on what 
we are doing now'. " He advocated less talk of 
'constitutional theory' and more emphasis on the practical 
'achievements such as shipping, airways, cables, 
engineering etc. '.! '-'9 Similarly, the MOI wanted a more 
systematic approach to propaganda in the colonies and 
wished to proceed with the construction of plans for 
specific areas. Like Sabine, frustration was voiced that 
any efforts to plan for propaganda in the colonies was 
likely to 'fall on deaf ears' until two pronouncements were 
made by the British government about the colonies, Ii) as 
to their political future, ii) as to their economic 
future'. 60 
Permanent Under-Secretary of State at the Colonial 
Office, Sir George Gater, agreed that a 'properly co- 
or two Americans have taken it upon themselves to proclaim 
that we are not fighting to preserve the British Empire. 
This is certainly true. But by itself it is misleading. For 
it is equally true that we are not fighting to destroy the 
British Empire-The British Prime Minister meant what he 
said and it is too bad that he even had to say it', PRO, 
F0371/30689/All371. 
57 PRO, C0875/14/10, minute by Sabine, 7 September 1942. 
58 PRO, C0875/14/10, Memorandum by Sabine on the 
activities of the Public Relations Department, 1 October 1942. 
59 PRO, C0875/14/10, minutes of a meeting to discuss 
the co-ordination of Empire publicity in Britain, 12 
November 1942. 
60 PRO, INF1/555, minute by Cameron, 18 May 1942. 
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ordinated scheme of publicity activities' was required. 
The central problem was that the Colonial Office was only 
'tackling the question of publicity in bits and pieces'. 61 
Harold Macmillan agreed with Sabine that there was 'too 
great a consciousness of what has been wrong and too little 
recognition of what has been right' in public attitudes to 
the colonial empire. He identified that the major problem 
confronting the propagandists was the need for a 
'personality and a theme'. He was sure that a 
'personality' could be provided, but thought that the 
'theme' had yet to be agreed. Until a 'theme' had been 
developed the Colonial Office would have to 'make the best 
of a humdrum performance'. " While the discussions 
continued about a joint declaration there was little 
prospect of a comprehensive publicity initiative. 
American Criticism of 'Imperialism' and 
Propaganda in the United States 
Hitherto publicity in the United States about the 
colonial empire, like publicity in general about the 
colonial empire, had been handled in 'bits and pieces'. In 
the United States the publicity effort was hampered by the 
anti-imperial attitude of many American commentators who 
vociferously argued that the United States was not fighting 
for the preservation of the British empire. Although the 
United States was now an ally, the aim of re-educating 
American opinion about the empire was not abandoned. As 
Frank Darvall, head of the American Division in the MOI 
explained, the British propaganda effort in the United 
States was just as important now the Americans were 
fighting. Securing 'American collaboration in the defeat 
of the Axis' had-only been one of propaganda's aims. The 
continued support of the United States was also necessary, 
for unless Britain could 'also secure maximum collaboration 
in the conclusion of a satisfactory peace' an Allied 
r>2- PRO, C0875/14/10, Gater to Cranborne, 8 October 1942. 
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victory would be 'largely worthless'. 63 Restitution of the 
British empire that had been lost and preservation of the 
British empire that Britain held would be part of a 
satisfactory peace. 
In a wider context the organisation and direction of 
publicity conducted by the British Information Services in 
the United States had been under review by the Foreign 
Office. The Foreign Office was anxious to preserve its 
role of 'representation' against any MOI initiatives in 
this area of responsibility. '--As Alan Dudley*, the officer 
formerly in charge of the British Library of Information in 
New York, put it, 'publicity must be the servant of 
representation and not its master'. All publicity efforts 
were hindered by an American 'phobia' against propaganda 
and Dudley recommended that all publicity in the United 
States should be as unobtrusive as possible. A further 
problem identified by Dudley was that there was a lack of 
policy, proper planning and training of British 
publicists. " 
These general problems of publicity in the United 
States compounded the specific problems involved in trying 
to project the British empire to the Americans. Publicity 
about the empire had been criticised for only answering 
American criticism and not anticipating it. 65 Harold 
Butler*, the minister responsible for publicity aý the 
British Embassy in Washington, thought that 'a clear 
statement of our post-war policy in relation to the 
colonies would probably be extremely useful' even though 
Churchill was not prepared to go beyond the Atlantic 
Charter. " The Colonial Office regretted the lack of a 
policy on empire propaganda and the Foreign Office's 
nervousness about the subject. Sir Edward Gent, Assistant 
63 Quoted in Cull, op. cit., 
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Under-Secretary of State, who supervised the Defence, 
Eastern, General and Public Relations Departments, thought 
that the approach should be less unequivocal. The 
political problem should be faced head on and Britain 
should not 'take refuge in economic ideals of material 
betterment'. 67 
American ignorance and criticism of the British empire 
proved to be a difficult nut to crack. British propaganda 
efforts continued to appeal to American reason. It was 
thought to be important for the British advocate not to 
lose his case because he did not 'understand his jury'. 
The main problem American stereotypical views about British 
imperialism, that the colonies were a 'herd of cows kept 
for their milk'. The American attitude towards empire was 
sensitive because of the prevalent view that 'the American 
republic was born of a revolution against colonial 
mismanagement from London'. Furthermore Americans 
contrasted their 'imperial' record with the British 
experience: 
'We Americans treated the Philippinos well, so they 
fought for us on the Day of Reckoning. The British 
treated the Malayans and the Burmese badly, so they 
wouldn't lift a finger to help them'. From this the 
argument is expanded to a general damnation of British 
colonial rule. It feeds the American sense of 
superiority. 
Few Americans understood the difference between Dominions 
and colonies and thus the 'grand theme of the evolution of 
the Empire' was almost lunknown'. 68 
Between November 1942 and July 1943 David MacDougall, 
a 'beachcomber' with Far Eastern experience in the Colonial 
Service in Hong Kong, served as a temporary adviser on 
colonial affairs to the British Embassy in Washington. He 
was given the task analysing the state of American opinion 
about Britain's colonial empire and to make recommendations 
about future publicity policy to the MOI. He recommended 
that there should be an increased supply of basic material 
67 PRO, C0875/18/10, minute by Gent, 17 June 1942. 
60 PRO, C0875/18/10, 'notes on the presentation of our 
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to the United States, that there should be more speakers 
and that there should be a constant stream of material sent 
to the BIS and interviews with American correspondents in 
London. He concluded that it was not only the general 
American public who needed the 'slow-dripping poison' of 
re-education about the British empire but also the 
'academic liberals' who were often Britain's most vocal 
critics. MacDougall illustrated his point with the example 
of Michael Straight the Washington editor of the New 
Republic: 
Son of a rich family, Oxford educated, his sincerity 
is unquestioned and his brains first-class. Why then 
does he talk nonsense about the colonies, why in 
particular does he dare to argue with Hailey on issues 
of fact concerning the colonies? The answer is simple 
... If Lord Hailey 
is right, then Michael Straight 
becomes nothing: he ceases, in fact, to be the 
fearless crusader against exploitation and imperialism 
and takes on a duller hue. His whole picture of 
himself and his role is compromised: therefore 
(subconsciously, for I think he is honest) he cannot 
admit Hailey is right. The fairly exhibitionist streak 
in these people does not permit them to acquiesce in 
normality: they fight tooth and nail against anything 
which tends to reduce them to it. Hence the otherwise 
puzzling flying in the face of facts: hence the 
futility of argument. 69 
MacDougall recommended that publicity should state the 
facts 'endlessly and often' and that material should be 
prepared to refute the following criticisms: 
that colonial peoples are exploited and uncared for, 
that they have little education and public health, 
that they are ruled from the top by an army of gin- 
sodden whites who refer slyly to the white man's 
burden and have large bank balances: that the 
'natives' have no freedom of speech and no part or say 
in their own government, provincial and national and 
that they have no hopes of ever acquiring any sort of 
bloody revolution: that the schools, hospitals, 
agricultural institutes, administration and legal 
services are the jealous preserves of the white man: 
that white and coloured do not mix or cooperate on the 
social, professional or business plane. 70 
To make matters worse American criticism was often 
public and outspoken. For example, the American magazine 
69 PRO, C0875/18/12j MacDougall to Sabine, 12 March 
1943. 
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Life published 'an open letter from the editors of Life to 
the people of England' in October 1942. This letter was 
the work of the publisher and editor of Time and Life, 
Henry Luce, an aggressive proponent of the 'American 
Century'. " The letter claimed to speak for the majority 
of the 134 million citizens of the United States and called 
for 'concessions in policy': 
Quit fighting a war to hold the Empire together and 
join with us and Russia and your other allies to fight 
a war to win by whatever strategy is best for us. 
After victory has been won, then the British people 
can decide what to do about the Empire (for you may be 
sure we do not want it). But if you cling to the 
Empire at the expense of a United Nations victory, you 
will lose the war. Because you will lose us. " 
The United States, the letter continued, was fighting for 
the principle of freedom. While Americans recognised that 
India posed a difficult problem for the British, they did 
not see that the British 'solution' to date had provided 
'any evidence of principles of any kind'. Furthermore, the 
letter asked 'in the light of what you are doing in India, 
how do you expect us to talk of "principles" and look our 
soldiers in the eye? '. The 'founding principle behind 
American participation in the war was freedom: 
that if one wants to be free one cannot be free alone 
- one must be free with other people ... that is what 
we mean - most of us - when we talk about a United 
Nations war ... this is a war by free men to establish 
freedom more firmly and over a wider area on this 
earth. And most of us are beginning to understand this 
is the only kind of war that will win a real 
victory. 73 
The letter concluded with a warning: 
if you want to keep us on your side you must move. part 
of the way over to our side. If you will do so, then 
you will find that our side is plenty big. It always 
has been big. It is much bigger than Britain. It is 
much bigger than the British Empire. It is bigger than 
both of us combined. You will find our side on the 
steppes of Asia and across the deserts of Africa and 
7 11 Thorne, OP-cit-, pp. 142 and 107. Luce looked 
forward to an 'American Century' in which American 
democracy could create a 'vital, international economy and 
... an international moral order'. 
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up and down the muddy banks of the Mississippi and 
along the smooth sliding waters of the Thames. Our 
side is as big as all outdoors. 74 
The Foreign Office recognised the seriousness of this 
kind of American criticism. Sir Alexander Cadogan*, the 
Permanent Under-Secretary of State in the Foreign Office, 
wrote to Cyril Radcliffe, Director General of the MOI about 
Foreign Office's concerns and the impact of American 
criticism in the future post-war period: 
We believe that on the sympathy with which the 
Americans view our imperial system ... will greatly 
depend their attitude towards the question of post- 
war collaboration with us. Unless they come generally 
to regard our ideas and practice in the field of the 
administration of backward peoples and dependent areas 
as no less advanced than their own, they may be 
unwilling to remain in partnership with us and other 
nations in the establishment of a stable world order 
after the war. It is not inconceivable that they might 
recoil entirely from collaboration with 'British 
imperialism' or, on the other hand, seek to impose 
American leadership on us in the belief that it 
represents a higher and more enlightened political 
ideal iSM. 75 
Radcliffe agreed that the American attitude was 
'unsympathetic' and was worried that an accepted belief 
appeared to be that one of the United State's war aims was 
the lend of imperialism'. The solution to this problem was 
not merely a question of 'publicity' or 'instruction' as 
this alone would not 'effect that major conversion of 
American feeling'. What was needed in the first place was, 
according to Radcliffe, a study of American opinion. To 
this end he recommended the establishment of an 
interdepartmental committee of the Foreign, Colonial and 
India Offices and the MOI. Second, the American 
Administration should be tackled 'with a frank enquiry 
whether they are with us or against us in this matter'. 
Third, the interdepartmental committee would recommend new 
publicity measures about the empire in the United States. 76 
Cadogan warmly welcomed Radcliffe's idea about the 
74 ibid. 
'75 PRO, C0875/19/2, Cadogan to Radcliffe, 29 September 
1942. 
'76 PRO, C0875/19/2, Radcliffe to Cadogan, 9 October 1942. 
241 
setting up of an interdepartmental committee. The 
Interdepartmental Committee on American Opinion and the 
British Empire was established in December 1942 under the 
chairmanship of the Minister of State at the Foreign 
Office, Richard Law*. Law was the son of the former Prime 
Minister Bonar Law, had an American wife and had worked in 
the newspaper industry in the United States where he had 
also travelled extensively. The Law Committee had the 
following terms of reference: 
(a) to study the state of American feeling about the 
British Empire with a view to ascertaining the measure 
and extent of favourable and hostile reactions. 
(b) to study and make recommendations concerning the 
best methods of stimulating favourable and moderating 
hostile feeling with a view to securing a general 
sentiment sympathetic to the maintenance of the 
British imperial system and recognition of the Empire 
as a suitable partner with the United States in world 
affairs. 77 
At the first meeting of the 'Law Committee' Radcliffe 
cautioned the Committee against over-ambition, stating that 
'what was wanted was an American recognition of our right 
to hold on to our system and a recognition of its inherent 
value in the world'. At the very least, he added, 'it 
should be enough if the Americans would leave us alone'. 71 
Sabine warned that while it was sensible to take into 
account the effect on American opinion that decisions about 
British colonial policy might have, he thought that: 
it might be a short step from deciding to put across 
some act of policy in a way palatable to American 
opinion, to doing some act calculated to appeal to or 
appease them. 
For the 'dividing line between public relations and policy 
may be at times dangerously obscure'. 
Sabine thought that the government was not doing 
enough in Britain or in the United States to explain 
British colonial policy and that: 
the creation so far as it is possible of a more 
healthy public opinion in America on British Colonial 
matters depends very largely on whether we can create 
'77 PRO, C0875/19/2, Cadogan to Radcliffe, 7 November 
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and maintain a healthier public opinion here, and make 
sure that this is reflected to America. 7"' 
In the meantime, however, it was clear that the 
Americans were not going to drop the issue of the future of 
the British empire. The American Administration continued 
to pursue the idea of a Colonial Charter. Halifax talked 
to the American columnist Walter Lippmann about the 
proposed joint declaration. Lippmann thought that while a 
joint declaration was a good idea in principle. However he 
would not like it to be the 'first official shot' because 
American public opinion might conclude that Britain had 
been 'pushed into it by the Americans'. Instead he advised 
that something should be said in general terms by the 
British first. While Churchill thought that it would be 
better to leave the suggestion on one side for the moment, 
a speech made by Lord Cranborne in the House of Lords was 
used as the public opportunity to put forward the Colonial 
Office's attitude to the 'Colonial Charter' issue and to 
articulate Colonial Office objections to declarations with 
universal applications. " 
Although Cranborne had been replaced by Oliver Stanley 
as Secretary of State for the Colonies on 23 November 1942 
to become Lord Privy Seal and Leader of the House of Lords, 
Cranborne's involvement in colonial affairs was 
undiminished and he continued to be the spokesman for 
colonial affairs in the Lords. The Labour peer, Lord 
Listowel, sought a clarification of the government's 
attitude towards a 'Colonial Charter' following on from a 
broadcast made by the Republican leader, Wendell Wilkie. 
Wilkie had spoken about the responsibility of the United 
States and Britain in 'making the free world a commonwealth 
of free nations' and a statement made by Roosevelt during a 
press conference in which he said that 'the provisions of 
79 PRO, C0875/18/12, memorandum by Sabine, 
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the Atlantic Charter applied to all humanity'. " 
Several peers spoke in favour of the extension of the 
principles of the Atlantic Charter to the colonies. Lord 
Samuel, the former High Commissioner for Palestine, 1920-5 
and an elder statesman of the Liberal Party thought the 
Atlantic Charter could not be 'subject to geographical 
limitation'. According to Samuel, Wilkie had not 
envisioned the liquidation of the British empire, but 'the 
more rapid extension of self-government'. 81 
Lord Faringdon urged the formulation of a Colonial 
Charter as 'an earnest of our intentions': 
Just as the Beveridge Report is an earnest of our 
intention to carry out domestically the implications 
of the Atlantic Charter, so the Colonial Charter would 
be an earnest of the Government's sincerity and of 
their activities in pressing towards a better world. 03 
In his speech Cranborne wanted to advertise the 
achievements of Britain's colonial record to balance 
against the 'Misdirected' criticisms which had been aimed 
at Britain following the fall of Malaya. He argued that it 
did not follow that because of what he called a military 
failure, a 'wider measure of self-government could have 
provided a cure'. Although he recognised that it was 
'alien to the British temperament to advertise our 
achievements', he thought that there were times when 
'reticence can be carried too far'. 
He was not sure, however that the best way for the 
government to proceed would be by producing a 'Colonial 
Charter': 
Even the term 'Colonial Charter' is to my mind open to 
criticism. It is no doubt compact and convenient. But 
anyone who has had any, personal experience of the 
Colonial Empire would, I think, agree that it tends to 
be oversimplified and in some ways misleading. 84 
The 'simple course' of producing a 'standardised Colonial 
policy applicable equally to all the territories of the 
81 Hansard, vol. 125, col. 381,3 December 1942. 
82 ibid., col. 391. 
83 ibid., col. 401. 
84 Ibid., cols. 402 and 403-4. 
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British Colonial Empire' was inadvisable because of the 
'diversity' of 'continents, islands, climates, conditions, 
problems; above all, a diversity of peoples, greater than 
in any Empire of the past'. Britain had never established 
a 'cut and dried pattern' in the empire and had operated 
different systems of administration 'distinguished above 
all by variety, elasticity and flexibility'. In order to 
accommodate this diversity political progress in the empire 
had been characterised by a process of 'very gradual 
evolution'. " 
Cranborne clearly stated that the 'ultimate objective' 
of British policy was to 'promote self-government in the 
Colonies'. It was Britain's aim to establish free 
democratic institutions before self-government was 
achieved: 
... we do not mean by this the mere perpetuation of 
what we found when we went there, government by some 
local autocrat or some narrow tribal oligarchy, with 
all the poverty and cruelty which have so often 
accompanied it in the past. We seek indeed to retain 
all that is good in the existing social and political 
system, but we aim also to graft to it modern ideas 
and the lessons of our own experience, so that 
finally the peoples of even the most backward Colonies 
may become fit for free institutions, self-government 
by the people as a whole - which is what we mean by 
free institutions - and the problem of making free 
institutions understood and work in backward and 
primitive communities is, as noble lords who have had 
first-hand experience know, not an easy one. 81 
The grafting on of a democratic system of government 
African communities organised along tribal lines would not 
be simple; 'democracy, as we know it here, is not an easy 
system of government to work' and it implies a 'very high 
standard of political development'. He repeated that it 
was Britain's aim 'to equip Colonial peoples to administer 
their own affairs, whether our goal is near or far'. In 
working towards this aim, Cranborne suggested, Britain had 
already made 'considerable progress' . 07 
In commending political progress already made, for 
85 ibid., col. 407. 
86 ibid., col. 408. 
8-1 ibid., col. 409. 
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example the appointment of Africans to the Governors' 
Executive Councils in West Africa, Cranborne attached great 
importance to the 'modern doctrine of partnership'. He 
asked peers to remember that the British empire was 'a 
living organism', which was 'constantly changing and 
developing'. 81 
Cranborne recognised the great contribution made by 
the colonies to Britain's war effort, particularly in the 
dark hours following the fall of France: 
Let us never forget that what stood between Hitler and 
absolute victory in 1940 ... was not Britain, an 
isolated island standing alone in the sea, but the 
British Empire, that commonwealth of free peoples and 
dependencies of which the Colonial Empire forms so 
essential a part. 
Britain and her Empire had come through this 'severest 
test', she had been 'tempered by the fire'. Now it 
remained 'for us to go forward, calm, resolute and 
confident'. 89 
He answered critics who suggested that the days of the 
British empire were numbered, Cranborne concluded by 
looking to the future and Britain's continuing global 
mission: 
all the British Colonies at the present time are 
moving in the right direction. In some cases progress 
is rapid; in some it is inevitably slow, and to 
attempt to go too fast would upset existing 
institutions before the population was ready for 
others. Of one thing I am sure - the British Colonial 
Empire is not coming to an end. The work that we have 
to do is only beginning. We, the citizens of the 
British Empire, whatever our race, religion, or 
colour, have a mission to perform, and it is a mission 
that is essential to the welfare of the world. 
Cranborne did not make any declaration about the direct 
application of the Atlantic Charter to the colonies, but 
merely stated that the British mission was 
to ensure the survival of the way of life for which 
the United Nations are fighting, a way of life based 
on the freedom, tolerance, justice, and mutual 
understanding, in harmony with the principles of the 
88 ibid., col. 411. 
09 ibid., col. 414-5. 
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Atlantic Charter. " 
Cranborne's speech was hailed by Lord Listowel as one 
of 'the most interesting contributions' to the colonial 
debate during the war. 911 Sections from it, in particular 
the passages denying that the colonial empire was about to 
come to an end and about self-government being the ultimate 
aim of colonial policy, were distributed to the press by 
the Colonial Office's Press Section. 92 The Times carried a 
full report of the speech and its leader column praised 
Cranborne's speech in terms which the Colonial Office Press 
Section would have been hard pressed to criticise: 
Lord Cranborne's speech was as able a vindication of 
British colonial policy and owed its great 
persuasiveness largely to its restraint. He based his 
argument on history, which has left an indelible mark 
upon the Colonial Empire. The past of the Empire is as 
constantly misrepresented as its present is 
misunderstood ... The clear facts, as stated by Lord 
Cranborne, are the best vindication of the imperial 
record ... No one can study this lucid speech without feeling that the Colonial Empire is already 
progressing, no doubt by slow and sometimes faltering 
steps, on the way along which its most vigorous 
critics, at home and abroad would marshal it. It moves 
forward self-government in politics, towards the 
recognition of a universal community of interest, 
uniting senior and junior partners, in economic well- 
being ... by his own abstention from developing the 
theme Lord Cranborne emphasised the special duty which 
falls to the new Secretary of State, the duty of 
integrating the future of the colonies with that which 
has been planned for the United Nations and the world 
under the Atlantic Charter. But the first condition of 
British colonial progress is the continuity of 
administration in Whitehall and its protection against 
changes designed to meet the minor exigencies of 
political adjustment. 93 
The MOI arranged for Cranborne's speech to be published by 
Oxford University Press as an Oxford pamphlet. 94 
Six days after Cranborne's speech in the House of 
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Lords the Cabinet discussed a joint memorandum produced by 
Attlee, Cranborne, Eden and Stanley on the British draft of 
the 'Colonial Charter'. The memorandum set out the British 
case for issuing a statement on colonial policy. A 
statement had become necessary 'if only to enable us to 
keep the initiative in our hands'. In the first place the 
memorandum noted the 'widespread' and 'misguided' American 
attitude that there was 'something archaic in the 
conception of the British Colonial Empire and that some new 
system ought to be substituted for it more in accordance 
with the spirit of the times'. American criticism was 
thought to be completely ignorant of the conditions in 
Britain's colonial empire. As part of a re-education 
process it was hoped that Cranborne's speech would 
contribute to the 'enlightenment' of American opinion. 95 
Second, it was noted that the 'enlightenment' of American 
opinion was only one of the factors which influenced their 
argument in favour of issuing a statement. Britain also 
sought to obtain specific commitments from the American 
government, namely a willingness to 'enter some general 
defence scheme which would include the defence of Colonial 
areas', to commit the United States to the principle 'that 
we and other Colonial powers concerned should have the 
unquestioned right to administer our own Colonies, 
Protectorates and Mandated territories, including those 
which we have temporarily lost to the Japanese' and to 
'achieve a crystallisation in a form not unfavourable to 
ourselves of the existing vague but widely-held theories 
regarding colonies'. 
The draft British statement emphasised Cranborne's 
idea of developing the idea of regional cooperation as a 
counter to American ideas of trusteeship schemes. It also 
emphasised the obligations of 'Parent states' to cooperate 
in effective defensive arrangements as an essential first 
step before the development of political and social 
institutions could be contemplated. The goal was to help 
the colonies to reach the stage when they would be 'capable 
of discharging in due course the full responsibilities of 
95 PRO, F0371/31527/Ul734, W. P. (42)544,5 December 1942. 
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government'. There would, however, be no commitment to a 
timetable of political development or any mention of the 
word lindependencel. 36 It was hoped that 'by linking 
progressive thinking about social and economic development 
with the trend towards larger units, it would be possible 
to forge a viable position which avoided the rocks of 
international administration on the one hand, and the 
whirlpool of political independence on the other'. 97 The 
Cabinet approved the draft which was sent to Lord Halifax 
to give to Hull in February 1943.98 
The American response received in April 1943 
'effectively ruled out the possibility of a joint 
declaration'. 99 It seemed the Colonial Office's worst 
fears about the kind of 'Colonial Charter' acceptable to 
the United States, had been realised. The American version 
implied the full application of the principles of the 
Atlantic Charter to the colonies and it included 
timetables, independence and international administration. 
In May the British objections to the American draft were 
given to the American Ambassador, John Winant, but no 
response to the British objections was received. Instead, 
the possibility of the British making a unilateral 
declaration on the basis of the British draft agreed in 
Cabinet was discussed. 100 
Stanley's Speech to the House of Commons, July 1943 
It was decided that Oliver Stanley, the Secretary of 
State for the Colonies, would use the opportunity presented 
by the colonial affairs supply debate scheduled for July 
1943 to make a statement on British colonial policy which 
would both 'impress Parliament' and be 'a means of 
11 ibid. CA. Lee and Petter, QR. cit-, p-134. 
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publicity for the Colonial Empire and in the Colonies'. -I-01, 
Oliver Stanley was well equipped for the job. Stanley had 
wide ministerial experience in the Home Office, the 
Ministry of Transport, Boards of Education and Trade and 
prior to his appointment as Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, he had been Secretary of State for War and was 
number three in the Conservative Party hierarchy. He was 
regarded by some as a possible future Prime Minister until 
his untimely death at the age of 54 in 1950. His 
personality produced conflicting opinions. As Secretary of 
State during the critical period of post-war planning he 
had a private office reputation for being 'moody' (although 
this could be attributed to his cancer). Others thought 
him urbane, a man of considerable wit and intelligence with 
a sharp mind. Across the Atlantic the Under-Secretary of 
State Sumner Welles thought him the 'most narrow, bigoted, 
reactionary Tory' he had met in his official career, while 
the President liked Stanley, he thought he was 'hard- 
boiled' but he felt 'there was a genuine streak of 
102 liberalism in him'. Whatever the opinion of Stanley it 
is clear that he' provided a strong defence of the British 
empire at a time when it was most vulnerable to the 
interference of outsiders. Looking back on his experience 
of dealing with the United Sates on colonial issues this 
becomes clear: 
I suppose the Foreign Office were horrified ... that a colonial policy should be directed in the first place 
to the benefit of the Colonies and only after that to 
the appeasement of the United States. X03 
In accordance with the Cabinet's desire to keep the 
colonial declaration initiative in the hands of the British 
government, Stanley presented Parliament with a desideratum 
of British colonial policy which had an 'unequivocally 
progressive ring' and represented the 'fullest expression 
11011 Lee and Petter, op. cit., p. 140. 
102 Lee and Petter, OP. cit-, p. 71, Louis, op. cit., pp. 
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to date of the development vision'. 104 
It was not, said Stanley, his purpose to deal with the 
colonial war effort but to turn his attention to the 
questions arising from the practical preparations being 
made for peace. Stanley began his speech by endorsing the 
new version of the relationship between Britain and her the 
colonies, that of a progressive 'partnership': 
The central purpose of our Colonial administration has 
often been proclaimed. It has been called the doctrine 
of trusteeship, although I think some of us feel now 
that word 'trustee' is rather too static in its 
connotation and that we should prefer to combine with 
the status of trustee the position also of partner. 105 
He insisted that an idea of 'ultimate self-rule did 
exist"01: 
we are pledged to guide Colonial people along the road 
to self-government within the framework of the British 
Empire. We are pledged to build up their social and 
economic institutions, and we are pledged to develop 
their natural resources. Those objects have often been 
proclaimed and for me to proclaim them again today 
would be one more speech in a world where speeches now 
are rather as a discount and it is more deeds that 
count. 101 
He stated that he was not going to 'expound the theory 
of Colonial administration' but would 'give some account of 
the progress that we have made in the past and to outline 
some of the practical steps that we hope to take in the 
future'. In the past, the success of Britain's colonial 
administration had been measured in terms of the progress 
of political evolution in each territory. This, he 
suggested was, 'dangerous if... too narrowly interpreted'. 
If it was to succeed: 
it has to have solid, social and economic foundations, 
and although without them spectacular political 
advances may draw for the authors the plaudits of the 
superficial, they will bring to those whom it is 
1104 Lee and Petter, op. cit., PP-162-3. 
1105 Hansard, vol. 391, col. 48,13 July 1943. 
1106 David Goldsworthy, Colonial_ Issues in British 
Politics, 1945-1961, (oxford, 
1971), P-12. 
zlý Hansard, vol. 391, col. 
48,13 JulY 1943. 107 
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designed to benefit nothing but disaster. 108 
This would not be a hurried process, but would be dependent 
on progress in social and economic fields: 
It is no part of our policy to confer political 
advances which are unjustified by circumstances, or to 
grant self-government to those who are not yet trained 
in its use, but if we really mean as soon as 
practicable to develop self-government in these 
territories, it is up to us to see that circumstances 
as soon as possible justify political advances and to 
ensure that people are that as quickly as possible 
people are trained and equipped for eventual self- 
government. 101 
British colonial policy should not be judged merely on the 
basis of the progress of political reform but also on its 
success in producing viable states for self-government to 
be evolved to: 
the real test of the sincerity and success of our 
Colonial policy is two-fold. It is not only the 
political advances that we make, but it is also, and I 
think more important, the steps that we are taking, 
economic and social as well as political, to prepare 
the people for further and future responsibilities-110 
Stanley then outlined the development vision he had for the 
future of British colonial policy, a policy which would 
build on the commitments embodied in the 1940 Colonial 
Development and Welfare Act. He spoke of projected 
educational advances at both primary and secondary level, 
of encouraging the establishment of trades unions and 
cooperative movements, of colonial service reforms which 
would aid the policy already in place of encouraging the 
building of local government and administration to give the 
colonial populations the necessary experience in 
government. He also spoke about the economic vision for 
the colonies, the importance of building communications and 
transport infrastructures, of making the colonial economies 
self-supporting, with economies not purely based on 
agriculture or extractive industry but the development of 
secondary industries of processing and simple manufacture. 
This economic vision for the colonies reinforced his 
1108 ibid., col. 49. 
"09 ibid. 
IL-10 ibid. 
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argument about political progress being dependent on secure 
social and economic foundations: 
Our objective in the Colonial Empire must be to make 
the Colonies self-supporting. By 'self-supporting' I 
do not mean self-contained. I do not mean a narrow 
autarchy. I mean Colonies which are able to support an 
adequate and sound economic basis which will meet the 
needs of Government and peoples and which will give a 
reasonable standard of life. It is pretty clear that 
unless we succeed in doing this any talk about self- 
government is really humbug. There cannot be any real 
self-government if you are financially dependent. 
Political responsibility goes ill with financial 
dependence. 113-11 
The Labour Party's colonial expert Creech Jones questioned 
Stanley about more controversial subjects, the specific 
political problems facing British colonial policy makers 
like South African aspirations on the continent, ideas for 
a Pan African Conference, of settler demands in Kenya for a 
greater measure of white settlement, about the proposals 
for the amalgamation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland, the 
question of the colour bar and the need for colonial 
representation in both municipal and central government. 3-112 
A major problem confronting the British government, argued 
Creech Jones, was that together with heightened public 
interest in colonial affairs came suspicion: 'in the eyes 
of the world in the past, as well as in the eyes of the 
public here, we have not been altogether free from 
suspicion as to what we are up to in the territories in our 
control'. "' 
In general Creech Jones agreed with Stanley that the 
'fundamental' issue facing the British government was 'the 
economic and social problem'. 11314 He also used the now 
accepted mantra of a progressive colonial policy that of 
'Partnership': 
I hope we shall give the Colonial Secretary all the 
encouragement and all the money he needs for the 
development of the programmes he has submitted to us 
112-11 ibid., cols. 63-4. 
112 ibid., cols. 72-5. 
ibid., Col. 73. 
ibid., C01.75. 
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today. I hope that by that means we will show that 
partnership with us is a privilege of service to 
people who are weaker and often more ignorant than 
ourselves and that by this help we can go forward with 
them to the full realisation of their freedom and 
well-being. Our real object, however,. must always be 
to give a fuller life to all the peoples of the 
Colonies. We shall achieve that only when - if I may 
quote from a speech made at the Pacific Conference at 
Mount Tremblant"115 by a, coloured speaker a few months 
ago: "When all our noble declarations of policy are 
translated into terms that the common man throughout 
the world can understand - peace, bread, a house, 
adequate clothing, education, good health and, above 
all, the right to walk with dignity on the world's 
great boulevards. ""J'6 
Stanley's speech has been criticised for being 
insincere and unreal in that, the government and Colonial 
Office doubted that some dependencies would ever be capable 
of self-government. Nor did it outline any practical means 
by which self-government could be achieved. I JL 7 But if we 
look back at the climate of opinion and despondency which 
questioned whether the British empire had any future it is 
clear a remarkable turnabout had been achieved. 
Stanley's speech had been successful in reaching a 
consensus in Parliament about the broad aims of British 
colonial policy which was acceptable to both the Coalition 
government and its Labour detractors. L'8 It was also 
important in that the government appeared to have seized 
the initiative and made a statement on the future of 
colonial policy on the lines that had been proposed by the 
"I's Institute of Pacific Relations Conference at Mount 
Tremblant, Quebec, 4-14 December 1942. 
112-r> Hansard, vol. 391, col. 81,13 July 1943. 
I'll-' See the criticisms made by Robert Pearce in 'The 
Colonial Office and Planned Decolonisation in Africa', 
African Affairs, 83, January 1984, p. 80. 
113-0 The Colonial Office was pleased with the realistic 
approach of the Labour Party towards colonial affairs. For 
example in the Labour Party pamphlet, The Colonies 
published in 1943 showed how far the bipartisan approach 
had been achieved in its statement that 'Political advance 
would be determined by progress in tackling social and 
economic problems: no longer was even lipservice paid to 
the notion of capitalistic exploitation and the document 
was virtually silent on the subject of political 
development'. C. f. Lee and Petter, OP-cit., p159. 
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Ministers to the Cabinet in December of the previous year. 
The speech, with its: 
opening invocation of the 'partnership' model, with 
its stress on social and economic development as the 
essential preparation for self-government, was the 
outward and visible sign of the [Colonial] Office's 
recognition that expectations had undergone a powerful 
change since the early days of the war. L19 
Indeed, the speech was heralded by The Times as 
'liberal and forward looking'. 120 The Foreign Office was 
angry at the Colonial Office's apparent lack of cooperation 
about the speech and the impact this would have on any 
hopes of resurrecting the possibility of a joint Anglo- 
American declaration. 3.23L The Colonial Office had however 
succeeded in making a statement which was heralded as 
progressive and had defended the fundamental right of the 
British government to administer the internal affairs of 
her empire. 
The crisis was over. The colonial propagandists had 
received a 'green light' to embark on a positive publicity 
campaign about the future of the colonial empire for which 
they had been agitating for a long time. The propagandists 
now had in their armory the valuable addition of tangible 
war aims for British colonial policy. This new campaign 
aimed at creating the 'healthy' public opinion both in 
Britain and abroad that Sabine had been advocating and 
would be centred on the theme of 'partnership'. 
The colonial issue did not disappear from the agenda 
of Anglo-American relations for the rest of the war. The 
international trusteeship issue consuming large amounts of 
Colonial Office time, but the Colonial Charter had died a 
119 Lee and Petter, op. cit., p. 162. 
1120 The Times, 14 July 1943. 
-112 11 Lee and Petter, op. cit., p. 141. As Alan Dudley 
commented, 'Colonel Stanley's recent statement in the House 
of Commons on Colonial policy ... came as a considerable 
surprise. Telegrams were received from Lord Halifax, and by 
the MOI, from Mr. Harold Butler, asking for explanations 
and complaining that the lack of preparation made publicity 
impossible. (Actually there was practically no mention of 
the statement in the American press. What little there was 
favourable PRO, F0371/34093/A8483, minute by Dudley, 
28 July 1943. 
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natural death. From the crisis of 1942-3 the empire had 
struck back and was now morally rearmed with the new 
mission of partnership and this theme became the focus of 
colonial propaganda. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE COLONIAL PARTNERSHIP CAMPAIGN, 1943-45 
Following Stanley's speech in Parliament the British 
empire would not be advertised but reinterpreted as a 
dynamic not dying empire with Britain working in 
'partnership' for progress with her colonies. This new 
theme formed the basis of British propaganda to the end of 
the period under consideration. 'Partnership' proved to be 
a useful and versatile theme. It could satisfy both the 
requirements of the MOI and the Colonial Office. As part 
of the MOI's responsibility to conduct 'win the war 
propaganda', 'partnership' reflected the way in which the 
colonial empire and Britain cooperated to defeat the enemy. 
Similarly, 'partnership' also reflected the Colonial 
office's requirement to 'win the peace'. A 'partnership' 
for progress would continue as the post-war model of the 
colonial empire's relationship with Britain. Emphasis was 
placed on how this 'partnership' would develop by 
projecting not empty promises and charters but the 
practical benefits of the colonies' association with 
Britain, such as development and welfare projects. 
Colonial publicity acknowledged that while the ultimate aim 
of Britain's colonial policy was self-government, this 
would not be granted until the colonies were in a position 
to be self-sufficient. Political advance would depend upon 
economic and social advances first. When economic, social 
and political developments were publicised the evolutionary 
and not revolutionary nature of Britain's colonial policy 
was always stressed. Had the revolutionary nature of 
Britain's colonial policy been emphasised this could have 
backfired and implied that there had indeed been something 
wrong with the policy of trusteeship. 
Efforts were intensified to achieve the closest 
possible cooperation between the Colonial Office and the 
MOI to ensure the successful implementation of the new 
policy. Propaganda plans about the colonies were reviewed 
not only in terms of publicity to the colonies but also in 
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terms of publicity about the colonies in Britain., 
Propaganda about the empire received a more prominent 
place in MOI propaganda output. Cyril Radcliffe, the 
Director General of the MOI, identified two subjects that 
were 'looming up as important propaganda subjects for the 
rest of the war period and after': India and the colonies. 
In neither case did he feel that the MOI was tackling them 
properly. ' The Colonial Office welcomed the new MOI 
impetus behind a more systematic approach to the problem. 3 
Problems had long been apparent in the liaison between 
the MOI and the Colonial Office. MOI officials had 
complained to the Colonial Office that the Colonial Office 
had sometimes adopted a 'too parochial view of publicity 
problems' and did 'not realise sufficiently their world 
importance'. ' The Public Relations Officer at the Colonial 
Office, Noel Sabine disagreed. It was not the cooperation 
between the MOI and the Colonial Office which was at fault, 
but that the Colonial Office was often not informed about 
events which happened in the colonies which might have 
publicity value in Britain .5 As one Public Relations 
Department official put it, 'it not so much "liaison" as a 
"publicity sense"' which the MOI found lacking in the 
Colonial Office. 6 
To remedy this state of affairs the Colonial Office 
sent a circular despatch to the colonies asking them to 
ensure that in the future the Colonial Office would be 
given advance information on events which were likely to 
become the subject of comment in Britain in order to avoid 
PRO, INF1/555, Grubb to Sabine 13 May 1942. 
2- PRO, INF1/112, Radcliffe to the Deputy Director of 
the MOI, 3 November 1942. 
3 PRO, INF1/555, Fraser to Grubb, 21 May 1942. In 
November 1942 Cranborne had expressed his determination to 
strengthen the staff of the Public Relations Department, 
Lee and Petter, op. cit., p. 135. 
PRO, C0875/14/12, note by Macmillan, 20 April 1942. 
5 PRO, C0875/14/12, minute by Sabine, 27 April 1942. 
6 pRo, C0875/14/12, minute by Gent, 27 April 1942. 
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'misunderstanding' and 'undesirable speculation' .7 
One area identified as ripe for improvement was the 
MOI's internal organisation. Radcliffe wanted to remove 
the inconvenience of publicity divisions being organised 
territorially. 0 The Empire Division was also reinforced by 
a change in personnel. Gervas. Huxley joined the Division 
as Honorary Adviser in December 1942 and became Director of 
the Empire Division in April 1943. The addition of Huxley 
was welcomed by the Colonial Office as he combined 
experience of professional public relations with colonial 
expertise. ' Huxley was fortunate that his tenure as the 
Director of empire publicity at the MOI coincided with the 
new articulation of Britain's colonial policy of 
'partnership' and in the wake of the MOI-Colonial Office 
agreement on the incorporation of long-term public 
relations as part of Britain's wartime propaganda. 
Therefore some of the reasons for Colonial Office 
dissatisfaction with the MOI's colonial propaganda had been 
removed before be became Director of the Empire Division. 
Nevertheless, the importance of personalities should not be 
overlooked. As we saw in chapter one the Colonial Office's 
lack of confidence in the personnel of the Empire Division 
undoubtedly had an impact on how some officials regarded 
propaganda and the extent to which they were willing to 
cooperate with the MOI. Because of his work for the EMB 
Huxley was a known quantity. He was not tainted with 
academia or amateurism and therefore inspired more 
confidence. As will be seen even with these advantages the 
impact of his energy and drive and his endeavours to make 
the relationship between the MOI and the Colonial Office a 
" PRO, C0875/14/12, circular despatch, 8 May 1942. 
8 PRO, INF1/112, Radcliffe to DDG, 3 November 1942. 
9 PRO, INF1/110. The appointment of Huxley was so 
successful in transforming the MOI approach, George Gater 
the Under-Secretary of State felt able to comment that 
there had never been such an excellent response from the 
MOI and that in order to keep up with the output of the 
Empire Division the Colonial Office's Public Relations 
Department staff ought to be strengthened, c. f. 
C0875/14/11, minute by Gater, 21 May 1943. 
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happier one heralded a new and much improved era in the 
conduct of colonial propaganda. 
Gervas Huxley had a distinguished pedigree in colonial 
publicity. He had joined the EMB in 1926 and in 1932 went 
to work for Ceylon's Tea Board where he was responsible for 
the film Sonci of -Ceylon. 
Huxley had visited the United 
States every year where he learned the art of public 
relations. He had been involved informally as an advisor to 
the MOI while continuing his job with the Tea Board. 
Through his friendship with Cyril Radcliffe he overcame his 
reluctance to work in an executive position within the MOI 
when he became director of the Empire Division. He was 
under no illusions about government attitudes to public 
relations, which he considered, 'surrounded by ignorance 
and prejudice' and that publicists were often thought of as 
'charlatans'. In his autobiography he recalled the 
attitude of Sir. Edward Harding, his brother-in-law and the 
Permanent Under-Secretary of State at the Dominions Office. 
Harding told Huxley, 'in all seriousness', 
that his Information Officer was so good at his job of 
keeping the Press away from the Department and its 
work that there had not been a mention of it in the 
Press for the last, twelve months. 110 
In the first place Huxley tried to improve the 
relationship between departments and organisations 
concerned with colonial propaganda. Huxley considered that 
the Empire Division was in a 'mess' when he took up his 
position in 1943, but that the state of the Colonial 
Section was even worse. The Colonial Section appeared to 
be in 'a permanent state of warfare' with the Public 
Relations Department in the Colonial Office, which was in 
turn handicapped by the 'hostility' of senior men in the 
Colonial Office 'to any form of publicity'. Relations 
between the BBC and the Colonial Office had reached a 
'Complete impasse' as the BBC refused to broadcast material 
supplied by the Colonial Office as it was considered 'quite 
110 Gervas Huxley, Both Hands: An Autobiography, 
(London, 1970), pp. 123,196 and 190. For Huxley and the 
Empire Marketing Board c. f. Lee, 'The Dissolution of the 
Empire Marketing Board ... 1, p. 53. 
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unsuited for effective broadcasting'. 3-JL 
The MOI also addressed the danger of overlap and the 
duplication of effort. Under Huxley's leadership the 
organisation was centralised. While the Empire Division 
conducted propaganda to the colonies, a separate unit in 
the Home Division under Vincent Harlow conducted propaganda 
to the British public about the colonies. Unlike some in 
the Colonial Office, Huxley held Harlow in high esteem and 
thought him an 'invaluable ally' X2 Huxley wanted 
Harlow's unit to move to the Empire Division to remove the 
complications caused in relations with the Colonial Office 
by having several channels of communication. Furthermore, 
'at least 75% of all that Professor Harlow (in Home 
Division) is doing for the projection of the Empire to the 
United Kingdom is of the closest interest in the projection 
of the Empire overseas'. Therefore Huxley recommended the 
enlargement of Harlow's unit into an 'Empire Projection 
Unit' within the Empire Division. " Harlow moved back to 
the Empire Division as head of the Empire Information 
Service to conduct 'long-term publicity about the Empire at 
home and overseas'. 114 The terms of reference for Harlow's 
unit under Huxley's supervision became 'a) the planning and 
initiation of long term publicity about the Empire, through 
all territorial departments and b) the collection, editing 
and passing of all long term publicity materiall. x5 
The Empire Division of the MOI also improved 
cooperation with the Colonial Office by the institution of 
three weekly meetings, one with the Secretary of State for 
the Colonies, one with the staff of the Public Relations 
113. ibid., pp. 207-8. 
22 Huxley, opocit., p. 207. 
X3 PRO, INF1/112, Huxley to Grubb, 28 June 1943. 
14 PRO, INF11110, Office circular, no. 210, 'Publicity 
about the Empire', 18 August 1943. The Foreign Office while 
doubtful of Harlow's abilities as an administrator had 
little doubt about his 'enthusiasm'. PRO, 
F0371/34095/AlO367, minute by Dudley, 15 November 1943. 
1943.115 
PRO, F0371/34093/A6758, Huxley to Dudley, 26 August 
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Department of the Colonial Office and the 'Huxley 
Committee' which sat to coordinate empire, British and 
American propaganda about the India and the colonies. 16 
The Secretary of State for the Colonies, Oliver Stanley, 
also held weekly meetings with representatives of the BBC 
Overseas Service and the Director of the Empire Division of 
the MOI. 117 
In order to contribute to an expansion in the 
publicity effort about the colonies the Colonial Office 
also improved its organisation. It was suggested that the 
staff of the Press Office should be increased. Since 
November 1940 the Colonial Office's Press Office had been 
successful in increasing the number of press handouts it 
produced which had in turn resulted in a significant 
increase in column inches devoted to colonial affairs in 
the British press-118 The staff of the Press Office began 
to think of post-war requirements. They felt that steps 
should be undertaken to ensure that material received from 
the colonies could be more rapidly converted into press 
releases for the British press. As potentially one of the 
'most hopeful post-war activities', A. J. H. Haler wanted 
the appointment of at least one press officer to be 
appointed to specialise in the writing and placement of 
background material for trade papers and periodicals. It 
was noted that there had been recent developments to 
interest the trade press in the colonies and the Press 
Office sought to increase this kind of work. 119 The Press 
Office also wanted to continue the tradition of appointing 
216 PRO, INF11110, minute by Rawdon Smith, 11 January. 1943. 
" PRO, C0875/17/10, Stanley to Bracken, 17 December 1942. 
"' PRO, C0875/16/10, Haler to Sabine, 28 February 
1943; the comparative figures were as follows: 
'Hand-outs' Results Inches 
November, 1940: 30 12 16 
December, 1940: 31 8 14 
November, 1942: 40 77 135 
December, 1942; 62 80 238 
119 PRO, C0875/16/10, minute by Haler, 24 August 1942. 
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Press Officers with journalistic experience. " 
Organisation In Africa 
A more concerted effort was made to improve propaganda 
organisation in Africa itself. Once again the idea of 
appointing a coordinating Information Officer for East 
Africa was considered. The General Officer Commanding in 
East Africa suggested appointing a Principal Information 
Officer as an agent of the MOI who would be located in 
Nairobi and who would oversee and coordinate the various 
organisations involved in propaganda in the region, both 
civilian and military. 211 The MOI thought the Colonial 
office would object to the idea as they had done when a 
similar post had been proposed for the West Indies and West 
Africa. 22 The Colonial Office was aware of the 
implications of such an appointment was concerned that this 
development might infringe on the Secretary of State for 
the Colonies control of all matters concerning the 
territories for which he was responsible. The Principal 
Information Officer might be put in a difficult position if 
he received directives from both London and the military 
organisation in Cairo. 23 
Mervyn Hill, the Information Officer in Kenya, was 
suggested for the post of new Principal Information 
Officer. The Colonial Office withdrew its objections to 
20 The staff of the Colonial Office Press Office in 
early 1942 consisted of four Press Officers. Kenneth 
Williams had been the editor of Great Britain and the East; 
Fenn Sherie had been an assistant editor of the Humorist, 
the Royal and the Strand and had considerable experience as 
a freelancer in North Africa, the United States and Europe; 
A. J. H. Haler had spent two years working for Reuters, two 
years in newspapers in East and Southern Africa and with 
the Associated Press and H. L. Collins had spent eight years 
working for the Daily Herald, ibid., Sabine to Rawdon 
Smith, 16 March 1942. 
'3- PRO, C0875/9/17, MOI notes for a meeting with 
Colonial Office on propaganda in East Africa, 19 September 
1941. 
12 PRO, INF1/552, minute by Harlow, 9 September 1941. 
1941.23 
PRO, C0875/9/17, Sabine to Leigh Ashton, 11 October 
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the new post as long as it was understood that it did not 
prejudice discussions with the MOI of sending less 
standardised material to the colonies and that the PIO's 
main task would be the supervision of propaganda designed 
primarily for Africans. 24 Mervyn Hill, however, was ruled 
out following his resignation from the post of Information 
Officer in Kenya resulting from 'irregularities' which had 
occurred while he was Honorary Secretary of the Royal 
Agricultural Society. 25 Instead the GOC in East Africa 
suggested Sir Geoffrey Northcote, the former Governor of 
Hong Kong. 26 
Thereafter discussions continued about the PIO's terms 
of reference. This left two unresolved questions: first, 
'who exactly are the Information Officers to be 
coordinated? ' and second, 'does coordination mean control 
or voluntary collaboration? '. 27 The Colonial Office 
preferred that the PIO should coordinate and not control 
the activities of the East African and Occupied Enemy 
Territories Information Officers in order to preserve the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies's overall 
responsibility. " Northcote took up his appointment in 
January 1942 as a MOI coordinator of propaganda activities 
in East Africa. At this time the Colonial Office was 
optimistic as relations between the Colonial Office and the 
MOI were now on a 'happier basis' in general and this new 
29 development 'Should be extremely to the good'. 
Huxley's Publicity Directive 
24 PRO, C0875/9/17, Colonial Office to Kenya, 
September 1941. 
25 PRO, C0875/9/17, Kenya to Colonial Office, 
November 1941. 
26 
1 
26 PRO, C0875/9/17, GOC in Chief, East Africa to WO, 
14 November 1941. 
27 PRO, C0875/9/18, minute by Edmett, 10 December 1941. 
28 PRO, C0875/9/18, Colonial Office to Kenya, 27 
December 1941. 
29 PRO, C0875/9/18, minute by Sabine, 9 January 1942. 
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With relations between the Colonial Office and the MOI 
on an improved footing, colonial publicists were able to 
focus their activities around propaganda for the new theme 
of 'partnership'. 30 At home the aim would be to break 
through the 'crust of boredom and indifference' about the 
British empire where 'ties of kinship' were 'largely 
absent'. Apart from Kenya and the Rhodesias and a few 
isolated communities, the modern colonial empire consisted 
almost entirely of 'non-British stock with a preponderance 
of coloured races'. 23- 
The new colonial mission was one of dynamic 
partnership between Britain and her colonies 'in progress 
towards self-governing institutions in the political sphere 
and towards a better and fuller life in the economic and 
social spheres' . 32 Although the 'declared policy of 
furthering progress towards self-government was to be 
expounded', the main emphasis was to be on 'the gigantic 
task which H. M. G. had undertaken in raising the physical, 
cultural and economic standards of backward and primitive 
peoples and on the responsibility which the citizens of 
this country bore in the matter'. 33 The emphasis of 
propaganda would be on the economic and social and not the 
political aspects of partnership. As Huxley stated in his 
directive on colonial publicity: 
Important as are the efforts being made to fit 
Africans for eventual self-government, it is on the 
economic and social aspects of the partnership that 
chief stress is being laid for the practical purpose 
of most effectively projecting the partnership theme; 
on health services - the war against malaria, 
hookworm, the tsetse- fly etc.; on education; on 
economic progress - the war against crop pests and 
animal diseases, the preservation of the soil and 
agricultural development and better nutrition, the 
development of suitable secondary industries, on 
transport and communications. In all these technical 
aspects of the partnership theme there is a wealth of 
30 PRO, C0875/19/13, note on a long-term publicity 
meeting, 2 June 1942. 
31 PRO, C0875/14/10, Harlow to Gater, 3 September 1942. 
32 PRO, INF1/356, Huxley's directive, 24 May 1943. 
33 PRO, C0875/14/11, Huxley's memorandum, 18 May 1943. 
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human material if challengingly presented, closely 
linked to the lives and experiences of our own people, 
and showing how men and women of our own race are 
actively helping to improve conditions and to get the 
African to play an increasing part in helping himself 
to better his position, this theme should rouse a new 
interest and responsibility in our own partnership 
with the peoples of the colonies and should thus help 
to create that live and informed public opinion that 
is essential to provide the sustained driving force 
behind the new government policy of colonial 
development and expenditure . 34 
This was directly in line with Colonial Office thought 
that a more forward colonial publicity campaign was 
required. Indeed Britain's very status as a world power 
was at stake. The Permanent Under-Secretary of State at 
the Colonial Office, Sir George Gater had written to Sir 
Cyril Radcliffe, Director General of the MOI that the 
colonial empire was 'so important to the world influence of 
the mother country that no effort should be spared to 
maintain our position'. 35 
It was decided, however, that 'no useful or lasting 
effect would be produced by an advertising campaign'. What 
Huxley envisioned was a 'sustained long-term effort in 
education - using that word in its widest sense'. 36 In 
this new effort a large and diverse amount of material was 
prepared not merely for the MOI's own purposes but also 
'for the educational activities of Voluntary Bodies of all 
kinds and of the Churches and for Schools, as well as for 
publication in general and specialised papers and 
magazines' . 37 
The Appeal to British Youth 
British youth was targeted through cooperation with 
the Board of Education and youth organisations. A MOI- 
Board of Education liaison Committee was set up. Greater 
awareness of the colonial empire was linked with post-war 
34 PRO,. INFl/356, Huxley's directive, 24 May 1943. 
35 PRO, C0875/19/2, Gater to Radcliffe, 14 October 1942. 
36 PRO, C0875/14/11, memorandum by Huxley, 18 May 1943. 
37 PRO, INF1/356, Huxley's directive, 24 May 1943. 
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opportunities in the colonial service. It was felt that 
'one of the root causes of present-day ignorance and lack 
of interest in the British Empire has been the totally 
inadequate character of the teaching of the subject in the 
schools'. In the first place the emphasis was on 'teaching 
the teachers'. A special conference organised by the Board 
of Education was held in London in November 1942 on the 
teaching of imperial history and 'its contemporary 
problems' based on a syllabus prepared by the MOI. Similar 
conferences were held during 1943 and 1944 in other parts 
of the country. A joint MOI-Royal Empire Society scheme 
was also initiated which provided secondary and public 
schools with lecturers on the Empire. The Board of 
Education also considered material produced by the MOI, 
including, pamphlets, handbooks, posters, maps, etc. If 
the item was approved by the Board of Education around 
35,000 copies were supplied to schools, Teachers' Training 
Colleges, youth organisations and evening institutes. The 
Rhodes Trust made a grant of one thousand pounds to enable 
the YMCA to undertake educational work about the colonies 
throughout the country and invited the YMCA to hold a 
briefing conference for their club leaders at Rhodes House, 
Oxford . 38 Regional Empire Youth conferences were also 
organised by the Colonial Office and the MOI. Posters, 
wallcharts and a 'British Commonwealth of Nations' map were 
distributed free to youth organisations and voluntary 
bodies. 39 The Colonial Office arranged for a series of 
twelve 2,000 word articles on the empire to be written for 
the teachers' magazine, the Schoolmaster. 40 Other articles 
on the colonies were produced for the Teacher's World, and 
the Colonial Office discussed a post-war project for 
30 PRO, C0875/14/11, Memorandum by Huxley, 18 May 1943. 
39 PRO, C0875/14/11, minute by Sabine, 19 May 1943. 
40 PRO, C0875/15/6, Committee on Colonial Publicity in 
the United Kingdom, 6 January 1943. 
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teachers to visit colonies. " 
The Empire Information Service of the MOI initiated 
other activities to influence British youth which included 
the supply of material to and participation in weekend 
conferences of the National Association of Boys' Clubs and 
the National Association of Girls' Clubs. A special 
programme for study and discussion was prepared for the 
National Association of Training Corps for Girls on the 
subject of 'Nation-building in the British Commonwealth and 
Empire'. Contact was made with the pre-service 
organisations, the Sea Cadets, the Air Training Corps and 
the Army Cadet Force. A series of lectures was prepared to 
be held at the London headquarters of the Girl Guides 
Association. A series of articles on the empire was 
supplied for publication in The Guider and a special 
'Empire Information' badge was instituted. Similar 
arrangements were made for the Boy Scouts' Association. 42 
The Empire Information Service also offered The Children's 
Newspaper a regular selection of short features. 43 
One of the publications distributed to educational 
groups and organisations was Kenneth Bradley's Diary of a 
District Officer. Although published privately, the MOI 
took steps to ensure that it received paper allocation to 
help in -its publication. " Bradley was the former 
Information Officer in Northern Rhodesia, 1939-42 and went 
on to be Colonial and Financial Secretary of the Falkland 
Islands. Before he became Information Officer, Bradley had 
411 PRO, C0875/15/6, sub-committee on colonial 
publicity in the educational field of the committee on 
colonial publicity in the United Kingdom, 13 January 1943. 
42 PRO, INFI/112, Progress Report from the Empire 
Information Service of the MOI, 1 September to 30 November, 1943. 
43 PRO, INF1/112, Kamm to Harlow, 4 November 1943. For 
example between November 1944 and February 1945 the 
newspaper published twenty feature articles dealing with 
'the activities of children in different parts of the 
Empire, including items on social and economic progress and 
details of the Empire's war effort', PRO, C0875/21/1, 
Empire Information Service Progress Report, 1 November 1944 
- 28 February 1945. 
44 PRO, C0875/14/10, minute by Sabine 20 July 1942. 
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been a District Officer in Northern Rhodesia for thirteen 
years. In Diary of a District Officer he lucidly portrayed 
life in the Colonial Service and described nearly a year in 
his life of travelling around his area of responsibility 
and visiting villages accompanied by his dog and faithful 
African guides. He presented the beauty of Africa, its 
flora and fauna and its people and the humour of his daily 
duties as District Officer. 45 
Bradley's Diary of a District Officer was critically 
acclaimed at the time. For example, a review in Empire the 
journal of the FCB commended it for making 'the atmosphere 
real to his readers' as the pages were packed with 'many 
vividly realised landscapes and convincing human 
portraits'. 41 The public agreed. Bradley's book was so 
successful that the first edition sold more than 100,000 
copies. 41 It also became required reading for young 
Colonial Service cadets. As the historian and former 
Colonial Service officer who served in Nigeria, Anthony 
Kirk-Greene later noted he knew virtually nothing about the 
Colonial Service before his appointment and until he read 
Bradley's book thought a District Officer was 'a male 
variant of the district nursel. 48 
Bradley's literary career continued. He went on to a 
post-war career as a publicity officer in the Colonial 
Office as the editor of the colonial service's morale- 
boosting magazine Corona. 49 
The Colonial Office sought to capitalise on the 
publicity efforts-undertaken to educate British youth about 
the colonies by linking this to post-war opportunities in 
45 Kenneth Bradley, Diary of a District Officer 
(London, 1942), passi . 
46 Empire, May 1943. 
47 pRO, CO875/15/6, Committee on colonial publicity in 
the United Kingdom, 17 March 1943. 
-48 Quoted in Charles Allen (ed. ), Tales From the Dark 
Continent: ImaQes of British Colonial Africa in t 
Twentieth Centur (London, 1979), p. 43. 
49 For Kenneth Bradley's editorship of Corona, c. f. 
PRO, C0875/29/2/file; C0875/29/3/file and C0875/58/l/file. 
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the Colonial Service. The Colonial Office noted the 
encouraging response of British youth in considering a 
career in the Colonial Service. For example, a frequent 
question asked as a result of the Empire Youth Conference 
held in Newcastle at the end of 1943 had been 'How can I be 
of service? '50 Similarly, it was also considered a matter 
of urgency to 'interest potential candidates serving with 
the Forces' in a post-war Colonial Service career. " 
Ralph Furse, the Assistant Under-Secretary of State 
chiefly responsible for colonial service recruitment agreed 
that it was the moment to take the initiative in a 
comprehensive publicity effort for post-war recruitment. 
The young were the Colonial Office's main target. Furse 
thought the Colonial Office should exploit the feeling 
which existed in the country of 'How can I make a better 
world? ' and 'Where can I help? '. The Colonial Service was 
a vocational profession and this should be emphasised as it 
was the main 'trump card in competing with business and 
other professions which can offer "glittering prizes"'. 52- 
Publications 
Vincent Harlow, the Director of the Empire Information 
Services, wrote a booklet The British Colonial Empire and 
the-British Public, which explained the evolution of the 
relationship between Britain and the colonies and 
emphasised the responsibility the British public had 
towards the colonial peoples in partnership. He suggested 
that 'pride of possession as regards the Empire' was 'a 
dead sentiment - and rightly so'. Instead 'pride in 
progress' could become 'a national exhilarating emotion'. 
The relationship was not one of Britain exploiting the 
colonies, indeed Britain had abolished the slave trade in 
the colonies. It was a 'senior - junior partnership' 
exhibiting the essential feature of a partnership: 
5cl PRO, C0875/19/22, minute by Thomas, 3 November 1943. 
" PRO, C0875/19/22, minute by Jeffries, 22 October 1943. 
52 PRO, C0875/19/22, minute by Furse, 7 February 1944. 
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'voluntary collaboration for mutual benefit'. Using the 
example of the findings of Lord Hailey's African Survey, 
Harlow noted that Africans had in the past been held down 
by 'a dead weight of poverty, ignorance and tropical 
pestilence' which was 'beyond their capacity to alleviate'. 
This was where Britain would help. The 1940 Colonial 
Development and Welfare Act was only the first instalment 
of Britain's moral obligation to bring progress to the 
colonies and help them to stand on their own feet. In 
combining the new theme of partnership with a new sense of 
an imperial mission, Harlow concluded with a cri de coeur: 
The war has taught us a new sense of community or 
partnership between sections and classes. Step by step 
we have come to accept a similar relationship between 
ourselves as a whole and the peoples of the 
Dependencies. Prove to an Englishman that this 
colonial partnership, to which we have set our hands, 
is a pioneer job of almost daunting dimensions and 
that it is an integral part of the evolving British 
tradition for which he is now fighting, and he will 
not be slow to respond to its challenge. 
Unlike some of Harlow's previous efforts the Colonial 
Office was on the-whole pleased with his booklet which was 
seen as a 'most helpful piece of work'. One critic, 
however, felt that rather more prominence to 'exploitation' 
had been made than he would have preferred . 53 It was 
considered that this resulted from Harlow's inclination to 
allow his 'undoubted liberality of mind to impart a 
slightly apologetic attitude-into his approach to colonial 
propaganda'. " 
Following on the success of a MOI pamphlet, 50 Facts 
about India, particularly in the United States, the Empire 
Information Service of the MOI decided to produce a similar 
pamphlet about the colonies to be followed by others in the 
50 Facts... series covering individual areas, such as 
55 Malaya, the West Indies, West Africa and East Africa. 
5: 3 PRO, C0875/15/14, Vincent Harlow, The British 
Colonial Empire and the British Public; Keating to Harlow, 
17 May 1943; minute by Lloyd, 10 May 1943. 
54 PRO, C0875/14/10, minute by Sabine, 20 July 1942. 
-5!! s PRO, C0875/19/1, note of a meeting with the 
Colonial office, 26 January 1944. 
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The more general pamphlet 50 Facts about the Colonies aimed 
to correct misconceptions about Britain's colonial policy 
both in Britain and in the United States while at the same 
time promoting the new policy of 'partnership'. For 
example, the pamphlet explained the objectives of British 
colonial policy in its new incarnation. That it was also 
intended for an American audience was apparent in the words 
and images employed. 'Fact 91stated that the aim of 
British colonial policy was to train colonial peoples in 
the art of self-government and accepted President Lincoln's 
ideal: 'Government of the people, by the people, for the 
people', as soon as possible 'by the peoplel. s6, 'Fact 10' 
stated that immediate 'Government by the people' was not 
possible in every colony as they were at different stages 
of development, ranging from countries with elaborate 
parliamentary constitutions to small ocean outposts 
directly administered by British officials. The speed of 
political advance depended 'on cultural and economic 
progress, which it is the declared aim of British policy to 
foster'. " 'Fact 131 sought to draw comparisons with the 
United States (while also at the same time reminding 
Americans that Britain was not the only colonial power), 
stated that until the point where self-government could be 
achieved -the people of Britain, through Parliament, 
remained 'ultimately responsible for the government of the 
whole Colonial Empire, just as the people of the United 
States are ultimately responsible for their outlying 
dependencies'. " 'Fact 16' articulated the partnership 
ideal as a replacement of trusteeship. Partnership was 
thought up by the people of Britain themselves as a better 
expression of the relationship: 'the people of the 
Colonies are partners with the people of the United Kingdom 
and of India and the Dominions in the British Commonwealth 
56 PRO, F0371/34088/AlO885,50 Facts About the 
Colonies, October 1943. 
57 ibid. 
58 ibid. 
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and Empire'. " 
The pamphlet continued by 'outlining the lead Britain 
was giving the colonies in preparing them for eventual 
self-government. 'Fact 171 outlined progress at the local 
level based 'on the tribal, clan, or village organisations' 
and the experience gained for example, 'Local native 
administrations raise taxes which they themselves spend on 
education and the medical services'. 60 'Fact 18' 
exaggerated reality by suggesting that 'the great majority 
of officials in Government service are recruited from the 
local inhabitants' and 'in Africa the numbers of African 
judges, administrative and professional officers are 
steadily increasing'. 6' 
The pamphlet produced mixed reaction in the American 
Department of the Foreign Office. Alan Dudley, former 
Director of the BIS commented that the pamphlet left him 
'cold' and that, while it might 'provide the specific 
answers to criticisms', it was not the 'basis for 
missionary work'. Angus Malcolm, who had served in the 
Washington Embassy, 1938-42 thought, however, that the 
pamphlet was correct in sticking to the facts and not 
making 'direct general assertions about the "loyalty" of 
the Colonies, or the "benefits" which "mankind" derives 
from our Colonial Empire'. 62 
Cooperation was also encouraged with other bodies like 
the Workers Education Association. The WEA had produced 
The Colonial Empire: a Students Guide. Lord Hailey 
criticised its publication as 'undesirable' because it 
contained 'malicious suggestions', 63 such as 'is it true to 
describe the Empire as a gigantic system of outdoor relief 
for the British governing classes' and questioned whether 
the concept of 'trusteeship' had any basis in reality, or 
519 ibid. 
60 ibid. 
r>11 ibid. 
" PRO, F0371/34088/2728, minutes by Dudley and 
Malcolm, 22 March 1943. 
63 PRO, C0875/16/7, minute by Hailey, 16 June 1943. 
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was 'a piece of humbug and self-justification on our part'. 
The book directly attacked British colonial policy in 
Africa by stating: 
If among other war aims we are fighting to destroy the 
pernicious racial theories and practices of the Nazis, 
can we honestly maintain a policy of racial 
discrimination (such as implicit in the system of 
Native Reserves established in e. g. Southern Rhodesia 
or Kenya) in our African colonies? " 
The Colonial Office objected to these 'unhelpful ... 
half-truths ... regrettable ignorance and class bias' and 
Sabine noted the irony that the WEA was subsidised by the 
Board of Education. 65 Harlow thought that it would be 
worthwhile to approach Green, the General Secretary of the 
WEA, whom he considered to be a 'reasonable person', and 
suggest that the MOI would produce for them another book on 
the colonial empire which would provide a necessary 
corrective by stressing 'the magnitude of our obligations 
and the responsibility of the citizen in this country'. 66 
The Army Education Council and the ABCA collaborated 
with the MOI to produce material about the empire to guide 
Education Officers and Sergeant Instructors. MOI printed 
material was used in conjunction with joint productions of 
material such as a series of illustrated 'wall-sheets' on 
empire subjects. " The ABCA approached the MOI to produce 
a book on the colonies, recognising that the Army was an 
important audience because they were the most 
representative cross-section of the community'. It was 
agreed that Harlow would write a pamphlet, The Ladder of 
Self-Government, in the empire series titled 'The British 
Way and Purpose'. 68 I 
Harlow explained the process of the evolution of self- 
government in the colonies. From the gradual transfer of 
64 ibid., T. L. Hodgkin, The Colonial Empire: a 
Students' Guide, p. 22, p. 32 and p. 14. 
65 PRO, C0875/16/7, minute by McLean, 22 June 1943 and 
minute by Sabine, 24 June 1943. 
66 PRO, C0875/16/7, minute by Harlow, 25 June 1943. 
67 PRO, C0875/14/11, Huxley memorandum, 18 May 1943. 
61B PRO, C0875/14/19, Thomas to Harlow, 14 December 1943. 
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responsible government from the Governor first to a 
nominated council then to an executive council and 
legislative council, to a representative government and 
finally to responsible government. He was careful to avoid 
any reference to actual timetables for the transfer of 
power. Not all the territories in the colonial empire were 
on the same rung of the ladder to self-government. As 
Harlow noted: 
A large area (say in Africa) inhabited by very 
primitive people may require a very long process of 
social and economic build-up before they are ready for 
a substantial political advance. 
For in the final analysis, a 'vote will not fill an empty 
stomach'. 19 
In another area of adult education which had expanded 
during the war, the MOI cooperated with the National Fire 
Service in its discussion groups on current problems. 70 
London Fire Stations organised a course of 600 lecture- 
discussions on citizenship 'in which Britain's imperial 
responsibilities had a prominent part'. 70 
The MOI provided its 14 Regional Offices with speakers 
on. colonial subjects for many different kinds of public 
meetings: in town halls, cinemas,,, Rotary Clubs and 
'between-shift factory talks'. Colonial Service officers 
on leave in Britain were encouraged to give lectures about 
their experiences in the colonies and a regional census of 
ex-Colonial Service officials was made in order to increase 
the supply of colonial speakers. The number of meetings on 
colonial subjects had increased sharply from 479 in the 
period from April to September 1942 to 1,170 for the period 
October 1942 to March 1943. -Il During 1943 there were 4,411 
72 lectures on colonial subjects, rising to 5,630 in 1944. 
69 PRO, C087514/19, Vincent Harlow, The Ladder of 
Self-Government. 
70 PRO, C0875/14/11, Huxley memorandum, 18 May 1943. 
PRO, C0875/14/11, Huxley memorandum, 18 May 1943; 
C0875/15/6, committee on colonial publicity in the United 
Kingdom, 12 February 1943. 
72 PRO, C0875/21/1, Progress Report of the Empire 
Information Service, 1 November 1944 - 28 February 1945. 
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Targeting Women 
The colonial publicity effort also targeted women. 
Lady Bella Southorn was the MOI's liaison officer with 
womenst periodicals. Lady Southorn had an interesting 
colonial background. Her second husband was Sir Thomas 
Southorn, a recently retired Governor of the Gambia. She 
was the daughter of the barrister Sidney Woolf and sister 
of Leonard Woolf, the editor of the Political Quarterl , 
the founder of the Hogarth Press, the Secretary of the 
Labour Party's Advisory Committee on Imperial Questions and 
prolific writer on colonial issues. She was also, 
therefore sister-in-law to Virginia Woolf. Lady Southorn 
supplied the womens' periodicals with feature articles and 
photographs from East Africa which illustrated the war 
effort of women in the colonies. From Kenya, Elyeen 
Harrold supplied a number of articles including 'the East 
African Womens' League in Wartime', 'the MOI in Nairobi- 
Kenya Women in War Work', 'The Establishment of the 
Military Nursing Service', 'Women of the Red Cross Service 
in Kenya Colony', 'An Indian'Maternity Home in Nairobi', 
'the Training of Army Cooks in Kenya' and ''The Birth of an 
African Hospital'. 73 By July 1943 Lady Southorn was 
placing the articles of fifteen women correspondents 
appointed by governors in the colonies. In the period 
October 1942 to July 1943 Lady Southorn successfully placed 
a number of articles in the women's press with an East and 
Central African background. These included an article by 
Mrs. L. B. Freeston (wife 'of the Information Officer) of 
Tanganyika, 'My Day', in Homes 
- and 
Gardens; 'Welfare in a 
Gold Mine in, Kenya', 'Indian Women Learn First-Aid in 
Kenya', 'Nursery School in Kenya', 'Masai Man and Child' 
and 'War Workers' Hostel in Kenya' in the Nursinq Mirror; 
'Women's War Work in Kenya', 'Women's War Work in Northern 
Rhodesia' and 'Scrapbooks' by Mrs. Freeston in the Lady and 
'Wild Flowers of Northern Rhodesia', 'Busy Bees of Africa' 
73 PRO, C0875/14/11, undated report for the Secretary 
of State on colonial publicity activities; C0875/16/12 and 
for details about the supply of photographs from East 
Africa, C0875/17/12/file. 
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and 'Asian Guides 
also arranged for 
edition of Girl's 
general article on 
also contributed 
representative on 
Guides. 74 
in Kenya' for Girl's Own. Lady Southorn 
the production of a special Empire Day 
Own for May 1944 for which she wrote a 
the 'Empire family'. Lady Southorn 
to the Crown Colonist and was a 
the overseas committee of the Girl 
Pamphlets 
Huxley suggested that the MOI should produce a series 
of pamphlets of 2500 words in length on 'How the Other Half 
Lives'. This was specifically designed to illustrate the 
individual aspects ofýthe 'partnership' theme in a lively 
manner. Examples included, A Day in the Life of a Ugandan 
Cotton Grower, A Day in the Life of an African Member of a 
Legislative Council, A Day in the Life of a District 
Commissioner. 75 He suggested that they should seek to 
achieve an authentic feeling by enlisting the talents of 
the most imaginative Information Officers on the spot to 
choose the most suitable individuals in their territories. 
It was hoped that a personal appeal to British youth would 
be made by illustrating the jobs of individual Africans and 
how in their daily lives they worked in cooperation with 
Europeans. For example, in the pamphlet A Day in the Life 
of a District Commissioner, the aim was to 'get over the 
effect of a man actually writing it as he sits in his 
bungalow perspiring at the end of the day's work that he is 
describing'. 76 It was decided that Michael Varvill would 
write the pamphlet. Varvill had been seconded to the 
Colonial Office from Nigeria where he served since 1932 and 
continued to serve there after the war until his retirement 
when Nigeria became independent. He had already broadcast 
on the BBC on the subject of life as a District 
74 PRO, C0875/17/15, minute by Bella Southorn, 3 July 
1943 and her report on liaison with the women's press from 
19 October 1942 to 19 July 1943. 
75 PRO, C0875/15/16, Huxley to'Sabine, 4 May 1943. 
-1-5 pRO, C0875/15/16, Huxley to Keating, 31 May 1943. 
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Commissioner . 77 For other authors the Colonial Office 
cabled colonies in Africa for other 'word pictures' of life 
in the colonies. 
78 
The idea met some opposition. It was feared that 
there was a danger that the British public might receive a 
false impression of life in the colonies and an unrealistic 
appreciation of their problems. The title 'How the Other 
Half Lives... ' was also criticised for being 'patronising' 
and it was feared it would be resented in the colonies. 79 
Notwithstanding this criticism the Colonial Office felt 
that the project should proceed. It was pointed out that 
the title of the series was based on a popular quote 'one 
half does not know how the other half lives'. The Colonial 
Office felt it was unnecessary to be apologetic about the 
proposed series and sent their detractor a specimen of one 
of the pamphlets. 80 
In view of the success of the kind of material 
received from West Africa for this series the Colonial 
Office agreed that the MOI should approach Sir Geoffrey 
Northcote in Nairobi to produce an pamphlets which would 
represent East and Central Africa in a similar way. Titles 
suggested included, A Day in the Life of a Tanganyikan 
Village Headman, A Day in the Life of an 'Improved' Kikuyu 
Farmer, A Day in the Life of a 'Medical officer in 
Nyasaland, A Day in the Life of a Minister of the Kabaka of 
Buganda, A Day-in the Life of a Jeannes School-teacher in 
Kenya, A Day in the Life of a Game Warden and A Day in the 
Life of an Arab Mudir in Zanzibar. 81 The more 
controversial idea of A Day in the Life of a European 
Farmer 
-in 
Kenya was rejected as it was decided to 
77 PRO, C0875/15/16, minute by Keating, 5 June 1943. 
'70 PRO, C0875/15/16, Colonial Office to Nigeria and 
Gold Coast, 17 August 1943. 
"79 PRO, C0875/15/16, Grantham (Lagos) to Colonial 
Office, 7 September 1943. 
80 PRO, C0875/15/16, minute by Thomas, 8 November 1943. 
811 PRO, C0875/15/16, Harlow to Thomas, 23 December 1943. 
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concentrate on the African angle. 82 
Since the pamphlets were also intended for 
distribution to schoolmistresses and girl guides, the 
Colonial Office's East African Department felt that there 
should be a greater representation of women in the series. 
New titles suggested included A Day in the Life of a 
Nursing Sister. A Day in the Life of a Woman Education 
Officer and A Day in the Life of an African Maternity and 
Child Welfare Nurse. 83 The MOI sought to recycle some of 
the 'excellent articles' from the Department of Education 
in Uganda's publication, the Uganda Teachers' Journal in 
this series. For example an article by J. O. K. Inyolo, a 
Sub-Inspector of Police and an article by S. G. Nsubugo on 
training of engineers-84 
In addition to the series 'How the Other Half 
Lives... ' the MOI produced two further series of pamphlets 
for the British audiences. 'Wars Not Yet Won' covered 
subjects like Tsetse fly control, anti-malarial work, 
illiteracy, war against magic and superstition - health 
services, a local hospital in operation - education, 
schools and colleges, anti- locust measures, the fight 
against isolation - roads, railways and transport generally 
- from head porterage to aeroplane, fight against 
malnutrition - agricultural and veterinary work - anti-soil 
erosion measures,., the war against bad housing. Another 
series, 'Pioneers Who Served', examined the lives of empire 
builders like Raffles and Livingstone. 85 
The first subject of the 'Pioneers Who Served Series' 
was Mary Kingsley (1862-1900), the British ethnologist who 
had made extensive expeditions in West Africa. An early 
propagator of the principle of 'indirect rule', Kingsley 
recognised 'the, separate cultural worth and identity of 
IB2 PRO, C0875/15/16, minute by Scott, 3 January 1944. 
63 PRO, C0875/15/16, draft of letter to Harlow, 10 
January 1944. 
G' PRO, C0875/15/16, Harlow to Keating, 7 January 1944. 
85 PRO, C0875/14/11, Huxley memorandum, 18 May 1943; 
INF1/356, Huxley's directive, 24 May 1943. 
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African societies and saw that the missionary ideas of 
Christian proselytisation and the Colonial Office policy of 
direct rule tended towards the destruction of African 
social and political institutions'. 86 The MOI pamphlet 
concentrated on the continuities in British colonial policy 
and how the roots of the new policy of 'partnership' could 
be traced back to Kingsley's thinking: 
Above all, her understanding of the African mind 
caused her to be firm in the conviction that wise rule 
must be built up within a framework of African tribal 
laws and customs, and that it would be nothing short 
of national murder to attempt to impose on an ancient 
people an imitation European government. Lord Lugard, 
also working in West Africa, had come to the same 
conclusion, and it was through him that the principle 
of indirect rule was first applied. 
Out of trusteeship has grown the conception of 
partnership between free and independent nations which 
is the goal of our colonial policy today. Had she 
visualised this consummation Mary Kingsley could 
indeed have been proud of the foundations which she 
herself had helped to build. 8'7 
In order to illustrate the series of leaflets 
depicting the various aspects of the 'partnership' theme, 
the Colonial Office updated its circular despatch of 
December 1939 which had asked all colonies to supply 
photographs to build up a pictorial record of the war. At 
the same time the colonial governments were asked to supply 
London with photographs specifically relevant to the new 
pamphlets being produced. 68 
Books 
Both the MOI and the Colonial Office cooperated in a 
number of ways with publishing houses to produce books with 
a colonial theme. The MOI worked with Longmans and 
arranged for the publication of the books Britain and Her 
Dependencies by Lord Hailey and From British Empire to 
86 Paul B. Rich, Race and Empire in British Politics, 
(Cambridge, 1990), p. 31 and chapter 2, 'Mary Kingsley and 
the emergence of cultural relativism'. 
87 PRO, F0371/34095/AlO885, Commonwealth Leaflets, 
Series A, 'Pioneers Who Served', no. 1, Mary Kingsley. 
IB19 PRO, C0875/17/15, minute by Girkins, 3 July 1943 
and circular despatch to all colonies, 15 December 1943. 
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Commonwealth by Sir Alfred Zimmern, the Montague Burton 
Professor of International Relations at Oxford and Deputy- 
Director of the Research Department at the Foreign Office. 
Hailey's book was also published in the United States. The 
MOI also arranged for Longmans to publish a series of books 
on the regions of the colonial empire including one on East 
Africa. " Collins published a book in their illustrated 
series on the British Colonial Empire. 90 Sabine cooperated 
with the publishing house Chatto and Windus to produce a 
series illustrated booklets for children. 93- 
The MOI sponsored a visit by the author Philip 
Guedalla to East and West Africa who began a descriptive 
and historical book on the colonial empire on his return-92 
Guedalla was a writer and historian who was the Honorary 
Director of the Ibero-American Institute of Great Britain 
and head of the Latin American Section of the MOI. Hodder 
and Stoughton had asked the Colonial Office to take 5,000 
copies of the book and that they would need five tons of 
paper above their quota. This proposal was 'warmly 
supported' as it was thought that there would be a market 
for it in the United States. 93 
In order to celebrate Uganda's jubilee year the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies, Oliver Stanley, 
suggested that an illustrated book by a scholarly author 
should be produced on the development of Uganda in the last 
fifty years under British administration. It would be 
distributed both in Britain and in the United States. 94 
89 ibid. 
90 PRO, C0875/17/15, minute by Sabine, 19 May 1943. 
'3111 PRO, C0875/15/6, meeting of the publications sub- 
committee of the committee an colonial publicity in the 
United Kingdom, 13 January 1943. 
92 PRO, C0875/15/6, meeting at the MOI, 16 December 
1942. The MOI would help with paper allocation for this 
book. 
93 PRO, C0875/15/6, Committee on Colonial Publicity in 
the United Kingdom, 13 January 1943. 
94 PRO, C0875/15/6, meeting of the committee on 
publicity in the United Kingdom, 7 April 1943. 
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Elspeth Huxley initially agreed to write the book which 
would be titled Uganda's Jubilee but instead this was be 
partly covered by her in a more general book she was 
writing about East Africa. 95 
Professor W. K. Hancock's hugely successful Penguin 
Special Argument of Empire was shown unofficially to the 
Publications and Empire Divisions of the MOI but was not, 
at the author's request, submitted for policy approval. 96 
The Social Services Department of the Colonial Office 
cooperated with Chatham House in providing material for a 
survey on progress made in the social welfare area in the 
colonial empire. The Colonial Office had become involved 
because much of the original draft had been 'misleading or 
inaccurate'. " The project had been taken over at a later 
stage by the eminent anthropologist Dr. Lucy Mair*, whose 
previous form included the research for the Land and Native 
Administration chapter of Lord Hailey's African Survey. 98 
Mair's book was intended to serve as a counterblast to 
Leonard Barnes's Soviet Light on the Colonies which was 
critical of British colonial policy and had received wide 
public attention. " Barnes was a former Colonial Office 
official who resigned and went to live in Africa in 1925, 
working as a writer and journalist for the Natal Witness, 
the Ca e Times and the Johannesburc -ht on r 
Star. Soviet Lig 
the Colonies compared British colonial methods in tropical 
Africa and Soviet policies and practice in former Tsarist 
colonies of Central Asia. The book described a fictitious 
journey through British Africa undertaken by 'John' (the 
author) accompanied by a Soviet citizen, Vova Korolencko. 
The style of the book was informal and chatty. The 
95 PRO, C0875/14/11, note by Sabine, August 1943; 
C0875/14/13, meeting between MOI, Colonial Office and the 
BBC, 20 August 1943. 
'96 PRO, C0875/14/11, MOI Progress Report for 1943,30 
December 1943. 
97 PRO, C0875/16/3, minute by Orde Brown, 21 May 1943. 
98 Cell, OP. cit., p. 229. 
'519 PRO, C0875/16/3, Blaxter to Lloyd, 21 March 1944. 
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intricacies of British colonial policy, of concepts like 
Indirect Rule, Trusteeship and Native Authorities were all 
presented in an accessible manner. Criticisms of British 
policy voiced by Vova in dialogue with British people he 
met on his journey. Vova's boasts about Soviet 
achievements of regional autonomy for the constituents of 
the Soviet federation, of workers' democracy and the 
development of Trade Unions in Soviet Central Asia appear a 
little ridiculous to audiences of the 1990s, but the 
critique of British policy would surely have struck a chord 
with contemporary audiences who were trying to make sense 
of the British empire in the aftermath of Singapore. In 
summing up his journey to the author, Vova lamented the 
general lack of British recognition that change was 
necessary: 
'But, honestly, John, I am discouraged by what I have 
seen - apprehensive even. In a way, there is so much 
good will, so much unselfish endeavour. And yet, and 
yet ... What comes of it? Mostly it goes to waste because of your blank incomprehension of the issue. ' 
'Mine? ' 
'You know what I mean. The white people who rule 
Africa. Why, not one man Jack among them in the whole 
continent, or in your Colonial Office either, sees 
that the colonial problem is simply an aspect of the 
problem of the defence of democracy - or rather how to 
mount democracy's counter-offensive against fascism. 
Colonial freedom is the second front which the 
democratic principle will have to open throughout the 
world, if it is to save itself. Democracy will 
outlive the totalitarian challenge only if it can 
itself offer prompt, radical and constructive 
innovations. I see no sign that those who hold the 
reins in British Africa are either prepared for 
anything of the kind, or in command of means to 
execute it if they were ... 13-00 
The result of Mair's endeavours was hardly a match for 
Barnes's book. Although wider in scope as it covered 
social welfare developments in all of Britain's colonial 
dependencies it was dull and uninspired and written in a 
matter-of-fact style and without comment. Just one example 
will suffice: 
Social Welfare Officers have already been appointed 
for Nigeria and the Gold Coast, and an appointment has 
been sanctioned for Sierra Leone. Plans have been 
100 Barnes, op. cit., p. 225. 
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made for the appointment of one woman Welfare Officer 
in the latter colony and two for the Gambia. The 
Nairobi Municipal Council, which has taken the lead in 
Kenya in the study of urban problems, in 1943 proposed 
the appointment of a woman Social Welfare Worker for 
work in the African locations. -2-011 
In general the Colonial Office was delighted with the 
progress made by the Empire Division of the MOI under the 
direction of Gervas Huxley. Sabine acknowledged Huxley's 
skill in managing to achieve the cooperation among the 
various departments in the MOI, Empire, Home, Photographs, 
Films and Production Divisions working together 'on the 
projection of a single subject'. Indeed, Sabine felt that 
Huxley had succeeded in 'transforming the Ministry [of 
Information] almost out of recognition'. Sabine, however, 
also recognised that the propaganda effort in Britain would 
have to be of a long-term nature. there was no room for 
complacency as what had been produced to date was providing 
basic material, the propagandists were not 'in any sense 
engaged in a nation-wide campaign' . 102 
Nonetheless, problems still arose between the MOI and 
the Colonial Office. Some in the Colonial Office continued 
to feel antipathy towards the propagandists in the MOI who, 
they believed, did not have the expert knowledge required 
to be effective colonial propagandists. Although advances 
had been made, it was thought that at times the material 
produced by the Empire Information Service lacked 'much 
tangible appeal to the "common man"'. X03 - 
At the end of 1943 MOI-Colonial Office cooperation in 
producing a pamphlet This Partnership resulted in the 
abandonment of the project. The aim had been to 
'illustrate the material and moral strength of the British 
Commonwealth' and the 'partnership' which existed within 
the Commonwealth in fighting the war. 104 While Colonial 
Office officials agreed that the pamphlet conveyed a sense 
"Oll L. P. Mair, Welfare in the British Colonies 
(Iondon, 1944), p. 112. 
1102 PRO, C0875/14/11, minute by Sabine, 19 May 1943. 
103 PRO, C0875/14/11, minute by Keating, 23 December 1943. 
10' PRO, C0875/16/2, Usill to Morgan, 22 November 1943. 
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of the empire's cooperative effort, it was considered 
'dull' and the result of 'uninspired hack work'. L05 
Details were found to be inaccurate and even insensitive. 
For example, reference was made to the vast production of 
food in East Africa when there was a famine in Tanganyika 
that year. The selection of photographs was considered 
poor and the Colonial Office questioned why the MOI had not 
approached the PIO in Nairobi for more suitable 
material. '" The MOI decided to abandon the project. They 
complained to the Colonial Office that the territorial 
Information Officers in the colonies were too quick to 
condemn general material which sought to present a picture 
of the partnership 'within a bigger unit of the British 
Commonwealth' for failing to provide 'an exhaustive survey' 
of their own particular territory. 107 
A new initiative was also undertaken to increase press 
coverage of colonial issues, both in the national papers 
and in the provincial press. This activity was wide 
ranging. The Times promised to publish summaries of all 
the speeches given by the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, Oliver Stanley. "' The Colonial Office received 
a request from T. L. Blau of the Pictorial Press and-Feature 
Press and News Service to photograph 'Behind the Scenes at 
the Colonial Office'. Although some of the typical 
Colonial Office reluctance to be involved in any kind of 
'public relations' exercise resurfaced, it was decided that 
Colonial Office officials should 'accommodate ourselves to 
the manners of the times' not least because the Pictorial 
Press was a branch of the Hollywood Photography Ltd. and 
there were prospects that the photographs could be used in 
1105 PRO, C0875/16/2, Morgan to Sabben-Clare, 26 
November 1943. 
"06 PRO, C0875/16/2, minute by Footman, 16 December 1943. 
107 PRO, C0875/16/2, Usill to Morgan, 13 January 1944. 
11013 PRO, C0875/16/16, Pitt Robbins, the News Editor of 
The Times, to Sabine, 8 March 1943. The Times was unable to 
publish the full texts of Stanley's speeches because in 
view of the paper shortage they would take up too much room. 
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North America. LO9 The Secretary of State allowed himself 
to be photographed and Sir Charles Jeffries wrote an 
accompanying article of a tour around the Colonial Office 
in Downing Street. "O 
The MOI received sets of photographs from East Africa 
of wide ranging subjects such as, the control of locusts, 
malaria and rinderpest; hospital and nursery services; 
progress in agriculture and industry, sisal and coffee 
growing and breweries; and East African troops in the war 
in Burma. Between November '1944 and February 1945 the 
Photographic loans Library loaned out nearly 15,000 
photographs. "' 
The Colonial Office circulated a specially prepared 
colonial bulletin of short news items from all the colonies 
to news agencies, the national press and 800 provincial 
papers which had a 'fair success'. Many regular visits had 
been made to certain editors of provincial papers. Sabine 
thought that on the whole relations with the press and the 
Press Section in the Colonial Office were close and that 
the Press Section had a good name for being efficient and 
helpful. " The fall of Malaya had awakened press interest 
in the colonies and in general three times more space was 
devoted to Press Section handouts than during the early 
stages of the war. "I In February 1943 regional Press 
Conferences were arranged to stress the partnership theme 
which would also be mentioned at the monthly MOI 
"19 PRO, C0875/17/14, Blauýto Collins, I January 1942; 
minute by Jeffries, 6 January 1942; minute by Collins, 2 
January 1942. 
110 PRO, C0875/17/14, minute by Thornley, 16 January 
1942; Jeffries, 'The Colonial Office', undated. 
I'll PRO, C0875/21/1, Empire Information Service 
progressed Report, 1 November 1944 - 28 February 1945. 
112 PRO, C0875/14/11, minute by Sabine, 19 May 1943; 
minute by Sabine undated. 
IX3 PRO, C0875/14/11, minute by Sabine, undated. 
Column inch figures for March to June 1943 were as follows: 
Inches Inches 
March, 1943 254 May, 1943 243 
April, 1943 90 June, 1943 121 
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Ministerial meeting with the provincial press. 114 
Major problems confronting the Colonial Office in 
attempting to achieve a wider representation of the 
colonies in the British press remained competition with 
'war news' and paper rationing. Sabine met a very cool 
reception from the Treasury when he attempted to increase 
the distribution of the periodical the Crown Colonist. 
Sabine considered that the Crown Colonist provided 'an 
interesting and attractive account of current colonial 
affairs' which he sought to distribute more widely to 
libraries, training colleges and the provincial press. 
Eventually permission was granted to print an extra 2,000 
copies a month. "' 
William Simnett the editor of the Crown Colonist and 
the Colonial Office's representative at the New york 
World's Fair in 1940, wrote a book published in 1942, The 
British Colonial Empire. Simnett's book was supported by 
the Colonial Office and bought for distribution in Britain 
and the United States and to schools in particular. 
Although certainly 'not a thriller', the book was 
criticised for being 'rather pedestrian'. But it was 
recognised that there was a 'crying need for a text book of 
this kind'. Therefore the Colonial Office sent a circular 
despatch -to 
Colonial posts drawing attention to its 
publication. 1116 The book explained in simple terms the 
evolution of the British colonial empire, the principle of 
trusteeship which underlined British colonial policy and 
the commitment to 'hand over' the possessions to their 
former owners once they had achieved the 'fullest measure 
of political, social and economic development of which they 
may prove capable' within-'the framework of the British 
11114 PRO, C0875/15/6, Committee on Colonial Publicity 
in the United Kingdom, 12 February 1943. 
"I's PRO, C0875/16/9, Sabine to Gent, 23 March 1943; 
minute by Gent, 24 March 1943. See further C0323/1839/5/file. 
113.6 PRO, C0875/15/11, minute by Furse, 10 April 1942; 
Jeffries to Wood, Board of Education, 26 February 1942; 
minute by Sabine 3 January 1942; Cox to Education officers 
in all Colonies, 21 October 1942. 
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Commonwealth. 117 A chapter was devoted to each region of 
the empire, gave a brief outline of their history, a 
description of the colonies and details of constitutional 
advances already made. The book recognised the great 
cooperation between the Europeans and Africans during the 
war. It was non-controversial in its description of the 
future of East and Central Africa and promoted partnership 
between the races. While the prospects for inter- 
territorial cooperation already existed in East Africa in 
the form of the East Africa Governors' Conference, Simnett 
ruled out the emergence of a 'White Dominion' of East 
Africa. Instead the future lay in the 'fruitful 
cooperation between European and African'. 11118 
Similarly, in describing the future political 
developments in Central Africa, Simnett discounted the 
possibility of amalgamation until the 'obnoxious "pass 
laws"' of Southern Rhodesia had been repealed and a 
'practicable way' was found to encourage the 'cooperation 
between the two races'. -1-9 The book concluded with a 
chapter devoted to the future of the British Commonwealth. 
The constituents of the British colonial empire were at 
present in the position of 'junior partners' within the 
larger and evolving organisation of the British 
Commonwealth. The British colonial record, he asserted, 
was the most progressive among the colonial empires in the 
world. Simnett portrayed the British commitment to 
colonial self-government as a commitment to the 'eventual 
independence' of the colonies because self-government 
'naturally implies that they will be free like the 
Dominions to choose whether they wish to remain associated 
with the Commonwealth or not'. L20_ 
While Simnett favoured the internationalisation of the 
W. E. Simnett, The British Colonial Empire, 
(London, 1942), p. 22-3. 
1128 ibid., P. 90. 
t, 11119 ibid., P. 98. 
120 ibid., P. 221. 
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responsibility for the colonies and regional cooperation in 
the post war period, he was careful to maintain that the 
ultimate administrative responsibility for the British 
colonial empire remained British. He looked forward to the 
challenge of the future with a final uplifting message for 
the British and colonial peoples alike which the Colonial 
Office would find little to disagree with: 
here is work waiting, in all branches of the Colonial 
Service and in many unofficial capacities, for the 
best of Britain's sons (and daughters), and here too 
is a high and inescapable responsibility for the 
British peoples as a whole, no matter in what measure 
they may share it with others, and best of all with 
the Colonial peoples themselves. The Colonial Empire 
will pass: the Colonies will become nations. Britain 
has willed it so, has willed the end and the means, 
but here and now, and in the testing years to come, 
there is a great and worth-while task to be 
accomplished for humanity. 1211 
Although the reader had been told of the ways and means of 
the transformation of the British colonial empire into the 
British Commonwealth of free nations, the discerning reader 
would be forgiven for asking the question 'when". ) 
The Secretary of State for the Colonies, Oliver 
Stanley, received a request from the editor of the East 
African Standard, Ferdinand Joelson, to send a message of 
congratulation for publication in the 1000th edition of the 
newspaper. 122 Doubts were expressed about the request on 
the grounds that the paper represented 'white settler' 
opinion. The paper's attitude to East African affairs was 
also 'by no means acceptable in all quarters here'. the 
Colonial Office also wanted to avoid setting a precedent 
for similar requests in the future. x23 Notwithstanding 
these objections Stanley sent a-' message which clearly 
indicated the part he expected the East African Standard to 
play in the future. Stanley said he valued the work of 
'periodicals such as East Africa-and Rhodesia in strength- 
ening the bonds of understanding and interest between the 
121 ibid., pp. 224 and 228. 
1122- PRO, C0875/18/4, Joelson to Stanley, 18 August 1943. 
123 PRO, C0875/18/4, minute by Dawe, 6 September 1943; 
minute by Gater, 7 September 1943. 
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people of this country and those of the colonies overseas'. 
In particularly diplomatic terms he recognised how for 
nearly 20 years the East African Standard had been noted 
for 'its independent and forceful presentation of views 
upon East African topics' and hoped that in the future the 
paper would contribute to the solution of colonial problems 
by providing a 'week by week a continuous picture of East 
African life'. "' 
The Colonial Office was not pleased with articles 
which had appeared in a sister paper of the East African 
Standard, the Mombasa Times about the decline of morality 
in wartime Britain. JL25 Sir Gilbert Rennie, the Chief 
Secretary to the Kenyan government spoke to Anderson, the 
Managing Director of the East African Standard group which 
owned the Mombasa Times, to ensure that similar articles 
would not appear in future. The Mombasa Times, however, 
sinned again by publishing a report which stated that 
British 'morals had sagged'. The report claimed that there 
had been an 'increase in venereal disease' and that women's 
organisations had complained to the Government that because 
of 'official failure to use the women concerned in war 
work, prostitution is virtually classed as an essential 
occupation'. Northcote, the PIO in East Africa wrote to 
Kinnear complaining about the 'morbid pessimism' of the 
East African Standard group's London correspondent. The 
Colonial Office thought these kind of articles would have a 
bad effect on the morale of British troops serving in East 
Africa, but Kinnear was adamant that this was an issue for 
MOI censors and not the responsibility of his papers. The 
Colonial Office, reluctant to take the matter up with 
Watney, the London correspondent of the Mombasa Times, 
preferring to keep an eye on developments and recommended 
that Rennie should approach Anderson if it was deemed 
1943.1124 
PRO, C0875/18/4, Thornley to Joelson, 7 September 
1125 PRO, C0875/6/17, minute by Morgan, 18 March 1942. 
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necessary in the future. 1126 
New Initiatives at the BBC 
One of Gervas Huxley's aims when he became Director of 
the Empire Division was to improve the relationship between 
the BBC and the Colonial Office. To this end new avenues 
of cooperation were explored which aimed to increase the 
colonial content of BBC broadcasts and also to project the 
partnership theme in order 'to stimulate the provision, in 
the most useful form, of information and publicity material 
necessary to the effective coverage by the BBC of the 
affairs of the Colonial Empire and the work of the Colonial 
Office'. To this end the BBC agreed to the appointment of 
a Colonial Office Liaison Officer. 1127 The BBC suggested 
the appointment of Gervas Huxley's wife, Elspeth who was 
already working in the BBC's press department. The 
Colonial Office thought that the proposal was an 'admirable 
ideal 12 8 but ensured that all questions of policy remained 
under Colonial Office control. X29 
Under Elspeth Huxley's guidance a 'comprehensive 
scheme of broadcast talks, discussions and features on 
Empire subjects' was planned. 3.30 In January 1943, at the 
suggestion of the director of talks at the BBC a listener 
research report was prepared to enable the BBC to 
understand the state of British public opinion in order to 
plan a series on the empire. The resulting report 
represents an interesting insight into the state of British 
"" PRO, C0875/6/17, Mombasa Times, 17 August 1943; 
Northcote to Wathen 17 August 1943; minute by Morgan, 17 
September 1943; Thomas to Usill, 6 October 1943; Seel to 
Rennie, 6 November 1943. Morgan was able to not that 
'harmful' articles had ceased to appear, minute by Morgan, 
25 November 1943. 
1127 PRO, C0875/19/16, meeting between the Secretary of 
State, Oliver Stanley and Rendall and foot of the BBC, 17 
February 1943. 
1128 PRO, C0875/19/16, minute by Stanley, 12 April 1943. 
1129 PRO, C0875/19/16, Elspeth Huxley took up her 
appointment in May 1943. 
130 PRO, C0875/14/11, memorandum by Huxley, 18 May 1943. 
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public opinion, albeit a limited sample of that opinion, on 
the British empire and gives an idea of the 'publicity 
problem' confronting the propagandists in educating the 
British public about the colonial empire. 
The BBC used two sets of local correspondents who were 
asked the same questions. A group of 895 local 
correspondents were asked to summarise the reactions of 
people with whom the correspondents were in daily contact. 
The second group of 286 were asked to give their personal 
opinions to the same questions asked of the group of 895. 
In both cases the correspondents were told that the BBC was 
planning a series of talks on the British Empire so that 
the correspondents would understand the motivations behind 
the questions. 13X 
It was found that there was the most elementary 
confusion about the nature of the British empire. Indeed, 
even the term the 'colonies' was generally used to denote 
any part of the empire outside the United Kingdom. Few 
recognised that there was a difference between the term 
'colony' and 'dominion'. Of the 895 correspondents only 
29% of their contacts realised that the term the 'colonies' 
did not include the dominions. Moreover, the 895 
correspondents were asked whether in ordinary conversation 
they generally found people using the terms correctly, 18% 
said yes, but 82% said no. 132 
of the group of 895 correspondents 65% stated that 
their correspondents had firm opinions on 'how' the 
colonial empire was acquired. In many cases more than one 
factor was mentioned: 
Method % of correspondents 
most subscribed to this 
'By conquest from native peoples' 90 
'By peaceful colonisation' 60 
'By conquest from other Colonies' 46 
131 PRO, F0371/34088/A2750, The BBC Listener Research 
Report, the British Empire, 'Some aspects of public opinion 
on the British Empire, and in particular, the Colonial 
Empire', January 1943, the Listener Research Department of 
the BBC, 22 February 1943, p. l. 
132 ibid., p. j. 
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'By Mandate from the League of Nations' 39 
'By purchase or negotiation' 31 
'By dynastic marriage' 3 
The group of 286 correspondents were asked to give their 
personal opinion on 'how' and 'why' the colonial empire 
came into existence. The report showed that the responses 
to the question 'how' the empire came into being paralleled 
those given by the 895. The views of the 286 on 'why' the 
empire came into being were more diverse, but the most 
frequent response was the 'need for markets and raw 
materials'. The report showed that 'nearly as many took 
the view that the Colonial Empire had been acquired because 
British mariners had a spirit of adventure'. The compiler 
of the report also seemed to be shocked that a 
'surprisingly large group thought that the primary cause of 
the Colonial Empire's existence was the need for 
"lebensraum" while only one correspondent mentioned that 
the empire came into existence because 'it was the will of 
God that it should do SOO. L33 
The correspondents were then asked whether they 
considered the colonial empire to be an economic asset or a 
liability. The two groups gave similar responses; 86% of 
the 895 replied that most of their contacts regarded it as 
an economic asset. Comments made to elaborate this point 
of view included 'the Empire is regarded as an invaluable 
market and source of raw material, without which Great 
Britain could not subsist' and that this had become 
'acutely realised in wartime'. Small minorities voiced 
reservations, for example that the colonial empire was an 
economic asset only to the rentier and not to the nation as 
a whole. The minority who believed that the empire was an 
economic liability did so because they thought 'more was 
spent on development and protection than was seen in 
returns, and that Imperial preference led to an increased 
cost of living for the people of Great Britain. 1134 
The two groups were asked about attitudes towards the 
present state of social and economic development in the 
133 ibid., p. 2. 
1134 ibid., pp. 2-3. 
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colonial empire. The results were as follows: 
Present stage regarded as- 
Eminently Quite Barely Thoroughly 
Satisfactory Unsatisfactory 
Replies 
of the 
895 3% 33% 56% 8% 
286 5% 27% 59% 9% 
Looking at the report one could take some comfort in the 
observation that 'both extreme views receive comparatively 
little support' but one also could not overlook that over 
half replied that the present state of development was 
considered to be 'barely satisfactory'. The report noted 
that supplementary comments indicated that this was a 
result of the 'shock' at the loss of Malaya. Others felt 
that the 'interests of those engaged in exploitation of the 
resources of the Colonies had been put first to the 
consequent neglect of native welfare' . 2.35 
The 895 were asked about their personal 
responsibilities towards colonial peoples: 'Do most of your 
contacts think that if a Colony is not self-supporting it 
is right that it should be subsidised by the British tax- 
payer? '. Of this group 37% reported that their contacts 
had no opinion, and 40% thought that the British tax-payer 
should 'pay up', while 23% took the opposite view. The 
same question was asked of the group of 286 with the result 
that a ratio of five to one favoured placing the burden on 
the British tax-payer. Supplementary comments revealed, 
however, that subsidies should only be given 'with the 
object of achieving subsequent self-support' and when 'an 
eventual economic, or present strategic advantage was 
apparent'. M36 
The correspondents were then asked about attitudes to 
Britain's past colonial record. They were asked to name 
the most common view applying to each group. The results 
X35 ibid., p. 3. 
136 ibid. 
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were as follows: 
Statement 895 286 
'We have every right to be proud and no need 
to feel at all ashamed, of our Colonial record' 15 13 
'Our Colonial record is mixed, but the good 
exceeds the bad' 72 77 
'Our Colonial record is mixed, but the bad 
exceeds the good' 10 7 
'We ought to be ashamed of our Colonial record 
and have no right at all to feel proud of it' 
The report noted that in answering this question many 
people were making 'a comparative assessment of the British 
Colonial record against that of other powers'. A further 
factor influencing the responses was the feeling 'autre 
temps, autre moeurs' (other times, other manners). The 
report could offer the Colonial Office some comfort in the 
result that the majority of the responses thought that the 
British colonial record was mixed, with the good exceeding 
the bad and that the misgivings about British colonial 
policy had not received a wholesale candemnation. L37 
The 895 were asked to estimate what proportion of 
their contacts had any views about what the future of 
Britain's colonial policy should be: 
Some views are held by - 
- All - Most -A Minority - None 3% 34% 52% 11% 
The report also produced a digest of the views held on the 
future of British colonial Policy based on the thinking of 
the thoughtful minority'. The responses of the 286 
individual correspondents were as follows: 
The ultimate aim should be the admission of all 
Colonial territories into equal partnership with Great 
Britain and the self-governing Dominions, and that all 
Colonial policy should be directed towards that aim. 
As an immediate task, there should be an overhaul of 
the social, economic and educational systems of each 
137 ibid., p. 4. 
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Colony, so that all exploitation of native labour 
should cease and all vested interests be made to take 
second place whenever necessary. The first duty of the 
British Government should be the encouragement and 
education of native peoples in the art of self- 
government. 
The report remarked upon the absence of 'certain views' 
about the future of Britain's colonial policy. Although 
few said 'we ought to carry on as we have done in the past' 
or 'leave the Colonies to shift for themselvesl(sic), it is 
interesting to note that the favoured Colonial Office 
policy of 'partnership' was mentioned in this digest. 1138 
Finally, it was noted, there was 'considerable 
interest' in the projected series of talks on the empire. 
From the responses the following scheme was drawn up: 
I Historical 
(1) How and why the Empire was acquired 
(2) The present constitutional structure of the 
Empire, Colonial administration, and the differences 
between Colonies and Dominions 
(3) The mutual inter-dependence of the Empire; the 
advantages to Great Britain of the Empire, and the 
advantages of membership to it 
(4) Economic and political future; the conditions 
necessary for self-government 
II Descriptive 
(1) The social and economic conditions of Colonial 
territories before colonisation 
(2) The ordinary lives of the ordinary citizens of the 
Empire 
(3) Geography, climate and natural resources 
Above all it was thought that the talks should 'frankly 
present the Colonial point of view, preferably through 
Colonial speakers' and that the talks should be objective: 
there should be no attempt to gloss over past mistakes 
in Colonial policy, or view the problem through rose- 
coloured spectacles. It was felt that unless this was 
watched with the greatest care, the talks would be 
regarded as 'mere propaganda', and, far from doing 
good, would do positive harm. 
The BBC arranged for special empire talks in their 
schools programme which would complement efforts already 
made to interest the youth of Britain in the colonial 
empire. "' There was already a discernable increase in the 
M38 ibid. 
139 PRO, C0875/15/6, committee on colonial publicity 
in the United Kingdom, 12 February 1943. 
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number of colonial broadcasts on the Home Service by June 
1943. "" The BBC used the summaries of colonial news 
produced by the Colonial Office Press Section, 'Empire 
Round Up'. "' The Colonial Office took steps to ensure 
that any officers on leave from the Colonial Service were 
passed on to the BBC. "' 
One of the series produced by the BBC on the Home 
Service about the empire was 'Red on the Map' discussions 
on the meaning and obligations of the empire. The first 
programme on 13 April was a round table discussion between 
the M. P. and Chairman of the FCB, Arthur Creech Jones, 
Prof. W. K. Hancock, author of Arqument of Empire, Sir Harry 
Luke, the Governor of Fiji and High Commissioner for the 
Western Pacific, 1938-42 and Chief Representative of the 
British Council in the Caribbean, 1943-6, Frederick Kuh, 
the London bureau chief of the Chicaqo Sun and Graham Spry, 
the Canadian journalist. The series ran until the beginning 
of 1944 and included contributions from speakers like 
Quintin Hogg, Alfred Zimmern, Professor of International 
Relations at Oxford, Dr. Margaret Read, head of the 
Colonial Department, the Institute of Education at the 
University of London, Sir Arku Korash the distinguished 
judge and the first Chief Justice in post-independent Ghana 
and Sir Bernard Bourdillon, a former Governor of Uganda and 
Nigeria. Subjects debated ranged from trade, the work of 
doctors in the empire, mass education and raising the 
standard of living in the colonies. L43 
On the Forces Programme the BBC ran a more informal 
140 PRO, C0875/15/6, note by Sabine, undated. 
The increase was as follows: 
June 1942 June 1943 
Schools Talks 6 10 
Home Talks A 18 
Features 36 
Music 13 
14, PRO, C0875/15/6, committee on colonial publicity 
in the United Kingdom, 17 March 1943. 
142 PRO, C0875/15/6, committee on colonial publicity 
in the United Kingdom, 6 January 1943. 
143 Radio Times, 13 April 1943, ' 11 May 1943,6 July 
1943,14 September 1943,7 December 1943 and 4 January 1944. 
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series 'Brush Up Your Empire', between December 1943 and 
August 1944. This series covered specific areas of the 
empire including Australia, Canada, India, South Africa, 
West Africa, Malaya, West Indies, Burma, New Zealand, the 
Pacific Islands, and East Africa. The format of the 
programme was 'readers questions' put to guest experts such 
as Korash and Trafford Smith a representative from the 
Colonial Office who had also served in Fiji, the New 
Hebrides, the Solomon Islands and the Gilbert and Ellice 
Islands, by the presenter Lionel Gamlin. 
The biggest expansion was in the area of schools 
programmes in line with the Colonial Office's desire to 
educate British youth about the responsibilities of empire 
and to emphasise the colonial 'partnership' theme. 144 The 
BBC made room for programmes about the empire in English, 
geography and history broadcasts. For example, a District 
Commissioner from Tanganyika Donald Malcolm gave a talk on 
rural problems. The series 'Travel Talks: Other People's 
Jobs' featured the Colonial Office anthropologist Audrey 
Richards* on 'Copper for Pennies', the story of Africans 
working in Rhodesian copper mines, while in the same series 
T. D. Maitland on 'Soap for Washing' was the story of the 
extraction of vegetable oils from the palm groves of 
Nigeria. In an English broadcast Honor Wyatt's 'A Woman 
Explorer' examined what Mary Kingsley's writing revealed 
about her character as well as her adventures in West 
Africa. Mary Kingsley's travels in West Africa appeared 
again as a subject in the history series 'Stories from 
World History'. Other subjects in this history series 
included Rhoda Power, the director of schools broadcasts, 
'Covered Wagons in South Africa', the story of the 'great 
trek': how Piet Retief lost his life at the hands of 
Dingaan the Zulu; Power's 'the Adventures of a Negro', the 
story of Granville Sharp's work for the freedom of the 
slaves and Power's 'the Dark Continent, the story of 
Stanley's meeting with Livingstone. A geography series 
'New Developments in the British Empire', covered topics 
-144 PRO, C0875/15/6, Committee on colonial publicity 
in the United Kingdom, 6 January 1943. 
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like 'Fruit Farmers in Cape Colony', 'Pioneer Farmers in 
Northern Rhodesia', 'African Farmers in Uganda', 'Settlers 
of the Kenya Highlands' and 'West Africa's part in the 
War'. Towards the end of the war the series 'the World Our 
Neighbourl told the story of Livingstone. 115 
Major preparations were undertaken to celebrate Empire 
Day in 1943. The BBC planned to demonstrate 'the Empire's 
war effort' and 'attachment of the Colonies to [the] 
British connection and [the] confidence in (the] 
progressive realisation of aspirations within the framework 
of the British Empire'. "' Learie Constantine*, the black 
welfare officer at the Ministry of Labour and renowned 
Jamaican cricketer, presented the 'Postscript' programme 
after the news on 23 May. "' The Radio Times for the week 
23-29 May was an Empire Day special issue. An article by 
Leslie Stokes paid tribute to the empire's contribution to 
the war effort and the common feeling of friendship and 
unity among the 'empire family'. The war, he wrote, 
provided an opportunity for the people of the empire to 
meet each other all over the world. At first glance there 
did not appear to be common ground between these diverse 
people: 'it takes something else to make the kind of 
friendship that endures and survives quarrels - something 
else to hold friends together in spite of fundamental 
differences of outlook, different habits, different 
religions'. It was something intangible that could not be 
put into words because 'it never occurs to them to talk 
about it' and 'something which they all share', the 
unspoken assumption about the unity and friendship of the 
British empire. 148 
1145 Radio Times, 18 June -1943,29 October 1943,19 
November 1943,2 November 1943,6 December 1943,15 
November 1943,22 November 1943,29 November 1943,20 
January 1944,10 February 1944,24 February 1944,2 March 
1944,30 March 1944,1 May 1945. 
"46 PRO, C0875/19/17, Grenfell Williams to Sabine, 21 
April 1943. 
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On the 23 May there was a special edition of the 
'Brains Trust' devoted entirely to questions about the 
empire, an 'Empire Brains Trust' featuring regular 
panelists Malcolm Sargent and Julian Huxley and special 
guests, Lord Hailey, Learie Constantine and Reginald 
Coupland the Beit Professor of Imperial History at Oxford 
and member of the Round Table. 3-49 
On Empire Day itself the BBC featured a special 
schools broadcast presented by Douglas Allan in which 
British schoolchildren met representatives of the Dominion 
and the colonies in Britain. This included a Maori, a West 
Indian, a South African, an Indian, an Australian who told 
the story of 'Waltzing Matilda', the drums of West Africa 
and a flying officer from Canada. 'Children's Hour' 
presented a special Empire Day concert. Between 8 p. m. and 
8.15 p. m. 'The Empire Calls London' broadcast messages from 
parts of the empire including Newfoundland, the West 
Indies, West Africa, Uganda, Ceylon and New Zealand. From 
8.15 p. m. until the news at 9 p. m. 'The Empire Meets' 
presented a musical programme of men and women from the 
Dominions and the colonies in London. 3L50 
Empire Day was celebrated on a reduced scale in 1944 
and highlighted the united and undiminished effort in the 
final drive towards victory. Programmes included three 
concerts of empire music; a special 'Children's Hour' talk; 
'The Empire Speaks' a programme in which the people of the 
empire who had served in the armed forces and specially 
recorded messages by the Dominion Prime Ministers were 
given the opportunity to speak; an Empire variety show 'The 
Empire Sings' and an Empire Day service from St. Paul's 
Cathedral. "53- The youth of the empire were catered for 
with the celebrations of 'Empire Youth Sunday' on the 21 
May 1944 with a talk by the Roman Catholic Archbishop of 
Westminster and a programme devoted to the children of the 
11 -"' ibid. 
1150 ibid. 
Is" Radio Times, 21-27 May 1944. 
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empire, 'Empire Youth Compares Notes' . 1152 
The BBC continued to evoke the idea of empire unity 
within the British Commonwealth of nations, with its 
broadcasts for national occasions like Remembrance Sunday 
and Christmas broadcasts. For example the Christmas Day 
broadcasts in 1944 featured 'The Journey Home' which linked 
the peoples of the Commonwealth and the Allies by giving 
them the opportunity to greet their families throughout the 
world. The BBC devoted a week to programmes for victory in 
Europe and again on 13 May the BBC paid tribute to the 
contributions of the people of the empire and Commonwealth 
in 'A Victory Rhapsody' of songs and dances of the 
Commonwealth. The Empire Day broadcasts in 1945 provided a 
further opportunity to thank the people of the empire for 
their efforts. 'A Festival of Empire' with the music of 
the band of the Brigade of guards, a fanfare by the Royal 
Military School of Music and empire representatives of the 
armed forces. "' 
Empire Youth Sunday in 1945 looked to the future. The 
Radio Times included an article by Lord Elton on 'The 
Significance of Empire Youth Sunday'. He wrote, that after 
the struggle for survival in Europe, the 'heirs of a great 
inheritance', the children of the empire had the 
154 'tremendous task of shaping the pattern of a new age' . 
In the morning a young ex-POW officer gave the address 
at the Empire Youth Sunday Service from Westminster and in 
the afternoon representatives from the Dominions and the 
colonies took part in an Empire Youth discussion. 155 
In spite of the growth in BBC broadcasts about the 
empire, problems still arose between the Colonial office 
and BBC. Following 'the confusion surrounding a visit by 
the Queen to the Victoria League and the Colonial Office's 
failure to inform the BBC of this visit, the Colonial 
"52- ibid. 
X53 Radio Times, 25 December 1944,10-18 May 1945 and 
24 May 1945. 
. 154 Radio Times, 10-16 June 1945. 
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Office agreed that in the future they would ensure that the 
BBC would be informed of any ceremonies for which the 
Colonial Office was responsible. The BBC along with the 
MOI would also be invited to the Under-Secretary of State 
of State for the Colonies, the Duke of Devonshire's 'tea 
parties' with visitors from the colonies. 1156 Information 
Officers in the colonies would be reminded to send copies 
of any material to the BBC such as the recordings of an 
East African Masai ceremony which had been sent to India 
but not to London. 157 
Some in the Colonial Office continued to grumble about 
the BBC, reflecting how some were still uncomfortable with 
the idea of public relations. For example, Sir Cosmo 
Parkinson, Under-Secretary of State complained about BBC 
announcements: 
I am probably rushing in where Sabinic [after Noel 
Sabine the Public Relations Officer] angels fear to 
tread. But it does seem to me intolerable that the 
BBC, whatever other privileges it may aggregate to 
itself in its position of independent 
irresponsibility, should be allowed to garble official 
announcements. 151 
The 'Partnership' Exhibition 
The Colonial Office and the MOI cooperated to mount a 
major travelling exhibition on colonial partnership to 
demonstrate 'why Great Britain has earned the devoted 
patriotism of her colonial people'. In particular, it 
dealt with improvements in health, agriculture, education 
and nutrition and stress the partnership theme by 
attempting 'to break down any conception of inferior racial 
characterisations'. Issues explored in projecting the 
partnership theme included: 'the fundamental similarities 
between the colonial people and ourselves', 'quotations 
from the Prime Minister, the Colonial Secretary, etc. ', 'a 
new battle to be won - an opportunity for service by all 
156 PRO, C0875/14/13, Meeting between the BBC and the 
Colonial office, 26 November 1943. 
157 PRO, C0875/14/13, Meeting between the Colonial 
office and the MOI, 17 December 1943. 
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classes in the vast province of colonial development' , 
'scientific experiment to discover uses for "superseded" 
raw materials' and 'cooperation between British and foreign 
scientists in improving the conditions of colonial 
scientists'. Subjects considered too controversial were 
rejected, for example: 'the aspirations of colonial 
people', 'mistakes we have made, successes we have 
achieved', 'improvements envisaged', 'official denunciation 
of the colour bar' and 'resettling the returned native 
159 soldier'. A room was to be made available at each site 
for the showing of films including a selection of films 
produced by the Colonial Film Unit and filmstrips about the 
colonies. One of the displays at the exhibition would be 
recent publications on colonial subjects including '50 
Facts About the Colonies'. 1160 
A voice of dissent was sounded in the Colonial Office 
who criticised the proposal for being overdramatic. As one 
official observed, 'it all seems frightfully martial, wars, 
fights, challenges etc .... more health, more wealth, more 
education are what the colonies want'. JL63L Despite these 
criticisms the exhibition was considered a great success 
'in stimulating interest in the constructive work which is 
being done in the Colonies for social and economic 
welfare.... [and] as a valuable local focal point for other 
educational activities about the Colonial Empire'. The 
exhibition was always opened in each of the cities by a 
well-known colonial figure, like Lord Hailey or Sir Bernard 
Bourdillon, the former Governor of Nigeria. During the 
exhibition's year-long tour of the country over 400,000 
attended. -'L62 The Colonial Office was delighted with the 
1159 PRO, C0875/19/20, Shackle to Keating, 1 June 1943. 
3-60 PRO, C0875/15/6, Committee on Empire Publicity in 
the United Kingdom, 17 March 1943. 
1163. PRO, CO 875/15/6, minute by Eastwood, 1 July 1943. 
1162 PRO, INF1/112, Report on Publicity about the 
Empire, September to November 1943; July to October 1943. 
The attendance was as follows: 
Newcastle, October 1943,21,751 
Southampton, November - December 1943,28,543 
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exhibition as it provided 'an excellent focussing point for 
colonial publicity'. The exhibition was even mentioned on 
the 6 p. m. and 9 p. m. BBC Home Service news on 17 January 
1944. JL63 Following its nationwide tour the exhibition 
became an exhibit at the Imperial Institute in London until 
1946.1`1 
The Colonial Office also considered mounting an 
exhibition of a more cultural type. Audrey Richards, the 
distinguished anthropologist temporarily employed by the 
Colonial Office during the war, suggested an exhibition of 
primitive African art, crafts and music which would also 
contain films on native life, social service exhibits and 
the African in the modern world accompanied by pictures of 
Africans working in mines, munitions works, in hospitals 
and in the army. Such an exhibition was considered 
important to avoid the impression that everyone in Africa 
was 'a dancing cannibal'. 1165 It was decided that a Gold 
Coast exhibition would be arranged under the auspices of 
the Royal Empire Society and funded by the MOI. 111 
Mass Education In African Society 
The report on Mass Education in African Society drawn 
up by a sub-committee of the Colonial Office's Advisory 
London, December 1943 - January 1944,72,000 
Leeds, February 1944,73,458 
Manchester, March 1944,28,900 
Bristol, April 1944,51,184 
Bradford, April - May 1944,14,213 
Edinburgh, May - June 1944,15,031 
Glasgow, June -July 1944,46,999 
Liverpool, July - August 1944,20,887 
Sheffield, August - September 1944,20,511 
Swansea, September 1944,13,939 
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Committee on Education in the Colonies was publicised in 
late 1943 and early 1944. It was exactly the kind of 
tangible progressive social policy that the colonial 
propagandists wished to publicise as an 'indication of 
future intentions'. However a careful balance had to be 
struck. "' The Colonial Office wanted to avoid the 
impression that a big propaganda 'splash' might create of a 
'new mass education drive in the colonies' under wartime 
conditions. 168 The general line should be 'not to "boost" 
the report' but to 'aim at securing the widest possible 
publicity in organs read by intelligent people'. False 
hopes should not be raised among people who were likely to 
be affected. Publication was deferred until the African 
governors had examined the report's recommendations. `"'ý` 
The Colonial Office thought that it would be difficult 
to 'control the manner in which the popular press might 
exploit this report'. It was therefore decided that a good 
summary would be provided to set 'the tone'. The Colonial 
office helped the MOI to prepare a summary of the main 
points for distribution to the press. 170 Sabine undertook 
to contact the editor of The Times, Barrington-Ward, to 
offer a 'turn-over' article by Elspeth Huxley for 
publication. The BBC hoped to mention it on the Home News 
broadcast on the day of publication and to have a programme 
devoted to it in the 'Red On the Map' series. It was also 
proposed that a Parliamentary Question would be inspired on 
the subject to give the Secretary of State for the Colonies 
the opportunity to refer 'to the report' and say 'that 
copies were available in the Library of the House'. 171 
The foreword of the proof copy was considered good 
M67 PRO, C0875/14/13, meeting between the Secretary of 
State for the Colonies, the MOI and the BBC, 6 August 1943. 
11611 PRO, C0875/14/13, meeting of 13 August 1943. 
I. f, 9 PRO, C0875/14/13, meeting, 3 December 1943. 
170 PRO, C0875/15/9, meeting, 3 December 1943. 
1-73- PRO, C0875/15/9, The Report was debated by 
Margaret Read and Arku Korash in the BBC's series 'Red on 
the Map' on 14 December 1943; PRO, C0875/21/1, Huxley to 
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material for a broadcast. The foreword described the aim 
of extending education in Africa, in line with economic and 
social improvements before political developments: 
Man may be healthy, though illiterate. He may be 
prosperous without being learned. He may, while still 
almost entirely ignorant of the wider duties of a 
citizen live and indeed enjoy life under a government 
which provides him with security and justice 
[but] ... without such general share in education ýn'd* 
such understanding, that democracy cannot 
function and the rising hope of self-government will 
inevitably suffer frustration. 172 
Three pieces were prepared for distribution to the 
press on 'Education in the Colonies'. 'Education and the 
Colonies: Policy and Administration' put the report in the 
context of the general development of thinking on colonial 
policy. It quoted Lord Hailey's speech to a colonial youth 
conference in Newcastle in October. Hailey put the Report 
into the context of developments at home and the wider aims 
of British colonial policy. 'In our domestic politics', he 
said, 'we recognise today that the improvement of the 
standards of living of the community cannot be left to 
individual effort or voluntary organisation it is one of 
the most essential functions of the state'. That principle 
had been projected from domestic into colonial policy. He 
quoted Stanley's speech in July 1943 in which Stanley 
identified educational advance and economic development as 
'the twin pillars upon which any sound scheme of political 
responsibility must be based' for 'the success of self- 
government does not depend only on the capacity of the 
leaders to lead, but also on the ability of the community 
to respond'. X73 
The third piece provided a short summary of the report 
and argued that 'education must not consist merely in 
teaching children in school: it must look to the 
advancement of the whole community'. The summary of the 
Report sought to present the recommendations as a 
continuation of previous government policy and 
172 PRO, C0875/15/9, proof copy of 'Mass Education in 
African Society'; minute by Lloyd, 24 September 1943. 
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complementary to new ideas on development. For example, in 
1935 the Colonial Office's Advisory Committee on Education 
in the Colonies had stated that education should aim 
to render the individual more effective in his or her 
condition of life ... and to promote the advancement 
of the community as a whole through the improvement of 
health, the training of the people the management of 
their own affairs, and the inculcation of ideals of 
citizenship and service. 
Two features of the report were highlighted. First, that 
the 'new impetus' provided by the Colonial Development and 
Welfare Act meant that the rate of progress on improvements 
in education would be 'hastened'. Second, new mass 
education techniques were summarised to achieve the aim of 
the spreading of literacy to all the community focusing on 
the needs of the people in farming and hygiene. Every 
available agency would be used to help promote mass 
education, from the expansion in the availability of cheap 
and suitable reading matter, encouragement of the arts, 
music, dancing and drama, to the possible use of 
broadcasting and the cinema. 1114 
The Times welcomed the report in a leader on 13 
January 1944 seeing it both as 'the' justification of 
Britain's colonial mission and also its aim: 'guiding the 
process by which latent capacities of the less advanced 
races are drawn out until they are ready to bear their own 
political and social responsibilities as members of the 
Commonwealth of equal nations in a world of free peoples'. 
This was particularly true of the people of Africa, who had 
'the longest road to travel to the goal' IL75 
Victory in Africa 
The MOI decided to tell the story 
the African continent in a pictorial 
Africa. The pamphlet was written in 
and designed for African schools. 
were only a limited number of photogrý 
of the campaigns on 
pamphlet, Victory in 
'simplified English' 
Unfortunately, there 
aphs covering 'native 
'-"7-4 PRO, C0875/15/9, 'Education in the Colonies, 
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participation in the African campaign' which led the MOI to 
wonder if it was worthwhile to continue with the pamphlet. 
The Colonial Office wanted to proceed and noted that the 
text was 'excellent' and would lose some of its 
effectiveness if it were not illustrated. The only 
criticism the Colonial Office made about the pamphlet was 
that in the effort to pay tribute to the contribution of 
the African troops in the East African campaign, there was 
a danger that 'the part played by British troops may be 
diminished by lack of sufficient reference'. "' 
The resulting 47 page pamphlet told the story of the 
war in Africa from the Italian invasion of Abyssinia, the 
routing of Italian and German forces in May 1943 to the 
King's visit to Tunis in June. Pictures included not only 
the major figures involved such as Emperor Haile Selassie, 
the King, Winston Churchill, Generals Alexander, Sir Alan 
Cunningham, Wavell, Montgomery and Auchinleck but also 
pictures of African troops, including an African despatch 
rider, Basutos of the Eighth Army holding a Catholic mass, 
the Royal West African Field Force in action and Llanyian 
Dagarti, the first Gold Coast soldier to receive the M. B. E. 
in the war. "' 
The text echoed previous tributes to the contributions 
of colonial troops and emphasised that their efforts were 
Ispontaneous'. Memories of the treatment of the 
Abyssinians by the Italians in 1935 were awakened when 
Italy declared war in June 1940 and led to 'thousands of 
Africans' asking to be 'trained to fight'. Following the 
'great victory' in May 1943 there was 'rejoicing all over 
the world'. Again, the image of unity in the empire was 
evoked, embodied in the figure of the King. The King had 
travelled to Tunis 'to thank the soldiers for the people 
all over the Empire' a 'fitting' tribute following such a 
'great victory'. 1178 The initial print run at the end of 
1"76 PRO, INF1/243, Grigsley to usill, 9 September 
1943; Morgan to Hunter, 4 October 1943. 
177 PRO, INF1/244, COPY Of Victory in Africa. 
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1944 was over ten thousand copies. The pamphlet was so 
successful that another nine thousand were ordered at the 
beginning of 1945.1'79 
Sixty Million of Us 
A major publication in 1943 was the illustrated 
pamphlet to embody the British-colonial partnership in 
fighting the war, Sixty Million of Us. It was intended to 
show the 'growing and united effort by the colonies towards 
winning the war' and 'the solidarity of Empire behind 
Britain'. ` It was important because in showing the 
contribution of all the colonies to the war effort it would 
educational about the empire in a more general way. Huxley 
thought that a 'good book on the colonial war effort' would 
compliment the major publicity drive for the 'partnership' 
theme as long as it was written from the 'right angle'. 3-81 
The implication would be that the 'partnership' of sixty 
million of us to defeat the enemy would continue into 
peacetime. 
It used the theme developed by the King in his Empire 
Day BBC broadcast of 1940 entitled 'sixty million of us'. 
It was also decided that it would not be distributed freely 
in the colonies, Britain and the United States because 
Colonial - Office officials believed that a 'priced 
182 publication had more value than a free one'. 
Sixty Million of Us did not have an auspicious 
beginning. The 'dummy' produced in mid-1942 was criticised 
as 'wooden' and for being 'an aggregation of miscellaneous 
facts rather than a systematic if popular survey of the 
colonial war effort'. A text 'packed with strong meat' was 
3-"7'9 PRO, INF1/243, Biggs to Judd and Crossley, 22 
March 1944; Biggs to Judd, Grigsley and Treneman, 13 March 
1945. 
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sought. M03 Confusion was also evident in the MOI about the 
pamphlet's projected audience. The General Production 
Division of the MOI assumed that the primary audience was 
the colonies, as opposed to Britain, in order to 'keep them 
"sold" on the war and overcome the feeling they were out of 
itI. XS4 
The pamphlet was divided into four sections, 'On Guard 
on Forty Fronts' would show the local defence and strategic 
position of the colonies; 'Food and Supplies are Vital to 
the War Effort' portraying the increases in colonial 
production for the war effort. 'On Active Service' showing 
the colonial military contributions. The last section, 
'Gifts from Colonies to Britain's War Effort', highlighting 
the monetary contributions for things like aeroplanes and 
mobile canteens. The MOI was hampered in its efforts 
because of the limited availability of photographs from the 
colonies. The African war effort, however, was 
illustrated by photographs of scenes like the supply of the 
Middle Eastern war theatre, like a Nyasaland soldier from 
the King's African Rifles, women in munitions factories in 
the North Rhodesian copper mine district, a boy scout 
helping to collect war bonds in Kenya, a Ugandan transport 
steamer across lake Uganda helping in the distribution of 
fresh fruit and vegetables, Kenyan farmers increasing meat 
production for bully beef and bacon to feed the Allied 
armies, colonial nurses from Africa on service during the 
London blitz and the operation of mobile canteens in London 
supplied by Uganda, Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia. The 
products of East Africa were illustrated by a map, as was 
the defence of East Africa. 
Yet to be decided were the questions of the target 
audience and whether the pamphlets should be distributed 
free. As Radcliffe noted, the Colonial Office wished to 
educate the British public as 'material interest in 
colonial matters' was 'very low' and that they regarded the 
pamphlet as 'the apple of their eyes. In other words 
x83 PRO, INF1/245, minute by Grubb, 4 July 1942. 
-'a' PRO, INF1/245, minute by Vaughan, 8 July 1942. 
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nothing better of the same sort will be coming along'. 185 
The idea that some pamphlets would be sold created 
consternation in the MOI where it was thought that the 
whole project had been conceived with free distribution in 
mind. If it was to be sold, the emphasis would have to 
altered and the 'propagandist approach' would have to be 
'much less direct and obvious'. When considered against 
the background of competing propaganda themes and the tight 
reins the Treasury held over financing of free material, it 
became apparent that tension existed because this was just 
another project for the MOI whereas the Colonial Office 
considered the pamphlet to be a major publication. As 
Fraser, noted 'in my view, the relatively slight importance 
of the theme fails to justify the labourl of a kind of 
publication the Colonial Office envisioned would entail. 1186 
The MOI thought that the pamphlet could not be sold in its 
present form and if it needed a fresh approach it would 
find itself at 'the end of a long, long queue'. "' 
Radcliffe, the Director General of the MOI thought the 
General Production Division had underestimated the 
importance of telling the colonial story, not merely as an 
acknowledgement of the empire's contribution but as part of 
the long-term education of British public opinion: 
People will have to stop being bored about the 
colonies if they want the rest of the world to 
acquiesce in our retaining them after the war. And HMG 
does want this. So we must do our best to interest 
people. "' 
The General Production Division remained sceptical. 
Although from the commercial angle there was 'nothing to 
"sell" in it', it was also recognised that 'there seems to 
be some sort of sale for anything these days! '. L89 The key 
therefore would be to make it saleable. Sabine wanted to 
obtain the services of a distinguished writer to write the 
2-85 PRO, INF1/245, minute by Radcliffe, 28 September 1942. 
186 PRO, INF1/245, minute by Fraser, 8 October 1942. 
xG7 PRO, INF1/245, minute by Royds, 10 October 1942. 
188 PRO, INF1/245, Radcliffe to Royds, 14 October 1942. 
x-9 PRO, INF1/245, Royds to Fraser, 16 October 1942. 
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letterpress for the pamphlet. It was again stressed that 
the Colonial Office had to be very clear as to who their 
audience would be because the style would have to be simple 
for distribution in the colonies. 190 
The position was deadlocked. The Empire Division of 
the MOI wanted it to be freely distributed in the colonies 
and the Colonial Office seemed to be considering it from 
sale to the home audience and not for distribution 
abroad. 19' Usill of the Empire Division of the MOI 
suspected that the Colonial Office's real motives were very 
ambitious and wanted Sixty Million of Us to be as 'equally 
well received' booklets like Bomber Command. "' 
Although the MOI General Production Division continued 
to grumble about the Colonial Office's strictures, Usill 
pointed out that 'having gone as far as we have in getting 
them interested in propaganda, I think it would be unwise 
if we were to fight them any further on this matter'. X93 
A compromise was agreed whereby 20,000 copies of the 
pamphlet was prepared for free distribution abroad. For 
the home audience it was hoped that the publishing house, 
Hodder and Stoughton, would distribute the pamphlet in 
Britain at a price of one shilling. -IL94 
The Colonial Office had wanted the Daily Mail's 
features editor, Sidney Horniblow, to write the 
letterpress. Sabine argued thatt 'if we are to present the 
colonies' war effort to this country, it must be done in an 
195 absolutely first class way'. But Huxley pointed out 
that Colonial Office objections to the original dummy's 
style as being treated as popular journalism would not be 
1190 PRO, INF1/245, Usill to Vaughan, 19 October 1942; 
Vaughan to Usill, 10 November 1942. 
11911 PRO, INF1/245, Vaughan to Grigsbey, 15 December 1942. 
1192 PRO, INF1/245, Usill to Vaughan, 16 January 1943. 
193 PRO, INF1/245, Usill to Vaughan, 19 January 1943. 
19' PRO, INF1/245, Production Directive for SixtY 
million of Us, 23 February 1943. 
195 PRO, C0875/15/12, minute by Sabine, 16 April 1943. 
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remedied by Horniblow's treatment. 3-96 Huxley thought the 
MOI dummy was suitable for publication but the Colonial 
Office was not convinced. Ernest Sabben-Clare, the former 
Colonial Office-MOI Liaison Officer adopted a snobbish 
attitude towards the project and suggested scrapping the 
letterpress which meant the pamphlet would only have 
pictures. He argued that 'a good story' was being 'spoiled 
by being told with vulgar flourishes and exaggerations'. 
He illustrated his point with a textual example from the 
original letterpress: 
Just as in this country, the Colonial Empire is geared 
for Total War ... The immediate and whole-hearted 
response of the Colonial Empire in September 1939 was 
a spontaneous demand to be allowed to take the fullest 
possible share of the hazards of war... 
He hoped that 'if a really good pamphlet is to be produced 
... it is not to be written by incompetent hacks at Malet 
Street'. "' 
Hilton Poynton head of the Defence Department agreed 
that it was 'semi-popular rubbish'. -I-90 Among the Colonial 
office's Public Relations Department staff there was also a 
voice of realism. Some argued that a 'semi-popular' style 
was probably the best way of reaching a wide audience. 
Furthermore, its publication would serve a useful purpose 
in supporting the 'Colonial Partnership' exhibition which 
was due to open the following month in Newcastle. if 
British ignorance was to be overcome it was '_q1La_n_ti_tX_ 
rather than quality' which counted. 199 Thomas Lloyd, the 
Deputy Under-Secretary of State agreed, it is not a 
thoughtfully written, well-constructed document that is 
needed but one with popular appeall. 200 
The pamphlet was changed, re-written and re-organised 
by Josephine Kamm of the Empire Information Service but 
1196 PRO, INF1/245, Grigsby to Vaughan, 9 April 1943. 
197 PRO, C0875/15/12, minute by Sabben-Clare, 12 
August 1943. 
1198 PRO, C0875/15/12, minute by Poynton, 13 August 1943. 
3.99 PRO, C0875/15/12, minute by Thomas, 13 August 1943. 
2100 PRO, C0875/15/12, minute by Lloyd, 14 August 1943. 
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retained the original layout. The content was altered to 
take into account war developments and was designed to be 
more in line with the 'partnership' theme. 203- It began by 
reproducing the King's Empire Day broadcast of 1940. The 
first section became 'the Colonial Empire on Guard'. The 
'vulgar flourishes' of the original text were toned down to 
read: 
Just as in this country, the Colonial Empire is geared 
for total war. Although production is their chief 
weapon, the Colonies have sent many of their sons to 
fight overseas, and, like us, they have taken steps to 
defend themselves against possible attack ... The immediate wholehearted response of the Colonial Empire 
in September 1939 was a spontaneous demand to be 
allowed to take the fullest possible share of the 
hazards of war. 
The pamphlet then paid tribute to the colonial efforts in 
self-defence, the establishment of colonial volunteer 
forces and civil defence schemes. 202 The contributions 
made to self-defence in the individual regions of the 
empire were recognised. For example, the civil defence 
organisation in East Africa, echoed the 'Dunkirk' spirit of 
the cooperative effort of every sea vessel, big and small 
with the Kenya Naval Navy Volunteer Reserve placed on a war 
footing and local shipping 'pressed into service for 
minesweeping and anti-submarine duties'. Schooners and 
dhows (among the oldest craft existing) 'helped to defend 
the port of Mombasa and played their similar part in the 
occupation of Italian Somaliland' . 203 
The pamphlet acknowledged the contribution made by the 
colonial medical and nursing services, not just in the 
immediate context of the war but also looked forward to a 
continuing contribution in the post war period: it is our 
policy to train Colonial peoples in sufficient numbers to 
run their own health and medical services. The experience 
they are gaining today will help lay the foundations of a 
7-011 PRO, INF1/245, Kamm to Harlow, 17 June 1943. 
202 PRO, C0875/15/12, Sixtv Million of Us, p. 4. 
203 ibid., P. 5. 
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healthy future'. 204 
This section was followed by pages of pictures. 
'Ready to Defend Their Homeland' depicted a Nyasaland 
soldier of the King's African Rifles testing his '"panga" 
which he uses for woodcutting and sometimes for defence' 
and a picture of KAR soldiers engaged in bayonet 
practice. 211 'Women Play Their Part' showed a women in 
Northern Rhodesia working in a munitions factory making gun 
parts and shell and cartridge cases and a black African 
nurse who had come to work in a British hospital was shown 
with two white colleagues weighing a baby. 206 
The second major section, 'Food and Supplies Are Vital 
to the War Effort' described the 'vital part' the colonies 
played in providing raw materials and by comparing the 
efforts in the colonies to the 'Dig For Victory' campaigns 
at home. This section contained the rather optimistic 
declaration, that 'everywhere the Africans have responded 
eagerly to requests for help, requests which have been 
reinforced by vigorous articles in the African Press'. The 
production of food in East Africa for local consumption was 
described. Because of the wartime shortage of maize 
Africans had been encouraged to adopt a new diet with the 
inclusion of more meat and vegetables which would raise 
general standards of health and was 'another happy augury 
for the future'. 207 
Photographs chosen to illustrate this section included 
'Crops Are Weapons of War' which showed a field of sisal in 
East Africa, and Nyasaland women pounding home grown 
grain. 208 'Food for the Fighters' showed a creamery in 
Nairasha, Kenya, where butter was pressed and packed to be 
sent to troops in the Middle East and a Kenyan bully-beef 
factory which also sent tins of meat to the troops in the 
204 ibid., p. 6. 
205 ibid., p. 9. 
206 ibid., pp. 14-15. 
207 ibid., P. 18. 
208 ibid., pp. 20-1. 
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Middle East. A black Kenyan farmer was shown with one of 
his rams; the mutton was sent to the Middle East and the 
wool was used for army blankets. 209 'Shipping is Vital to 
Victory' illustrated how colonial produce was transported 
with a picture of a Ugandan Lake Victoria steamer and ocean 
going dhow at anchor in the port of Mombasa. 2LO 'Raw 
Materials Means More Munitions' was illustrated with a 
picture of a Northern Rhodesian mine producing copper which 
was used to make field telephone wires and cartridge 
cases. 23LI 
The third section 'the Colonies on Active Service' 
told the story of the colonial troops in the war and again 
emphasised the theme of 'spontaneous' contribution. As 
soon as the war broke out 'from every corner of the 
Colonial Empire came eager assurances of support'. There 
were many examples of the outstanding contributions of the 
colonial forces and their 'enthusiasm and efficiency and 
the gallantry of those who have served in the firing line 
have already made history'. This section continued with 
details of the East African campaign in general and of 
individual acts of heroism in particular. 
For many months after Italy's entry into the war in 
1940, the King's African Rifles, East Africa's white- 
officered regiment, which is composed of men from 
Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika and Nyasaland, bore the 
brunt of the fighting in the desert country of East 
Africa. With the Northern Rhodesian Regiment and the 
Somaliland Camel Corps, they put up a gallant and 
stubborn resistance against overwhelming pressure and 
carried out an orderly evacuation of British 
Somaliland. Later, when we passed over to the 
offensive and invaded Italian Somaliland, the first 
important objective to be captured - Afmadu - fell to 
the KAR and it was the speed of their advance to 
Afmadu which caused the Italians to evacuate Kismayu 
... In February 
1941, in the assault across the Juba 
river, the KAR made history. They hacked a road 
through dense, trackless bush which enabled our 
motorised columns to pass through and cut off the 
enemy's line of retreat 18 miles east of Gehib. In the 
same month a smaller, mobile force, including tanks 
and armored cars, captured Modun and took 1000 
209 ibid., pp. 22-23. 
2110 ibid., pp. 24-25. 
21111 ibid., p. 26. 
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prisoners ... Meanwhile other KAR companies had won 
victories at Todenyang and Namaraputu, while at Merca 
they released 179 British sailors, victims of a Nazi 
raider, who had been lodged in an Italian prisoner of 
war camp ... In Abyssinia, after a number of very 
successful rounding-up operations, the KAR were 
responsible for the brilliant capture of Mount Fike, 
which was instrumental in dealing a death blow to 
Italian hopes of a counter-attack. Further advances 
led in November to the assault on Gondar. East 
African troops and Ethiopian patrols had already 
captured Kulkaba on the road to Gondar, thus opening 
the way to the defences. In the final attack troops 
from all the East African dependencies took part. 212 
The Military medal was awarded to three KAR soldiers from 
Nyasaland, Sergeants Odilo and Walasai and Corporal Rabson. 
Sergeant Odilo's bravery was singled out for special 
mention who led his platoon after the commander was killed 
to go behind enemy lines and captured a machine-gun 
position. 211 
Pictures to illustrate this section included a soldier 
of the KAR and a picture of white Rhodesians with the 
caption '50% of the personnel of a Royal Air Force Bomber 
Command Squadron, which has made many raids on Germany, is 
composed of Northern Rhodesians'. There was an 
accompanying photograph of their homeland, the Victoria 
Falls in Rhodesia. 2" 'Skilled Workers in War Industries' 
showed a woman from Zanzibar, Spize Hooker, working in a 
munitions factory in Britain together with a picture of a 
Zanzibar town to illustrate where she had come from. 2" 
In addition to the contribution to the empire's armed 
forces, the financial contributions made by the colonies 
was highlighted in the final section 'Gifts to Britain's 
War Effort'. Apart from the official contributions made by 
the colonial governments 23 million pounds had been 
subscribed by the people of the colonies and 8 million 
212 ibid., p. 30. 
213 ibid., p. 31. 
214 ibid., pp. 32-35. 
22-5 ibid., p. 38. 
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pounds had been loaned. 216 
Colonial contributions greatly varied in size. They 
ranged from the government of Uganda's contribution to a 
fighter aircraft fund resulted in its name being given to a 
Hurricane squadron to the individual contribution by an old 
woman in Tanganyika. The experience of an individual was 
used to illustrate the larger theme: 
Nowhere is there greater devotion to the Allied cause 
than in Germany's former colonies. In Tanganyika, 
which has been mandated to Britain only since the last 
war, an old woman walked into a mission dispensary 
carrying a tin of flour. 'Take this for aeroplanes', 
she said. 'I have got no money but have saved up all 
my food for today for you to give to help to buy an 
aeroplane. I would fast for a week to keep the Germans 
out of our country, ' she added. 'I do not want my 
children and grandchildren to suffer under them as we 
did'. 217 
This section was illustrated with pictures of a mobile 
canteen donated by Zanzibar, providing refreshments to 
people clearing away air-raid debris in London, a picture 
of a mobile canteen donated by Uganda supplying drinks to 
the RAF and an army recreation hut also donated by 
Uganda. 2" The pamphlet ended with the tribute 'the 
peoples of the Colonial Empire are our friends. We salute 
them! ' 
Although the Colonial Office criticised small details, 
Sabine fel t that the new version was 'a. great improvement 
2X9 
on the earlier drafts'. Approximately 10,000 copies 
220 
were distributed in the colonies. 7,500 were put on 
216 ibid., p. 40. 
227 ibid., p. 41. 
228 ibid., pp. 44-45. 
219 PRO, INF1/245, Sabine to Huxley, 19 August 1943. 
220 PRO, INF1/245, Biggs to Judd and Crossley, 25 
October 1943. 
The following were ordered for East and Central 
Africa: 
500 for Kenya 
250 for Northern Rhodesia 
100 for Nyasaland 
200 for Tanganyika 
150 for Uganda 
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sale to the public who attended the 'Colonial Partnership' 
exhibition but only half of these were sold. 223- This 
disappointing lack of sales was explained by the waning of 
public interest in the war effort. By mid-1944 people were 
more interested in 'the ebb and flow of current battles, 
and in the shape of things to come. 1222 
Reaction to the pamphlet from East Africa was 
generally good. The P. I. O. in East Africa, Sir Geoffrey 
Northcote, felt it was 'very well executed' but complained 
that some of the captions were incorrect. From Zanzibar 
one of the pictures of a Zanzibarian woman identified as 
'Spize Hooker' had unfortunate repercussions. Her features 
and hairstyle were not found in Zanzibar and her name was 
unfamiliar. The feeling that the picture had been 'faked' 
called into question all British propaganda: 'if this 
picture is faked then other pictures are faked and if 
pictures why not news? "21 The Colonial Office proved to 
be at a loss to explain the problem concerning Spize Hooker 
as she had told the photographer that she was from 
Zanzibar. 211 
Self-Government in the Colonies 
Propaganda for the shape of things to come was 
embodied the MOI produced a pamphlet Self-Government in the 
Colonies, was designed mainly with an American audience in 
mind. A draft version contained the statement: 
We are pledged to guide the Colonial peoples along the 
road to self-government within the framework of the 
British Empire. We are pledged to build up their 
social and economic institutions and we are pledged to 
develop their natural resources. 
This statement caused concern in the Colonial Office and 
150 for Zanzibar 
500 for Sir Geoffrey Northcote P. I. O. East Africa 
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showed the Colonial Office was still sensitive about making 
definite pledges about political developments in the 
colonial empire. As the Deputy Public Relations Officer, 
Ambler Thomas* commented, 'it seems to me that sometimes 
that Moi propaganda assumes too glibly that self- 
government is the aim of British policy'. He recognised 
that this kind of thing was a 'bull point' in propaganda to 
the United States but it was usually accompanied with the 
qualification that an aim of British policy is 'progress on 
the road to self-government' conditioned by the laying of 
225 'sound foundations'. 
Arthur Benson* on temporary secondment from Northern 
Rhodesia and later governor of the dependency shared 
Thomas's 'unease' about the use of such a 'loose phrase' 
but pointed out that Stanley frequently used it. Therefore 
the Colonial Office could not backtrack since that might 
lead to demands for explicit definitions which 'with the 
best will in the world we could not give ... that is not 
the British method. Developments depend on future 
developments'. Benson also recognised that the aim of 
policy was to ensure that the colonial peoples were 'taking 
the maximum part possible ... in the management of their 
own internal affairs' and therefore 'self-government' was 
'a proper description of our aim'. 226 
Josephine Kamm re-wrote the pamphlet outlining the 
specific constitutional progress made in each colonial 
territory. The offending statement on self-government was 
altered to meet Colonial Office objections: 
'The striking feature of the British Empire is its 
diversity of peoples and conditions. We have been 
obliged to establish and operate a system of 
administration distinguished above all by variety, 
flexibility and elasticity'. These are the words of 
Lord Cranborne, as Secretary of State for the 
Colonies in 1942. 'We have no cut and dried pattern', 
he added. 'We have adopted and adapted existing 
systems, changing them readily as the need arose and 
experience taught'. 
Lord Cranborne's statement illustrates an 
essential characteristic of colonial policy, a policy 
225 PRO, C0875/21/3, minute by Thomas, 17 February 1944. 
226 PRO, C0875/21/3, minute by Benson, 19 February 1944. 
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which even in the strain and anxiety of total war 
fosters and encourages political progress. It is a 
policy with one ultimate goal - self-government for 
the Colonial Empire within the framework of the 
Commonwealth. The steps by which this self-government 
can be achieved may (and do) differ from territory to 
territory and will not necessarily culminate in 
dominion status as we know it in Canada, Australia, 
New Zealand and South Africa. The aim is to educate 
people as rapidly as possible to assume the greatest 
measure of responsibility in their own government 
along the lines best suited to their own capacity. 227 
Kamm supported her argument with examples of the political 
advances made in the colonies. In Nyasaland, for example, 
Kamm described the decision taken in July 1944 to establish 
two advisory African Provincial Councils as an, 'important 
link between the government and the people ... consultation 
between the government and the people through their 
recognised leaders will thereby be facilitated and the 
development of political responsibility among Africans will 
be advanced'. 
Sabine was delighted with the improvements and noted 
the importance of reinforcing 'the many statements which 
have been made about self-government by some solid facts 
about what has been achieved in recent years. The account 
is a good one'. The United States was sent 10,000 copies 
of the pamphlet and 10-20,000 were used in Britain. 220 
The Re-opening of the Race Question 
Although the Colonial Office and the MOI managed to 
launch their publicity campaign for greater awareness in 
Britain about the colonial empire and the promotion of the 
new policy of 'partnership', the question of race relations 
threatened this new image of empire relations. This left 
the Colonial Office vulnerable to charges of hypocrisy. 
After the American entrance into the war, the background 
against which race questions were discussed changed. This 
hampered Colonial Office initiatives to produce a 
declaration of policy on the subject. Americans were 
2277 PRO, C0875/21/3, COPY of Progress Towards Self- 
Government-in the-British Colonial Empire, by Josephine Kamm. 
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imported into Britain as part of the build up for D-Day and 
with them they imported their Jim Crow policies of racial 
segregation in an army where black Americans were 'equal 
but separatel. 129 By the time D-Day arrived their were 
130,000 black GIs in Britain. 230 
Britain was anxious that American racial practices 
would not spread to the British Army. Lord Cranborne noted 
this had implications for the Colonial Office's plans to 
issue a statement on the colour bar in the colonies. A 
public declaration against the colour bar would be 
interpreted by white American troops as 'a direct rebuke' 
and would exacerbate 'an already difficult situation'. 2331 
The first reaction of the British authorities was to 
try and avoid an awkward'situation in the first place and 
the government tried to exclude black GIs from coming to 
Britain at all. When this failed it was clear that 
whatever the Colonial Office may have argued, the 
government 'was certainly not prepared to risk-the wrath of 
232 its vital ally by coming out against jim crow'. 
Regional Commissioners for Civil Defence drew the War 
Office's attention to the brawling between black and white 
GIs when they met in social situations in pubs, cinemas and 
at dances. There was also concern at the relationships 
formed between black GIs and white British women. Seven 
months after the first black GIs had arrived in Britain the 
War office decided that while the segregation in the 
American army was a matter of their own concern, British 
officers would lecture their troops on the need to minimise 
contact with black Americans. Even more controversially 
General Arthur Dowler, commander of the Southern Region of 
England distributed 'Notes on Relations with Coloured 
Troops' to his district commanders. The notes while urging 
229 For the impact of the arrival of black American 
troops in Britain c. f. Graham Smith, When Jim Crow met John 
Bull: Black American Soldiers in World War II Britain 
(London, 1987) and Reynolds, OP-cit., chapters 14 and 18. 
230 Reynolds, OP-cit-, p. 303. 
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232 Smith, op. cit., P. 36. 
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British troops to be sympathetic towards black GIs also 
stated black people had a 'simple mental outlook'. British 
troops should be friendly but not intimate and should 
'avoid such action as would tend to antagonize the white 
American soldier'. White women should not associate with 
black GIs at all . 233 
The Colonial Office had not been informed, though it 
is debateable whether their protests could have stopped the 
distribution of these notes. The Colonial Office was angry 
at the 'puerile and prejudiced' attitudes revealed in 
Dowler's notes. It was not surprising that stories about 
this official policy found their way into the press and 
questions about the issue of a 'colour bar' was raised in 
the House of Commons at the end of September 1942. The 
Cabinet considered the question in October and decided that 
the government should not embarrass the American government 
over the colour bar question. 234 
In practice black GIs found they were more warmly 
welcomed by the British than the government attitude 
suggested. The Home Office even sent instructions to Chief 
Constables 'not to assist American efforts to enforce 
segregation'. While in some quarters the liaisons formed 
between white women and black GIs were frowned upon, it 
seemed that in general the British public distinguished 
between 'civil rights and sexual wrongs'. 235 Of course 
prejudice existed. David Reynolds related the apocryphal 
story of an upper class English woman who wrote to the 
commander of a local American base, inviting six of his men 
for Sunday lunch: 
But, she added, 'No Jews please'. on Sunday there was 
a knock at the door and she opened it to find six 
black Americans standing there. Horrified, she gasped 
that there must be some mistake. 'Oh no, ma'am', one 
of them replied, 'Colonel Cohen no make any 
233 Reynolds, op. cit., p. 224 and Smith op. cit., pp. 54- 
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mistakes' . 
236 
On the other hand the black GIs were often favourably 
compared to their white compatriots as more polite and less 
aggressive. As one Englishman was reported to have said 'I 
don't mind the Yanks, but I don't care much for the white 
fellows they've brought with them' . 237 
Notwithstanding the evidence of general British 
tolerance the Colonial Office still had to deal with the 
impact of the American occupation on British colonial 
subjects. The Colonial Office did what it could to condemn 
racial prejudice while not publicly embarrassing the 
American authorities. In mid-1943 the Colonial Office was 
confronted with the problem of the negative publicity 
arising from the discrimination experienced by Learie 
Constantine, the Jamaican cricketer and employee of the 
Ministry of Labour. Constantine, his wife and child had 
been refused accommodation at the Imperial Hotel in Russell 
Square on the grounds that the 200 American officers 
staying there would object to their presence. The story 
received publicity in the British press and the 
representative of the Associated Negro Press in London, 
Rudolph Dunbar, intended to file a report back to the 
United States. The Permanent Under-Secretary of State at 
the Colonial Office, Sir George Gater took the matter up 
with the Secretary of State for the Colonies and the legal 
aspects were explored to discover whether there were 
adequate grounds for a law suit. The Colonial Office 
considered issuing a statement on the case which resulted 
in an 'inspired statement' written by Sabine published in 
the News Chronicle. The MOI sent a guidance telegram to 
its overseas Information Officers condemning the action 
taken by the Imperial Hotel. Constantine took legal action 
against the hotel and successfully sued them and was 
2316 Reynolds, op. cit., PP. 303-4. 
237 ibid., P. 303. 
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awarded five pounds in damages. 
230 
Paul Emrys-Evans, the Conservative Parliamentary 
Under-Secretary of State at the Dominions Office, made a 
statement on behalf of the government in the House of 
Commons in reply to questions about the Constantine case. 
Evans reiterated that Stanley 'most strongly' condemned 
'any form of racial discrimination against Colonial people 
in this country'. 239 During a debate on colonial affairs 
which took place before the Christmas recess in 1943, 
Stanley took the opportunity to re-state the government's 
position on the colour bar and the Constantine case: 
I have said before, and I say in no unmeasured terms, 
that I am against it. As far as this country is 
concerned, the colour bar is a social question. It is 
a question which it is very difficult for the 
Governments or Legislatures to interfere. It is 
difficult by laws to prevent a certain number of ill- 
mannered and ignorant people allowing ill-manners and 
ignorance to get the better of them. 240 
The colour bar question was considered internally 
within the Colonial Office. At the end of 1942 the 
Colonial Office had asked Sir Mervyn Tew to prepare a 
report on the legal aspects of the colour bar in the 
colonies. Christopher Eastwood, former Private Secretary 
to Lords Lloyd and Moyne and head of the General 
Department, doubted the practicability of issuing a 
statement on the basis of_Tew's findings. The problem was 
that the colour bar was not merely a legal problem as it 
existed in other areas, such as in social relationships-24" 
The Colonial Office therefore considered asking the 
colonial governments to prepare reports on the enforcement 
of the colour bar in social situations in their 
territories. Kenneth Blaxter head of the Social Services 
Department thought such a request would 'overburden' the 
colonial governments and suggested that the subject should 
238 PRO, C0875/14/13, periodic meetings between the 
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be raised when the war situation was 'easier'. The 
question remained whether the Colonial Office should make a 
statement about its policy towards the colour bar in the 
colonies. John Keith thought that the statements made in 
the House of Commons about the Constantine case had already 
made the Colonial Office's position clear and recommended 
that further statements would be considered if the need 
arose in the future. In the meantime he thought that it 
was a good idea to ask the colonial governments to prepare 
a report on discrimination in social and administrative 
fields 'with a view to, the gradual elimination of 
inequalities'. He felt however that the considerable 
effort which was being made 'to improve the social, 
economic and political status of Colonial peoples provides 
an effective answer to allegations of discrimination'. 242 
Sir Thomas Lloyd agreed that the time was not 
opportune for a general statement, now or in the future, as 
he doubted that the 'political advantages' of such a 
statement would not outweigh 'some of the practical and 
administrative difficulties' of making a comprehensive 
declaration. The difficulties he foresaw were demands for 
equal pay and unwanted comparisons between the declaration 
and the actual record. Instead Lloyd recommended that the 
colonial governments should be sent a copy of Tew's report 
with a request that the Secretary of State for the Colonies 
wanted a report on the social aspects of the colour bar in 
the colonies. Stanley agreed and the matter was put to one 
side to be considered at a latter date. 243 
Propaganda in the United States 
Although it was the government's policy of Allied 
unity not to embarrass the United States about the subject 
of race relations, increased efforts were made to educate 
the American public about the British empire. The Colonial 
Secretary, Oliver Stanley, hoped that American enthusiasm 
for a colonial declaration would die 'a natural death' and 
242 PRO, C0859/126/4, minute by Keith, 28 October 1944. 
243 PRO, C0859/126/4, minute by Lloyd, 17 December 1944. 
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wanted to let 'sleeping dogs lie'. From mid-1943 global 
security considerations assumed greater importance. While 
there were Anglo-American disagreements over the 
trusteeship question, American policy had 'tended to 
support rather than break up the Imperial system'. "' This 
did not mean that the British government could afford to be 
complacent about its empire in its relations with United 
States. Vigilance was necessary lest latent anti-imperial 
sentiment reappeared or the colonial declaration issue was 
raised again. 
It was seen in chapter four that it had been agreed 
that the empire publicity campaign in the United States 
would be intensified once British public opinion had been 
'firmed up'. As the Colonial Office explained it to the 
Foreign Office, the order should be 'Contented Colonies, 
Contented United Kingdom, Contented United States of 
America' for, 'unless opinion in this country is correct, 
we can hardly expect the people of the United States to be 
what we call "sound"'. "' Therefore, once the campaign to 
promote 'partnership' was up and running from mid-1943 
consideration of colonial publicity in the United States 
could be undertaken. 
As part of this new campaign Alan Dudley of the North 
American Department of the Foreign Office proposed that 
British officers serving in the United States be brought 
back to Britain for 'refresher courses' because 'most of 
them might derive a good deal of benefit from an insight 
into what is being done to stimulate British interest in 
the Empire'. Huxley thought this was an 'excellent idea' 
and proposed that the Empire Information Service arrange 
courses to be held at Oxford the following summer. Sabine 
agreed and recommended that the people concerned could be 
given a copy of Hancock's Argument of Empire to stimulate 
the 'necessary interest'. Darvall, head of the American 
Division at the MOI concurred and added that the MOI had 
arranged for officers returning to Britain from America to 
244 Louis, ORe cit., p. 313 and 567. 
, 245 pRO, F0371/34087/A2404, Rawdon Smith to Dudley, 9 
March 1943. 
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travel via the West Indies and Africa in order to 'enlarge 
their experience'. 24t, 
The tremendous increase in the amount of material 
produced by the Empire Information Service of the MOI for 
their empire publicity campaign in Britain was also sent to 
the BIS in the United States. This material was used, as 
MacDougall had recommended, to endlessly and continually 
repeat the facts. The Empire Information Service also 
produced special pamphlets ordered by BIS. For example, an 
illustrated pamphlet, African Challenge: the Story of the 
British in Tropical Africa, traced the history of British 
involvement in Africa from opening up East and West Africa, 
through the break up of the slave, trade, to the 
achievements of early administrators and missionaries, 
ending with the political, social and economic work and its 
importance for the future of Africa. 24-1 
The British Library of Information in New York 
continued to answer questions on empire subjects. Material 
specially produced with an American audience in mind as 
part of the 'Bulletins from Britain' series included, Sir 
William McLean, the Colonial Office Representative at the 
New York World's Fair and head of the Colonial Office 
Reference Department wrote 'The Colonial Economy, Past 
Present and Future', Douglas Woodruff, the author and 
former press officer at the EMB wrote 'Traders Gave Place 
to Chartered Companies, They in Turn to Governors: Joint 
Aims of Justice and Self-Government', Harold Butler, 
minister in charge of propaganda at the British Embassy in 
Washington wrote 'Labour Conditions in the British 
Colonies: Progressive Policy is Improving Social Standards: 
Welfare the Primary Object and Joyce Cary*, the author and 
former Colonial Service officer in Nigeria wrote 
'Britain's Colonial Record, Founded on Freedom and Law 
2" PRO, F0371/34093/A7658, Dudley to Huxley, 18 
August 1943; Huxley to Dudley, 23 August 1943; Sabine to 
Dudley, 14 September 1943; minutes of a meeting between the 
Colonial, Dominions, Foreign and India Offices and the MOI, 
16 September 1943. 
247 PRO, C0875/21/1, Empire Information Service 
Progress Report, March - June 1945. 
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Which Governs Both Rulers and Ruled: New Ideas of 
Government'. "' The economic relationship between the 
colonies and Britain was handled very carefully as it was 
considered 'bad propaganda' in the United States because it 
would encourage the American belief that exploitation was 
the motivating factor in British colonial policy, with the 
empire regarded as a 'gold mine'. Therefore the emphasis 
was on what Britain was doing for her colonies, not what 
they did for Britain. The colonial contribution to the war 
effort was meant to show that 
far from wanting to break away from an oppressive 
United Kingdom [they] were anxious to contribute what 
they could from their small resources to the defence 
249 
of their mother country. 
The BIS had a special watching brief to summarise the 
attitude of American organisations on post-war affairs, 
including American attitudes towards the British empire. 
Although the American public was less interested in 
Britain's African colonies than in India and the Far East, 
the Foreign Office was encouraged that 'elite' opinion 
about the empire in Africa was more sound. American 
academic interest in Africa had been aroused because of 
'the bearing of African problems on the negro question' in 
the United States and had led to the study of the subject. 
The Phelps-Stokes Fund published a volume, The Atlantic 
Charter and Africa from an American Standpoint, which 
contained some criticisms of British colonial 
administration. It recommended that Africans should be 
given a larger share of government in their countries and 
suggested that the goal of ultimate self-government should 
definitely be accepted. In general, however, the picture 
of Britain's colonial administration was a 'favourable 
one I. 250 
David MacDougall the Colonial Office-MOI colonial 
248 PRO, C0875/18/16/file. 'Bulletins from Britain' 
articles had a distribution of 60-100,000. 
249 PRO, C0875/16/1, Darvall to Colonial Office, 13 
August 1943. 
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attache at the British Embassy in Washington presented an 
acerbic picture of academic liberal Americans interested in 
the future of Africa who sought, under the auspices of the 
Phelps-Stokes Fund, to establish an African Institute in 
the United States. MacDougall managed to get an invitation 
to the preliminary planning conference as an observer. 
According to MacDougall the conference was chaotic. Sixty 
delegates decided that the first purpose of this conference 
was to plan for an International Conference at a later date 
and to decide on the areas of discussion. The proceedings 
became 'amusing' because an argument broke out between 
anthropologists and missionaries advocating their 
particular methods as the only solution to African 
problems. To add to the chaos Robert Gardener from the 
Gold Coast wanted an undertaking to invite Africans to the 
proposed conference 'to prove they were not the helpless 
victims of imperialism'. It transpired that two West 
African students studying in New York had been invited to 
this planning conference but had declined the invitation 
'on the grounds that it was undemocratic to select 
delegates by name'. Nothing was decided after four and 
half hours of debate and 'nobody listened to anyone else' 
except to elect a seven person committee to decide who 
would be invited to the International conference . 251 
On a more serious note the Phelps-Stokes Fund also 
planned a conference on the war and peace aims in Africa to 
follow on form the publication of their book on Africa and 
the Atlantic Charter. Head of the African Department at 
the Colonial Office, Sir Arthur Dawe agreed with 
MacDougall's assessment that this development did not 'look 
promising'. The main problem was the presence of the 
writer, civil rights campaigner and Director of Research 
of the National Association for the Advancement of Coloured 
People, Professor William Du Bois of Atlanta University. 
Consistent in his criticism of all imperialism, Du Bois, 
according to MacDougall, 'learns nothing and forgets 
nothing'. Du Bois's professional life seemed 'to have been 
built around allegation that the British in 1919 torpedoed 
252. PRO, C0875/19/6, MacDougall to Sabine, 26 March 1943. 
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his Pan-African Conference in Paris'. MacDougall feared 
that the conference would attack Britain's colonial 
administration in Africa but was relieved that the 
conference committee had the restraining influences of 
Mumford, a former superintendent of education in Tanganyika 
and the former head of the Colonial Department at the 
Institute of Education of London University, and Edwin 
Smith, former President of the Royal Anthropological 
Institute of Great Britain. 151 
As part of his work in the United States MacDougall 
hoped to enlist the services of American writers to 
undertake publicity about the British empire; 'there is 
nothing we can say or do in America which is not better 
said or done by Americans'. He hoped to find an American 
to produce a pamphlet on Africa which would be 'non- 
political and non-controversial'. He told Sabine that his 
efforts had been successful; 'manna has been falling from 
Heaven' as he had managed to enlist the help of the 
prominent liberal and Noble Prize winning novelist Pearl 
Buck and author of The Good Earth to get her husband's 
publishing company -to produce a series of illustrated 
pamphlets designed to appeal to the families of American 
troops serving overseas to be called 'So Your Boy is in 
Africa'. "' How he managed to secure her cooperation is 
unclear and remarkable given Buck's past record of 
campaigning on behalf of the Indian nationalist cause 
against British policy in India. 254 
Further manna fell from heaven in the shape of the 
State Department. Unlike the defence departments who 
supported the continuation of empires to promote stability, 
the State Department thought in terms of decolonisation and 
252 PRO, C0875/19/6, memorandum on the Committee on 
Africa, the War and Peace Aims, 7 May 1943; minute by Dawe, 
26 may 1943; MacDougall to Sabine, 8 June 1943. 
253 PRO, C0875/18/19, Macdougall to Sabine, 12 January 
1943,12 June 1943 and 14 June 1943. 
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independence. "' Henry Villiard, the Assistant Chief of 
the Division of Near Eastern Affairs of the State 
Department who became head of the African Division of the 
State Department in 1944, spoke to a conference at the 
Chatanqua Institute. He outlined the future of American 
relations with Africa and was subsequently quoted in a 
State Department Press Release. Villiard, 'sympathetic to 
the affairs of the British Empire' 256 spoke on the trading 
opportunities the United States would have in Africa after 
the war and quoted point four of the Atlantic Charter which 
envisioned equal access to world trade and raw materials. 
He noted that the future administration of colonial empires 
was still under discussion but sought to remind Americans 
that 'only a small minority of peoples in the colonies have 
expressed a desire for self-government'. M57 While he 
thought it was safe to assume that 'many more would ask for 
it if they knew what it meant and were able to make their 
wishes known', he also knew it to be true 'that many of the 
inhabitants of these countries are actually opposed to 
self-government'. 21' In support of this claim he offered 
the case of 'numerous Africans' in Nigeria who opposed 
self-government 'on the grounds that they receive a greater 
measure of justice from the British courts than they do 
from the African courts functioning in the same districts, 
and because of the fear that many of the people would fare 
less well under a purely African regime'. Even more 
controversially he echoed sentiments often expressed behind 
the closed doors in Whitehall which viewed the American 
attitude towards colonial questions as hypocritical. He 
reminded his audience that"we would do well to reflect 
that we have minorities in territories under the United 
255 Louis, op. cit., p. 6. 
256 Louis, op. cit., p. 386. 
257 PRO, C0875/18/19, State Department Press Release, 
18 August 1943. 
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States flag who call for self-government'. "' Even though 
many Americans might agree with people who called for self- 
government in areas under American control, Villiard noted 
'we would scarcely welcome being advised by our allies to 
hasten the grant of self-government wherever it is asked'. 
Moreover, if Americans considered 'how thorny are the 
problems in our own territories, we will be less hasty in 
reaching conclusions about Africal. 260 
These remarks represented a new and more circumspect 
State Department attitude towards Africa. As MacDougall 
noted, these remarks were even more significant as this was 
the first time a member of the State Department had gone on 
record about American policy towards Africa. The Colonial 
Office welcomed this statement for it sought to arouse the 
interest of the American people in African problems. In 
addition this showed that the State Department had 
developed a 'sensible attitude' to the question. 261 
The Armed Services had also been asked for advice 
about the military aspects of Anglo-American relations and 
the War Office was represented on the Law Committee on 
American Opinion about the United Kingdom and the Colonies. 
Following a visit by Lieutenant-Colonel Cantlie to the 
African Commands in June 1943, the propaganda benefits of 
ensuring that American troops in transit from the United 
States formed the best possible opinions of Britain's 
African colonies during their stay were emphasised. His 
report highlighted American reactions and the need for 
better accommodation, particularly in West Africa. 
Americans, Cantlie noted, had high standards and therefore 
an American's first impression of a British colony was 
bound to be unfavourable with its 'corrugated houses, 
narrow unplanned streets and above all the lack of a 
"civilised" hotel'. The spartaness of his surroundings 
would lead him to think that Britain was 'draining West 
259 ibid. 
` ibid. 
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Africa's wealth into her own pocket'. In East Africa, 
first impressions were far better and American visitors to 
Mombasa and Nairobi had 'nothing but praise for their 
surroundings'. The Imperial Hotel in Kampala, Uganda was 
262 luxurious and would 'compare with any London hotel'. 
The Colonial Office subsequently asked the governors in 
West Africa to ensure that the 'itinerant' Americans were 
'properly entertained and taken around'. 263 
As a result of MacDougall's visit to the United 
States, a general agreement between the BIS and the British 
Embassy in Washington was reached about the future lines of 
colonial publicity in the United States. Conscious of the 
audience's predilection for independence the 
recommendations placed great emphasis on the political 
future of the empire. First, the nature of the British 
Commonwealth as 'a living developing organisation, the most 
successful example in history of large-scale voluntary 
association between peoples of differing races and creeds'. 
Second, the Commonwealth's evolutionary character: 'the 
movement is forward to ultimate self-government'. This 
process was complete in the Dominions, in Southern Rhodesia 
and India the goal was 'in sight', in Ceylon it was 'well 
past the half-way house', West Africa was 'being prepared 
to follow ... and so on down to North Borneo where 
political tutelage is in its infancy'. Third, the 
Commonwealth as a democratic world force: among colonial 
peoples the empire has created the aspirations which are 
now being satisfied'. Fourth, in addition to teaching the 
citizens of the empire about 'concepts of equality before 
the law and of individual freedom', the empire also 
'improved their standards of living by means of education, 
social welfare, and economic development'. Fifth, the 
post-war world needed the stability of the Commonwealth 
structure for 'whatever post-war system of international 
co-operation is envisaged', it would need the experience 
and structure of the Commonwealth, without which it could 
262 PRO, C0875/19/3, Rowe to Dudley, 15 June 1943. 
263 PRO, F0371/34095/AllO33, minutes of the Law 
Committee meeting, 26 November 1943. 
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scarcely be more than a political dream'. Finally, that it 
had been Hitler's aim 'to break up the British empire' and 
if he achieved this aim 'the war would have been lost'. 264 
MacDougall's other recommendations were approved by 
the BIS and were designed to be part of a 'long-term 
programme of adult education' in the United States. These 
were establishment of a Chair in Colonial History at an 
American University, the establishment of a British 
Colonial Research Library in New York and the appointment 
of a Colonial Advisor to the staff of the British Embassy 
in Washington. 211 The Colonial Office liked the idea of a 
Chair in Colonial History as part of general public 
relations work in the United States because 'we should be 
reaching, even if only to a limited extent, a number of 
people whose views in turn might well influence many more 
Americans'. 266 Several suggestions were made about which 
university should be the location of the Chair, either at 
Columbia, Princeton, Harvard or Yale. 267 Funding was 
difficult but the British Council had expressed an interest 
and was prepared to bend its rule against involving itself 
268 in 'information' activities in the United States. 
The Colonial Office agreed that it would be a good 
idea to establish a Colonial Research Library in New York 
with a staff of two but did not think that a Colonial 
Publicity Advisor to the British Embassy in Washington was 
necessary because of the acute colonial manpower problem. 
Instead it was thought that if the staff of the Colonial 
Library were selected carefully they could provide BIS with 
the necessary guidance. The Colonial Office was already 
represented in Washington by John MacPherson, former Chief 
264 PRO, C0875/18/2, memorandum by MacDougall, 
'Colonial Propaganda Themes in America', undated. 
265 PRO, C0875/19/7, MacDougall to Butler, 21 June 1943. 
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Secretary in Palestine and now the head of the British 
Colonies Supply Mission (and later a Governor of Nigeria 
and the Permanent Under-Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, 1956-9). It was therefore thought possible that 
he could undertake this kind of work in addition to his 
other duties .2 69' A meeting between the Colonial Office and 
the MOI was held to brief MacPherson before he left to take 
up his new post. MacPherson was to draw Butler's attention 
to the lack of manpower problem in filling any of the posts 
at the Embassy and the British Library of Information in 
New York. 27 0A compromise was reached whereby the Library 
would be reinforced with a special colonial section instead 
of a separate Colonial Research Library. 271 
In spite of these developments tension continued to 
exist between the Colonial and Foreign Offices over how far 
the British government should seek to placate the United 
States about British colonial policy. During the meeting 
of Allied Foreign Ministers at Moscow in October 1943, the 
American Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, raised the 
question of the joint Anglo-American declaration on the 
colonies. In December 1943 the Foreign office reopened the 
question of a colonial declaration and whether a fresh 
initiative should be made with the Americans. At a meeting 
of the Law Committee, Sir George Gater expressed the 
Colonial Office view that the issue should not be a matter 
for the Foreign Office alone but should be discussed by the 
Ministers concerned. Alan Dudley thought that a 
declaration which dealt not only with 'Colonies (which in 
practice means our Colonies)' but also with 'the 
development of tropical backward areas irrespective of 
269 PRO, C0875/18/12, Thomas to Huxley, 1 November 
1943. The Colonial Office hoped for 'great things' from his 
appointment as he was an 'excellent man' and a 'very live 
wire', PRO, F0371/34095/AllO33, minutes of the Law 
Committee, 26 November 1943, comments by Sir George Gater. 
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their form of government' would be acceptable. 27 2 However, 
the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Oliver Stanley 
continued to argue publicly against a colonial charter. In 
a speech in Leeds in January 1944 Stanley maintained that: 
A Colonial Charter may be all right if you mean by 
that a common objective in all Colonial problems, but 
if you can produce one document which will lay down 
for all those forty different territories exactly what 
is going to happen to each of them so that they can 
advance together at a stated time you will realise 
that this very diversity ... makes that quite impossible. 
Instead, he argued, the British government preferred to 
talk about 'partnership' towards the colonial empire, 'to 
enable it to develop on three simultaneous lines of advance 
political, social and economic'. A charter would not serve 
any useful purpose as it would not take into account the 
diversity of conditions in the British empire: 
politically, our declared aim is gradually to bring 
the Colonies to a position of self-government within 
the British Empire ... we do not want uniform 
development; we want each to develop the form of 
government which is most suitable to it. 273 
Christopher Eastwood, head of the General Department 
at the Colonial Office, opposed reviving the joint 
declaration. In his view the original raison dletre for 
the proposal, i. e. the 'criticism in America and elsewhere 
of our colonial policy caused by the fall of Malaya', had 
passed. 274 Richard Law presented Stanley with the Foreign 
Office view and said that it was clear that the Americans 
had 'made some advance on their original position regarding 
colonial questions' and that it was equally clear they were 
not prepared 'to shelve the question indefinitely'. 275 
Therefore at an inter-departmental meeting between the 
Colonial, Dominion and Foreign Offices agreed that the 
272 PRO, F0371/40749/UglO, Eden to Attlee, 31 January 
1944; PRO, F0371/34095/AllO33, minute by Dudley, 9 December 
1943. 
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British government would oppose a joint declaration on the 
colonies but would consider committing the government to 
establishing as part of world organisation machinery good 
colonial administration for the material and well-being of 
dependent peoples, for example regional commissions with 
consultative but not administrative functions. 276 
Stanley agreed to meet Dr. Isaiah Bowman who was part 
of the Stettinius mission to Britain in April 1944 to 
discuss the question. Stanley argued that a joint 
declaration which merely re-stated 'what had been said in 
this country during the last few months, might well seem an 
anti-climax'. In any case, he argued, the empire consisted 
of so many different territories at different stages of 
development that 'any general principles had to be the 
lowest common denominator, with the result that they were 
apt to look pretty thin'. Bowman seemed to be convinced by 
Stanley's arguments and agreed that no attempt should be 
made to resurrect a joint declaration on the colonies; any 
statement with the United States would be linked with the 
publication of a charter for the new world organisation and 
regional councils would, have consultative not executive 
powers. "' 
Churchill remained adamant that the government should 
not make any concessions to critics of British imperial 
policy, whoever they may be: 
There must be no question of our being hustled or 
seduced into declarations affecting British 
sovereignty in any of the Dominions or Colonies. Pray 
remember my declaration against liquidating the 
British Empire. If the Americans want to take 
Japanese islands which they have conquered, let them 
do so with our blessing and any form of words that may 
be agreeable to them. But 'Hands off the British 
Empire' is our Maxim and it must not be weakened or 
smirched to please sob-stuff merchants or foreigners 
2715 PRO, F0371/40749/U3625, minutes of the inter- 
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of any hue. 
270 
Churchill need not have been worried. At the San 
Francisco Conference, April-June 1945 which drew up the 
framework of the United Nations Organisation no commitment 
was made to independence as the ultimate goal of the 
colonial empires. The Declaration on Non-Self-Governing 
Territories appeared to accept the British formula of 
progressive development towards self-government. For the 
Americans the stability of South-East Asia had become a 
greater priority than breaking up the European empires. 
In January 1944 Gervas Huxley moved on to work on 
relations with the American troops stationed in Britain. 
He continued his work for the Empire Division in an 
advisory capacity and Vincent Harlow, head of the Empire 
Information Service, continued to work under his direction. 
Nicholas Mansergh, head of the South African section of the 
Empire Division, replaced Huxley. 279 Although Colonial 
Office officials lamented Huxley's departure, they thought 
they were getting 'the next best thing' in Nicholas 
Mansergh. Oliver Stanley minuted, 'I am very sorry that 
Huxley is not coming back. He has been a good friend to 
us'. 280 Indeed, Huxley had succeeded in improving the 
relationship between the Colonial Office and the MOI. 
Huxley had made the most of the 'partnership' theme. Under 
his guidance there had been a distinct increase in 
activities to project the colonial empire, both in scope 
and quality. A similar process occurred in propaganda in 
East and Central Africa. 
1944. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
FROM WAR TO PUBLIC RELATIONS: 
PROPAGANDA IN AFRICA, 1943-45 
In the period from 1943 to 1945 thoughts turned from 
the war to post-war. As in Britain, the propaganda effort 
in the colonies intensified. Propaganda for East and 
Central Africa increasingly reflected the need to 'win the 
peace' and to enlist the support of the colonies in the 
implementation of colonial policy in the post-war period. 
East and Central Africa continued to receive the more 
general MOI 'partnership' propaganda examined in chapter 
five. In addition to this, other propaganda material was 
sent from London which was tailored to meet the 
requirements of Africa. Film propaganda was developed. 
The work of the Colonial Film Unit increased and a feature 
film, Men of Two Worlds, was produced which embodied the 
'Partnership' theme. The British Council explored the 
possibilities of expanding its work in Africa and their 
potential for bringing greater understanding between the 
races was recognised in the Colonial Office. Under the 
auspices of the PIO in Nairobi, propaganda produced in 
Africa retained a military flavour. The East African 
Command also sponsored a Mobile Propaganda Unit. A new 
picture also developed. Regional co-operation improved and 
regional production units began to be develop with the 
post-war period in mind. As an example of the way the 
Colonial Office wanted the Information Offices in the 
colonies to develop the work of Harry Franklin in Northern 
Rhodesia stood out, as he had made the transition from war 
propaganda to public relations. The colonial governments 
had become better equipped to win the peace and win African 
consent for the policy of 'partnership'. However it is 
also clear that this would always be threatened by 
political developments in Africa, not least the problem of 
settler nationalism. 
Film 
During 1944 an effort was made to improve the supplY 
of film strips to the colonies. Films strips were 
considered to be of special value because of the direct 
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appeal which could be made to 'unsophisticated people'. ' 
Film strips would be particularly useful in Tanganyika 
where they would help in recruiting of Africans whose 'fear 
of army life' was ' based on ignorance' of conditions. The 
filmstrips would not only depict war subjects but also 
those of a long-term, educative nature, and would show the 
'necessity and virtue of local effort in social services'. 2 
Among the first strips to be sent were 'Road to Victory', 
'Britain Today and Tomorrow', 'British Soldiers on the 
Move', 'the BBC at War', 'Admiral Mountbatten', 'Salute to 
the Women of Britain', 'Workers Welfare in British 
Factories' and 'An English Village at War' .3 Later strips 
included those more directly relevant to African life like 
'Daniel Kaman becomes a Bus-Driver', 'District 
Commissioner' and 'Kenya Bus-Driver' .4 In order to 
facilitate the showing of these film strips the Colonial 
Office supported the shipping of a large number of 
projectors to Africa; 150 were sent to the East African 
Command at the end of 1943 .5 
A film made by the Information Office in Kenya, War 
Comes to Kenya, was distributed in Britain as War Comes to 
Africa. Jack Beddington, Director of the MOI's Films 
Division was 'very impressed' with the film which would be 
given wide distribution as invariably British audiences 
found 'any aspect of the Imperial story of great 
interest'. 6 Although shot by an amateur, it showed 
'lovely' views of Kenya and was therefore useful both as 
war propaganda and 'for the general views of Kenyan scenery 
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and Kenyan life'. 7 The only criticism the Colonial Office 
had was the use of the word 'savage' in reference to 
Africans at one point. 8 The Secretary of State for the 
Colonies saw the film which was subsequently tried out on 
an audience in Clapham. This audience displayed a 'quiet 
interest' in the film. It gave a round of applause when 
the Union Jack was run up in Addis Ababa and laughed at a 
scene of a local airforce officer in shorts and silk shirt 
who seemed to 'out Georing, Georing (sic) in size'. The 
Films Division edited the film and it was distributed by 
RKO. 9 
The Colonial Film Unit continued to expand its 
production programme. It was estimated that 140,000 
Africans were seeing Colonial Film Unit Films each week. 
By the end of 1943 the Colonial Film Unit employed 23 
people. " The Unit decided to increase the 'African' 
element of their output and it was decided to employ an 
African to be trained in film work who would 'act in an 
advisory capacity on African life and reactions I. XX 
Treasury approval was given on condition that it would not 
be necessary to 'import' an African. " A West African, 
Sowande, who was already resident in Britain was employed 
as an advisor and musical director. X3 
The Colonial Film Unit made a series of films on the 
subject of An African in Enc iland showing England through 
African eyes and the similarities between African and 
'7 PRO, C0875/13/17, Moore to Moyne, 4 December 1941. 
The cameraman was Guy Johnson who had previously made a few 
films for Imperial Airways. 
a pRo, C0875/13/17, minute by Sidebotham, 13 January 1942. 
9 PRO, C0875/13/17, minute by Sabine, 9 January 1942; 
Griggs to Beddington, 31 January 1942; Usill to Sabine, 20 
June 1942. 
10 ibid. 
11 PRO, INF1/144, minutes of an OEPEC meeting, 11 June 
1942. 
112 PRO, INF1/144, minute by Woodburn, 30 January 1943. 
13 PRO, INF1/144, minute Pyddoke, 31 January 1944. 
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English life. For example the aim of An African in 
Enqland - Visits an Enqlish Villaqe was to give 'as 
representative a picture as possible of English village 
life and to touch on the increasing interest being taken in 
colonial affairs by the people of this country'. The film 
told the story of an African student played by a student at 
St. Martin's School of Art, O. B. Alakija, who had seen a 
lot of town life wanted to see what life was like in the 
country. He took a bus out to the country and meets a 
farmer who showed him around the village where the African 
was 'charmed by the rural scene'. In the village the 
African was introduced to the people who live there. He 
met a labourer and his wife in their cottage with a 
'pleasant garden in front and a well kept vegetable plot 
behind' and the African admired the thatched roof. He was 
then introduced to the village policeman who 'chats with 
him in a friendly way'. The African was then taken into 
the village store and bakery where he met a Womens' 
Voluntary Service officer who invited him to attend a 
mothers' meeting later that afternoon in the village hall. 
The farmer took the African to his son's farm where he saw 
milking in progress and watched the farmer's wife feed 
chickens. As the village children left the school the 
African was introduced to the farmer's grandchildren. 
Passing the village church the African was introduced to 
the vicar who was 'obviously delighted to meet the visitor 
from Africa'. The vicar showed the African the village 
hall and they watched the unloading of equipment from a 
mobile cinema van for a film to be shown later that 
evening. Finally the African was taken to the farmer's 
house where his wife served tea. During their conversation 
the farmer expressed an interest in learning more about 
life in Africa and the film ends with chairs drawn around 
the fire while the African 'eagerly begins on the story of 
his homeland and the picture fades out on this friendly 
scene of mutual interest'. " 
The scheme to supply raw stock for use by amateur film 
makers in the African colonies met with success. The 
114 PRO, INF1/225, Usill to Sabine, 29 March 1945. 
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Colonial Film Unit supplied 5,000 feet or 212 reels a month 
to the colonies together with nine cine cameras. In return 
the unit received material from Northern Rhodesia, Kenya, 
Uganda and Tanganyika as well as film scripts. 's Since the 
scheme produced 'really worthwhile results', the MOI's 
Films Division asked the Treasury to finance the position 
of an Assistant Specialist for the Colonial Film Unit to 
supervise the raw stock scheme until such a time 'as the 
operators in the colonies become sufficiently expert to 
carry on the production work without the guidance of the 
"Parent" Colonial Film Unit'. `" The Treasury was faced 
with manpower shortages and could not agree to an extra 
appointment. The Films Division felt that the Treasury had 
formed the erroneous impression that the raw stock scheme 
had been set up to further the 'dabbling by amateurs' and 
had not understood the value of it in the production 
programme of the Colonial Film Unit in making films with an 
authentic 'African background'. In view of the importance 
which the findings of the report of Mass Education in 
African Society attached to the value of film in the 
education of Africans, it was clear that the project would 
have long-term use. 'L-1 A compromise was found by the 
employment of staff on a fee payment basis instead. " 
Money was-also found by the colonial governments in East 
Africa to finance the setting up of a Central Photographic 
Unit to film on behalf of the Colonial Film Unit. 19 
In order to obtain extra material, the Colonial Film 
Unit also examined films held by various non-theatrical 
film libraries to see if they could be exhibited in the 
colonies or in Britain. One thousand films were examined. 
Sellers was disappointed by the results. He thought that 
3.5 PRO, INF1/144, Bradshaw to Beddington, Usill and 
Fletcher, 29 February 1944. 
116 PRO, INFI/144, Fletcher to Phillips, 22 March 1944. 
11*7 PRO, INF1/144, Bradshaw to Usill, 19 March 1944; 
Morgan to Usill, 25 April 1944. 
3-8 PRO, INFI/144, Fletcher to Woodburn, 24 October 1944. 
119 PRO, INF1/144, Phillips to Campbell, 25 October 1944. 
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80% of them were of poor quality and 'if they do not convey 
a wrong impression of the colonies at least they do not 
directly create that impression which we or anyone with 
concern for the Colonial Empire would wish'. 20 Films held 
in the MOI's Central Film Library like Hunting Biq game in 
Africa, African Jungle Life, Wild Animals of Africa and 
Through Wildest Africa were criticised for being of poor 
photographic quality and because the animals were so far 
off they could not be seen in sufficient detail. Three 
films on the produce of East Africa Shamba Ya Kahana about 
coffee in Tanganyika, Shamba Ya Chai about tea in 
Tanganyika and Shamba Ya Kabani about sisal production were 
considered to be of too poor in quality to be shown because 
of their bad diagrams and maps. Kashu the Head-Hunter was 
described as depicting life in native Africa but on viewing 
was found to be 'a crude thriller staged in New Guinea'. 
Some were considered suitable for showing to school 
children and were placed in the Central Film Library of the 
Imperial Institute. Peoples of Kenya was considered 
'excellent and interesting material' as the people were 
shown in a straightforward manner against their natural 
background. Bwamba was a little incoherent but gave 
schoolchildren a view of the arts and crafts of the 
primitive peoples living in Nyasaland. Similarly, Buqufi 
was considered to be an 'outstanding' film showing the 
primitive industry of hoe making in Nyasaland, from the 
'gathering of the iron ore' to 'the laborious task of 
beating out the hoe'. 211 
The Colonial Film Unit faced difficulties in obtaining 
enough raw footage to increase their output of films. As 
part of the new effort to educate British and overseas 
audiences about the colonial empire, the Colonial Office 
asked the MOI to send a camera unit to the colonies to do 
the necessary filming. The Colonial Office's request, 
however, met the recurrent problem of manpower shortages. 
The Secretary of State for the Colonies had already 
20 PRO, C0875/17/17, Girkins 13 December 1942. 
21- ibid. 
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approached Ernest Bevin the Minister of Labour and National 
Service to ask for a 'freeze' on film industry staff. 
Stanley was not successful and was told that individual 
cases would have to considered on their merits. 22 Deputy 
Under-Secretary of State, Thomas Lloyd wrote to Kenneth 
Grubb, Controller of the MOVs Overseas Division, on behalf 
of Oliver Stanley to complain about the 'disappointingly 
slow progress' made on the supply of film from the 
colonies. Lloyd emphasised the need to 'stimulate the 
interest and participation of Colonial peoples in the war 
effort and to publicise the Colonies here and abroad'. 
Indeed, Lloyd argued, there was 'an urgent demand for 
material for films to be exhibited in this country, in 
neutral countries, in the U. S. S. R. and especially in 
America'. In addition, the Colonial Film Unit depended 
'almost entirely on getting adequately shot material from 
the Colonies'. A market existed for colonial films and 
both the MOI and the Colonial Office were 'agreed on the 
need for satisfying it'. Therefore Thomas Lloyd asked the 
MOI to make colonial films a priority and that a director- 
cameraman should be made available to visit the colonies. 
The Colonial Office welcomed the recommendation made at a 
meeting with the MOI to bring stills photographers over 
from the colonies and to train them to be film cameramen. 
But that was a long-term measure and even if the scheme 
were put into operation immediately, it would take at least 
18 months before actual films were produced. The Colonial 
Office sought a faster solution by obtaining the services 
of four director-cameramen, one each for East and West 
Africa and two for the West Indies. For East Africa Lloyd 
suggested that the MOI employ Dr. Johnson who had made 
films for Imperial Airways and did the camera work for War 
Comes to Kenya. 23 
Grubb agreed the best solution was to employ the 
services of a director-cameramen but he noted that 
individuals 'capable of working entirely on their own in an 
22- PRO, C0875/17/3, Bevin to Stanley, 8 March 1943. 
23 PRO, C0875/17/2, Lloyd to Grubb, 11 August 1943. 
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unfamiliar environment' were 'very rare birds'. The claims 
on their time were already great as film units would be 
needed shortly to send to liberated territories. Grubb 
was, however, prepared to 'attach a high priority to the 
needs of the colonies' as long as this did not conflict 
with other more pressing needs. It transpired that Dr. 
Johnson was not available to go and film in East Africa. 
The best that the MOI could suggest was that the Colonial 
office joined with them in making representations to the 
Ministry of Labour to prevent the call up of directors and 
cameramen on a case by case basis. 2" The Colonial Office 
was forced to be satisfied with this. Lloyd wrote to 
Huxley that the Colonial Office agreed the training of 
expert stills photographers from the colonies would be 
better than nothing and that the Office was prepared to 
support MOI representations to the Ministry of Labour in 
individual cases. 25 
Despite the manpower shortages, the Crown Film Unit 
produced a number of films with a colonial content. For 
example, material from South Africa and the Rhodesias was 
used in the film Morning, Noon and Night which depicted a 
day in the life of the British Commonwealth in wartime. 
Similarly, Rediscovery of Britain showed the experience of 
Commonwealth troops in Britain and the changes they had 
observed. It was arranged that its release would coincide 
with Empire Day 24 May 1943. However, the release date had 
to be put back because film had not arrived from the 
colonies. " Although it was not supposed to be a 'song of 
victory', and would have a composite commentary 
representing different empire and Commonwealth points of 
view of individual representatives of the empire on the 
lines of those who had taken part in the BBC's special 
Empire Day Postscript. The different points of view were 
resolved in the conclusion of the film which would leave 
24 PRO, C0875/17/2, Grubb to Lloyd, 10 September 1943. 
2-5 PRO, C0875/17/2, Lloyd to Huxley, 8 October 1943. 
John Page the cameraman was released by the Admiralty to 
film in West Africa. 
2'6 PRO, INF1/58/file. 
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the audience in no doubt of the 'importance of the 
Commonwealth of Nations both now and after the war'. 27 
Other Crown Unit films with an African background 
included African Girl as Mav Oueen, Complete Victorv in 
Africa, Plainsmen of Barotseland, Masai Gentleman, Fiqhtinq 
Men of Africa, East African Locust Control, Town Planninq 
and Slum Clearance in Africa and Report from Africa. 28 
Men of Two Worlds 
Undoubtedly the most successful production resulting 
from the Colonial Office's cooperation with the Films 
Division of the MOI was the feature film Men of Two Worlds. 
It brought to the screen the theme of 'partnership'. The 
idea had been first thought up as a result of the 
employment of writer, journalist and film critic of the 
BBC, Mrs. Arnot Robertson by the Films Division to work on 
treatments for films about the colonies in 1942. The 
initial idea had developed from a conversation between 
Sabine and Robertson based on Sabine's experiences as a 
District Officer in East Africa. The project, originally 
titled 'White Ants', was the story of 'how witchcraft and 
superstition which has a 'great hold on the natives is 
conquered in a dramatic way by a District Officer'. In 
order to break the power of the local witch doctor the 
District Officer used 'the faith and courage' of an African 
schoolmaster. Jack Beddington, the head of the Films 
Division, thought it was a promising story as there was a 
strong plot and a metaphysical theme which is a gift to a 
script writer looking for a central peg'. Its advantage 
was that it could show 'both good and bad natives: and 
though it does not show bad white people it hints at the 
defeats from lack of faith, etc., etc., which is the 
negative side of our own race when working in the 
2'7 PRO, INF1/58, minutes of production meetings, 30 
June and 1 July 1943; PRO, C0875/7/14, report by Franklin, 
on the activities of the Information Office in Northern 
Rhodesia, July 1942-June 1943,21 July 1943. 
7-'5 PRO, INF1/56, OEPEC paper, 8 January 1945. 
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Colonies'. 29 Doubts were expressed in the Colonial Office 
about the desirability of portraying witch doctors and the 
'evils of unenlightened superstition' instead of the 
positive achievements of colonial rule. Particularly since 
'so much is now happening and is being aimed at in the new 
enlightened Colonial policy that one can be fully justified 
in asking the public to forget the mistakes of the past 
while learning something of the present and the future'. 30 
It was difficult, however, to see how a dramatic feature 
film could be constructed around the theme of good colonial 
administration alone. The Films Division therefore 
proceeded with the project and reported to the Colonial 
Office that the American studio Columbia Pictures, would 
produce it with Paul Robeson in the starring role of the 
African schoolmaster . 3X 
The deal with Columbia fell through. Instead the MOI 
approached Filippo del Guidice, the managing director of 
the British film company Two Cities in November 1942.32 
The Films Division arranged for the release of the director 
Thorold Dickinson* from the Army Kinematograph Service to 
direct the film for Two Cities. 33 Arnot Robertson did not 
wish to turn her treatment into a screenplay. Dickinson's 
original choice for screenwriter was Louis MacNiece. 
MacNiece, however, was under contract to the BBC's Features 
2-9 PRO, C0875/17/6, Sabine to Lloyd, 19 August 1943; 
C0875/17/1, Beddington's memorandum on Colonial Film 
Material, 14 April 1942. 
30 PRO, C0875/17/1, minute by Collins, 23 June 1942. 
31 PRO, C0875/17/1, minute by Keating, 2 August 1942. 
32 Anthony Aldgate and Jeffrey Richards, Britain Can 
Take It: the British Cinema in the Second World War, 
(Oxford, 1986), p. 198. Aldgate and Richards also cite a 
letter from del Guidice to Beddington assuring him that 'it 
is the policy of this company not to make any films whether 
on subjects connected directly with the war or not without 
the approval of the MOV. Two Cities also cooperated with 
the MOI to produce The Way Ahead and The Way to the Stars. 
33 For an illuminating account of the making of Men of 
Two Worlds c. f. Jeffrey Richards biography of Thorold 
Dickinson, Thorold Dickinson: the_ Man and His Films 
(London, 1986), chapter six. 
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and Drama Department and the BBC was unwilling to release 
him. Dickinson's wife Joanna drew his attention to a 
pamphlet she had read, The Case for African Freedom by the 
writer and former Colonial Service officer in Nigeria, 
Joyce Cary. " During the 1930s and 1940s Cary had been an 
active member of the Liberal Party and The Case For African 
Freedom had been written for the Liberal Book club. 35 In 
addition to his political writings, Cary was the author of 
The African Witch and Mister Johnson. The screen play 
became a collaborative effort between Cary and Dickinson. 
A number of actors were discussed for the lead roles. 
Dickinson thought that John Mills was unsuitable for the 
part of the District Commissioner and he hoped that 'big 
names' could be found because the film presented a 'grand 
opportunity for dramatic acting, psychological character 
study and outdoor action'. He hoped Leslie Howard would be 
available and considered Wendy Hiller for the part of the 
young English doctor, who would provide the romantic 
interest in the film. 36 
Sabine cooperated fully with Two Cities throughout the 
project. He approached the Board of Trade for technicolour 
stock which was rationed during the war. Sabine's 
enthusiasm infected the staff of Two Cities: 
We have been particularly fired ourselves by all that 
Mr. Sabine has told us of the work of the Colonial 
Office and we feel more than ever the responsibility 
we have in making this film, for if it is successful 
it can be the forerunner of more excellent films about 
Africa and our colonies, and should do very much to 
correct prejudice and ignorance everywhere on this 
complicated and difficult subject . 37 
34 Richards, Thorold Dickinson ..., p. 113. 
35 M. M. Mahood, Joyce Cary's Africa (London, 1964), 
p. 68. Mahood's biography of Cary also contains an 
assessment of his screenplay in relation to his other works 
of fiction. 
36 PRO, INF1/218, Beddington to Kimberly, director of 
the Army Kinematograph Service, 10 November 1942; Sutro, 
producer at Two Cities, to Beddington, 17 December 1942; 
Roberts, BBC to Woodburn, 24 December 1942; Dickinson to 
Sutro, 28 May 1943. 
37 PRO, C0875/17/6, Sutro to Sabine, 22 January 1943. 
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Originally the film was to be set in West Africa but 
this was changed to Tanganyika. Dickinson and his 
production team visited Tanganyika between January and May 
1943 where he received the full cooperation of the 
government. It was an eventful trip. Dickinson became ill 
with malaria and the ship carrying their movie camera and 
film stock was sunk leaving the crew with only a stills 
camera. 38 Dickinson agreed that his unit would also take 
photographic 'stills' for use by the MOI in Britain while 
he was in East Africa. 39 
The government of Tanganyika appeared excited at the 
prospect of the film having a Tanganyikan background. 
Although the script avoided direct mention of Tanganyika, 
Mount Kilimanjaro in the background would identify it as 
Tanganyika. Freeston, the Information Officer in 
Tanganyika, was impressed with Dickinson's approach and 
told him that 'the basic problem - of reconciling box- 
office appeal with reality - has been solved with 
astonishing success'. Sabine was grateful for all the 
assistance Freeston had given Dickinson during his visit 
and emphasised the importance of the project because it 
'should have the sort of success here that we cannot hope 
to get by any amount of press articles or broadcast 
talks'. 40- 
Casting the African schoolmaster required sensitive 
handling. Two Cities wanted to cast Rudolph Dunbar. 
Dunbar was from British Guiana and was the London 
representative of the Associated Negro Press. Sabine 
thought the idea had much to commend it. Dunbar was, in 
his view, 'sincere and reliable' and had sent 'a good deal 
of useful material to the negro press in America'. 
Although Sabine was concerned that the casting of Dunbar 
might 'raise rather awkward questions', he thought it might 
have the advantage of allowing Dunbar to see much that 
38 Richards, Thorold Dickinson.... p. 113. 
39 PRO, C0875/15/6, committee on colonial publicity in 
the United Kingdom, 30 March 1943. 
40 PRO, C0875/17/6, Freeston to Sabine, 30 April 1943; 
Sabine to Freeston, 22 May 1943. 
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'would impress him and a good deal that would also shake 
some of his ideas both on the capacity and the standard of 
life of his brothers in Africa'. Sabine's worries came to 
nothing as Two Cities eventually casted Robert Adams, a 
West Indian actor, as the schoolmaster. 411 
Not everyone was satisfied with the first draft of the 
screenplay written by Cary and Dickinson. The main African 
character, a teacher in the original treatment, had been 
transformed into a black composer. Ian Dalrymple, Head of 
the Crown Film Unit thought it was 'pretentious and 
highbrow'. 42 Arnot Robertson who wrote the original 
treatment, thought it was 'an entirely unobjectionable but 
uninspired bit of committee work'. She criticised it for 
losing the quality of the original idea as it 'lacked 
fire': 
there is hardly any effective conflict in this version 
and very little suspense. The Good White Man is so 
impeccably good there is never any doubt that he will 
prevail over the evil forces which really haven't a 
fair chance. 43 
others disagreed. Ivor Cummings from Sierra Leone working 
in the Social Services Department of the Colonial Office, 
also examined the screenplay. Although he recognised that 
'exaggeration appears in all films, and that 
Isuperfici. ally' the screenplay was 'fiction'. But he 
thought the film was valuable in 'demonstrating to people 
who are ill-informed about the African countries that these 
countries must be brought fully -into 
line with the so- 
44 called civilised nations'. Nunn May, assistant director 
of the Films Division thought it had 'the makings of a 
really good film story, and that it shows British 
administration through appropriately rose coloured 
spectacles'. Gervas Huxley, head of the Empire Division of 
the MOI, thought it would make 'a really interesting film 
411 PRO, C0875/17/6, Sabine to Seel, 1 May 1943. 
42 Richards, Thorold Dickinson .... p. 115. 
43 PRO, INF1/218, minute by. Robertson, 28 May 1943. 
44 PRO, C0875/17/6, Cummings to Sabine, 2 August 1943. 
352 
of considerable propaganda value' . 45 
Sabine was delighted with the results and called it 
'the first realistic film about African administration' and 
thought it would have 'a good effect'. He commended 
Dickinson's attitude towards the project for he had shown 
'a high appreciation of the importance of getting a 
realistic treatment and of not falling into the temptation 
of making a purely sensational film'. Similarly, the 
project was welcomed in East Africa. The Tanqanyika 
Standard proclaimed it as being 'authentic Africa on the 
46 screen at last'. 
The film took six weeks to film on location in 
Tanganyika. Disaster struck when it was discovered that 
90% of the film shot was unusable when it came to be 
processed. As a result Tanganyika had to be reproduced at 
the Two Cities studio back in England. 47 Nevertheless the 
final product fitted the 'partnership' theme beautifully by 
showing Britain's vision for the future of Africa, guiding 
Africans in a partnership for progress and how education 
can overcome superstition. It starred Eric Portman as the 
District Commissioner and Phyllis Calvert as the earnest 
doctor. The story centred around a Tanganyikan, Kisenga, 
played by Robert Adams. Kisenga had studied music in 
England. The film opened with a lunchtime concert at the 
National Gallery of Kisengals work, 'Barazal the African 
for 'heated discussion'. The music was written by Sir 
Arthur Bliss and sounded like a mixture between a Gershwin 
concerto and African tribal music. 40 The reception of 
Baraza was so enthusiastic that a concert agent wanted to 
sign up Kisenga for a tour. But Kisenga. knew where his 
duty laid. The very next day he flew to Tanganyika and 
became an Education Officer in the Colonial Service back 
45 Richards, Thorold Dickinson .... p. 116. 
, 4r> PRO, C0875/17/6, Sabine to Lloyd, 19 August 1943; 
Tanganyika Standard, 19 November 1943. 
47 Richards, Thorold Dickinson 
..., p. 119. 
48 The music was praised for being 'one of the finest 
film music works ever written' by John Huntley in his 1948 
book on film music. Quoted in jbid, p. 122. 
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with his own people the Litu. In Kisengals absence there 
had been a serious outbreak of sleeping sickness. His 
District Commissioner, Portman, gave him the task of trying 
to persuade his old tribe to leave the Tsetse fly infested 
area to be resettled in a safer place. Naturally the Litu 
did not want to leave their homes. The scene was set for a 
confrontation, with Kisenga, caught in the middle, between 
'old Africa' and the newly-educated Africa. The tribal 
witchdoctor, Magole, cast a spell on Kisenga: if Kisenga 
lived the tribe would leave the infected area but if he 
died the tribe would stay. Under the weight of conflicting 
emotions Kisenga feels increasingly isolated. 
Earlier in the film Kisenga opened a school in his 
district and spoke of the value of education: 
knowledge is the only power that can fight against 
man's enemies: diseases and superstition, and the 
worst of all fear. Fear stands in the way of all 
progress not only in Africa but in all the world. 
People hate because they fear to learn to know how to 
think. 
So good was the education he received from the British that 
he told his sister, 'I thought I had two worlds, now I have 
none at all'. Kisenga was so depressed that he became ill 
in his hut and began to hallucinate. In a dream sequence 
illustrating his dilemma he was held down by the 
witchdoctor, his mother and his father. He tried to resist 
and held up his arms to discover that they had turned 
white. He tried to leave his hut. One door lead to tribal 
drumming. The other lead to a symphony orchestra which was 
the path he chose. He could not however escape the power 
of the witchdoctor who stabbed Kisenga. Phyllis Calvert 
and Portman argued about Kisenga. The beautiful doctor 
blamed the District Commissioner for placing so much 
responsibility on Kisengals shoulders that he gave up the 
will to live. Portman came to the rescue and organised the 
children of the village to sing one of Kisenga's 
compositions. The intervention of Portman saved Kisenga by 
telling him that 'his people' were singing for him and that 
he was needed by them or they would be lost. Kisenga 
revived. The power of the witchdoctor had failed and 
Magole was run out of the village. The film ended on a 
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positive note as the tribe, led by Kisenga, moved to their 
new area and to safety. 
In spite of its intentions, Jeffrey Richards has 
criticised Dickinson's film as 'perhaps his least 
successful' and compared it unfavourably with Powell and 
Pressburger's Black Narcissus which was also in 
technicolour, also produced at Denham and also dealt with a 
clash of cultures. Although individual elements of the 
music and dream sequence of Men of Two Worlds were 
acclaimed its 'didactic nature' and the impression that in 
spite of efforts to the contrary, the African background 
was a 'fake' were criticised. The Spectator found it 
'disappointing'. Dilys Powell in The Sunday Times said 'It 
is quite often dull. But Men of Two Worlds is on the right 
track: it has a subject, it is about something real, it is 
getting somewhere'. Elspeth Huxley, writing under her 
maiden name Grant, said in the Daily Graphic: 'It is not 
without faults. It is repetitive. The colour is erratic. 
The crowd scenes are stiffly handled. But an interesting 
problem is presented and treated without a vestige of the 
smugness one fears in the discussion of racial 
differences'. Years later Thorold Dickinson described the 
experience the experience: 'the whole thing was total 
misery'. 49 Nor was Men of Two Worlds a milestone in the 
career of Joyce Cary. According to Mahood the fact that 
, it was a commissioned work seems to have deprived it of 
the vitality which informs Cary's other African stories' 
and the dialogue was 'overlaid with the schoolmasterly tone 
peculiar to most productions of the wartime MOI1.50 
In artistic and critical terms then the film was not a 
success and arguably these were the only measures which 
counted. While it may have portrayed 'the classic white 
liberal faith in education'5: L and was overflowing in worthy 
intentions it was far more than merely this. It was an 
accurate representation of colonial policy as it existed in 
49 Richards, Thorold Dickinson ..., pp. 128-9 and 133. 
50 Mahood, opecit., p. 70. 
5" Richards, Thorold Dickinson ..., p. 127. 
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the 1940s. The film embodied the propaganda theme of 
'partnership' and so in this more limited sense, by getting 
the empire up on the big screen it was a success. That the 
empire of 'partnership' proved to be less exciting subject 
matter for a feature film than the tales of conquest of the 
imperial epics of the 1930s was hardly the fault of those 
involved in its production. 
The British Council 
Throughout the war the British Council sought to 
increase its work in the colonies. In general the Colonial 
Office supported the Council because it recognised the 
value its work in furthering understanding between British 
and colonial peoples in the postwar period. On a cultural 
level, the Council's work could lend support to the 
Colonial Office's attempt to win the peace in post-war 
Africa. In 1941 the Council had appointed Sir Angus 
Gillan, a former officer of the Sudan political service, to 
supervise the Council's empire activities. Initial 
activity in the colonies was limited to the territories 
which had been subjected to the propaganda of foreign 
powers, Malta, Cyprus, Palestine and Aden . 52 In early 
1941, the Colonial Office, under Lord Lloyd who 
simultaneously held the post of the Chairman of the British 
Council, had welcomed any increase in Council activities in 
the colonies. Assistant Under-Secretary of State for 
Social Services, Sir Charles Jeffries, was appointed as the 
Colonial Office's representative on the Executive Committee 
of the Council and the Budget sub-committee. Jeffries 
thought the Council could expand by establishing local 
Institutes in the colonies and also help in supplying 
English teachers. 53 Lord Moyne, Lord Lloyd's successor as 
Secretary of State for the Colonies, was keen that the 
Colonial Office should 'take advantage' of the proposal to 
cooperate with the British Council and held out the 
52 PRO, BW2/313, Minutes of the Executive Committee of 
the British Council, 3 December 1940; Robertson to Cadogan, 
2 September 1941. 
53 PRO, C0859/81/21, minute by Jeffries, 15 March 1941. 
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possibility of the Council receiving Colonial Welfare and 
54 Development money to fund some of its activities. 
At a meeting between the Colonial Office and the 
British Council in May 1941 it was agreed that the first 
two areas where the Council should expand would be the West 
Indies and West Africa. 55 It was also agreed that the 
Reverend Guthrie, lecturer in Swahili at the School of 
Oriental and African Studies, should visit and report on 
expansion in East Africa. The Colonial Office agreed to 
finance his trip and the East African Governor's Conference 
agreed to cooperate fully during his visit. The majority 
of territories would 'welcome' the expansion of British 
Council activities tin East Africa. 56 
In the meantime the British Council investigated the 
ways in which the Council would fund the proposed expansion 
and discussed with the Colonial Office the direction its 
'cultural' work should take. The Foreign Office was 
opposed to any colonial expansion which might divert 
funding from British Council work in foreign countries. 
The Treasury thought that there might be problems in the 
future as it would be difficult to distinguish between 
activities of a 'cultural propaganda' nature and those of a 
'welfare' nature. Moreover, at a time when the British 
Council's future post-war funding was not guaranteed, talk 
of colonial expansion was tentative and cautious. 57 
The Colonial Office was not discouraged by the 
attitudes of the Foreign Office and the Treasury. Jeffries 
argued that the case for colonial expansion was even 
stronger than its activities in foreign countries since 'we 
have direct responsibility for strengthening the links 
54 PRO, C0859/81/21, minute by Moyne, 19 March 1941; 
minute by Jeffries, 1 April 1941. 
55 PRO, C0859/81/21, minutes of the joint meeting, 26 
May 1941. 
56 PRO, C0859/82/6, Gillan to Jeffries, 28 October 
1941; EAGC to Colonial Office, 4 May 1942. 
57 PRO, C0859/81/21, Minutes of an inter-departmental 
meeting between the Foreign Office, the Treasury, Dominions 
office, Colonial Office, MOI and the British Council, 17 
October 1941; Kingsley Wood to Stanley, 11 March 1943. 
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between them and this country'. As Oliver Stanley 
explained to Kingsley Wood, the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, the British Council could supplement the work of 
official machinery in the colonies, particularly 'by 
bringing people of different races together in common 
cultural enterprises' and wanted to see the Council 
encouraged 'in every possible way' . 50 
Kingsley Wood warned that the Colonial Office and the 
Foreign Office would have to compete for funding from the 
British Council's 'common purse'. While Wood was not 
prepared to give the Colonial Office preferential financial 
treatment, he was prepared to consider schemes on their own 
merits. " 
The British Council outlined its proposals in a 
memorandum about the future development of the Council. In 
the territories of the empire, argued the British Council: 
(while] making all due allowance for difference in 
race, origin or constitution there is in all of these 
countries something British; and in bringing Great 
Britain to them we are bringing to them something in 
which they already have a share. 
Teaching English, a major component of their activities in 
foreign countries, was not seen as part of their colonial 
programme as this was already being done by the colonial 
governments. Planning for the future was based on the 
assumption that there was a 'pre-existing sympathy with 
British traditions and culture even though accompanied in 
some cases by a suspicion of British policy'. It was 
thought that the Council would have a further advantage in 
that there would be little danger of their activities being 
suspected as 'political propaganda'. Therefore the main 
aim of Council activities in the colonies would be the 
'interpretation of British life and thought', while also 
'promoting closer cultural relations' by encouraging an 
50 PRO, C0859/81/21, 
March 1943. 
Stanley to Kingsley Wood, 17 
59 PRO, C0859/81/21, 
April 1943. 
Kingsley Wood to Stanley, 20 
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interest in the colonies at home. 61 
The Council did not seek to establish British 
Institutes in the colonies as the colonies were British 
anyway. Instead they would encourage the colonies own 
cultural societies or institutes, for example, the Lagos 
Institute or the Trinidad Institute. These Institutes 
would provide a 'common ground where men of goodwill of any 
race or colour can meet, without the restraints of host and 
guest or of office formality, to exchange ideas and discuss 
mutual problems'. Therefore the larger part of its work 
would be in supporting local libraries. 61 
Jeffries was concerned about possible British Council 
tendencies to see the interpretation of the colonies to 
Britain as part of its functions. The Permanent Under- 
Secretary of Sate for the Colonies, Sir George Gater, 
thought the time had come for a clear definition of British 
Council responsibilities. The Council agreed that it was 
not part of their work to publicise the colonies at home 
and that they should be limited to maintaining contact. 62 
Jeffries thought that in view of the rapid expansion 
of the Council's work, a general review should be 
undertaken, preferably by a Cabinet Committee. He thought 
that the Council should be reorganised, particularly as the 
number of people employed had increased. one area of 
concern was control of the Council, especially over 
financial matters, which Jeffries considered to be 'weak'. 
Financial control was exercised through the Executive 
Committee, while the day-to-day activities of the Council 
were supervised by the Council's Chairman, Sir Malcolm 
Robertson. Robertson, a former Ambassador to Buenos Aires, 
could not devote all his time to the Council as he was also 
the Conservative M. P. for Mitcham. Instead Jeffries wanted 
to see more effective control by a new Board of 
60 PRO, C0859/127/5, White to the Colonial Office, 7 
March 1944. 
611 ibid. 
62- PRO, C0859/127/5, minute by Jeffries, 8 March 1944; 
minute by Gater 13 March 1944; Colonial Office-to., White, 17 
March 1944 and White to Colonial Office, 23 March 1944. 
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Governors. " 
While Sabine was prepared to accept the broad 
definition of the Council's aim 'to develop closer cultural 
relations between the United Kingdom and the Colonies for 
the purpose of benefitting the British Commonwealth of 
Nations', he had certain reservations about how this 
objective could be secured. Far from being a purely 
cultural organisation, its work would have political 
implications and would need close monitoring: 
It may well be based on culture, using that term in 
the most liberal sense. But if it aims at bringing 
people of different races together in the common 
enjoyment of intellectual and cultural pursuits, with 
all the difficult psychological adjustments that this 
involves; if it aims at bringing knowledge of 
different aspects of British life and thought to 
considerable cross sections of Colonial peoples and 
creating in their minds a feeling of sympathy and 
admiration for things British; then, the political 
implications of such a development must be of major 
importance. they must be related to political 
realities and must be kept under constant review. 
Sabine thought that the Council or some such body could 
make a 'most valuable contribution towards creating the 
conditions in which the progressive development of our 
Colonial policy will have the best chances of success'. He 
doubted, however, whether this could be achieved by the 
Council under its present direction. He agreed with 
Jeffries' ideas for more effective control of the Council 
and thought the Council needed to be more precise about how 
its objectives in the colonies would be implemented because 
as they were presently conceived they were nothing more 
than 'vague, ambitious and diffuse programmes'. 61 
Andrew Cohen*, Assistant Secretary of State for the 
Colonies responsible for Central Africa, thought that the 
Council had an important part to play in the post-war 
relationship between the colonial governments and the 
people, particularly in the 'more primitive Colonies'. In 
Africa, he argued, for the vast majority of the people 
'their only contact with British ideas is through the 
63 PRO, C0859/127/5, Jeffries to Gater, 15 March 1944. 
'-' PRO, C0859/127/5, minute by Sabine, 2 June 1944. 
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Government and Government officials'. In the governed- 
governing relationship, 'one of the main weaknesses of 
British Colonial Administration ... has been over- 
paternalism, an excessive affection for the "noble savage", 
the failure to understand and the difficulty in making 
contact with the rising educated or semi-educated classes'. 
In Cohen's opinion, it was here that the Council could make 
its contribution to the problems of development in the 
colonies because it could provide the means of 'bringing 
together the British and the educated local communities'. 
This was, he thought, just as important as the actual task 
of spreading British culture and ideas. Like Sabine, Cohen 
thought that, while the Council's aims could be agreed you 
could not 'bring people together just for the sake of 
bringing them together'. The Council needed to formulate 
specific programmes. 6ý5 
Christopher Eastwood, head of the General Department 
identified other British Council problems. In his capacity 
as Principal Private Secretary to Lord Lloyd, Eastwood had 
experience of Council work and knew a number of its staff 
privately. He thought that the abilities of those employed 
by the Council varied. Some were 'wild', 'odd' and 
'lightweight', while others were, in his view, 'extremely 
good'. A major difficulty appeared to be: 
that organising the staff of the British Council must 
be almost as difficult as organising the staff of the 
B. B. C. since in each case you have to try and instil 
habits of administrative and financial efficiency into 
people with more or less of the 'artistic 
temperament' (to use a horrible phrase) and the two do 
not usually go together. 
Eastwood had also been informed that the staff were not 
happy under the Chairmanship of Robertson. On the other 
hand he had received good reports of Council work in 
Palestine and Aden and he pointed out this kind of cultural 
work was better done by a 'semi-official body' like the 
British Council than by colonial governments and that the 
Colonial Office 'should never have got the money for it 
65 PRO, C0859/127/5, minute by Cohen, 3 June 1944. 
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from the Treasury'. 66 
The British Council approached the Colonial Office 
with a proposal to fund colonial expansion from Colonial 
Development and Welfare money. The Council noted that 
during a debate on the Act there had been 'considerable 
criticism of the slow rate of spending'. The Council 
looked to Colonial Development and Welfare money to cover 
the costs of expansion such as buildings in the colonies. 67 
Assistant Secretary of State for the Colonies responsible 
for Economics and Finance, Frederick Pedler, noted that it 
was necessary to draw a line between: 
a) activities which are designed to assist the work of 
the Colonial Government Departments in improving the 
social and economic position of the inhabitants and, 
b) activities which are designed to publicise British 
culture, institutions or opinion in the Colonies, and 
to stimulate interest for the Colonies in the United 
Kingdom. " 
Jeffries thought that in principle that 'if British 
taxpayers' money is involved in 'substantial capital or 
recurrent expenditure' it ought to come via the Colonial 
Development and Welfare Act and not via the British 
Council'. 69 
These questions about the financing and organisation 
of the British Council were delayed until the report of a 
sub-committee of the Cabinet Committee on the machinery of 
government chaired by the former Permanent Under-Secretary 
of State at the India Office and former Director General of 
the MOI, Sir Findlater Stewart . 70 The Colonial Office 
presented a memorandum to the Stewart Committee which 
reviewed the Council's plans of expansion in the colonies 
and made the case for the kind of reorganisation Jeffries 
had been advocating. This memorandum described the 
" PRO, C0859/127/5, minute by Eastwood, 5 June 1944. 
67 PRO, C0859/127/3, Gillan to Jeffries, 21 March 1944. 
60 PRO, C0859/127/4, minute by Pedler, 4 September 1944. 
69 PRO, C0859/127/4, Pedler to Caine, reporting a 
conversation with Jeffries, 14 September 1944. 
70 A. J. S. White, The British Council: the First 25 
Years, 1934-1959 (London, 19650, pp. 53-7. 
362 
relations between the Colonial Office and the British 
Council as generally 'very satisfactory'. In addition to 
Jeffries being represented on the British Council's 
Executive and the Budgetary Sub-Committee there was a Joint 
Colonial Office-British Council Standing Committee and the 
Colonial Office was consulted informally about the 
appointment of staff to the colonies. The Colonial Office 
noted that these arrangements had evolved 'through trial 
and error' and they were 'ripe for review'. Moreover, the 
memorandum argued that cooperation between the Colonial 
Office and the Council was even more important than 
cooperation between the Foreign Office and the Council 
because the Secretary of State for the Colonies was 
answerable to Parliament for all matters concerning the 
colonies and, as such, had the ultimate responsibility for 
their 'cultural advancement' since Parliament provided the 
Council's funding. Therefore the British Council had 
undertaken its activities on an 'agency basis' for the 
Colonial Office. This did not mean that the Colonial 
office sought a rigid control of the Council's activities 
in the colonies. It could still 'be allowed a reasonable 
freedom to apply its own methods and practice in working 
out a previously agreed policy'. It meant that the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies had to 'have an 
effective voice in determining the scope and functions of 
the Council in the territories under its jurisdiction' 
through a local 'charter' which would set out the terms 
within which the Council would operate. The changes the 
Colonial Office sought were effective representation on the 
Finance and Agenda Committee, continued representation on 
the Executive Committee and Colonial Office representation 
on Selection Boards for appointments in colonial 
territories with the Secretary of State for the Colonies 
being given the right to veto appointments which he 
considered lunsuitable'. 71 
presented in early 1945, Sir Findlater Stewart's 
72- PRO, C0859/127/5, 'Colonial Office's Memorandum for 
Sir Findlater Stewart: British Council Activities in 
Relation to the Colonies', undated. 
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Report on the future of the British Council met some of the 
Colonial Office's requirements. Stewart recommended the 
post-war continuance of the British Council and that it 
should continue as an independent body and not be absorbed 
by any government department. He recommended that the 
Council should be asked to prepare a five year plan and 
that it should receive government assurance that funding 
would be available for the period of the plan. The 
Executive Committee would be replaced by a governing board 
of six or seven under a full time chairman on which 
government departments would not be represented. " Stewart 
accepted that the Council would operate in the colonies as 
an 'agent' of the Colonial Office and would be separately 
funded out of the Colonial Office vote. Although the 
Colonial Office would not be represented on the proposed 
governing body it would be able to exercise control through 
a Joint Standing Committee. As Jeffries commented 'I do 
not see how in the circumstances we could press for 
representation on the Board which even the Foreign Office 
will not have'. He thought that the question of whether 
the proposals would work in practice would depend on the 
'personalities of the Chairman and the Board and the spirit 
in which the plan is worked' rather than on the Council's 
'paper constitution'. He recommended that the Colonial 
Office should accept the proposals on a trial basis while 
reserving the right to demand more formal control over 
expenditure if the arrangements proved to be unsatisfactory 
in the future. 73 The Council was given 600,000 pounds for 
the financial year 1945-6 to operate in Aden, Cyprus, 
Gibraltar, Malta, the Mauritius, Palestine the West Indies 
and West Africa. 
The Secretary of State for the Colonies, Oliver 
Stanley, was less sanguine. He thought there was 'no 
justification for the intrusion of this extraneous body 
into what should be one of the responsibilities of a 
Colonial Government'. Nor was he impressed with the work 
72 White, op. cit., pp. 55-6. 
73 PRO, C0859/127/6, minute by Jeffries, 23 March 1945. 
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of the Council: 'practically nothing of the work of the 
Council I have seen in the past makes me anxious for its 
continuance in the future'. However, Stanley was realistic 
enough not to look a gift horse in the mouth, 'with the 
British Council, we shall get 600,000 pounds a year: 
without it I am sure we should be told that we must rely on 
the 120,000,000 pounds [of Colonial Development and Welfare 
money] and there would be no additions'. He had come to 
the conclusion 'that the pill is sufficiently gilded for us 
to swallow'. " 
For the time being and before work could begin in 
Africa, the Colonial Office would have to await the 
decision of the new post-war government on whether 
Stewart's other proposals would be accepted and for 
consideration of Guthrie's report on the future of the 
British Council activities in East and Central Africa. 
Developments in Africa 
Steps were taken to ensure the, faster supply of 
material to Africa. For example, arrangements were made to 
supply negatives instead of photographs from the newly 
established West African Photo Unit to Southern Rhodesia, 
East Africa and South Africa direct instead of being 
supplied via London. 75 In addition to the MOI's EMPAX 
guidance news telegrams a weekly 1000 word telegram would 
be sent to East and Central Africa which would interpret 
the war, give background to the war and summarise-the war 
situation. 76 
Propaganda activities in the African colonies 
increased in quantity and variety in the second half of the 
war. The Colonial Office had encouraged the local 
production of propaganda for use both in the colonies 
themselves and Britain and overseas. The arrival of Sir 
74 PRO, C0859/127/4, Davidson to Blaxter, 7 June 1945 
containing minute by Stanley, 2 February 1945. 
75 PRO, INF1/356, USM to Evans (MOI in Accra West 
Africa), 6 February 1943. 
76 PRO, INF1/552, Empire Division directive, undated-, 
mid- 1942. 
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Geoffrey Northcote as the Principal Information Officer in 
Kenya held out the hope that propaganda activities in East 
Africa would be given a new sense of direction and impetus. 
This was important since not all territorial Information 
Officers in East and Central Africa were full time. The 
territorial Information Officers continued to communicate 
directly with the MOI, but it was hoped that Northcote 
would coordinate activities and encourage cooperation and 
the interchange of material so that the overlap of activity 
would be avoided. He would also maintain close contact 
with military intelligence in East Africa and help prepare 
material for the East African war effort, for recruiting 
and propaganda for Italian prisoners of war. Northcote 
also proposed the establishment of an East African Film 
Unit to produce films for Africans locally. " 
London directed Northcote to undertake more 'long- 
term propaganda' about British colonial policy and its 
objectives. His views were sought on whether Africans 
would be interested in propaganda about what the British 
government had already been able to accomplish in the West 
Indies and West Africa as a result of the Colonial 
Development and Welfare legislation since the East African 
territories would 'no doubt be applying for similar 
assistance'. " 
Northcote was criticised for a lack of 'enterprise' by 
the military authorities in East Africa and by the Governor 
of Kenya, Sir Henry Moore. Although his activities were 
considered to have improved to a 'marked degree' by the 
beginning of 1943, he was continually ill and never left 
Nairobi. In addition Northcote held the view that all the 
initiative should come from the territorial Information 
Officers themselves. 79 
The situation in East Africa was further complicated 
by renewed discussions between the Colonial Office and the 
1942. 
PRO, C0875/9/18, Northcote to Cameron, 14 August 
*78 PRO, C0875/9/18, Cameron to Northcote, 11 June 1943. 
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MOI about Northcote's terms of reference, which reawakened 
the old dispute between the MOI and the Colonial Office 
over MOI encroachments into areas of the Secretary of State 
for the Colonies responsibility. The MOI proposed that 
Northcote should be responsible for 'assisting the 
Information Officers with their local propaganda problems 
as an agent for distributing Ministry [of Information] 
guidance and background material'. The Colonial Office, on 
the other hand, thought that this would be the 'thin end of 
the wedge' of MOI interference in the direction of 
propaganda. This would conflict with the Secretary of 
State for the Colonies's responsibility for all activities 
in the colonies. Instead the Colonial Office wanted 
Northcote's terms of reference to remain vague and like the 
terms of reference for the MOI's representative in West 
Africa, should be confined to that of 'liaison'. " 
The East Africa Command recognised the need to address 
the future and suggested the creation of a Combined Civil 
and Services Information Bureau. This Bureau would replace 
Northcote's office of PIO to the East Africa Command and 
would be responsible both to the military and to the East 
Africa Governors' Conference in order to 'originate schemes 
of benefit to East Africa and its soldiers as a whole'. 
There was- a pressing need to counter boredom and maintain 
morale in the fighting forces. It had been noted that the 
African askaris had begun to ask questions about 
demobilisation. There was also a need to counter civilian 
'complacency and maintain interest in our war effort'. " 
The East African Governors' Conference agreed to the 
establishment of a new Bureau in which Northcote would 
remain as PIO assisted by a deputy, F. R. Stephen, who would 
be the MOI's representative in East Africa. 82 The Colonial 
Office and the MOI agreed to East Africa's proposal. The 
PIO's main function would be to ensure that close liaison 
00 PRO, C0875/9/18, Huxley to Sabine, 4 May 1943; 
minute by Morgan, 7 May 1943. 
01 PRO, C0875/9/18, memorandum from the East African 
Command, May 1943. 
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existed between the civil and military authorities for a 
'consistent policy in propaganda and publicity being 
directed to African troops on civil matters, particularly 
in respect of post-war rehabilitation and to maintain 
efficient contact between the troops and their homes'. The 
PIO would assume charge of the Propaganda and Information 
Section of the East African Governors' Conference 
Secretariat. He would also ensure that the 'comparatively 
neglected field' of publicity to the United Kingdom would 
be developed and would be responsible for supervising 
publicity directed overseas about East Africa. 83 
The close cooperation between the PIO and the military 
proved to be a double-edged sword. Following a visit to 
Nairobi in June 1944 the MOI's representative in West 
Africa, Harold Evans*, noted: 'the resources of the East 
Africa Command have made it possible for the Ministry [of 
Information] to use the Army as agents to an extent not 
possible in West Africa, but as a result there is a strong 
military flavour to most of the activities undertaken on 
the spot'. " A major consideration was the lack of finance 
available to balance the kind of propaganda produced by the 
East African Command to prepare the African troops for the 
return to civilian life after the war and a whole range of 
, social problems' which were 'being created for which the 
civilian authorities would be more competent to deal with 
than the military'. While the PIO could still supply some 
material for native troops serving in East Africa or 
overseas the terms of reference precluded the MOI from 
providing the military with propaganda material. In the 
final analysis the onus would be on the PIO to persuade the 
military to produce this kind of material but 'if the 
military are providing the money they may very well wish to 
85 call the tune'. 
The East Africa Command eventually recognised the need 
83 PRO, INF1/553, MOI-Colonial Office meeting to 
discuss propaganda and publicity in East Africa, 11 August 
1943; C0875/9/19, minute by Morgan, 8 December 1943. 
84 PRO, INF1/554, note by Evans, 12 June 1944. 
85 PRO, INFI/554, Usill to PIO, 7 October-1943. 
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to address the problems of demobilisation and return to 
civilian life by creating a new Directorate of Education 
and Welfare which took over the Army education and 
Information Services. This had four functions: 1) 
education, post-war planning liaison and vocational 
training; 2) broadcasting and mobile home news units; 3) 
entertainments, films, leave billeting and hostels; and 4) 
canteens, sports and radio equipment, personal welfare, 
legal aid and personal enquiries. 86 
The PIO's primary role in East Africa was not as a 
production organisation but to distribute MOI material to 
local Information Officers and from the East Africa 
Command. The PIO did, however, finance and sponsor local 
propaganda initiatives which were made possible by using 
the resources and personnel of the East Africa Command 
which therefore accounted for the 'military' flavour of 
propaganda produced locally together with the fact that a 
quarter of a million Africans were serving in the armed 
forces. For example, the PIO did not control a 
photographic service but instead supplied the East Africa 
Command with photographic material in return for the 
production of photographs by the Command. The PIO also 
financed and distributed the fortnightly wall sheets 
produced by the East Africa Command which illustrated the 
activities of the Command. The PIO supplied the paper for 
the printing of maps of war fronts produced by the East 
Africa Command for civilian use. A series of booklets 
illustrating the work of branches of the East Africa 
Command were financed by the PIO. Similarly, the PIO 
sponsored a war correspondent, Gandar Dower, to write about 
the East African forces who produced The King's African 
Rifles in Madagascar. The PIO additionally financed the 
pamphlet about East African troops called Spear of Freedom 
which had been designed to encourage enlistment and to 
maintain morale of the Pioneer Corps. African Soldiers at 
War in Abyssinia, East Africans at War. East African 
Education Corps, East African Electrical and Mec-hanical 
Engineers, Motor Military Transport Corps and M11-litalY 
016 PRO, INF1/554, Gurney to Northcote, 4 May 1944. 
369 
Mobile Unit were all PIO financed booklets. ". 
The PIO paid for broadcasts from Nairobi to the 
troops, consisting of twenty one hours a month of 
vernacular broadcasts for African troops and eight hours a 
month for imperial troops. Northcote also financed the 
Kenya Information Office's weekly broadcasts, 'Guide to the 
News' and 'East African Newsletter'. 00 
In the area of local film production the PIO supplied 
stock or part of the cost of the production of films made 
by the East Africa Command which resulted in the production 
of seven 16 mm. films and eight 35 mm. films in 1943. 
These were also distributed to the territorial Information 
Officers as well as to the MOI. 89 For example, the 35 mm. 
film, Return of an Emperor about the return of Haile 
Selassie to Abyssinia, was reproduced onto 16 mm. film and 
was financed and distributed by the PIO. Other 16 mm. 
films shot by military cine-photographers included Masai 
Cattle Sale which depicted Masai tribesmen bringing cattle 
for the troops partly for sale and partly as gifts, African 
Pioneers in the Middle East, made in the Middle East and 
sent to Nairobi for editing and then sent to South Africa 
to be copied and Major Kingston-Davies' Traininq of 
American Lorry Drivers. 90 
Before the war Major Kingston-Davies received Colonial 
office support in his previous incarnation as a maker of 16 
mm. educational films in East Africa. 9-1- During the Second 
World War be received a grant of 150 pounds to make films 
commissioned by the PIO. Davies toured East Africa, Kenya, 
Tanganyika, Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia to gather 
material to produce films on three themes TrusteeshiP, 
87 PRO, INF1/554, note by Evans, 12 June 1944; 
C0875/9/20, annual report of the MOI Office, East Africa 
Command, 13 February 1943. 
88 PRO, INF1/554, note by Evans, 12 June 1944. 
89 PRO, INF1/554, note by Evans, 12 June 1944. 
90 PRO, C0875/9/20, annual report on MOI office East 
Africa Command, 13 February 1943. 
91L C. f. PRO, C0323/1356/5/file. 
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Native African Craftsmen Yesterday and Today and East 
African Export Products. The Trusteeship film would 
illustrate the administrative systems and social services 
of the East African colonial governments in 'preparing 
their native peoples of these colonies for ultimate self- 
government'. Native African Craftsmen would contrast 
traditional and modern methods and East African Export 
Products would. show production for war purposes of 
commodities like sisal, rubber, tin and copper. 91 
A survey of film activities in East Africa was 
undertaken in June 1944 to discover the requirements of the 
colonies under the responsibility of the PIO. This was 
done to facilitate planning for future local developments 
including the possibility of establishing a central film 
making unit. It was found that the type of film in 
greatest need were educational and documentary films 
'dealing with all social matters for the general uplift of 
the African with a limited number for entertainment of a 
suitable type' and films which portrayed life in the 
various colonies, showing the 'cultural, social and 
economic life and development ... in their true light to 
British, American and European public outside Africa, 
stressing certain features which the masses are ignorant or 
ill-informed'. The development of this kind of film was 
thought to be increasingly important as the war was drawing 
to an end and which 
would leave something in the nature of an anti-climax 
in the mind of the Africans whether soldiers or not 
and that the best way of countering this would be the 
substitution of some new interest such as a liberal 
supply of cinemas, showing films which really appealed 
to the African and directed his thoughts to higher 
ideals, morally, socially and materially. 
Moreover, these kind of films would be of value in the 
promotion of mass education in the colonies in support Of 
the recent policy commitments made by the British 
government. 93 
Although the Information Officers recognised the need 
92 PRO, INF1/564, Northcote to Kingston Davies, 21 
March 1944. 
93 PRO, INF1/564, report by Champion, 22 June 1944. 
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to establish new machinery to produce these types of films, 
few of them were prepared to finance the whole cost of 
establishing a central unit. It was estimated that the 
initial capital outlay would be seven thousand pounds with 
recurrent expenditure of ten thousand pounds per annum. It 
was hoped that the initial capital outlay and the first few 
years of current expenditure would be met by a grant from 
the Colonial Development and Welfare fund. 94 
Implicit in the suggestions for the establishment of a 
central film unit was criticism of the films produced by 
the Colonial Film Unit. The report was at pains to remark 
that some of the films made by the Colonial Film Unit like 
Mr. English At Home and Royal Review, had been well 
received by African audiences. It was felt, however, that 
what in future films shot in an African environment would 
be required, 'featuring Africans and in scenes and actions 
which they are familiar' which would be more readily 
understood and convincing to African audiences. 91 
The majority of Information Officers favoured the 
production of coloured silent 16 mm. films because they 
could be used by mobile units and shown to Africans of 
different languages. Harry Franklin* in Northern Rhodesia 
favoured 'talkies' because the Africans in Central Africa, 
particularly those in the Copperbelt, had become accustomed 
to 35 mm. 'talkies' and might be discontented with anything 
less. He also argued that apparatus which would provide 
the films with sound tracks could also meet the increasing 
demands of the BBC in London for recordings of native 
songs. It was argued, however that 35 mm. 'talkies' would 
be far more expensive to produce and that the conditions in 
Northern Rhodesia presented particular circumstances of 
films for mine employees, whereas the majority of Africans 
in East and Central Africa had 'hardly, if ever seen any 
type of film'. " 
It was agreed that it would be necessary to produce 
9' ibid. 
95 ibid. 
96 ibid. 
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films to the 35 mm. commercial standard for overseas 
audiences. These films should be short, four to six minute 
features, as 'European and American cinema-goers as a body, 
would be ill-disposed to spend a whole evening viewing 
films featuring life and activities of the African 
colonies' unless they were feature films of the Sanders of 
the River type. And feature films would be beyond the 
budget of the proposed unit. 97 
It was also hoped that when the cameramen employed by 
the unit were not engaged in filming that they would be 
able to devote some time to stills photography. This would 
lead to the creation of a central photographic library 
which would be attached to the central film unit. 
Similarly, it was agreed that it would be advantageous to 
set up a central laboratory to develop and copy the films 
made by the unit instead of sending them to South Africa 
for processing. " 
In the area of broadcasting there was a concerted 
effort to coordinate broadcasting in East and Central 
Africa. The BBC was also anxious to improve its service to 
Africa. On the Overseas Service there had been more 
balanced programming between 'talks' and 'entertainment'. 
There was a move away from 'talks' and features because 
there was criticism from Africa 'on the ground that there 
was a disproportionate amount of speech'. 99 There was 
also a general increase in the number of programmes 
specially for Allied troops serving overseas. Wickham 
Steed continued to present 'World Affairs' and Herbert 
Marshall and Sidney Horniblow presented 'News from Home'; 
'Matters of the Moment' continued, but 'War Report' was 
dropped. 'Wickham Steed remains outstandingly and almost 
universally popular, and the only speakers who approach him 
are J. B. Priestley and Howard Marshall'. 3-00 The African 
97 ibid. 
98 ibid. 
99 WAC, E2/497, Programmes Overseas, Quarterly Report 
Empire Countries and the U. S. A., 17 August 1942. 
I-Ocl ibid. 
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Service broadcast the Home Service series, 'Red on the 
Map'. The former East African specialist in the Empire 
Division of the MOI, Herbert Scott, recorded 'News Letters' 
for the Empire Transcription Service. 1102- A new twelve part 
series was produced especially for the Africa Service 
called 'Middle of the World' which featured talks by 
figures like Joyce Cary and Julian Huxley. In September 
1943 Lord Lugard and Lord Hailey broadcast on 'the future 
of Africa and the Africans'. There had been a greater 
demand for more entertainment and music programmes from 
both audiences in Africa and the troops serving in North 
Africa. Accordingly a greater amount of air time was 
devoted to light music and entertainment with favourites 
like 'Tommy Handley's Half Hour', the 'Starlight' variety 
programme featuring stars like Vera Lynn, 'Old Mother 
Riley', 'Tommy Get Your Gun' featuring Tommy Trinder and an 
evening of light music and quizzes in the 'Weekly Party at 
the Overseas League' presented by Joan Gilbert. On 
Saturday nights there was the special programme 'It's All 
Yours', which provided a link between troops serving in 
isolated parts of the world and their families in Britain. 
There was an increase in the number of programmes in 
Afrikaans and the entertainment programme, 'Songtime in the 
Laager', -aimed at South African and Southern Rhodesian 
forces continued. The change of emphasis towards 
entertainment was confirmed by the incorporation of the 
General Forces Programme into the General overseas Service 
in June 1944. 
The BBC was careful in the variety material they 
broadcast overseas and bore in mind, 11. the needs and 
susceptibilities of our troops overseas. 2. the interests 
and susceptibilities of our various special audiences in 
the Empire and the United States and other foreign 
countries where they listen to London'. Areas to be 
avoided were 'any suggestions that their womenfolk might be 
getting off with someone else particularly with troops from 
overseas', any 'suggestions that people at home are having 
1101 WAC, E2/497, Overseas Service, Quarterly Report 
for Empire Counties and the U. S. A., 1 January 1943. 
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a very gay time and spending a lot of money', 'alarming 
air-raid stories' and 'too much nostalgic sentiment'. 
Material dealing with 'colour questions' also needed 
careful handling. The word 'native' was to be avoided and 
the word 'nigger' never used. In the use of jokes 
commonsense and good taste should be observed to avoid 'any 
cannibal stuff - natives eating white men and women'. 
Controversial questions in a quiz like '"What do you mean 
by a white man? " Answer: "An upright, truthful man"' were 
also to be avoided. 1102 
The MOI carried out a listening survey on broadcasting 
in the colonies based on the responses of the territorial 
information officers which was intended to help the BBC in 
its programming on the Overseas Service. The first task 
was to establish the size of the audience. 103 The results 
received were as follows: 
COLONY NUMBER WITH ACCESS NUMBER HEARING LONDON 
TO A RADIO REGULARLY 
Northern 
Rhodesia 10,000 Europeans 10,000 Europeans 
8,000 non-Europeans no non-Europeans 
Nyasaland 400 sets, practically practically everyone 
all Europeans, many with access 
Indians and a few 
Africans 
Uganda 480 Europeans all Europeans and most 
340 non-Europeans non-Europeans 
Zanzibar probably 100 Europeans 
and 2,000 non-Europeans 
hear BBC news by 
loud-speaker 
In general, news presentation was thought satisfactory, but 
1102 WAC, E2/496/2, Cecil Madden's, Policy Directive 
for Variety material broadcast Overseas, undated. 
IL03 PRO, C0875/3/9, MOI Questionnaire on Radio 
Listening in the Colonies: the BBC Empire Service 
Intelligence Memorandum, the Colonial Audience, 14 January 
1942. Also C. f. PRO, C0875/4/17, for the 1938 figures for 
wireless ownership in Kenya (2995), Uganda (391) and 
Tanganyika (605). 
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Northern Rhodesia thought it varied. There was the 
criticism that there was boring repetition of military 
successes and that attempts should not be made to conceal 
reverses. The survey was not very complimentary about 
musical programmes. As Nyasaland reported, 'too much music 
hall matter with "comic" pattern which is difficult to 
catch. Music is often distorted. The tendency is to tune 
to other stations for music'. Northern Rhodesia commented 
that musical programmes were only listened to by people in 
isolated districts. The Information Officers were also 
asked if they wanted broadcasting in any languages other 
than English. Nyasaland thought it unnecessary, while 
Northern Rhodesia favoured Afrikaans, Zanzibar wanted 
Swahili and Uganda wanted, Hindustani. LO4 The Colonial 
Office thought that the results were disappointing, 
especially as far as entertainment was concerned. 
Officials questioned the validity of some of the comments 
and suspected they were the personal opinions of the 
Information Officers. The Colonial Office looked forward 
to a time when the BBC could send qualified intelligence 
officers to the colonies. In the meantime the BBC wished 
to encourage the establishment of panels of special 
observers to monitor BBC Empire Service programming. "' 
The Colonial Office urged the Information Officers in East 
Africa to take advantage of the new attitude in the BBC 
which was less 'fastidious' about its reputation for 
'independence' than it had been in the past. Therefore any 
assistance the Information Officers could provide in 
helping the BBC in its programming might fall on more 
receptive ears. The Colonial Office was reluctant to add 
to the work of the Information Officers by encouraging them 
to monitor BBC programmes and suggested that the 
Information Officers could recruit other people to help in 
ibid. 
1105 PRO, C0875/3/9, minute by Wilson, 24 January 1942; 
Davenport (BBC) to Edmett, 21 March 1942. 
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the task. 106 
As far as local broadcasting in East Africa was 
concerned, while Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland had 
government-operated radio stations and Kenya was served by 
the Cable and Wireless station in 7LO Nairobi, Uganda, 
Tanganyika and Zanzibar had no local stations of their own 
and had to rely on Kenya. The Nairobi station 7LO 
broadcast a compilation of East African news nightly which 
was supplied by the East African Standard. The Information 
Officer in Kenya compiled a weekly East African newsletter 
based on material sent to him by the Information Officers 
from the other East African colonies. -LO7 7LO broadcast in 
English, Hindustani and ten African languages, Swahili, 
Kikuyu, Dholuo, Kikamba, Kavirondo, Nandi, Luganda, 
Chinyanja, Kisii and Acholi. In a meeting of East African 
Information Officers in September 1943 plans were discussed 
for the development of territorial stations to be 
established in colonies not already engaged in local 
broadcasting. It was concluded that in order to minimise 
the expense of each colony developing a broadcasting system 
of their own, the best development would be to establish a 
central East African broadcasting station and this would be 
further developed after the war. In the meantime, the 
Information Officers wished to invite a technical expert 
from the BBC to visit the region and report on the future 
of broadcasting in East Africa. 'LOO 
The BBC's East Africa correspondent was the editor of 
the East African Standard, George Kinnear, who sent the BBC 
a good deal of information. Northcote, the PIO, wanted the 
BBC to institute a weekly East African newscast. Grenfell 
Williams of the BBC's Overseas Service was delighted with 
the 'rising interest in broadcasting' shown by East Africa 
1106 PRO, C0875/3/9, Colonial Office to information 
officers in East Africa, 27 June 1942. 
110' PRO, C0875/2/15, minute by Keating, 15 February 
1944; Northcote to Wathen, 12 November 1943. 
1108 PRO, C0875/2/15, extract from the proceedings of 
the East Africa Information Officers conference, Nairobi, 
27 September 1943. 
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and promised full BBC cooperation. The BBC also hoped to 
ensure that more East African material could be broadcast 
on the Home Service. Although the Home Service schedule 
was 'tight', Williams had little doubt that 'good material' 
would 'find a market'. -LO9 
At the end of 1943 the BBC introduced a fortnightly 
programme on the Overseas Service called 'Calling East 
Africa' in addition to 'Calling South Africa' and 'Calling 
Southern Rhodesia'. 'Calling East Africa' was not 
altogether a success. It was criticised by the Information 
Officer in Tanganyika for being too Kenya-centric. "' The 
BBC thought that there were inherent problems in this kind 
of programming as it merely recast East African news back 
to East Africa. -L1111 Instead the BBC favoured the 
development of local broadcasting in East Africa. The 
first priority would be to achieve an improvement in 
listening facilities in East Africa. "L2 While it was 
recognised that it was difficult to estimate the exact 
audience because of communal listening facilities, it was 
clear that the figures were not 'very imposing'. The 
Colonial Office thought that, while all should be done to 
improve regional cooperation. in broadcasting, the main 
priority was to encourage the supply of radio sets for 
communal purposes. While the war was still being fought, 
and finance for such ambitious schemes was limited, it was 
1109 PRO, C0875/2/15, Northcote to Wathen, 12 November 
1943; Grenfell Williams to Latham, 16 December 1943. 
3.3-0 PRO, C0875/2/15, Tanganyika to Colonial Office, 9 
December 1943. 
"I'll PRO, C0875/2/15, minute by Morgan, 11 February 
1944 on a meeting of Usill, Latham and Grenfell Williams, 5 
January 1944. 
11112 PRO, C0875/2/15, minute by Keating, 15 February 
1944. 
The number of wireless sets in East Africa in 1944 were as 
follows: 
Kenya 
Tanganyika 
Uganda 
Zanzibar 
Nyasaland 
Northern Rhodesia 
6,377 
2,000 
820 
100 
400 
21,000 (estimated total). 
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recognised that little could be done in this area until the 
return to peacetime conditions. 113 
The Information Office in Kenya had been criticised by 
Ferdinand Joelson the editor of East Africa and Rhodesia, 
for failing to send material to Britain for publication in 
the British press. -114 The Colonial Office was similarly 
disappointed with news received from Kenya as only 'a small 
percentage of material received is of sufficiently high 
standard for the National newspapers'. In any case Kenya 
was 'fairly well covered' by correspondents of the national 
newspapers, but because a small number of them had a 
'virtual monopoly' of the news, little effort was made to 
do feature work. One explanation for this lack of interest 
in feature work was thought to be an 'exaggerated fear' of 
cabling stories which might 'offend against security'. '"L5 
In order to improve the supply of news to Kenya the 
Colonial Office negotiated with Reuters to establish a 
cable service. Reuters attached 'greater importance to 
getting their news into Kenya than into any other 
Dependency'. The Colonial Office encouraged the Kenyan 
government and the East African Standard to share the cost 
of the transmission of news. As Reuters showed increased 
interest in colonial news and in appointing correspondents 
in the colonies, colonial governments were encouraged to 
accommodate Reuters. The colonial governors were reminded 
that it would be of advantage to support Reuters not only 
during wartime but also for post-war when it would be 
important for the British press to have accurate 
information about the British empire and Commonwealth. "' 
The Information Officer in Kenya, Eric Davies, was 
generally pleased with the material received from London. 
Northcote ensured that this material was passed on to the 
military whose supplies of material from Britain had not 
IX3 PRO, C0875/2/15, minute by Keating, 15 February 1944. 
11114 PRO, C0875/13/17, minute by Haler, 7 September 1942. 
11115 PRO, C0875/18/1, minute by Haler, 24 June 1943. 
112-6 PRO, C0875/4/30, minute by Watherston, 4 October 
1943; circular despatch, 3 January 1944. 
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been as regular. Northcote also ensured that material sent 
to Kenya, like daily Empax commentaries and 'Veritas' was 
passed on to the territorial Information officers in East 
and Central Africa. The books, pamphlets, posters and maps 
sent from London were useful, but postcards were not needed 
and the posters were generally 'too complicated for the 
African to appreciate'. More posters of the 'Together' 
kind would be suitable as it had a simple message depicting 
men from various parts of the empire 'marching together'. 
The Information Office could use any posters of the Royal 
Family which continued to have 'unlimited appeal'. The 
Office had engaged the services of a Rhodesian soldier who 
helped in the broadcasts of Radio Nairobi and edited the 
well-received, 'Kenya Information Office Fortnightly', a 
four page broadsheet sent to 2,000 farmers, District 
Commissioners and Agricultural officers containing 'farming 
notices and orders and instructions on whatever subject 
appears most pressing at the time'. 117 A weekly newsletter 
in Afrikaans was produced by the Kenyan Information Office. 
The office's Indian section produced a weekly Gujerati and 
Urdu newsheet. There was increasing awareness of the need 
to address the problem of propaganda to African communities 
and at the end of 1943 a new African section was added to 
the Information Office. To cater for the African community 
a weekly Swahili newsletter, Pamola, was produced by the 
African section. '"16 
European opinion in Kenya, however thought that the 
civilian war effort, particularly in the area of 
production, was inadequate. Blame was laid on the 
government of Kenya about food shortages for labour. These 
problems had been partially addressed by a three day 
production conference in March 1943 attended by farmers on 
regional production committees which helped to 'clear the 
air' and boosted the resolve to increase production. -I"9 
113. " PRO, C0875/6/17, Davies to Sabine, 28 April 1943. 
112-13 PRO, INF1/554, report by Evans, 12 June 1944; 
INF1/564, Davies to Gurney, 8 March 1944. 
11119 PRO, C0875/6/17, Davies to Sabine, 28 April 1943. 
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Davies was also anxious to conduct publicity for 
overseas consumption on behalf Kenya, in particular, what 
the colony was 'doing for the Africans'. In order to 
address criticism of British colonial policy Davies 
arranged for the production of illustrated articles on 
subjects like 'African Administration in Nairobi', 'Medical 
Activities in the Reserves', 'African Schools', 'Better 
African Health and Housing in Kenya' to be sent to 
London. "O 
Public opinion in the East and Central African 
colonies among the European populations was thought to have 
remained generally constant. In Nyasaland the Information 
Officer, Wisdom, reported public opinion followed closely 
'what one hears of the trend of public opinion in Britain'. 
Excited rumours, resulted from the setbacks in the position 
in South-East Asia but, as the situation stabilised and 
with news of the Allied offensive, 'a much calmer and more 
confident atmosphere' was apparent. There was now a 
X2 3- worrying tendency towards 'over-optimism'. In Northern 
Rhodesia, where the Europeans were confident of eventual 
victory, the focus of their grumbles was the machinery of 
government and not the government itself. The Europeans 
employed in the Copperbelt mines were more busy with work 
than thinking about their individual contributions to the 
war effort. Growing criticism of the BBC's Overseas 
Service was evident. Europeans questioned whether they 
were being told the 'truth' about the war and whether 
disasters were being 'glossed over'. The suggestion that 
the fall of Tobruk was a 'blessing in disguise' was 
122 'exasperating'. 
The African population of Nyasaland was on the whole 
more interested in the 'daily business of living' while the 
more educated were influenced by the European 
z2o ibid. 
: L2-11 PRO, C0875/1/16, report of the Information Officer 
in Nyasaland, January 1942. 
X22 PRO, C0875/7/2, Report on public opinion in 
Northern Rhodesia, July 1942. 
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population. 123 In Northern Rhodesia the picture of African 
opinion was mixed. In rural areas the African 'understands 
the war but little' although he was confident that 'Britain 
will win as they always do'. It appeared that the message 
about the nature of the German threat to the Africans had 
filtered through as they were conscious of the German view 
of black people being a 'most inferior race'. But the 
rural African was more preoccupied with the desire to 
'secure peace and quiet, food and drink'. Educated African 
opinion divided into two groups. Educated and loyal 
Africans understood the war, tolerated deprivations and 
disturbances to their lives, believing that British rule 
was 'better than any other' and would stand by Britain if 
war came to Northern Rhodesia. The criticisms of educated 
but not so loyal Africans were growing. They did not think 
that the war was any of their concern, had little desire to 
contribute, would not help if war came to Northern Rhodesia 
and had purely local interests of improving their own 
conditions of life. They were especially audible in the 
Copperbelt and urban areas where they saw the colour bar in 
practice. 121 
The activities of the Nyasaland Information Office 
were praised for making the transition from purely war 
propaganda to a 'more effective public service' and in 
particular directed towards the Forces and maintaining 
contacts between them and their homes. 1125 The Nyasaland 
Information Office produced several newsletters for the 
African populations. Nkhani za Nyasaland in Nyanja had a 
distribution of 11,000 copies a week and Makani qha 
Nyasaland in Tumbuka had a 2,000 a week distribution. 
These combined both war news and local matters in the hope 
that 'whatever new call may be made upon them they will be 
prepared'. A newsletter for Nyasaland troops had a 
223 PRO, C0875/7/16, report of the Information Officer 
in Nyasaland, January 1942. 
124 PRO, C0875/7/12, report on public opinion in 
Northern Rhodesia, July 1942. 
1125 PRO, C0875/7/16, minute by Edmett, 4 June 1942; 
minute by Morgan, 5 November 1943. 
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circulation of 600. It included family messages and local 
African issues and from November 1942 a free letter service 
from families to troops was instituted. 126 The Information 
Office complained that it received too many MOI press 
telegrams and British press articles that repeated much of 
what was already heard on the BBC or read in South African 
or Southern Rhodesian newspapers. Articles supplied by the 
Kenyan Information Office, however, were used because they 
were 'fresh' and had 'considerable local interest'. The 
English newspaper, the Nyasaland Times, continued to be 
fully cooperative. Their leader articles were often 
'inspired' by Information Office material and the MOI's 
London Letter appeared in a series 'Sidelights on the War'. 
Although the paper was loyal in so far as it supported the 
British war effort, undercurrents of political 
dissatisfaction were apparent; 'the indignant correspondent 
still secures a certain amount of space', criticising the 
Nyasaland government over issues like colonial 
administration and development policy and petrol 
rationing. "' 
Comedies continued to be popular with African 
audiences in Nyasaland where Colonial Film Unit films like 
An African Sees London and This is a Barraqe Balloon were 
popular especially in schools. Target for Tonight had been 
shown to enthusiastic audiences. Films were also received 
from Nairobi, like the film about Abyssinia, Return of an 
Emperor and the East African Newsreels. The newsreel, 
British News, was the 'highlight in local cinema 
programmes'. Cinema programmes were successful in 
providing an hour's entertainment 'without a single dull 
moment'. "' 
Cooperation with the PIO in Nairobi also improved. 
1126 PRO, C0875/7/16, report by the Information Officer 
for January 1942, April 1942 and September- December 1942. 
112-7 PRO, C0875/7/16, report by the Information officer 
in Nyasaland, May-August 1942. 
11219 PRO, C0875/7/16, reports of the Information 
Officer for Nyasaland, January 1942, April -June 1943, July 
-September 1943. 
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The PIO sent Nyasaland wall maps and more news about 
Nyasaland appeared in the African troop newspaper, Askari. 
The Colonial Office had complained about the 'death-like 
silence' which hung over Nyasaland following requests for 
material which could be publicised form London. Wisdom 
explained that he had wanted to send more material to 
Britain for use at home and overseas but was hampered by 
the lack of time and skill. Nyasaland did not seem to have 
'the amateur or semi-professional writer as is to be found 
in larger territories like Kenya' and he had asked that the 
PIO send a professional journalist to cover Nyasaland. 119 
Each week the Information Officer sent local news in 
Nyasaland collected by the District Commissioners to be 
used in newspapers and Radio Nairobi. Nyasaland did not 
have a local broadcasting station of its own but the BBC 
could be heard around the clock. M30 
The East Africa Command's Mobile Propaganda Unit 
A Mobile Propaganda Unit was attached to the East 
Africa Command and toured East and Central Africa during 
the war and again added to the military flavour of official 
propaganda in East Africa. The Unit was led by Major 
Dickson, a former foreign correspondent with the Daily 
Telegraph-and consisted of one other European officer and 
28 African askaris from 19 units, 20 tribes and 7 
territories. "' The-Unit mounted film shows, P. T., mortar 
and small gun displays in order to show life in the army 
and to bring the war to Africans in their own locality. "' 
Writing about the Unit in 1945, Dickson was adamant 
that the aim of this 'mobile edition of the Aldershot 
1129 PRO, C0875/7/16, report from the Information 
officer in Nyasaland, July -September 1943 and C0875/18/1, 
minute by Haler, 24 June 1943. 
130 PRO, C0875/7/16, report by the Information Officer 
in Nyasaland for January-March 1943 and April 1942. 
JL31 Captain A. G. Dickson, 'Studies in War-time 
Organisation: the Mobile Propaganda Unit, East Africa 
Command', African Affairs, 44: 174,1945, p. 10. 
1132 PRO, C0875/8/8, Dickson's report, March 1943. 
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Tattoo' was not to obtain African recruits. Instead, its 
aims were fivefold. First, it aimed to 'show the life and 
training of the askaril. Second, to 'demonstrate modern 
weapons and equipment'. Third, to 'explain news of the war 
and its significance to Africans'. Fourth, to 'stimulate 
greater interest in their relatives in the Army' and fifth, 
'to encourage an intensified war effort by the civilian 
population'. 133 The main task, as Dickson saw it, was not 
to increase the number of African recruits but to live down 
the tradition of 'brutal, licentious soldiery'. In this 
respect Dickson thought that the Unit's 'safaris' had some 
value in dispelling rumours about army life and also 
inculcated the feeling that 'this war is one of all the 
tribes of East Africa'. The Unit was aided in this task by 
employing African askaris in their displays as Africans 
were far more likely to believe what another African had 
told them. In this way it was not the displays themselves 
which were of the greatest benefit but rather the 
opportunity for Africans to speak to members of the African 
fighting forces in a direct and personal way. X34 
As Dickson later explained his men were 'mission- 
aries'. Their job as public relations men meant they were 
on duty all the time. For example, Corporal Leo 'gave up 
our one free afternoon in the Copper Belt to drill the 
Chingola police'. When the Unit had a free evening they 
attended parties given in their honour 'with set speeches 
and exchanges of view'. Attention was even paid to the 
kind of impression they left after a visit. Sergeant Allen 
'wrote letters of thanks to every school, boma X35 , or 
individual from whom we received outstanding hospitality- 
that is to say, nearly everyone'. 136 
Dickson was right in identifying the army's 'public 
10. 
133 Dickson, 'Studies in War-time Organisation 
3.34 PRO, C0875/8/8, Dickson's report, March 1943. 
13 5A boma was the Swahili for district or divisional 
government headquarters. 
2: 3 6 Dickson, 'Studies in Wart-time Organisation 
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relations' problem, in view of the bad experience of 
Africans who had fought in the First World War and their 
treatment in the 'carrier corps'. As we saw in chapter two 
this was a sensitive issue and the BBC promised to omit any 
reference to the carrier corps in their broadcasts. But 
while Dickson was self-congratulatory about the laudable 
motives his Unit had and declared the aim was not to 
increase the number of recruits, he himself was forced to 
admit that as a result of the displays 'some thousands' of 
Africans 'begged to be allowed to join the Army'. "' 
In 1942 94,000 Tanganyikans had seen its displays. 
Dickson's report of the Unit's 'safari' in Uganda reveals 
much about the Unit's activities and also provides an 
individual appreciation of Britain's propaganda effort 
among African populations. In 109 days the Unit covered 
4,800 miles, held 74 displays for African audiences and 3 
for European audiences and reached a total audience of 
154,000 people. X30 
Dickson gave a vivid, if paternalistic account of the 
reception he received in the communities the Unit visited 
in Uganda. He recounted the response of an African chief 
following a mortar bomb display. A bomb landed nearer to a 
plantation than had been intended which led the chief to 
exclaim, ! If anyone has been killed, its been well worth 
it! I'll pay the blood money myself! ' He also recalled how 
" District Commissioner and the Inspector of police headed 
" 'sprint' of 500 naked Karamojong across a ravine to get 
souvenir splinters of the mortar bomb. He recounted how 
'the appearance and accomplishment of the eleven year 
bugler from Jinja amazed Africans to such extent it was 
thought that he must be an adult dwarf ... We could with 
ease, have recruited a battalion of them! '. 139 The Unit 
received over 200 letters and essays about the displays in 
which the word 'gentle' ran like a 'refrain, a quality not 
generally connected with soldiering, and not always linked 
137 ibid. 
3-: 3*3 PRO, C0875/8/8, Dickson's report, March 1943. 
M39 ibid. 
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with the word "gentleman"'. This gentle and personal touch 
combined with the 'force of example' would, in Dickson's 
opinion, 'for many years in Africa outweigh the influence 
of papers, posters, wireless, and the cinemal. 1140 Although 
the African audiences probably only retained about 10% of 
propaganda points, they went home with the impression that 
'life in the army is good, that all can help and that the 
war is not yet won'. 14" 
However, the numbers of people attending the Unit's 
displays and the anecdotes of the successes of the Unit did 
not tell the whole story. It was also obvious that the 
Unit had only added to the problems confronting the British 
authorities in Uganda, which were in places acute. As much 
as Dickson tried to demonstrate the enthusiasm which 
greeted his Unit, the facts spoke a different truth. 
Dickson said himself that he did not want to imply it had 
been a triumphal tour of Uganda. Not every Colonial 
Service officer was pleased to see the military. The 
arrival of the Unit was not seen as a 'gift from 
Providence' as it threatened the relationship the District 
Commissioners had built up with the local populations. The 
Unit was unable to proceed with a display at King's College 
in Budo following an incident a few days before the 
coronation of the Kakaba of Buganda in which the Kabaka's 
portrait had been torn down resulting in the troops being 
called in from Kampala and the closure of the school. This 
disloyalty and undiscipline was particularly worrying as 
the demonstrators represented the 'elite of the youth of 
Uganda'. Similarly the Unit met a hostile reception in 
Luguzi following the murder of a government entomologist 
and the sentencing to death of eleven Ugandans fuelled by 
the fear that European cannibals existed on the evidence of 
the 'Red Hand' bully beef brand believed to contain human 
meat. The African population feared that the Unit had been 
sent as a 'press ganging ruse to disguise a show of force 
by the government'. Dickson was also concerned about the 
1140 Dickson, 'Studies in War-time Organisation 11 P. 11. 
"Il ibid. 
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way Administrative Officers urged the Unit to 'fire our 
weapons so that Africans might appreciate the futility of 
arguing with Bren guns'. JL42 
Dickson tried to minimise the seriousness of the 
situation in Uganda by blaming the lack of a full 
understanding among the colonial population about the war 
and British administration. The real problem, according to 
Dickson, was not so much 'imminent violence' as 'chronic 
apathy', or not so much 'ignorance of the war so much as 
failure to appreciate how far the war affects them'. In 
face of this 'negative luke-warmness' it was far harder for 
the Unit's propaganda to combat than 'avowed hostility'. 
The Ugandans also expressed a distaste for the 'virile side 
of military life', had a contempt for manual labour and 
preferred technical units. As a Native Authority Treasurer 
told Dickson in Uganda where the colonial population was 
among the most educated in Africa, the Unit's propaganda 
'like religion, must be destined for the less enlightened 
tribes'. The same Bugandans who had been described by Lord 
Lugard in his Dual Mandate as loyal were now only attracted 
to the army by the 'lure of high wages and technical 
corps'. Dickson felt that some of the blame lay with the 
British themselves as 'the Dual Mandate must in operation , 
mean a dual loyalty - and when was that ever known to 
work? '. "' It did not seem to occur to Dickson that the 
most simple explanation could have been that Ugandans 
merely disliked the idea of joining the army. 
Dickson was not altogether complimentary about the 
propaganda effort in Uganda and questioned the 
appropriateness of material used. In regard to a MOI 
poster, he wrote, "'in addition to producing 90% of the 
world's nickel, Canada supplies - bushels of wheat etc" (in 
English) - nothing need be said'. MOI films also came 
under attack by Dickson who wanted to see the local 
production of more suitable films. 144 He was equally 
142 ibid. 
x43 ibid. 
. 144 PRO, C0875/8/8, Dickson's report, March 1943. 
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critical of colonial government attitudes towards 
propaganda who regarded it as 'something essentially 
"common", undignified, and "not in keeping with the best 
tradition of the service"'. Moreover propagandists 
themselves were seen either as 'self-advertising hustlers' 
or as 'the unhappy local reporter, "almost a gentleman", in 
his drab Burberry collecting the names of mourners at the 
church-gate, for inclusion in to-morrow's paper'. "' 
However as a possible augury for the future the 
displays were significant in demonstrating that Europeans 
and Africans could work together. Dickson emphasised the 
view of the Acting manager of the Roan Antelope Mine on the 
Copper Belt, where the memories of the bloodshed during the 
1940 strike were still strong: 
'I can't say that black and white relations are 
particularly good at the moment - they're not. But in 
all the years I have been out here, I've never felt a 
wave of appreciation and sympathy go through a 
European crowd, as I did at your Show yesterday, for 
what the Africans are doing in the war'. 
Following a visit by the Unit schoolchildren were given the 
essay title: 'Does the war really affect Africans? ' One 
student's essay was encouraging: 'Now we Africans know that 
the Europeans (particularly the British), do not make us 
different. from them but regard us as fellow workers in a 
common cause'. 116 
Indeed, argued Dickson, the future presented great 
opportunities. Dickson cited two comments from people who 
had been present at the Unit's displays. The first was a 
student at the Jeannes School 147 in Northern Rhodesia, 
Emman Mhango, whose father had been deported from South 
Africa for alleged sedition for attempting to establish a 
Native Trade Union. Mhango echoed the theme of winning the 
peace as there were wars not yet won: 
1145 Dickson, 'Studies in War-time Organisation ... 1, p. 
17. 
146 Dickson, 'Studies in War-time Organisation... 1, p. 13. 
114'7 Jeannes Schools were named after the founder of a 
series of community colleges for adult education in the 
southern United States. In its African form the Jeannes 
schools were training centres for married teachers and 
their wives. 
389 
Although this present war may be won ... our men will 
still be engaged in another war - the war of ignorance 
and superstition. With the knowledge they have 
acquired from the Army and from peoples of different 
races, they will try hard to make Africa a place 
really worth living in. 
The second was the comments of the District Commissioner at 
Petauke, who hoped that the cooperation to fight the war 
would be continued into the post-war period: 'it is seldom 
that the arts of war and the arts of peace can have a 
common aim, but the Propaganda Unit has shown how a spear 
for freedom may easily be beaten into a ploughshare ... Its 
emphasis, now on the destruction of the Axis, may later be 
on the reconstruction of the African'. . 148 
As far as the PIO in East Africa was concerned, the 
Unit was a 'great success'. The principal achievement was 
that the colonial peoples had been shown the part 'East 
Africans are playing in the war and their potentialities in 
the way of civilian activities'. 149 In July and August 
1943 Major Dickson's East Africa Command Mobile Propaganda 
Unit had toured Nyasaland with audiences reaching over 
7,000. The Information Officer in Nyasaland agreed with 
the PIO that Dickson's Unit was 'a complete success'. By 
explaining to the people 'what their men folk in the Army 
are doing' the displays 'greatly stimulated interest in the 
war effort'. "' 
In the Colonial Office some felt Dickson's report was 
the work 'of an intelligent and penetrating observer' and 
hoped that the apparent 'diseases of apathy, inertia and 
unjustifiable conceit' would not be allowed to 'extend 
indefinitely'. The Colonial Office urged the MOI to take 
up the criticism of MOI films and point out to Dickson that 
eleven Colonial Film Unit films had been despatched to 
Uganda since February 1943. But William Morgan, 
administrative officer on temporary secondment to the 
Public Relations Department from the Malayan Education 
: L411 Dickson, 'Studies in War-time Organisation p. 18. 
3.49 PRO, INF1/554, Northcote to Wathen, 17 April 1945. 
3.50 PRO, C0875/7/16, report by the Information officer 
of Nyasaland for July-September 1943. 
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Department was more perceptive: 'reading between the lines 
one gathers that it was not altogether a success or 
particularly welcomed' X511 
A Model Public Relations Office: 
the Case of Northern Rhodesia 
The Colonial Office regarded the Information Office in 
Northern Rhodesia as 'one of the best information set ups 
in the colonies'. 1152 Under the guidance of the Information 
Officer, Harry Franklin, the activities of the Northern 
Rhodesian Information Office expanded in the second part of 
the war. Harry Franklin, later famous for the introduction 
of the 'Saucepan Special' wireless receiving set"' had 
served in Northern Rhodesia during all his Colonial Service 
career, first as a Native Education Inspector and then in 
the Judicial Department. He had little experience in 
propaganda but had been a former editor of Mutende, the 
official government publication for Africans. In the first 
part of the war he had been Assistant Secretary for Native 
Affairs in the Secretariat in Lusaka. Throughout his long 
career first as the Information Officer and then as the 
post-war Director of Information, Franklin was dedicated to 
the interests of the African. In 1950 he decided to resign 
when it appeared that the Federation in Central Africa was 
becoming a reality. Federation, he thought, would spell 
the end of the policy of the paramountcy of African 
interests, and that policy had been 'the only policy under 
115' PRO, C0875/8/8, minute by Lieutenant-Colonel 
Rolleston, 3 June 1943; Morgan to Wathen, 30 June 1943; 
minute by Morgan, 29 May 1943. 
1152 PRO, C0875/7/14, Morgan to Elspeth Huxley, 11 June 
1943. 
153 In the days before the transistor radio when 
wireless sets were very expensive and therefore of 
prohibitive expense for the African, Franklin managed to 
persuade Ever Ready to produce cheap sets, suitable for 
tropical climates which used saucepans as their outside 
coverings. The result was a mini-communications 
revolution. C. f. Harry Franklin, The Flag-Wagger (London, 
1974), chapter 14. 
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which I felt I could work' . 1154 
This man of principle was a maverick and was no 
stranger to controversy. In 1938 he incurred the wrath of 
the Governor (Sir John Maybin) when he wrote a 'vicious 
attack on Hitler' for Mutende. He was reprimanded, with 
the Governor arguing that to print would probably earn him 
the sack as it Iran counter to HMG1s diplomacy at the time 
and a copy of the paper always went to the Colonial 
Office'. Although the article did not appear, Franklin was 
unrepentant as he thought the Governor's arguments were 
'irrelevant' unless Hitler also received a copy and Hitler 
was not on Franklin's 'distribution list'. -L525 
Franklin constantly faced the opposition of the 
European settler politicians to any of his innovations in 
the information services. They 'did not like the idea' of 
his Press Section as part of the work of the Information 
Department and they were in total opposition to the idea of 
special broadcasts for the Africans, as the Africans would 
listen and 'get wrong ideas into their heads' . 156 
Franklin was fortunate in having the full support of 
the Governor, Sir John Waddington, until the latter's 
retirement in 1947. In a description which could have been 
about himself, Franklin felt Waddington 'knew where his 
duty lay,. in the uplifting of the African people, and his 
inclination ran with his duty'. According to Franklin, 
Waddington had to 'conceal his distaste for politicians and 
his dislike for the leaders of the white Trade Unions of 
the copper mines'. Franklin recounted a story (which is 
impossible to substantiate, but gives an excellent flavour 
of the political situation within which both the 
administration and the Information Office tried to operate) 
of Waddington's skill in dealing with the leader of one of 
the mineworkers' unions who had threatened to strike which 
would have endangered the supply of the vital war material 
copper. Vain, illogical and difficult to reason with, the 
154 ibid., p. 200. 
155 ibid., p. 141. 
3-5r- ibid., pp. 171 and 173. 
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union leader had a passion for music and had formed his own 
miners' brass band: 
'We'll have a garden party and bring him and his band 
down to Government house instead of using the 
Regimental Band, ' the Governor said to me. I ventured 
to doubt whether that would help reason to prevail. 
'We'll see, ' said the Governor, chuckling. 
It was a splendid garden party. The Governor, a 
music-lover, endured the band with amiable fortitude 
and praised it lavishly in a little speech thanking it 
for its appearance. The bandsmen were very pleased, 
the Trade Union leader was almost overcome with 
delight and led the band through the town from the 
railway station when it arrived back on the 
Copperbelt. He then declared the strike off. "' 
In these difficult circumstances Franklin had a record of 
great achievement. In the second part of the war he 
brought about a huge expansion in propaganda activities in 
Northern Rhodesia. He emphasised the local production of 
propaganda material because material produced in Britain 
was done by individuals who lacked 'local knowledge'. The 
Information Office produced material designed to 'keep the 
African alive to the realities of war' in order to maximise 
the African war effort which was a difficult task in view 
of the African inclination towards apathy. In addition to 
Mutende, material regularly produced included a weekly 
pamphlet of local news for the African troops, Mau a 
Asikari. - The BBC's Overseas Service was supplemented by 
Radio Lusaka a local government-run broadcasting station 
which broadcast three times a week in three official 
languages and in English. Films were shown using a cinema 
van purchased from South Africa. 158 
Franklin ensured Northern Rhodesian troops were well 
catered for. He himself visited the fronts and wrote about 
the troops when northern Rhodesians were in action and he 
established a Troops' Welfare Service which ensured that 
relations with the military were 'excellent'. The European 
officers and NCOs had developed the habit of calling into 
the Information Office when they were on leave and gave 
news from Northern Rhodesians serving abroad and their 
1157 ibid., pp. 173-4. 
3-50 PRO, C0875/7/14, Franklin's report, 4 September 1942. 
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'views on post-war problems. The Information Office also 
cooperated with the military by raising funds and by 
distributing 'comforts for the troops from the 
territory. "' 
The European population was served by a weekly 
broadcast with the aim of 'trying to keep them on their 
toes'. Weekly Newsletters in Afrikaans and English were 
issued. Posters and cinema slides were produced by a local 
artist, and were intentionally 'low-brow' to suit the 
'tough Copperbelt population'. 160 
Franklin also expanded his activities to embrace 
'public relations'. He believed that in addition to 
encouraging the war effort, it was the task of the 
Information Office to 'popularize the Government by 
informing the people about what it was doing and how and 
why it was doing it'. 11611 His 'public relations' work 
entailed extensive travel and attending meetings and 
informal gatherings and obtaining information about the 
state of public opinion at first hand. He was somewhat 
hesitant about this as he did not wish to usurp the 
activities of the Provincial Commissioners. Nevertheless, 
Franklin felt 'public relations' was important in 
maintaining 
a liaison between the Public and the Government and 
the keeping of a finger on the pulse of the public, 
both African and European, so as to be in a position 
to report to Government the people's criticisms, 
reaction to existing and contemplated measures, and so 
on. 
In this activity Franklin hoped to be as flexible as 
possible: 
mixing with miners in pubs is a somewhat delicate 
operation, but this is a very democratic Colony and, 
and that sort of thing is not without value - though 
not of course as a whole time occupation. 
Franklin also engaged in 'public relations' activities with 
the South African and Southern Rhodesian press as the local 
1159 ibid., pp. 152-3 and PRO, INF1/354, Wathen to 
Northcote, 5 April 1945. 
"" ibid. 
3-1>1 Franklin, OR-cit., p. 165. 
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Northern Rhodesian press did not 'carry a lot of 
weight'. "' He made personal contact with the editor and 
staff of the Bulawayo Chronicle and the chiefs of the Argus 
Newspaper group in Pretoria and the South African Press 
Association, giving them a good deal of background 
information about Northern Rhodesian conditions. Franklin 
was particularly satisfied with the results of his contacts 
with the _Bulawayo 
Chronicle which led to the paper 
'presenting the affairs of this country in a more 
reasonable light and in refraining from publishing a good 
deal of rubbish from irresponsible sources'. His 
intention, he assured the Colonial Office, was not to 
'muzzle the press' as they were all reasonable people who: 
when they have an understanding of local affairs they 
treat them with understanding. We send them as much 
information, both for publication and as background- 
not for publication - as we possibly can, and this is 
growing as Government Officials, brought up in a 
tradition of silence, are gradually learning not to be 
afraid to trust me with news of their work. 163 
Franklin's future work looked towards expanding the 
'public relations' aspect of the Information Office, 
building a modern radio studio and installing three 
transmitters-"' 
Sabine was particularly pleased with Franklin's 
activities and the start he had made in the 'public 
relations' field which would assume an even greater role 
3L, 57- ibid; a Colonial Office survey of the colonial 
press did not recommend local Northern Rhodesian press, the 
independent Northern Rhodesia Advertiser and the 
Livingstone Mail, which on the one hand published a high 
percentage of MOI material, nevertheless adopted an 
'unfailingly critical' tone in its editorials against the 
British government. The Southern Rhodesian Bulawayo 
Chronicle was commended for being 'second only to the East 
African Standard in British East Africa, with a high 
standard Of journalism, c. f., PRO, C0875/16/15, survey of 
the colonial press, February 1943. 
163 PRO, C0875/7/14, Franklin's report, 4 September 1942. 
11" ibid. 
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postwar. "' Indeed, Franklin's terms of reference were 
officially extended and he became the first Public 
Relations Officer in East Africa. 166 The PIO, however, was 
a little more cautious about the development of 'public 
relations' in Northern Rhodesia. In Northcote's view, 
efforts should be concentrated in future on 'outward' 
public relations by publicising Africa to the 'outside 
world' and to explain or 'popularise Government's policy' 
in East Africa itself rather than 'inward' activities. 
Although Northcote agreed that a Public Relations Officer 
'should do what an to keep the Government appraised of 
public opinion' he did not regard that as a 'major 
function' as this was more the administrative 
responsibility of the District Officers. 167 
During 1943 the staff of the Northern Rhodesian 
Information Office increased to an assistant information 
officer, a cinema photographer and four clerks. The 
broadcasting activities of Radio Lusaka increased during 
1943 although there had been difficulties in obtaining the 
three transmitters. There were also problems with radio 
reception. While morning reception was good there were 
problems with evening reception in some areas. An extra 
programme was broadcast on Thursday evenings to 'assist in 
driving home various campaigns, Salvage Campaign, Savings 
Campaign, etc. ' There was also a new departure in special 
programmes for special days like Empire Day and St. 
George's Day featuring amateur talent. Because the public 
was tired of hearing the same voices, different voices were 
heard, of government officials and 'private individuals 
with interesting experiences (escaping from the Far East, 
for exaýmple)', soldiers who had been through Dunkirk, 
messages from African chiefs, African choirs and lessons in 
English. Records were difficult to obtain therefore the 
Information Office had begun to make its own for African 
3.65 PRO, C0875/7/14, Sabine to Franklin, 19 November 
1942. Sabine also reassured Franklin that he had not 
underestimated the value of mixing with miners in pubs. 
266 PRO, C0875/7/14, Usill to Sabine, 17 June 1943. 
217 PRO, INF1/554, Northcote to Franklin, 4 May 1944. 
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broadcasts. Recordings of the governor of Northern 
Rhodesia were made and broadcast from Lusaka, Luanshya and 
Nairobi and listened to as far a field as Madagascar and 
Ceylon. The governor's Christmas message to African troops 
was greatly appreciated and Franklin frequently heard the 
comment that 'this was the first time we really felt that 
Northern Rhodesia was remembering us'. 1168 In order to 
increase the number of African listeners, the government of 
Northern Rhodesia approved the establishment of a grant of 
5 shillings a month to Europeans in rural areas who allow 
Africans to listen to Lusaka broadcasts and to keep their 
radio batteries charged. 1"5; ' 
Relations with the press continued to be good in 
Northern Rhodesia. On average twenty four communiques were 
issued a month going to twelve organisations and press 
agencies and to three new ones, Africa World, the United 
States Office of War Information and to the new Northern 
Rhodesian newspaper the Northern News. 170 The circulation 
of the English newsletter increased from 3,000 to 3,500 a 
month. People even began to complain that they were unable 
to obtain the newsletter so it was decided to send one to 
every European household in Northern Rhodesia and 6,300 
were distributed. The Office began producing a monthly 
newsletter for European Servicemen which was 'more 
enthusiastically received than anything else published by 
the Department'. 500 copies were distributed world-wide 
giving local news in an informal style as well as sports, 
social and official news. 171 
The circulation of the African paper, t1ug-tende, 
increased since 1943 from 11,940 to 14,133 copies and was 
also sent to North Rhodesian Africans living in neighboring 
territories and South Africa. Local news content increased 
as did news and pictures from askaris abroad. The African 
staff of the Mutende office also expanded their activities 
1168 ibid. 
"69 ibid. 
"70 ibid. 
3--" ibid. 
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to include translating and broadcasting on Lusaka radio and 
the preparation of war news and local news for the African 
broadcasts. For Northern Rhodesian askaris a free letter 
scheme was introduced for the troops and their relatives at 
home. "' 
The Northern Rhodesian Information Office produced its 
own pamphlets in the local vernaculars, with a picture 
pamphlet every two or three months. Subjects included 
'Grow more Food' and the illustration of the work of 
Northern Rhodesian troops abroad. M73 Unfortunately, the 
pamphlet African Advance, considered by the Colonial Office 
to have excellent pictures and a 'good "partnership" story' 
was too Northern Rhodesian specific to merit publication as 
a MOI booklet. X74 
The local production of photographs increased. These 
photographs were distributed and published regularly in 
Mutende, the Bulawayo Chronicle and the Crown Colonist. 
Photographs from Northern Rhodesia were also used and 
distributed by the PIO in Nairobi and a set was sent to the 
Picture Post to illustrate Northern Rhodesia's war effort. 
Photographic and written material was sent to the MOI for 
distribution to the British press and for the MOVS 
publication, East Africa at War. An article, 'Temporary 
Wartime Housing in Northern Rhodesia', was prepared for the 
Architectural Magazine, 'Northern Rhodesia' for the Empire 
Maqazine and 'the Work of the Women's Institute in Northern 
Rhodesia', 'Northern Rhodesian Women's War Work', and 
'Government House, Northern Rhodesia' for the Lady and Good 
Housekeeping. X75 
Approximately 60,000 items of propaganda material, 
posters, pamphlets, booklets, photographs, leaflets, 
postcards etc. were received from Britain, South Africa, 
Southern Rhodesia, the United States, India and the Congo 
and distributed each month by the Information Office, which 
X72 ibid. 
X 73 ibid. 
x"74 PRO, INF1/354, Wathen to Northcote, 5 April 1945. 
L75 ibid. 
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far exceeded the requirements of a territory the size of 
Northern Rhodesia. Material had been distributed mainly by 
the local District Officers but this had led to 
bottlenecks. Therefore, the Information Office distributed 
more material directly to individuals, schools, clubs and 
societies. In addition Information Office Bookstalls were 
established in each large population centre in Northern 
Rhodesia and manned by volunteers. 11*7r, 
The Information Office had its own Mobile Cinema and 
Film Section which had overcome difficulties in obtaining 
supplies of apparatus and suitable films. The section gave 
90 shows to 60,000 Africans between July 1942 and June 
1943. More than 6,500 feet of film was shot in Northern 
Rhodesia which resulted in the production of two army 
recruiting films, two newsreels for local use, a local 
interest film on the subject of 'native blacksmithing', a 
film on copper production, material sent to Nairobi for 
inclusion in East African Newsreel, a 'Target Film' to 
assist in the drive for war charities and a film about 
'native' life in Barotseland. Northern Rhodesia showed 
films on football and health received from Southern 
Rhodesia and films from the South African Bureau of 
Information. MOI films were now shown on the commercial 
circuit. "' 
The Information Office used all propaganda media for 
the conduct of campaigns on copper production, salvage, 
careless talk costs lives, war savings and target month for 
war charities. The Office's 'public relations' activities, 
acting as a liaison between the government and the public 
resulted in a growing confidence in the Office by outside 
officials and the public. This was evidenced by the 
increase of visitors to the Office, increased demand for 
Newsletters, the reporting of rumours and requests for 
information and advice. The office received about 200 
letters a month. "' 
"76 ibid. 
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The Colonial Office was delighted with the progress 
made by Franklin's office and was impressed that so much 
had been achieved with so small a staff. M79 They 
especially liked the newsletters produced by the Office and 
the developments made in the 'public relations' field. it 
was hoped that Franklin could play in the post-war period: 
a more useful and responsible part in the 
administration, in respect not only of propaganda 
directed to the immediate war effort but of civil 
developments, political, social and economic, in 
connection with which the Government is concerned to 
assure itself of the support and understanding of 
public opinion. 
There was a growing recognition that it was no longer 
sufficient to regard the colonial press as a 'gauge of 
public opinion'. If information work was to be successful 
in the colonies, it would have to embrace 'public 
relations' activities on the Northern Rhodesian model. 3-BO 
It was also thought that a good 'public relations' service 
in the colonies would be of the utmost importance post-war 
because, if it were handled in the right way it could do 
much 
to bridge the awkward gap which we may expect between 
the rise of political consciousness and the time, 
which may be far distant, when some of the political 
aspirations aroused can be satisfied. 181 
Political Developments in Africa 
Even during the war good public relations alone were 
not enough to satisfy political aspirations. While the 
declared Policy of the British government was economic and 
social development and gradual progress towards self- 
government in a 'partnership' with the colonies, the 
Colonial office was subjected to pressure from the white 
settler communities in East and Central Africa 'to accede 
to consitutional innovations for closer union which had 
3L-19 PRO, C0875/7/14, Wathen to Franklin, 26 October 1943. 
1943. 
so PRO, C0875/5/15, minutes by Morgan, 2 and 11 June 
lax PRO, C0875/5/15, minute by Sabine, 24 June 1943. 
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been inspired by wartime expedients'. 1182 
In spite of the increasing commitment to the 
coordination of wartime activities on a regional basis, the 
Colonial Office had tried to avoid public discussion of 
closer union throughout the war. While the economic merits 
and practicalities of economic regional cooperation and its 
continuation after the war had been accepted by the 
Colonial Office these developments intensified the 
political demands of settler communities for 
reconsideration of the question of closer union. George 
Seel head of the East African department of the Colonial 
office explained 'in a world of planned and controlled 
production ... 
the advantages of larger groupings, in East 
Africa as elsewhere, have become clearer'. Similarly, as 
Sir Philip Mitchell, in charge of East Africa's war effort 
put it, 'there can never be a reversion to pre-war 
separation. War is a good umbrella and the time is ripe to 
take a walk under itf. 103 
The question of closer union in East Africa had 
received 'considerable attention again in the Kenya press'. 
It was recognised by the Colonial Office that Lord Hailey 
favoured a regional grouping of the East African 
territories and believed that 'salvation would come from 
making the Kenya settler a part of a much larger unit'. 
The Governor of Kenya, Sir Henry Moore, was a strong 
advocate of closer union. Moreover the Colonial Office 
also had to consider the possible political penetration of 
South Africa in both East and Central Africa. Closer union 
offered the settler communities an alternative to overtures 
from Pretoria. On the other hand, it was recognised that 
there were 'strong elements' in the House of Commons, in 
particular within the Labour Party who were 'bitterly 
I'll Lee and Petter, op. cit., p. 225. 
103 PRO, C0822/108/20, minute by Seel, 15 February 
1943; C0822/108/19, Mitchell to the Colonial office, 15 
January 1941. See further N. J. Westcott, 'Closer Union and 
the future of East Africa, 1939-48: A case study in the 
sofficial Mind of Imperialism', The Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History, 10: 1 (1981), p. 69. 
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opposed' to closer union. 1184 Not least because it had been 
the stated policy of the British government to regard 
'native interests' as paramount. 
The Secretary of State for the Colonies's position was 
explained to Moore. It was not 'feasible' to take up this 
question under present conditions as all energies 'must be 
directed to winning the war'. In these circumstances it 
was unlikely that Cabinet or Parliament could find time to 
consider closer union. Lord Moyne had no objections to the 
secret discussion of closer union between the East African 
Governors but 
nothing should be done to lend colour to any 
impression among the public or indeed in official 
circles that [the] question is being taken up by [the] 
Government. "' 
The Colonial Office attempted to avoid a move towards 
closer union during the war and, in the meantime, 
maintained a 'midway position without a commitment for or 
against closer union'. The danger remained that unless the 
Colonial Office took some kind of lead over the question, 
the British Government might be faced with the 'fait 
accompli'. Having experience a degree of new power and 
regional collaboration in a wartime organisation, this 
'would almost certainly create a situation which would lead 
up directly to the creation of an EastlAfrican Dominion or 
quasi-Dominion as the end of the war'. 1186 
The Colonial Office's desire to keep discussions about 
the question of closer union private did not meet with 
complete success. For example, an article in the 
Economist, 'Test in Africa', alerted the public to the 
dangers of the wartime developments in Africa that 'vested 
interests appear to be entrenching themselves in then name 
1184 PRO, C0822/108/19, minute by Watherston, 25 
January 1941; minutes of a conversation between Lord Moyne 
and Lord Hailey, 18 April 1941; Kenya to Colonial Office, 
14 January 1942; minute by Dawe, 1 May 1942. 
11135 PRO, C0822/108/19, the Colonial Office to Kenya, 
Dawe to Moore, 21 January 1942. 
1186 PRO, C0822/108/19, minute by Gater, 5 May 1942; 
minutes of a meeting in the Secretary of State's room, 10 
June 1942. 
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of wartime efficiency': 
The colonies of East and Central Africa are being 
drawn more and more into the war - militarily, by the 
Japanese threat to the Indian Ocean, economically, by 
the supply demands of the armies of the Middle East. 
Yet, the result has not been to associate the whole 
people of these colonies more closely with Great 
Britain in the war effort, to give Europeans and 
Africans a common basis for working together and to 
promote in both races a feeling of responsibility. 
Instead, the opportunity has been taken, whether 
unconsciously or not, to advance the interests of the 
Europeans. 
In Northern Rhodesia, the article continued, Europeans 
filled executive posts. The Europeans supported 
amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia, 'whose native policy 
is restrictive: consequently, anything which puts them in a 
more powerful position is particularly regrettable'. The 
Economist called for reform and the restatement of British 
government policy that native interests were paramount: 
Hitherto, British policy in East and Central Africa 
has been negative. In the interests of the Africans, 
it has opposed amalgamation between the Rhodesias and 
Nyasaland and it has attempted to be a bulwark between 
them and the white settlers. But no positive policy 
has been offered in return before the course of the 
war raised the well-known obstacles - and excuses. "' 
In August 1942 the Governor of Kenya, Sir Henry Moore 
came to London to discuss the question of closer union with 
Lord Cranborne, the then new Secretary of State for the 
Colonies. Cranborne argued that the fall of Malaya had 
resulted in demands in both Britain and the United States 
for increased African participation in government. Given 
the wartime regional administrative developments in East 
Africa and the growth of settler power through bodies like 
the Civil Defence and Supply Council, there was the danger 
that people in Britain 'might think that a constitutional 
development was in fact taking place and that the Secretary 
of State no longer exercised control'. Moore was sure that 
the Europeans would be prepared to 'accept the idea of 
partnership with Africans after the war' but they wanted 'a 
lot of other things on their own account', for example, 'a 
2-8-1 The Economist, 22 August 1942. 
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greater share in government'. 188 
The East African Department of the Colonial Office 
prepared a memorandum on East African policy on the 
following assumption: 
the question is no longer 'should closer union be the 
aim of policy? ' but 'what form of closer union is most 
likely efficiently to secure the defence and the 
economic and welfare of the inhabitants of those 
territories? '. 
The Department proposed a federal solution under a Governor 
General. It was thought that Africans would accept this 
proposal as long as it was made clear that there were open 
opportunities for all races to take their part in public 
affairs, that there would be progressive education of 
Africans in public affairs and that there would be no 
encroachment by settlers on native lands. 119 
Moore envisioned not a federal East Africa but a 
unitary state: 'British East Africa'. Seel thought that 
the economic argument for closer union was now 
'incontrovertible' but foresaw problems of presenting such 
a plan as it would need to be based on a better argument 
than it was good for big business. Seel was critical of 
Moore's proposal because 'insufficient attention seems to 
have been paid to the factor created by the recognition of 
the duty of Colonial powers to facilitate the assumption by 
Colonial peoples of a share in their own government'. 
Furthermore, as the head of African Division, Assistant 
Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies Sir Arthur Dawe 
pointed out, Moore's proposal would have to go to Cabinet 
and it would not be possible 'to get this scheme accepted 
by opinion here'. 110 
It was the instinct of the fifth wartime Secretary of 
State for the Colonies, Oliver Stanley, to 'scrap' any 
schemes for closer union in East Africa because they would 
-188 PRO, C0822/108/19, minutes of a meeting in the 
Secretary of State's room, 25 August 1942. 
189 PRO, C0822/108/20, memorandum by the East African 
Department, March 1943. 
1190 PRO, C0822/108/20, Moore to the Colonial office, 
20 April 1943; minute by Seel, 17 May 1943; minute by Dawe, 
19 May 1943. 
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be unacceptable to Cabinet, to Parliament and to British 
public opinion. Dawe stressed the need to take the 
initiative now or be faced with the scenario of a settler 
'ultimatum' later. Therefore Dawe recommended the 
preparation of a plan for federal union. Federal union 
rather than a unitary state would make the task of 
'political presentation' easier. 3-91 
In the meantime, however, Stanley had made his speech 
on the future of British colonial policy to the House of 
Commons in July 1943 which had given the go ahead to the 
Colonial Office and MOI's campaign for 'partnership' 
between the colonies and Britain. The Times Nairobi 
correspondent, George Kinnear, reported that the statement 
had been 'well received' in Kenya and that the East African 
Standard welcomed 
the emergence of the idea of partnership in place of 
the one-sided doctrine of trusteeship, and interprets 
this partnership as meaning 'active cooperation and 
shared responsibility in the evolution of policy 
accepted in common by Great Britain and the colonies'. 
The East African Standard, however, sought to remind 
Stanley that conditions in East Africa required special 
treatment. The European community was 'virile ... 
spreading rapidly and growing apace' and wanted immediate 
action for the benefit of the whole of East Africa. The 
Europeans would not be content to wait for the fulfillment 
of the long process of African education, social and 
economic development and- progress visualized by the 
Secretary of State's plan'. 192 'Partnership' would not, it 
appeared, solve the problems of white nationalism. 
The Colonial Office thought that a solution to the 
closer union question had now become urgent as the basic 
principles of the government's new policy appeared to be 
under threat from the white settlers; the 'early settlement 
of political conflict ... is a necessary preliminary to 
H. M. G. 's Policy Of social and economic betterment for 
11911 PRO, C0822/108/20, minutes of a meeting held in 
the Secretary of State's room, 4 June 1943; Stanley to 
Moore, 15 June 1943. 
M92 The Times, 17 July 1943. 
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Africans'. The Lord Privy Seal, Lord Cranborne, made a 
personal appeal to the Labour Party leader, Clement Attlee 
to accept a plan for closer union in East Africa by arguing 
The white people of Kenya and Tanganyika are already 
extremely restive under Whitehall government. They 
will not stand it permanently, and we shall, I am 
convinced, be unable to coerce them, even if we wish 
to do so. If we allow relations between the home and 
local governments to reach a deadlock we shall be 
beaten as we have always been beaten in the past. 
If the trend towards closer union was resisted, continued 
Cranborne, the white communities would be alienated and 
pushed towards South Africa, which would 'from the point of 
view of the black population, be a disastrous 
development'. "' 
In spite of these arguments Clement Attlee was 
unimpressed. At a meeting in the Colonial Office he said he 
'failed to see any adequate case made out for closer union' 
and that the Labour Party would never accept an unofficial 
majority [i. e. white settler majority] governing East 
Africa. "' 
While the domestic political situation in Britain was 
unlikely to produce agreement on closer union for East 
Africa, doubts were also expressed in the Colonial Office. 
As Seel noted, if Moore's-plan for a unitary state in East 
Africa was conceded, 'the Secretary of State would be on 
very difficult ground in refusing to concede it in Central 
Africa'. In order to find a way out of this impasse, 
Stanley decided to ask for the views of the other East 
African Governors on closer union. 195 
The results were not encouraging. While the Governors 
of Uganda, Tanganyika and Zanzibar would consider federal 
economic cooperation, none appeared to favour political 
union for fear of being dominated by white settlers in 
193 PRO, CO822/108/20, 'Reasons for urgency in dealing 
with the East African problem', undated; Cranborne to 
Attlee, 22 July 1943. 
194 PRO, C0822/108/20, minutes of a meeting at the 
Colonial Office, 5 August 1943. 
x95 PRO, C0822/108/20, minute by Seel, 6 August 1943; 
Stanley to Dundas (Uganda), Jackson (Tanganyika)and Pilling 
(Zanzibar), 7 September 1943. 
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Kenya. Therefore it was unlikely that these three 
territories would accept either the federal or the unitary 
plans for closer union. "'6 
In the face of these difficulties Stanley admitted to 
Moore that he was at a loss over the next step. He did not 
want to see the situation dragged out, but, because of the 
opposition of the Labour Party to any form of closer union, 
Stanley felt unable to go to Cabinet with a recommendation 
for a statement to be made that the government intended to 
establish a unitary government for East Africa. The East 
African Governors were equally opposed to another 
Parliamentary Commission into the subject as it would 
produce 'fruitless public controversy'. Moreover, the 
domestic opposition to closer union in Britain had 
intensified. Arthur Creech Jones had openly admitted 
suspicion of settler intentions in a House of Commons 
debate on 17 December 1943, while the FCB had published a 
research pamphlet, Kenya - White Man's Country? 1197 
The Colonial Office faced a dilemma. It was anxious 
to maintain the minimum coordination of the East African 
territories in the post-war period, but it was faced with 
the concerns of the East African territories that 
despite all the safeguards that could be devised, the 
European settlers of Kenya would in practice control 
policy and its application. The whole dog would in 
fact be wagged by its tail. -198 
The wartime government failed to find a way out of the 
deadlock. Further developments would have to await 
consideration by post-war governments. 
Amalgamation in Central Africa 
While the British government had attempted to avoid 
public discussion of the question of closer union in East 
1196 PRO, C0822/108/20, meeting in the Secretary of 
State's room, 29 October 1943. 
1197 PRO, C0822/108/20, Stanley to Moore, 13 January 
1944; minute by Seel, 15 February 1944. 
198 PRO, C0822/108/20, minute by Seel, 15 February 
1944; C0822/114/10, Hathorn Hall (Uganda) to Stanley, 8 
February 1945. 
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Africa, it was equally determined to avoid a similar 
discussion about the amalgamation of North and South 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The 1939 Bledisloe Report had 
pointed out the advantages of larger units, but had not 
recommended full amalgamation. Instead the Report 
recommended the establishment of an Inter-Territorial 
Council for Central Africa. In 1940 the British government 
secured a 'gentleman's agreement' with the Prime Minister 
of Southern Rhodesia, Sir Godfrey Huggins*, not to raise 
the issue of amalgamation during the war. So sensitive was 
the government to this issue, that it had even refused to 
publish a report by Lord Hailey on the effect of 
amalgamation on native policy in the three territories. "' 
In 1943 a speech by the South African Prime Minister, 
General Smuts*, had the effect of re-opening the public 
debate on the question of amalgamation in Central Africa. 
In November 1943 Smuts, said he favoured the establishment 
of a regional commission for the continent of Africa. He 
proposed a Pan-African conference to be held at some time 
in the future to discuss regional economic cooperation and 
held out the possibility of a federation of South and 
Central Africa. This led to press speculation in Southern 
Rhodesia about the implication of this on the issue of 
amalgamation in Central Africa. For example in an 
editorial 'Time to Think of the Future', the Bulawayo 
Chronicle acknowledged that the political situation in 
Southern Rhodesia was 'very fluid' and that Huggins had 
agreed not to raise the amalgamation issue during the war. 
There would come a time in the not too distant future when 
the Southern Rhodesian attitude to this and Smuts's 
regional proposals would have to be formulated. Southern 
Rhodesia, it argued, should not be left out of these 
discussions and it was time that the country's viewpoint 
was 'crystallised'. 200 
1199 PRO, C0847/22/2, Colonial Office to Northern 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 4 March 1942. For the debate on the 
publication of Hailey's report see PRO, D035/1161/R. 208/2/file. 
200 PRO, D035/1161/R. 208/13, the Bulawayo Chronicle, 9 
November 1943. 
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The Colonial Office was concerned that Smuts would 
promote a conference to discuss the future of Africa during 
the war. Oliver Stanley talked to Smuts and was relieved 
to discover that he had no intention of promoting political 
connections in either East or Central Africa. 101 A 
retreat from this controversy was evident by a denial of 
the British High Commissioner in Southern Rhodesia that 
Huggins and Smuts had discussed post-war Pan-African plans 
or the incorporation of Rhodesia into the Union of South 
Africa. 101 But controversy did not disappear. The 
Economist urged the British government to stand firm 
against any Southern Rhodesian demands for amalgamation at 
the forthcoming empire conference in May 1944 emphasising 
the differences in native policy in the Central African 
territories: 
The Colonial Office policy maintains the paramountcy 
of native interests and the ability of the African 
eventually to govern his own territory. Southern 
Rhodesian policy is based on the paramountcy of 
European interests and the complete segregation of the 
African in the colony's social and economic life. 
It was noted that under the Premiership of Huggins, African 
welfare had improved. Therefore, while t he Colonial Office 
was 'right in steadfastly resisting the amalgamation 
scheme' as long as Southern Rhodesia's native policy was 
'based on' restraint of the African's rights', its hand 
could be strengthened 'if it were equally energetic in 
pursuing social and economic development schemes and 
equally willing to spend money on them as is the Government 
of Sir Godfrey Huggins'. 20: 3 
The Colonial Office was treading on very thin ice in 
its Central African policy. It had proposed the 
continuation of war-time regional cooperation in the form 
of a Central African Council which would be a consultative 
body with a permanent secretariat under the chairmanship of 
. 203- Louis, OR-cit., p-321 citing a memorandum by 
Stanley on a conversation with Smuts, 19 November 1943. 
2-02 PRO, D035/1161/R. 208/16, for the denials published 
in the Daily Telegraph, 5 February 1944 and in the Daily 
gggress, 8 February 1944. 
203 The Economist, 6 May 1944. 
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Southern Rhodesia. While the British government regarded 
the establishment of the Council as a 'concrete alternative 
to amalgamation' it was aware that critics had accused them 
of 'mere window dressing'. Therefore it was of the 
greatest importance for the public to understand that the 
government 'really do intend coordination between the 
territories to be a reality' and not as a step on the path 
towards Central African amalgamation. 204 
This proved easier said than done. In Southern 
Rhodesia, the New Rhodesia realised that the Colonial 
office intended 'closing the door on amalgamation for many 
years to come' and that Southern Rhodesia would do its best 
to make the Central African Council a success. The 
newspaper stated, however, that 'possibly its most 
important task will be to educate the Colonial Office'. 
Similarly, the Rhodesia Herald regarded the Council as a 
'substitute' for amalgamation, which would 'do much to 
prepare the way for the ultimate acceptance of the greater 
concept of amalgamation' and help to 'iron out snags and 
difficulties which obsess the Colonial Office, particularly 
the position of native populations'. It concluded with: 
If we must take two bites at the cherry of 
amalgamation, it is up to the new Council to show that 
the first one is followed by no gastronomical 
complications which might delay the enjoyment of the 
second one. 205 
204 PRO, D035/1161/R. 208/24, minute by Cohen, 28 
February 1945. 
205 PRO, D035/1161/R. 208/24, the New Rhodesia, 6 April 
1945; the Rhodesian Herald, 2 April 1945. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
PUBLIC RELATIONS AND THE 
PROJECTION OF THE 'NEW' EMPIRE, 1944-48 
During 1944 the Colonial Office and the MOI seriously 
began to consider the future of publicity about the empire 
in general and Africa in particular. Debate centered on 
the kind of publicity organisation necessary in the post- 
war period both in the Colonial Office and in the colonies. 
These discussions on the future of publicity services were 
tentative because the Cabinet had not yet reached a 
decision on the wider questions of national publicity 
policy and because the future of the MOI was undecided. 
Nevertheless as the end of the war approached some of the 
old arguments outlined in chapter one resurfaced against 
the Colonial Office engaging in any kind of public 
relations activities. In order to obtain Colonial Office 
endorsement of a public relations strategy the Public 
Relations Officer Noel Sabine reviewed the record of 
progress made during the war. Sabine was eventually 
successful in achieving the permanent role for public 
relations in the work of the Colonial Office and the 
Colonial Service. A consensus was formed which 
acknowledged the role of public relations. Public 
relations work would continue to help to 'win the peace' in 
the colonies by popularising policies and holding the 
imperial line between the awakening of political 
consciousness and the achievement of self-government. 
'Partnership' continued to be the theme of British 
propaganda about the colonial empire in the post-war period 
and was not altered with the advent of the Labour 
government. The policy of colonial development and welfare 
would now be fully implemented and Africa became the centre 
of Britain's colonial position. 
However the post-war period brought new hardships and 
a series of economic crises which left a question mark over 
the ability of Britain to develop her colonial empire and 
create viable states capable of eventual self-government. 
By the end of the period under consideration the optimism 
for colonial reform of the war years and the immediate 
post-war period confronted the realities of Britain's 
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inability to deliver the benefits of 'partnership'. 
Bringing the modern state to Africa and the economic 
development of Africa was no longer the act of an 
altruistic colonial power. Instead of economic development 
which would create viable economic units, the colonies in 
Africa would be developed provide essential raw materials 
and markets upon which would help Britain's economic 
recovery in the post-war period. Two separate policies co- 
existed side by side: super exploitation on the one hand 
and colonial development and gradual political education on 
the other. By 1948 the public relations theme of 
'partnership' to bring about progress in the colonies had 
become out of step with reality. The result of this 
collapse of the period of colonial reform in 1948 was a 
crisis of credibility and damaging criticism of Britain's 
reputation as a colonial power. Could public relations 
hold the colonial position when the gap between propaganda 
and policy had, become so wide? 
The uncertainty which surrounded the future of the 
government information services at the end of war produced 
a determined defence of the Public Relations Department by 
Sabine. Sabine argued strongly for the continuance of 
Colonial Office publicity activities as a permanent feature 
of government. He hope there would be no return to the 
pre-war position of publicity carried out by a single Press 
Officer. During the final stages of the war Sabine wanted 
a decision to be made in principle for the retention of the 
Colonial Office's publicity machinery. 
While many in the Colonial Office recognised the 
necessity of wartime propaganda, some Colonial Office 
officials had reservations about its post-war role. Sir 
Sydney Caine, Assistant Under-Secretary of State in charge 
of the Economics Division, was conscious of the 'lack of 
sympathy' some felt to any plan to continue an active 
public relations policy in the post-war period. Caine's 
own objections were two-fold. First, propaganda was only 
justifiable in a wartime context. Second, the selection of 
material to transmit to the public was flawed because the 
process was not impartial. 'Confusions', he argued, would 
arise from the attempt to project wartime procedures and 
412 
practices into the post-war period. He grudgingly accepted 
activities like censorship were necessary during war and 
had 'obliged Government Departments to be more positive and 
active in the issue of information than was necessary 
before the war'. This was because during the war 
information was not as freely available as in peacetime, 
government Departments had the 'added responsibility to 
provide it' and on security grounds they had 'to think 
carefully about what can and cannot be published'. ' 
A second particular wartime factor was 'the necessity 
of expounding a new and unfamiliar background'. During the 
war the sacrifices that had been demanded from the civilian 
population had to be justified 'by emphasising the purposes 
for which we are fighting and clothing the incidents of war 
with as much glamour as possible'. He questioned the idea 
that public relations could play any part in colonial 
policy and also doubted whether it would be possible to 
'focus peace-time efforts and enthusiasms on a goal as 
distinct and clear as military victory'. 2 
A third factor which would not apply to the post-war 
situation was the suspension of party politics with the 
government coalition of all the principal political parties 
which had helped, in Caine's opinion, to secure 'public 
acquiescence in the information activities of Governmentl. '3 
A fourth wartime factor was the projection of 
Britain's colonial policy overseas, particulary to the 
United States. This projection, Caine believed, had been 
an attempt to 'Justify ourselves at the bar of world public 
opinion'. While this may have been necessary while war 
conditions applied because of the 'fact that American help 
in the war was absolutely essential', in the post-war 
period 'we shall not necessarily feel the same concern when 
our dependence on American assistance has passed'. ' In 
this respect Caine like many of his colleagues in Whitehall 
'L PRO, C0875/20/8, minute by Caine, 31 October 1944. 
2 ibid. 
3 ibid. 
4 ibid. 
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totally underestimated the degree to which Britain would be 
dependent on the United States in the post-war period and 
how Britain would have a continued need to project Britain, 
including her colonial policy to the United States once 
hostilities had ceased .5 
Caine found it difficult to accept that any kind of 
public relations activity was necessary within the Colonial 
Office. He argued that the Colonial Office was not an 
administrating but a supervising department and, as such, 
had 'comparatively little direct relation with members of 
the public'. If public relations work was to be conducted 
at all, the task of explaining 'the impact of policies on 
individuals is almost wholly for Colonial Governments' who 
did have a relationship with the public. As we have seen 
colonial governments tended to view propaganda activities 
as a luxury and until the Colonial Office took the lead 
over the issue just before the war the examples of this 
kind of activity was rare in the colonial empire. While 
progress had been made during the war the colonial 
Information Officers still relied on Whitehall to provide 
material and guidance and this state of affairs was likely 
to continue for some time in the post-war period until 
regional organisations had been established. 
Caine questioned the aim of supplying the public with 
'information' about colonial policy. He argued it could 
never be objective due to the selection process of what 
kind of information should be supplied. The process of 
selection had important political implications. There was 
the danger of the government information services becoming 
the mouthpiece for party interests rather than the national 
interest. He argued it was 'only too easy to step over the 
line which divides support of general Government policy 
5 For example C. f. C. J. Morris, 'The Labour 
government's policy and publicity over Palestine 1945-71, 
in Anthony Gorst, Lewis Johnman and W. Scott Lucas (eds. ) 
Contemporary British History 1931-1961: Politics and the 
Limit of Policy (London, 1991) for the importance of 
projecting Britain's policy in Palestine to the United 
States to gain their support at a time when Britain was 
vulnerable to American pressure during the negotiations for 
the post-war American Loan. 
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from support of the policy of a particular Minister or 
Party'. An even worse scenario for Caine would be if 
the policies which a Colonial Office Public Relations 
Department would seek to support would become in 
course of time neither 'generally agreed' policies nor 
even the programmes of political parties but simply 
the policies of a bureaucratic clique. 6 
Even if the Colonial Office accepted the case for an 
active public relations policy Caine doubted that the 
policy would meet with success as 'the capacity of the 
average person's mind to absorb information on a serious 
subjects is limited'. By implication therefore the British 
public was too stupid to understand such a serious subject 
like the administration of the dependencies for which they 
were through Parliament ultimately responsible. ' 
Caine thought that the Colonial Office should limit 
its public relations activities to the pre-war practice of 
supplying information 'on demand' and not engage in the 
factive and inevitably selective presentation of 
information'. ' For who would decide on what basis the 
material should be selected? 
This function of selection is, in fact, in some ways 
the hallmark of active 'public relations' as opposed 
to the mere passive issue of reports as and when asked 
for. It is implicit in the word 'theme' as commonly 
used in public relations work. It is obvious enough 
why. -When we set out to project Kenya here, we have 
got to decide whether to see through the eyes of 
Margery Perham or Elspeth Huxley. When we 'project' 
the United Kingdom in the Colonies, we may decide to 
recommend an up-to-date portrayal of English social 
life; do we choose 'Love on the Dole' or 'Mrs. 
Miniver". ) 
Indeed if it had been a mere choice between seeing colonial 
policy through the eyes of Margery Perham or the eyes of 
Elspeth Huxley the colonial propaganda selection process 
may not have been impartial. In the first place as the 
collection of their correspondence to each other first 
published in 1944, Race and Politics in Kenva revealed, 
they had very different and partial views about Kenya. We 
r> ibid. 
'? ibid. 
8 ibid. 
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saw in chapter three the settler background Elspeth Huxley 
brought with her to her job as liaison officer at the BBC. 
In chapter four Margery Perham's position as both a critic 
and reformer of British colonial policy and how she was 
also deeply involved in the training of Colonial Service 
officers was also noted. In their correspondence these two 
positions were magnified: settlers vying with a benevolent 
Colonial Service for the title of best protector of African 
interests. For example Huxley had a paternalistic view of 
the Africans, her attitude in a 'nutshell' was that in 
order to advance the African she would strengthen local 
interests, whereas Perham would increase imperial ties. 
Huxley saw the leadership of Kenya coming form the 
Europeans, while Perham saw it coming from a gradually 
educated African population. Huxley viewed the settlers as 
a group under attack and Perham wanted to stop any further 
surrendering to their position. Huxley did not think 
settler and African interests were antagonistic but Perham 
thought it was time to clear Kenya of settlers altogether. 9 
At first sight then Caine's argument over selection 
appears compelling. But the implications he drew were not 
quite as dramatic as he portrayed. Publicity guidelines 
would be set by Colonial Office officials, not by Elspeth 
Huxley or Margery Perham. If the machinery, operated 
properly and close liaison between the staff of the Public 
Relations Department and the rest of the Colonial Office 
was maintained problems could be avoided for the 
propagandists would be fully conversant with the 'official' 
line over issues like Kenya. 
In addition to issues such as selection, others 
criticised the retention of public relations machinery in 
the post-war period both within the Colonial Office and in 
the colonies on financial grounds. Although the colonial 
governments experienced new 'buoyant revenues' as a result 
of the wartime demand for colonial produce, this prosperity 
would not necessarily continue into the post-war period. 
Therefore the Colonial Office should be chary of taking a 
9 Elspeth Huxley and Margery Perham, Race an Politics 
in Kenya (London, 1958), pp. 151-2,236,29 and 30. 
416 
strong lead in the public relations field because of the 
danger that 'these revenues may be dissipated among too 
many activities, with the result that no one is performed 
really well and with the further danger of extra 
difficulties in the event of a future slump'. 110 
It was this kind of opposition that Sabine had to 
overcome in order to obtain the acceptance of a continued 
role for public relations in the post-war period. Sabine 
made his case by reviewing achievements made during the war 
and then went on to consider colonial publicity objectives 
and how they could be secured in the future. He argued 
that public relations work should not be abandoned just 
when it had begun to achieve some measure of success. 
There were four aspects of colonial publicity alreadyýin 
operation, first, publicity in the United Kingdom, second, 
publicity in the colonies, third, publicity in the rest of 
the empire and fourth, publicity in foreign countries. 
Although these aspects targeted different audiences, Sabine 
recommended that there should be an to end the present 
practice of divided control between the MOI and the 
Colonial Office with ultimate control over both policy and 
practice resting in one authority, the Secretary of State 
for the Colonies. Naturally cooperation would continue 
with other departments and the Colonial Office would use 
the technical facilities of whatever kind of 'General 
Production Division' the government decided to establish 
after the war. "' 
Sabine noted that the wartime experience of divided 
control between the MOI and the Colonial Office had not 
produced a happy relationship. The evidence we have seen 
supports his view, particularly in the first half of the 
war. At times there had been mutual resentment with 
discussions over colonial propaganda 'conducted in an 
atmosphere of intrigue and personalities'. 112 The exception 
110 PRO, C0875/20/3, minute by Williams, 23 February 1945. 
I'll PRO, C0875/20/8, Sabine's note on the future of 
colonial publicity, 4 October 1944. 
3-2- ibid. 
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to this rather 'gloomy picture' was when Gervas Huxley 
headed the Empire Division at the MOI. At that time the 
relationship between the MOI and the Colonial Office was 
more efficient and successful. This had not been the rule, 
however and was largely due to Huxley's 'unorthodox views 
on the relative functions of the two Departments, and to 
his outstanding ability to handle some of the personalities 
involved'. In the absence of such a strong personality 
like Huxley, the principle of divided control would mean a 
return to a situation where time would be wasted the 
efficiency of business would be prejudiced by continuous 
'discussion, negotiation, and appeasement'. " Sabine's 
implication was clear. In order to preserve the Colonial 
Office's area of responsibility, the Colonial Office would 
have to remain active in propaganda. 
Sabine continued his case for the defence by outlining 
the publicity achievements during the war. There had been 
considerable improvement in the Colonial Office's 
relationship with the press. With the exception of 
criticism resulting from the fall of Singapore and the loss 
of Malaya in 1942, the tone of the press in general could 
be contrasted to that of the pre-war period when 'criticism 
of our Colonial policy was the general rule'. Sabine 
suspected-that this increased press interest in colonial 
affairs could be attributed to the 'recovery of national 
self-confidence' and reaction against 'American criticisms 
of 'Imperialism' but also 'the greatly increased output 
from the Press Office of material about the Colonial war 
effort, development measures, and constitutional 
progress'. " Indeed the Colonial Office line over 
statements of policy like the Colonial Development and 
Welfare Act of 1940 was adopted by the Press which was also 
positive about the 'partnership' theme. 
The Colonial Office received increasing numbers of 
requests for official publications and, as a result of 
Gervas Huxley's efforts, the MOI produced a wide range of 
13 ibid. 
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leaflets, posters, pamphlets and maps. Colonial subjects 
were of increasing interest to publishers and Sabine hoped 
that this development could be encouraged in the future 
when wartime restrictions like the paper shortage no longer 
applied. " 
The output of the MOI's Films Division had been 
'disappointing' but things were 'moving in the right 
direction'; increasing numbers of films, in addition to 
those of the Colonial Film Unit, were being produced as 
increased material became available from the colonies. 
Cameramen were sent to East and West Africa which had 
produced some 'first-class material'. Very close liaison 
had been established between the Colonial Office and the 
BBC resulting in more effective cooperation on the Overseas 
Service than on the Home Service as the Talks Department 
had been reluctant to take advantage of the system of 
consultation between the BBC and the Colonial Office. 16 
The public relations job had therefore just begun and 
there was no room for complacency. Although progress had 
been made during the war to educate British public opinion 
about the colonial empire, 'it would be illusory to think 
we have done much more than scratched the surface' as the 
mass of public opinion had been little affected. In the 
post-war period it was critical that the foundations which 
had been laid during the war should be built on. official 
publications together with indirect publicity for example, 
helping publishers and writers by providing them with 
facilities and information, should increase. This kind of 
public relations activity, Sabine noted, should not be 
entrusted to an outside body. One of the chief lessons 
during the war had been that it was essential that all 
material 'should be checked for facts and policy'. This 
could only be done by the Colonial Office. Moreover, there 
were policy questions about the future of broadcasting and 
the cinema in the colonies which had to be taken before any 
publicity programme could proceed. Again only the Colonial 
115 ibid. 
116 ibid. 
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Office could give this guidance. 117 
As far as publicity in the colonies was concerned, 
Sabine's task of persuasion would not be so difficult as 
even a staunch critic like Caine conceded that public 
relations was a justifiable colonial government activity. 
Sabine noted that the four functions of Public Relations 
agencies in the colonies had been 'generally accepted' as: 
A. To explain Government policy to the people. 
B. To obtain external publicity for the affairs of the 
Colony. 
C. To provide information to the Colony about 
developments and thought in the United Kingdom. 
D. To co-ordinate and advise on departmental publicity 
campaigns. 
Sabine recommended that the most important post-war 
development was the decentralisation of the production of 
publicity materials in regional publicity organisations in 
the colonies. London would then provide basic material 
which could be adapted for use in the colonies. The 
Colonial Office Public Relations Department's role would be 
to assist the colonies in this task through the provision 
of guidance and by creating the 'right kind of 
relationship' between the Colonial Office, the colonial 
governments and unofficial publicity agencies like the BBC 
and film companies. " Therefore Sabine's defence of public 
relations- in the colonies also served to defend the 
continued existence of the Public Relations Department in 
the Colonial Office. 
Above all, Sabine argued, it should be recognised that 
the Colonial Office would be neglecting its responsibility 
if it were to return to the pre-war situation and abandon 
the policy of educating British public opinion about the 
colonial empire. He re-stated the case for public 
relations. The act of popularising government policies was 
part of the democratic process: 
It is clearly not in the interests either of the 
Colonies or of the Mother country that Colonial 
affairs should be in the hands of officials who are 
not subject to the stimulus and check of public 
criticism. At the same time such criticism if it is to 
'" ibid. 
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be fair must rest upon the basis of informed public 
opinion. Those who are in a position to influence 
policy as officials or unofficials should be 
restrained from unrealistic doctrinaire extravagances 
by the sound common sense which the British public can 
be relied upon to show with regard to any matter in 
which its interest is aroused, if it is made aware of 
the broad issues involved. 119 
Sabine was aided in his case for the retention of his 
department in the post-war period by the decision of the 
Ministerial Committee on Machinery of Government that 
1considerable government publicity will be required after 
the war'. There would be no return to the post-World War I 
situation when the Ministry of Information was disbanded 
and nothing replaced it. The MOI would be replaced by a 
common service organisation which would work in cooperation 
with the propaganda organisations which existed in other 
departments of state. Therefore, Public Relations 
Departments of 'appropriate size' would be necessary in 
departments following the disappearance of the MOI. 
overseas publicity would be the responsibility of the 
government departments concerned. Sir Thomas Lloyd noted 
that, if these proposals were accepted by the Cabinet, the 
Colonial Office would have a case to retain the Public 
Relations Department and even see it expand. " 
At a. meeting of the Under-Secretaries of State in the 
Colonial Office on 24 October 1944 it was decided that all 
the 'existing activities' in the public relations field 
should continue for the time being. 211 Sabine also noted 
that the Prime Minister had agreed that although the 
Cabinet had not decided the future of government publicity 
organisation as a whole, the Machinery of Government 
Committee's proposals 'may be taken as assumptions for 
planning purposes'. 22 
Sabine was able to obtain Colonial Office agreement on 
the future of publicity in Africa. Sabine toured Africa 
11'9 ibid., Appendix A. 
2-0 PRO, C0875/20/8, minute by Lloyd, 16 October 1944., 
21 PRO, C0875/20/8, minute by Lloyd, 11 November 1944. 
22 PRO, C0875/20/8, minute by Sabine, 30 June 1945. 
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between November 1944 and March 1945 in order to report on 
the public relations departments in the colonial 
territories and to discuss future lines of development. 23 
He appealed to conservative elements within the Colonial 
Office and Colonial Service by suggesting that there was 
nothing new about public relations in the colonies as it 
had always been part of the work of good colonial 
administration. Indeed, $every time a District 
Commissioner addresses a native council, every time a 
Governor explains Government policy at a Caledonian dinner, 
he is engaged in a public relations activity'. It was 
important, argued Sabine, that public relations should not 
be regarded as 'esoteric or extraneous to administration' 
but should be regarded as an 'integral part of 
administration'. In the future the functions of public 
relations work should be: 
A. To interpret the policy of the government to the 
people, and the views of the people to the government 
in the closest co-operation with the Administration 
and the technical departments. 
B. To provide information about Colonial affairs in 
Great Britain and elsewhere. 
C. To provide the Colonial public with information 
about developments and events in Great Britain; to 
interpret His Majesty's Government's Colonial policy 
to the Colonial public. 
D. To 
* 
act as an advisory and co-ordinating agency for 
the planning and execution of Departmental propaganda 
campaigns. " 
Colonial governments would be confronted with both 
problems and opportunities after the war. The local 
populations many of whom were 'at present illiterate' but 
were also curious. They had been exposed to new 
experiences as a result of the war and were 'more conscious 
than ever before of unsatisfied hopes and unresolved 
apprehensions'. These populations would continue to be 
vulnerable to 'outside' influence in the post-war period. 
In these dangerous circumstances public relations could 
23 PRO, C0875/20/3, 
Africa', undated. 
Sabine's 'Report of Tour in 
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help by providing 'guidance and leadership'. 25 However 
this potential danger could be turned to an advantage if 
the colonial governments themselves took the initiative in 
helping to mould colonial public opinion. 26 
While in a general way Sabine considered the war 
propaganda in Africa had been a success since there had 
been little resistance to the war, African troops had been 
recruited and fought bravely and voluntary gifts to the war 
effort had been donated, there were also many Africans who 
had little understanding of the war and were more 
interested in their daily lives. Others had 'remained 
passive and apathetic at the prospect of a change of rule'. 
Therefore in the future an increased effort would be needed 
to 'strengthen their connexion with us, and give them a 
more conscious sense of their association with the Empire 
and Commonwealth'. : 17 
Sabine also recommended that there had to be a change 
in colonial government attitudes towards public relations 
work as part of the overall colonial administration. 
During the war there had been a change in the character of 
colonial Information Offices in Africa. Some had already 
made the transition from war propaganda to public relations 
and were now explaining and interpreting government policy. 
But further development of these Information Offices was 
hindered because Public Relations Departments were not 
sufficiently integrated into the government as a whole and 
Public Relations Officers were not always kept informed of 
important developments 'in good time'. Public Relations 
officers were also handicapped in a number of other ways. 
They were often preoccupied with other duties. They were 
not always specialists in propaganda, at times they 
resisted the use of new techniques and had an inadequate 
knowledge of how to plan a propaganda campaign. They were 
further hampered by a lack of local production 
25 ibid. 
26 ibid. 
27 ibid. 
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facilities. 28 
After the war it was of particular importance 
therefore that the Public Relations Officer should be in 
close contact with the Adminstration and not be seen as a 
separate department of government. The Public Relations 
Officer should be an Administrative officer and a member of 
the Secretariat itself. This would enable the Public 
Relations Officer to maintain close contact with policy in 
order to be ready for consultation at all times. This 
officer should not have the dual role of public relations 
and education officer. The Public Relations Officer should 
be a 'professional propagandist' and learn the basic 
methods of propaganda planning. 29 
It was not Sabine's intention to see 'propaganda 
running riot all over Africa'. It was recognised, however, 
that increased quantities of publicity material would be 
required in the future. This material would be more 
effective if produced in Africa itself so that it contained 
the sufficient 'local colour' which was often lacking in 
material produced by the MOI in London. This trend towards 
the decentralisation of production had already begun in 
Achimoto and Nairobi and should be continued in the post- 
war period. Decentralisation had the added advantage of 
being more economical. It was also time to lay plans for 
the development of local broadcasting in Africa and to 
build on the close relationship that had been established 
with the BBC. The first priority would be to establish or 
strengthen local broadcasting stations in each territory 
and then to establish a central broadcasting station for 
each region. The central stations would relay the BBC's 
Overseas Service programmes, broadcast magazine and feature 
programmes covering the whole region and broadcast the 
'cream of these programmes to the outside world' . 30 
The Public Relations Officers would also be expected 
to produce more material which could be used by the 
2-8 ibid. 
29 ibid. 
30 ibid. 
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Colonial Office in its campaign to educate British public 
opinion about the colonies. This would require an increase 
in the supply of news and feature material. Sabine 
therefore recommended that each regional propaganda 
organisation should employ two journalists. Nairobi should 
immediately proceed with its plans to establish a 
photographic unit and the Colonial Office would encourage 
Reuters to send correspondents to Africa . 31 
The main obstacle to this expansion plan was finance. 
Sabine feared that after the war there would 'be a tendency 
in the Colonies as in this country, to direct the axe of 
retrenchment to the young sapling of Public Relations'. 
Sabine thought that a compromise could be achieved and 
proposed that financial responsibility for the functions of 
the Public Relations departments in'Africa be divided. The 
colonial governments would have the responsibility for 
interpreting local government policy to the people and the 
Colonial Office would have the responsibility of projecting 
colonial affairs to Britain and overseas as well as Britain 
to Africa. Sabine hoped the Colonial Development and 
Welfare Act could provide finance for publicity connected 
with local development schemes. 32 
At a meeting between the MOI and the Colonial Office 
in January 1945 Sabine's recommendations about the 
functions of the Public Relations Officers and the 
principle of decentralisation were accepted and formed the 
basis of a circular despatch to the African governors. 33 
Before the despatch was sent the Colonial Office discussed 
the question of finance, the main obstacle to the 
implementation of the post-war plan. Andrew Cohen, 
Assistant Secretary of State for the Colonies responsible 
for East and Central Africa thought that the Colonial 
office should present the case for increased public 
relations activities and let the governors make up their 
31 ibid. 
32 ibid. 
33 PRO, C0875/20/3, minutes of a meeting between the 
Colonial Office and the MOI on publicity in Africa, undated. 
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own minds about what they were going to do and let them set 
their own priorities . 34 Sir George Gater, the Permanent 
Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies thought that it 
was unlikely that the African governments would 'indulge in 
any very extravagant organisation for public relations' 
particularly when they were to be warned by the Colonial 
Office that they would have to bear the bulk of the cost 
35 out of their own pockets. The despatch embodied all of 
Sabine's recommendations and warnings about finance and was 
commended by Oliver Stanley as 'excellent'. 36 
A copy of Sabine's report was also sent to the BBC 
with the Colonial Office's recommendation that plans for 
broadcasting in Africa would be considered as part of 'the 
general approach of the whole problem of post-war 
broadcasting throughout the Colonies'. The BBC welcomed 
the report and the indication that the Colonial Office 
planned a comprehensive approach to colonial 
broadcasting. 37 
The African governors were asked for their reactions 
to Sabine's proposals contained in the circular despatch. 
The only reply that survives in the Colonial Office files 
is that of Sir John Hathorn Hall, the Governor of Uganda 
and the former British Resident of Zanzibar. Hall agreed 
there would 'be a need to continue to expand publicity 
services after the war'. He agreed that Public Relations 
officers should be appointed and would function in 
accordance with the role defined by Sabine. He further 
welcomed the proposal for regional production units. The 
Public Relations staff he envisioned was a Public Relations 
Officer (with the head of the East Africa Commands Mobile 
Propaganda Unit, Captain Dickson as a possible candidate), 
aided by two assistants, a technical supervisor of cinema 
34 PRO, C0875/20/3, minute by Cohen, 26 February 1945. 
35 PRO, C0875/20/3, minute by Gater, 13 March 1945. 
36 PRO, C0875/20/3, circular despatch to all African 
colonies, 28 April 1945; minute by Stanley, 21 March 1945. 
37 PRO, C0875/20/3, Lloyd to Rendall, 7 May 1945; 
Rendall to Lloyd, 15 May 1945. 
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units, a photographer and an Asian Information Officer. 30 
In the MOI thoughts also turned to post-war planning 
and the future of the Empire Division. Although the future 
of the MOI was undecided, the Empire Division argued that 
in the post-war period there should be no reduction of 
effort in publicising the British empire. The Empire 
Division had reached the same conclusion as Sabine, that 
there should be a redoubling of effort in the projection of 
the British empire. Indeed, it was more important than 
ever to remain active in this area particularly in East and 
West Africa since the effects of developments in 
communications could not be reversed: 
Often for the first time in their history, the most 
modern features of radio, films, photographs, press 
services ... have been introduced into Colonies 
thus 
creating new habits and an ever increasing demand for 
the 'wonders' of the modern world. Many parts of the 
Colonial Empire are awakening from an age-long sleep, 
and unsatisfied demands for enlightenment and 
guidance, and failure to meet these demands ... will 
have the most serious repercussions. 
The wartime tasks had been: 
keeping Colonies well informed, placing events in 
their right perspective, strengthening loyalty to the 
Crown, building up a belief in ultimate victory and 
persuading the various peoples to increase their 
appropriate contributions to the total war effort. 
No matter-how 'difficult' some of these tasks had proved to 
be they were 'insignificant compared with the task Of 
projecting the peace and the thousand and one problems 
which it will bring in its wake'. 39 
A consensus appears to have been reached, in spite of 
reservations within the Colonial Office about the 
continuation of the Public Relations Department. The 
wartime experience had changed the political climate and 
the framework within which policy operated. The wartime 
economic policies of London and the development and welfare 
policies of the British government had led to unprecedented 
38 PRO, C0875/20/3, Uganda to Colonial Office, 16 JulY 
1945. 
39 PRO, INF1/945, Mansergh to Grubb, 26 June 1944, 
containing a copy of Usill's memorandum, 'The MOI and its 
work in relation to the British Colonial Empire'. 
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intervention by the state into the affairs of the colonies. 
This, together with developments in communications, created 
a new situation and new disruptions. African opinion could 
no longer be ignored as it had been in the pre-war years. 
Indeed for British policy to succeed African participation 
was essential. It was also essential that the British 
public should continue to be educated about its colonial 
responsibilities in order build on the wartime efforts to 
create a healthy public opinion to support British colonial 
policy. 
This consensus on colonial propaganda continued into 
the post-war period. The change of government in July 1945 
did not affect the government's commitment to an active 
public relations policy. The Labour government held it as 
axiomatic that it was part of the government's democratic 
responsibility to explain their policies and create a 
healthy public opinion. The fear outlined by Sydney Caine 
that once the wartime coalition was dissolved the new 
government would hijack the official information services 
which would become party propaganda machines was rejected 
by the incoming Labour government. The official 
information services would be concerned with national 
projection and not party politics. It was agreed at an 
inter-departmental meeting of Ministers that 
no government should use departmental facilities for 
purely Party propaganda, but every government must 
present to the public the facts necessary for an 
understanding of the government's activities. Though 
the boundaries between information, explanation and 
advocacy were tenuous, the possibility of 
embarrassment and misrepresentation should not deter 
the government from providing through an efficient 
information service, the material on which the public 
could reach an informed judgement on current affairs. 
Such provision was indeed the government's duty and 
the public's right. 40 
40 PRO, C0875/21/8, minutes of the inter-departmental 
GEN85/lst. meeting, 18 September 1945. The meeting was 
attended by the Lord President of the Council, Herbert 
Morrison, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Hugh Dalton, the 
President of the Board of Trade, Sir Stafford Cripps, the 
Secretary of State for India and Burma, Frederick Pethick- 
Lawrence, the Secretary of State for the Dominions, 
Christopher Addison, the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, George Hall, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of 
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Not only was it the duty of the government to explain its 
activities, publicity was also seen as an important 
instrument in the conduct of government policy. In foreign 
affairs this relationship between publicity and policy had 
been clearly recognised: 
HMG is pushing its objectives by a great variety of 
means ranging from military and naval measures, 
diplomatic representations, and various forms of 
international negotiation and participation in 
international bodies ... Publicity has a part to play 
in the support of many of these activities, and if it 
is to succeed, it is essential that it should be 
integrated with them and not independent of them. 
Actions speak louder than words, and words are more 
411 effective when they support actions. 
The organisation of government publicity services, 
however, had yet to be decided. The MOI was being wound up 
and would cease to exist at the end of March 1946. The 
question became what kind of organisation should replace 
it. Questions of responsibility for policy decisions were 
at the forefront of discussions. The Foreign Secretary, 
Ernest Bevin, was adamant that the responsibility for 
propaganda should not be delegated to the Central Office of 
Information: 
In the international 
the present junctu: 
publicity must march 
Foreign Secretary 
information policy 
Information Services 
field we have, particularly at 
re, the most delicate tasks, and 
so closely with policy that the 
cannot delegate control of 
and its execution by our 
abroad. 42 
In a similar vein Sabine recommended that the question 
of responsibility should be settled in order to avoid some 
of the unnecessary disputes which had occurred during the 
war between the MOI and the Colonial Office. He urged that 
State for Foreign Affairs, Hector McNeil and the Minister 
of Information, Edward Williams with the Prime Minister, 
Clement Attlee in the chair. 
-411 PRO, INF12/61, Foreign Office memorandum for an 
inter-departmental meeting on the 'Projection of Britain', 
July 1946. 
42 PRO, F0800/480/MIS/47/52,16 December 1947 Bevin 
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Morrison's 'mishandling Of information services', Ben 
pimlott, The Political Diaries of Hugh Dalton, 1918-40 and 
1945-60, (London, 1986), p. 374. 
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the Secretary of State for the Colonies should argue for 
the preservation of Colonial Office responsibility: 
The Colonial Secretary should retain, constitutionally 
and in practice, full responsibility for all colonial 
publicity. It is impossible to divorce publicity from 
policy; and the Secretary of State must possess not 
only the negative right of having the last word on 
questions of the policy and content of colonial 
publicity, but the positive right of initiating 
publicity proposals, and having them executed through 
whatever machinery is established for the purpose. 43 
Sir George Gater agreed. The Colonial Office would 
'cooperate' with the new COI in the sense that the Colonial 
Office would use the COI's production facilities. Ultimate 
power would rest with the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies: 
The essential point is that it is impossible to 
divorce publicity from policy. The Secretary of State 
is responsible for matters of policy in the Colonies. 
It is clear that he must retain the ultimate and 
general direction of publicity. The growth of self- 
governing institutions in the Colonies renders the 
relations between this country and individual colonies 
increasingly delicate and complex. The intrusion at 
this stage of development, into the field of an 
organisation responsible only to the Minister of 
Information and independent of the Secretary of State 
and of Colonial Governments would obviously be full of 
danger. But this is not to say that as long as 
control remains in the right place we should not use, 
as we have done during the war, some of the mechanical 
facilities offered by the Ministry. " 
George Hall*, the Secretary of State for the Colonies and a 
former Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, 1940-2, endorsed these views in a meeting with 
fellow Ministers. Hall argued that, 'provided technical 
services were available from a central organisation he 
would prefer that publicity work in the Colonies was done 
by the Colonial Office or by Colonial Governments under 
Colonial Office direction'. 45 
The MOI proved reluctant to relinquish the position it 
had built up during the war. The Minister of Information, 
Edward Williams*, did not agree with the Foreign Office's 
-43 PRO, C0875/21/8, minute by Sabine, undated. 
44 PRO, C0875/21/8, minute by Gater, 7 September 1945. 
-45 PRO, C0875/21/8, GEN85/lst. meeting, 18 September 1945. 
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contention that overseas publicity was a branch of foreign 
policy. Williams argued that overseas publicity was a 
'function and interest of the government as a whole' and 
that its 'size and complexity' required a 'Department in 
its own right'. 
Is it in fact possible to give one single instance of 
any importance drawn from any country during the last 
six years, where publicity has been out of step with 
policy? ... Much of the greater part of the subject 
matter of British publicity is the total British way 
of life, and in projecting this there is not the least 
likelihood of conflict with foreign policy as such. 46 
Sabine thought that it would be safe to leave it to the 
Foreign Office to 'demolish' these kind of arguments. The 
Colonial Office had never denied that overseas publicity 
was not the function of the government as a whole but this 
objection could be met by the provision of adequate co- 
ordinating machinery. Moreover Sabine questioned the MOI 
view that policy and publicity had been well co-ordinated 
during the war, 
If it is not possible to give a single instance of any 
importance where publicity has been out of step with 
policy in the last few years it is only because of the 
constant vigilance on the part of the Overseas 
Departments. I can recall many occasions upon which 
the Ministry would have gone wrong if we had not 
guided them. They have always, of course accepted the 
necessity for such guidance. It has always seemed to 
me that if they are ready to take the guidance it is 
unnecessary for them to have any ministerial status; 
if they are not willing to accept it if turns out in 
practice that embarrassment and friction will 
result. " 
Herbert Morrison, as Lord President of the Council had 
the responsibility for government information services. In 
a Cabinet paper he summarised the results of discussions he 
had held with Ministers. All the points made by the 
Foreign and Colonial Offices were met. There was general 
agreement that both overseas and domestic publicity should 
continue in peacetime. Ministers concerned would be 
responsible for departmental publicity. For reasons of 
economy, however, public relations staffs should be limited 
46 PRO, C0875/21/8, Hancock to Thornley, 13 November 1945. 
4" PRO, CoB75/21/8, minute by Sabine, 15'November 1945. 
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in number and 'should continue as the primary instrument 
for Departmental publicity and for keeping Ministers and 
Departments in touch with public opinion'. A common 
service Organisation, the Central Office of Information, 
would undertake technical and production functions be 
available to both overseas and home purposes. Noting the 
importance of British propaganda speaking with one voice 
Morrison argued that there should be the maximum co- 
ordination of home and overseas publicity so that a 'common 
line' could be presented. 48 With this, the Cabinet agreed 
to wind up the MOI and replace it with a Central Office of 
Information. 
During the early stages of the war the possible 
encroachment of the MOI into areas the Secretary of State 
for the Colonies's responsibility proved to be the catalyst 
to arguments in favour of the establishment of the Public 
Relations Department in the Colonial Office. In the post- 
war period, the need to preserve the Secretary of State for 
the Colonies's responsibility against the ambitions of the 
COI helped Sabine to win the arguments for the retention of 
the Public Relations Department in the Colonial Office. 
Indeed, the question was no longer whether the Colonial 
office should retain public relations machinery but what 
kind of additions would have to be made so that it could 
carry out its post-war activities. 49 
In 1945 the tasks facing the Labour government were 
enormous. The reconstruction of Europe, the defence of 
empire, the evolution of anti-Soviet Cold War policy 
together with the rebuilding of the economy and the 
economic and social revolution at home required public 
support at a time of austerity and hardship in Britain. 
This led, in turn, to concerted efforts by the Labour 
government to project its policies not only in the domestic 
context but also to audiences overseas. The necessity Of 
maintaining British prestige and influence in the reshaping 
of the post-war world was universally recognised by the 
40 PRO, CAB129/5, C. P. (45)316,30 November 1945. 
49 PRO, C0875/21/8, minute by Lloyd, 10 December 1945. 
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government and civil servants alike. It was also 
recognised, however, that Britain's physical power had been 
diminished. Britain had used or lost more than 25% of her 
assets during the war and the demands of post-war 
reconstruction prohibited substantial expenditure overseas. 
Therefore propaganda became essential in the task of 
maintaining Britain's status as a world power. In the 
short-term, propaganda would endeavour to mask Britain's 
weaknesses. In the long-term, after the post-war economic 
problems had been resolved, propaganda would encourage 
other countries, be they European or the new or emerging 
independent countries within the Commonwealth, to look to 
London for moral and ideological leadership. 
The foundation of Britain's claim to world power 
status was the existence of her empire. The fact of empire 
would save Britain from being relegated to the status of a 
secondary European power in the emerging post-war world of 
rivalry between the two Superpowers, the United States and 
the Soviet Union. John Darwin described the 'persuasive 
belief' found in 'a wide cross-section of contemporary 
opinion', 
that Britain derived her uniqueness, as well as 
cultural, economic and political benefits, from her 
maritime and imperial contacts around the world, and 
that her independence and even survival were bound up 
50 with their preservation. 
There was little evidence of a new, specifically 
Labour attitude to the empire or of a fundamental 
reappraisal of Britain's imperial policy and commitments 
after the 1945 election. The Labour government was 
lunradical in its approach to foreign, defence and imperial 
policy'. There was no sign that the British empire was a 
'white elephant' or that the Labour government was any less 
committed to the empire than previous governments. India 
was the exception rather than the rule. There was no 
large-scale decolonisation during the Labour 
administration. On the contrary there was a renewal of the 
colonial mission in the post-war period. The Labour 
50 John Darwin, Britain and Decolonisation: the 
Ret in the POst-War World, (London, 1988), 
p. 73. 
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government sought to 'build a substitute for India in 
Africa'. 'Quitting India', therefore, 'has to be seen in 
the light of the simultaneous decision to push penetration 
deeper into tropical Africa and the Middle East'. As far 
as Africa was concerned, 1945 heralded the period of the 
'second colonial occupation' . 51 
The Labour government was not the Fabian Colonial 
Bureau or the Labour movement in power. The new government 
was bound to a large extent by the decisions of its 
predecessor. Nor was the empire was considered in 
ideological isolation. As David Fieldhouse has written: 
Governments are no more consistent in their behavior 
than other groups and only a novice historian or party 
apologist would expect the Attlee governments of 1945- 
51 to have pursued an internally coherent and 
ideologically predictable policy toward the British 
empire of colonial dependencies and the Commonwealth 
of sovereign states ... Attlee's ministers governed on 
a day to day basis: they were not a coven of 
philosopher-kings insulated from the exigencies of the 
51 real world. 
Even in temperament the leading members of the Labour 
government were not natural colonial revolutionaries. With 
the exception of Arthur Creech Jones, the wartime chairman 
of the Fabian Colonial Bureau, the Attlee government was 
dominated by personalities who held deep attachments to the 
. 51 the Prime empire For example, while Clement Attlee, 
Minister had a deeply-held commitment to Indian 
independence, he was also a patriot who combined 'an 
intellectual anti-colonialism with an emotional feeling for 
Britain's paternalistic role in raising the condition of 
lesser breeds in far-flung countries'. Ernest Bevin, the 
52. ibid., pp. 71-3; Jack Gallacher, The Decline, - 
Revival and Fall of the British Empire, (Cambridge, 1982), 
p. 144; Crowder, op. cit., p. 28. 
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53 Creech Jones became Secretary of State for the 
Colonies in October 1946. One of his officials remarked his 
appointment 'was rather like making a theoretical prison 
reformer a prison governor', quoted in Goldsworthy, 
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Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs was a strident 
nationalist and 'deeply permeated by a traditional 
attachment to the cult of Empire'. Herbert Morrison, the 
Lord President of the Council and Leader of the House of 
Commons, revealed his imperialist outlook when he talked of 
the 'jolly old Empire' in 1946. Morrison was also cautious 
about political developments in Africa: 'to give African 
colonies independence would be like giving a child of 10 a 
54 latch-key, a bank account and a shotgun'. 
The Labour Party's policy towards the empire did not 
represent a clearly defined programme. The party's 
manifesto in 1945, Let Us Face the Future, contained only a 
one sentence commitment to 'the planned progress of our 
colonial dependencies'. The 1943 document passed at the 
party conference The Colonies: the Labour Party's Post-War 
Policy for the African and Pacific Colonies was consistent 
with coalition declarations on colonial policy and 
reflected Colonial Office orthodoxy. It accepted an 
indefinite period of British colonial rule: 'for 
considerable time to come these peoples will not be ready 
for self-government'. It contained no specific commitments 
or timetables for independence and dealt primarily with 
ways of solving the major economic, social and 
administrative problems of the colonies, with an emphasis 
on the local government. 55 The Labour Party embraced the 
theme of 'partnership' in a unanimous 1943 party conference 
resolution which called for the 'abolition of colonial 
status and the rapid realisation of genuine partnership 
between this country and the colonial peoples' . 56 
Like the wartime Coalition government, the new Labour 
government continued to follow a policy of gradual self- 
government within the Commonwealth based on the foundation 
54 Morgan, op-Cit., pp. 146,156 and 186; Brian 
Lapping, End of Empire (London, 1985), p. 41. 
55 Labour Party, The Colonies: the Labour Party's 
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of economic and social development, 'independence 
57 
eventually rather than soon'. Or as Rita Hinden put it 
to a Fabian Colonial Bureau Conference in 1946: 
British socialists are not so concerned with ideals 
like independence and self-government, but with the 
idea of social justice. 58 
59 
The Labour government did not start with a tabula rasa. 
But a notion of a specifically Labour and new programme as 
far as the empire was concerned still persists. For 
example, Ronald Hyam has implied that a break with the past 
occurred under Labour: 'Partnership with colonial peoples 
would replace trusteeship. The long-term aim was 
preparation for self-government which was soundly based, 
representative and beneficial to all'. 60 In fact there was 
little to chose between the declared policy of the 
Coalition government as outlined by Oliver Stanley in July 
1943 and the policy outlined by the new Secretary of State 
for the Colonies, George Hall. In the first peacetime 
statement on colonial policy in July 1946 Hall said: 
I can say without hesitation , 
that it is our policy to 
develop the Colonies and all their resources so as to 
enable their peoples speedily and substantially to 
improve their economic and social conditions, and, as 
soon as may be practicable, to attain responsible 
self-government ... the idea of one people dominating 
or exploiting another is always repugnant. It is not 
domination that we seek. Nor on the other hand, is it 
our intention in any way to abandon peoples who have 
come to depend on us for their defence, security, 
development and welfare. To us the Colonies are a 
great trust, and their progress towards self- 
government is a goal towards which His Majesty's 
Government will assist them with all the means in 
their power. They shall go as fast as they show 
themselves capable of going. 6: L 
The priority would continue to be social and economic 
progress: 
political development is governed by social and 
57 ibid., p. 13i - 
so quoted in Fieldhouse, op. cit., p. 104. 
59 Lee and Petter, op. cit., p. 249. 
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economic progress. It is difficult to create a 
democracy out of a hungry and illiterate people, and 
too many of the inhabitants of our Colonies have, in 
the past, been hungry and uneducated. 62 
This emphasis on economic and social development was 
nothing new but in the post-war period aim of the planned 
progress and socialisation in the colonies was to be 
intensified and the plans made during the war would be 
implemented. As with developments at home, the building of 
the New Jerusalem was translated into the 'post-war 
euphoria to reform all things into utopia' in the colonial 
empire. " As noted in chapter four the Colonial 
Development and Welfare Act of 1940 implied a new 
relationship between the colonies and London with new 
intervention by government. Under Labour the corporate 
state would come to Africa becoming 'an agent of 
modernisation'. 64 There was little real difference 
between the approaches of the coalition and the Labour 
governments though with the Labour government there was a 
greater emphasis on state intervention through public 
corporations and by the nationalisation of resources. 
The government built on the provisions of the 1945 
Colonial Development and Welfare Act. Under the 1945 Act 
the colonies were given 120 million pounds over a ten year 
period. The Colonial Office asked the colonial governments 
to prepare ten year development plans for their 
territories. The kind of projects undertaken in East and 
Central Africa were wide ranging. In Kenya plans were 
drawn up for the combatting of soil erosion; the 
improvement of veterinary services; the establishment of 
health centres; the improvement of water supplies through 
the Tana River scheme and tackling the housing problems of 
62 ibid., col. 249. 
63 Ronald Robinson, 'The Moral Disarmament of African 
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urban Africans. In Tanganyika there were plans for the 
mining of newly discovered diamonds; a railway was to be 
built to Mpanda to aid the transport of lead deposits; 
agricultural programmes including softwood afforestation; 
the development of Sukumaland in lake Province where the 
population would be redistributed, the land improved and 
water supplies would be developed. In Zanzibar there were 
plans for the improvement of education and agriculture. In 
Nyasaland a new runway was to be built at Chileka airfield; 
research was to be undertaken into water, agriculture, 
soil, insecticides, malaria and yellow fever. In Northern 
Rhodesia plans were made for improvements in education and 
health, water supplies and irrigation and for rural 
development. In the region as a whole research would be 
undertaken into tsetse fly and locust control. 65 All this 
activity brought a new breed of Colonial Service officers 
to Africa. It was the era of the technocrats. 
Lord Hailey, chairman of the Colonial Research 
Committee, captured the mood of the late 1940's 
'development fever': 
Everyone is talking of development in Africa. It is 
one of the slogans of the day, and I almost expected 
to find it featured on the London hoardings, alongside 
the National Savings elephant and the Guiness 
kangaroo. 61 
Development was not the priority on the imperial 
political agenda in the immediate post-war period. The 
government had to tackle the complex questions of the 
transfer of power in India, Ceylon and Burma, the 
controversies over Malaya's constitution, the future of 
British policy East of Suez, the Palestine Mandate and the 
counter-insurgency campaigns against the Jewish anti- 
colonial struggle. Indeed, Palestine proved to be George 
Hall's chief preoccupation as Secretary of State for the 
Colonies and took up half of Creech Jones's time when he 
155 PRO, CAB21/2879, Return of schemes made under the 
Colonial development and Welfare Acts, by the Secretary of 
State for the Colonies with the concurrence of the Treasury 
in the period from 1 April 1946 to 31 March 1947. 
66 Lord Hailey, 'The Foundation of Self-Government in 
the African Colonies', African Affairs, 47: 188, (1948), p. 149. 
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took over in October 1946.67 
Paradoxically problems in other parts of the british 
empire only served to highlight the importance of British 
Africa where there would be no imperial retreat. As 
Frederick Pedler wrote in 1946: 
Africa is now the core of colonial position, the only 
continental space from which we can still hope to draw 
reserves of economic and military strength. Our 
position there depends fundamentally on our standing 
with Africans in the mass. 60 
In order to maintain British interests in Africa as part of 
Britain's larger imperial interests the Labour government 
had to retain the cooperation and friendship of the 
colonies in an active imperial partnership. Andrew Cohen 
noted, 'we are in fact at the end of the period during 
which we could rely on the white man's prestige to govern 
Africa'. " But no one was under any illusions that the 
task ahead would be easy. It was not enough to have 
altruistic ideals: 
We may start with the best intentions in the world but 
find our intentions are misunderstood and grossly 
misrepresented by the people to whom they are designed 
to bring advantage. It is of the greatest importance 
that those intentions are understood by the people for 
whom this work is being done. 70 
In a debate on Colonial Affairs in the House of 
Commons on July 1947 the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, Arthur Creech Jones, outlined his attitude 
towards the relationship between public relations and 
colonial policy. He made it clear that the success of the 
government's policy was dependent on the ability of the 
government to persuade rather than coerce the peoples of 
the colonial empire to support government policy: 
colonial progress is not a matter merely of directives 
151 Goldsworthy, OP-Cit-, p. 15; Fieldhouse, op. ci , p. 
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from the Colonial Office or the Government of the day. 
We have to get implemented in our territories our 
principles and policies, it is true, but, at the same 
time, in all our efforts, we have to remember that our 
territories are advancing to some degree of 
responsible self-government, and, accordingly, we 
cannot impose our will. We have to persuade them to 
build up their own institutions with the acceptance of 
the sound policies which we feel will make for the 
betterment of the colonial territories. If the 
Colonial Office is to perform its important services, 
it is essential that it should have the requisite 
knowledge for the work in hand, and our object is to 
transform the dependencies to responsibility, and to 
exercise a trust so that each blossoms into a 
partnership of disinterested service and friendship. 
We try to give what practical aid we can in achieving 
the social happiness and well-being of the colonial 
peoples to make their contribution to the larger life 
of mankind ... In Britain, we have reorganised our 
public relations department in order that a better 
service of information may be made available to the 
British public and to foreign States, and also that 
contributions may be made in regard to the relations 
in the colonial territories themselves. 71 
And as David Rees-Williams, the Parliamentary Under- 
Secretary of State put it: '"Theirs not to reason why" went 
out with Tennyson'. 72 
Until the 1947 reorganisation of public relations 
under the direction of the new head of the Information 
Department, Kenneth Blackburne there was little evidence of 
any new initiatives in public relations in the Colonial 
Office. Indeed, business continued as usual with the 
Colonial Office providing the policy guidance for the 
Empire Information Service and the producer divisions of 
the mol and its successor the COI. Colonial publicity 
continued on the lines established during the war, 
'partnership' remained the central theme of imperial 
propaganda. Those responsible for colonial propaganda 
remained the same until 1947. Noel Sabine continued as 
head of the Public Relations Department in the Colonial 
office and Vincent Harlow continued as head of the Empire 
Information Service. 
71 Hansard, vol. 441, Cols. 264-5,29 July 1947. 
emphasis added. 
-72 PRO, C0875/23/1, report by Rees-Williams on a visit 
to West Africa, 1948. 
440 
The Empire Information Service continued educating 
British public opinion by organising public lectures on the 
colonies. In October 1945 the Service ran a course for 
teachers in Portsmouth with lectures given by Sir Bernard 
Bourdillon on 'the British Empire and its Problems' and 
Vincent Harlow on 'Britain, the Colonies and the World' . 73 
Printed material continued to be produced including 
Josephine Kamm's African Challenge which told the story of 
British tropical Africa from the beginnings to the present 
'political, social and economic work now in hand and its 
importance for the future of Africa'. A leaflet about 
David Livinqstone described his life and achievements. 
'War notes' were prepared for the BIS in the United States 
on subjects like East African pyrethrum production and 
political progress in African dependencies. Additions to 
the series 'A Day in the Life ... I were made. 71 Picture 
sets were received from East Africa and included the sisal 
industry in Uganda. These sets were distributed to the 
national press. The Films Division of the MOI completed 
Know Your Commonwealth - Southern Rhodesia and Know Your 
Commonwealth - East Africa. The Division also produced a 
film about tea in East Africa. The successor to the 
wartime British Overseas Wireless, the London Press 
Service, carried items of colonial news around the world. 75 
Liaison was maintained between the Colonial Office and the 
COIls Reference Division and a weekly news bulletin, 
Colonial News was produced. The Information Officers in 
the colonies were asked to provide a continuous supply of 
local material. This local material would illustrate 'the 
progress of colonial development and welfare and the 
73 PRO, C0875/21/1, Empire Information Service 
progress report, 1 July 1945 - 31 October 1945. Between 
June and September 1945 the MOI organised 150 meetings on 
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implementation of British colonial policy'. -Ir, The colonial 
governments were asked to aid the fight against 'apathy' 
about the colonial empire. They were asked to provide up 
to date information about the practical benefits of the 
imperial partnership, in particular about local development 
projects, for inclusion in the Colonial Office's annual 
report to Parliament. As in pre-war days this report would 
be available both to MPs and to the public. These annual 
reports would also be sent to the United Nations and the 
colonial governments were asked to bear in mind the 
'international' audience in the compilation of their 
reports, although this did not mean that reports should be 
censored to appeal to international opinion. 77 Creech 
Jones argued optimistically that the government should not 
be afraid of the principle of international accountability, 
as it would 'be particularly stupid of us to appear 
grudging and reticent particularly when we have such a good 
story to tell'. 78 
Continuity is also apparent in public and 
parliamentary statements. 'Partnership' continued to be 
the theme of colonial policy and commitments to timetables 
for independence continued to be avoided. Creech Jones 
used the 'partnership' model in a speech to the House of 
Commons outlining Labour's colonial policy: 
What are the assumptions in the Labour policy? What is 
the approach of Labour Ministers to particular 
problems? We start on certain assumptions ... First we 
say that discrimination and racial superiority must be 
made to disappear as quickly as possible, and that the 
relationship between this country and the Colonial 
peoples should be a relationship of partnership, the 
responsibility of Britain being to give the colonial 
peoples all the aid and assistance and technical skill 
that we can afford, to help them forward in their 
development. Further, the assumption is that political 
'76 PRO, C0875/21/1, minutes of a meeting between the 
Colonial Office and the Reference Division and the empire 
Information Service of the COI, 14 August 1946; Heald to 
Evans, 4 September 1946. 
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and economic privilege and domination shall go, and 
that in its place there shall be political freedom 
which leads to responsible self government. The third 
assumption is that economic exploitation of natural 
resources and people in the interests of groups 
whether internal or external, would go, and it is our 
responsibility, therefore to drop the ideas of 
economic imperialism. 19 
It would be wrong to suggest that the colonial policy 
of the post-war Labour government lacked any initiative. 
In 1947 the Colonial Office devised a political strategy 
for Africa. The political instrument of partnership would 
be African participation in the administration, with the 
encouragement of 'Africanisation' of the Colonial Service 
and in government, at the local level. The development of 
local government would be hastened so that the political 
education of Africans would be undertaken simultaneously 
with developments in the economic and social fields. The 
impact of the unprecedented economic and social development 
of the colonies planned during the war therefore would be 
channeled positively into the task of nation-building, 
rather then allowed to fester and transform into political 
opposition. 
As we saw in chapter four the policy of trusteeship 
was abandoned in 1943 and replaced with 'partnership'. The 
ultimate goal of colonial policy was self-government within 
the Commonwealth. From mid-1943 onwards British propaganda 
explained how the partnership would work to create viable 
units in the colonies in economic and social spheres 
through the implementation of development and welfare 
policies. For these policies to be successful colonial 
participation was crucial. But who these 'partners' would 
be was left vague, perhaps deliberately and pragmatically 
SO. There were the traditional rulers who led the Native 
Authorities but it was difficult to see how these feudal 
chieftains could be incorporated into the machinery of a 
modern state as they did not necessarily represent vehicles 
for progress but rather reaction. However there was little 
evidence of an emerging political class among the African 
populations which could command the support of the masses. 
79 Hansard, vol. 425, col. 344,9 July 1946. 
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Lord Hailey had found during a wartime tour of British 
Africa that political consciousness was on the rise but 
nothing which resembled 'mature' mass nationalism. " The 
Colonial Office was content to encourage cooperation 
between the tribal and educated elites and 'saw no reason 
to make any irrevocable choice between them'. 81 
For the British government in East and Central Africa 
the choice of partners was even wider and problematic. It 
was not merely a choice between traditional ruling elites 
and the newer politicised, educated cadres, as was broadly 
the case in West Africa. During the war the contributions 
of the white settler communities to the war effort had made 
them vocal and powerful 'partners' of the British 
government. As we saw in chapter six it was the white 
settler communities who were the most politically mature in 
East and Central Africa and it was they who clamoured for 
self-government. But an exclusively white settler-London 
'Partnership' was totally unacceptable to London, not least 
because it would have contradicted the policy of African 
paramountcy. This was obviously an explosive situation. 
The British government was in danger of losing the 
initiative through a policy of inaction on political 
issues. Unless action was taken in the political field 
'partnership' would be pure rhetoric - propaganda without 
substance. It became increasingly clear that 'without the 
active support of Africans' the development plans would 
fail as the 'framework for the collaboration between 
colonial rulers and local elites no longer met modern 
requirements'. " 
Under the leadership of Creech Jones the Colonial 
Office sought to address these unresolved questions. The 
Colonial Office and the colonial governments would equip 
themselves for the new role of development instead of pure 
administration. It was recognised that the development 
80 Cell, Hailey .... p. 244. 
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policies would have political consequences and it was 
important that political viability received the same kind 
of attention as economic and social viability. The notion 
of watching the Africans for cues and gradually evolving 
the traditional institutions into local government was 
abandoned. While the end point was the same - self- 
government within the Commonwealth - formal empire was to 
be ended constructively. 
The development of African nationalism would not to be 
resisted. The aim was to be active in the creation of 
self-governing states, which would be broadly based, viable 
in economic, social and political terms, friendly, non- 
communist and firmly within the Commonwealth framework. 
Instead of reacting to events, the Colonial Office was 
anxious to seize the initiative in political developments 
in Africa by producing a programme of practical policies. 
'Decolonisation was not mentioned', instead the Colonial 
office 'Planned in magisterial fashion the gradual 
devolution of self-government within the Commonwealth'. 83 
This strategy was embodied in the Local Government Despatch 
of February 1947. The aim was responsible government 
within a generation in West Africa. Elsewhere progress 
would be 'considerably slower'. 81 This would be achieved 
in four stages of increasing African participation in 
government from the local level, through elections based on 
universal franchises to the final stage of African 
ministers representing the majority party would form the 
government on a Westminster model. 85 At the root of the 
strategy to prepare the African colonies for responsible 
government was progress at the local level. Local 
government would be democratised. This would, it was 
hoped, avoid the creation of a new class of professional 
African politicians who were out of touch with the mass of 
83 Porter and Stockwell, op. cit., p. 69. 
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the people. The Colonial Office hoped to see a way out of 
a possible dilemma of either holding on too long or making 
premature concessions. Political progress would be 
determined by the strength of nationalist feeling. The 
ability of the nationalists were able to insist on change 
would depend on 'the degree to which they had achieved mass 
support'. " 
It would be wrong to see the plan for the development 
of Local Government either as an inflexible blueprint or 
even a revolutionary policy change. The pace of 
development would depend on local conditions. As Ronald 
Robinson*, who with Andrew Cohen drew up the scheme for 
Local Government later described it: 
It was entirely within the terms of seeking to 
reconcile what's been called the ethos (I would call 
it habit of mind) of the Colonial Office over many 
years, the notion of slow and stately progress towards 
self-government, and the fact that this was usually 
brought about by pragmatic responses to events, 
usually those in the territories. What it sought to 
do was to break away from leaving this process 
entirely to an outburst at the other end before anyone 
thought about doing anything. It sought to set, no 
doubt very naively, a kind of programmed form of 
pragmatic reactions, and there was no proposal in it 
which hadn't already been carried out somewhere in 
some part of the colonial empire. It represented an 
attempt to systemise possible pragmatic responses to 
what was conceived as a variety of situations. " 
The Local Government strategy therefore sought to put some 
meat on the bones of political 'partnership'. In East and 
Central Africa political rhetoric of self-government would 
be pursued in deed. The aim would be to'improve the status 
and experience of Africans leading to participation in 
'genuine partnership'. " Self-government would have to 
wait until the African majority was ready to play a full 
part with the settler communities. Here it can also be 
seen that the Labour government accepted that the white 
settlers had an essential role to play in the development 
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of territories in East and Central Africa. 
However these plans were not received with enthusiasm 
when they were presented to a meeting of the African 
governors which met in London in November 1947 to discuss 
the implementation of the Local Government Despatch. The 
governors would only endorse the local government policy as 
a general statement and would not commit themselves to 
specific points of detail. The differences between 
conditions in the regions of British Africa were 
highlighted. The East African governors insisted that the 
political future of Africa had to be considered on a 
regional basis; 'the "black man's countries" of West Africa 
and the "plural societies" of East and Central Africa had 
essentially different problems and were going to progress 
along very different timetables'. 89 
The education of the African in the art of government 
proceeded in any case, but at a leisurely pace and without 
the recognition that the foundations of this education 
should be at the local government level. While there were 
examples of progress at the local and district levels, 
particularly in the early 1950s, they were often seen as an 
'alternative' to political developments at the centre and 
not as a preparation for them. 90 
The reluctance of the governors in East and Central 
Africa to adopt a central' and pro-active role in the 
development of local democracy in their territories came at 
the same time as the economic crisis which began in the 
summer of 1947. Radical and rapid approaches to the 
transfer of power were put on one side. The economic 
crisis of balance of payments difficulties and the 
convertibility of the pound led the government to reassess 
its commitments in Africa. The answer was not an imperial 
retreat, but rather a decision to use the economies of the 
colonies. The colonies would prop up Britain's position in 
order to aid- economic recovery by integrating colonial 
development into domestic economic planning. This new 
89 Cell, 'On the Eve pp. 255-6. 
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emphasis on economic 'partnership' between Britain and her 
colonies in Africa dominated, social and political 
partnership were eclipsed. The economic crisis did not 
prompt the process of decolonisation or the abandonment of 
development schemes in Africa as a cost-cutting measure. 
Instead the economic crisis gave impetus to the colonial 
solution of Britain's economic difficulties and the 
development of tangible resources: 
Attlee's Cabinet succumbed like no other before it, to 
the legendary attraction of the colonies, and 
especially Africa, as an 'El Dorado', possessing vast 
untapped wealth which offered an escape route from 
Britain's problems. 91 
The colonies were seen as an asset in strengthening the 
sterling area by continuing to build up their currency 
reserves in London. The colonies were asked to limit their 
dollar expenditure and to curb imports from the sterling 
area so that products could be released and sold in the 
dollar market. The colonies were also asked to increase 
their production of goods bought from the dollar area and 
to increase the production of goods which were dollar 
earners. 92 African resources were developed as dollar 
earners, in particular the chrome, coal and copper of 
Central Africa. 
The Colonial Office, however was less enthusiastic 
about the economic advantages afforded by the 
intensification of development in Africa. The development 
ethos was corrupted. The aim of Colonial Office 
development plans was to create a viable economic unit with 
the mixed economy that implied and not solely the 
encouragement of primary production in British interests 
producing material to earn and save dollars. The Colonial 
office tried to explain that government expectations were 
unrealistic and were based on ignorance of local 
conditions, particularly the state of the infra-structure 
in Africa. However a combination of Creech Jones's lack of 
power and the relative isolation of the Colonial office 
within Whitehall prevented it from defending its Policy 
91 Butler, OP. Cit., p. 124. 
92 ibid., p. 125. 
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goals. " Instead the Attlee Cabinet proposed new 
legislation. In 1948 the Overseas Resources Act was passed 
which created the Colonial Development Corporation and the 
Overseas Food Corporation which led to the most infamous 
development project of the Attlee government in Africa, the 
Groundnuts scheme in Tanganyika. 9,4 
The Secretary of the Cabinet, Norman Brook, thought it 
necessary to draw attention to the political implications 
of this 'development' policy: 
I wonder whether Ministers have considered 
sufficiently the difficulties of defending this policy 
against criticisms and misrepresentations, which it 
may provoke? It could, I suppose, be said to fall 
within the ordinary definition of 'Imperialism'. And, 
at the level of political broadcast it might be 
represented as a policy of exploiting native peoples 
in order to support the standard of living of 
workers in this country. '95 
In spite of Brook's warning, it is particularly striking 
that there was an apparent lack of concern that a paradox 
existed 'in the contrast between the benevolent rhetoric of 
economic development and the reality of economic 
exploitation'. 96 To the Attlee government, the recovery of 
the British economy took precedence over colonial 
development. Moreover, in considering the colonies, 
Labour governments after 1945 genuinely saw no 
inconsistency between their stated intention to 
develop them for their own good. Even if it was 
necessary to exploit the colonies in the short-term, 
their long-term welfare depended on and would be 
ensured by a prosperous socialist Britain ... Between 
1945 and 1951 a good socialist case could be made out 
of forcing the colonies for a few years, to help feed 
the goose that would eventually lay them golden 
eggs. 197 
But as we will see the disasters of the super-exploitation 
93 Butler, opocit., p. 133. 
94 C. f. PRO, CAB128/6, C. M. (46)93,31 October 1946 for 
discussion of the groundnut scheme and CAB128/10, 
C. m. (47)53,10 June 1947 for discussion of the development 
of colonial resources. 
95 PRO, CAB21/1690, Brook to Attlee, 1 January 1948. 
96 Fieldhouse, op. cit., p. 95. 
9-1 ibid., pp. 101 and 102. 
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development policy symbolised in the failure of the 
Groundnuts project called into question British claims to 
be a partner in African progress. 
Africa also assumed greater importance in Britain's 
defence strategy. British Africa would become a major 
support area, providing manpower and raw materials for the 
Middle Eastern theatre. Africans would compensate for the 
loss of the Indian Army. The development of a strategic 
base in Kenya was discussed as East Africa was 'expected to 
be more important in a future war as a result of greater 
weapon ranges and weakening of Britain's position in the 
Middle East', becoming a 'major training base and storage 
depot' and to defend the main support area in South Africa. 
Although the ambitious plans for the strategic development 
of East Africa proved to be too expensive to be realised 
the development of the Kenya base remained desirable but 
not essential. " 
As the Cold War intensified Africa was perceived to be 
vulnerable to Soviet penetration. Bevin feared that the 
Russians 'would sooner or later make a major drive against 
our position in Africal. 99 Bevin, however, was not 
prepared to see a reduction in Britain's power as a result 
of the Cold War, instead he wanted to create a British-led 
'spiritual union of the West', a 'Third Force' as an 
alternative to the division of the world into two rival 
blocs, 
Provided that we can organise a Western European 
system ... backed by the resources of the Commonwealth 
and the Americas, it should be possible to develop our 
power and influence to equal that of the United States 
of America and the USSR. We have the material 
resources in the Colonial Empire, if we develop them, 
and by giving a spiritual lead now we should be able 
to carry out our task in a way which will show clearly 
that we are not subservient to the United States or to 
913 Ronald Hyam, 'Africa and the Labour Government, 
1945-19511, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth history, 
vol. XIX, no. 3, MayI1988, p. 159. 
99 ibid., p. 149. 
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the Soviet Union. 1100 
As part of creating a 'Third Force' Bevin hoped to organise 
'the middle of the planet'. In this organisation the 
resources of the colonies in Africa would be vital for the 
success of Bevin's overall global strategy and essential to 
secure Britain's independence in the world-. If Britain 
only pushed on and developed Africa, we could have the 
United States dependent on 
, 
us and eating out of our 
hands in four or five years ... the United States is 
very barren of essential minerals and in Africa we 
have them all. "' 
The colonies also needed to be protected against 
communist incursions. In 1948 the Foreign Office took the 
initiative and established a new propaganda department, the 
Information Research Department to fight the Cold War. It 
had three functions: 
1. an offensive branch attacking and exposing 
Communist methods and policy and contrasting them with 
'Western' democracy and British methods and policy; 
2. a defensive branch, which would be concerned with 
replying to Soviet and Communist attacks and hostile 
propaganda; 
3. a positive branch which would deal with the 'build- 
up' of the Western union conception. X02 
This organisation was supplemented by the establishment in 
July 1948 of the Colonial Information Policy Committee 
which co-ordinated anti-communist propaganda in Britain's 
colonial 'Possessions. This committee was chaired by 
Christopher Mayhew, Minister of State at the Foreign 
office, and was attended by the Parliamentary Under- 
Secretaries of State of the Foreign, Colonial and 
1100 PRO, F0371/71648/N134, meeting at the Foreign 
Office, 30 December, 1947; - 'The First Aim of British 
Foreign Policy', PRO, CAB129/23, C. P. (48)6,4 January 1948. 
11011 John Kent, 'The British Empire and the Origins of 
the Cold War', in Anne Deighton (ed. ) Britain and the First 
Cold War (London, 1990), p. 179. 
102 PRO, F0371/71687/N765, meeting of the Russia 
Committee, 15 January 1948. For a more detailed examination 
of the Information Research Department and British anti- 
communist propaganda 'c-f., W-Scott 'Lucas and C. J. Morris, 
'A Very British Crusade: the Information Research 
Department and the Beginning of the Cold War', in Richard 
J. Aldrich (ed. ), British Intelligence, Strategy and the 
Cold_War, 1945-51; (London, 1992), pp. 85-110. 
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Commonwealth Relations Offices, a representative of the COI 
and General Sir Ian Jacob of the BBC. Its existence was 
secret even from other departments in Whitehall. 103 
In the Colonial Office the Public Relations Department 
(renamed the Information Department) was re-organised by 
the new Director of Information, Kenneth Blackburne. 
Blackburne was appointed in May 1947. From the outset he 
had one big advantage over Noel Sabine, his predecessor 
because he was 'someone of good reputation within the 
official hierarchyl. 104 Sabine had been a District 
Commissioner when he was transferred to the Colonial Office 
from Kenya. Blackburne not only had a wider experience in 
Nigeria, Palestine and the West Indies but was also more 
senior having been the Colonial Secretary in the Gambia (he 
was the youngest ever appointment to the position of 
Colonial Secretary). His rank and reputation within the 
Colonial Service meant that he was better placed than 
Sabine to have the views of the Information Department 
heard and acted upon. His appointment-coincided with the 
intensification of development of the colonies which would 
have to be explained in the colonies as never before. 
Therefore it was important that he headed a department 
which was equipped to fulfill this task. 
Only-one month into the job Blackburne produced a 
survey of the activities of the Information Department and 
future requirements. He considered that re-organisation 
was necessary because of a feeling in the Department 'that 
we do not know what we are working for nor where we are 
going'. Blackburne saw the fundamental purpose of the 
Information Department as building friendship between the 
people of the colonies and the people of Britain: 
to assist in the maintenance of a powerful British 
Commonwealth of Nations in the interests of its own 
peoples and ofthe world as a whole; and I suggest 
that the Department has a vital part to play in this 
- 103 PRO, CAB130/37, GEN231/4, 'Anti-Soviet and pro- 
British Colonial Propaganda', 16 June 1948; PRO, 
C0537/5130, Morgan to Keith, 12 October 1949. The papers 
of the committee are retained in PRO, CAB21/1691-1693. 
104 Kenneth Blackburne, Lasting Legacy: a Story of 
British Colonialism (London, 1976), p. 93. 
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connection. In the past the British Commonwealth has 
been built up and maintained by the strength of Great 
Britain, by political control exercised from this 
country, by economic ties, and by strategic 
requirements in the interests of defence. The steady 
progress towards self-government in the Colonies and 
the pressure continually *being exerted on His 
Majesty's government to lessen the economic ties 
between the United Kingdom and the Colonies, the 
difficult financial position of the United Kingdom, 
and the development of atomic power and aerial warfare 
- all are tending to weaken the political, economic 
and strategic ties between the United Kingdom and the 
Colonies. There is only one certain link left - 
friendship between the People of the United Kingdom 
and people of the Colonies - and I suggest that the 
fundamental and vital aim of the Information 
department is to foster the growth of that 
friendship. X05 
The Information Department, he argued, was not 
equipped to carry out this task and he envisioned 
substantial increases in staff. 
The first, objective `of the Department was the 
'Projection of -Britain'. The territorial Information 
Officers were not equipped to undertake this task as their 
primary role was the interpretation of territorial policy. 
Blackburne would encourage visits from the colonies and 
visitors to the colonies, Trades Union officials, MPs and 
the Press as 'ambassadors for Britain. In relations 
between the Colonial Office and -the COI, the Colonial 
Office should take the initiative in making publicity 
suggestions in order to end the 'haphazard' method of 
planning-106 
The second objective of projecting the colonies in the 
United Kingdom should be intensified. The Colonial Office 
should hold a monthly press conference. He wanted to see 
the transfer of the COI's Empire Information Service to the 
Colonial Office because the existing relationship was 
unsatisfactory. The third objective of projecting the 
colonies to the world should also be intensified. The 
Foreign Office should encourage foreign consuls to visit 
the Colonial Office. The British Council should be used 
105 PRO, C0875/42/6, Blackburne to Jeffries, 11 June 1947. 
ibid. 
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more and the Information Department should be more active 
in the activities of the COI in this area because the 
Colonial Office seemed to be 'more a censor than a driving 
force'. 10' 
Above all, Blackburne thought the Colonial Office 
needed to seize the initiative and plan long-range 
publicity. He wanted the Information Department to be 
split into two sections. A News and Publications 
Department would be a functional department concerned with 
'creative' work and departmental public relations. it 
would have four branches: press, information and reference, 
editorial and publications. An Information Services 
Department would be concerned with work towards long-term 
objectives and would consist of four branches, the 
projection of Britain to the colonies, the projection of 
the colonies to the United Kingdom, the presentation of 
British colonial policy to the world and broadcasting. 1108 
Blackburne's proposals were welcomed in the Colonial 
Office. Jeffries found his survey 'able and practical' and 
supported his general proposals. Sir Thomas Lloyd, the 
newly promoted Under-Secretary of State thought it was an 
'admirable piece of work' and 'agreed throughout' with 
Blackburne's plans for the future. The only problem he 
foresaw was obtaining Treasury agreement for staff 
expansion. Creech Jones commented, 'I agree with the 
recommendations and hope the Treasury can be persuaded. I 
hope the programme can be carried out. A good paper'. -09 
The following month Blackburne called for a policy 
statement on the public relations work as 'not only we in 
the Colonial Office but those who are handling public 
relations work overseas are inclined to be in the dark as 
to our true objectives'. Such a statement would have the 
secondary purpose of enabling the Colonial office to 
'tackle' governments in the colonies which had not 
1107 ibid. 
1108 ibid. 
3-09 PRO, C0875/42/6, minutes by Jeffries, 11 June 
1947; Lloyd, 17 June 1947 and Creech Jones, 24 June 1947. 
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appointed full time information officers. L10 An old critic 
Sydney Caine, objected. He could not grasp the need for 
publicity 'specialists'. Every officer, he argued, should 
take into account 'the public aspects of his work, being 
prepared when necessary to explain to an interested public 
what he is doing and why'. Caine was overruled by the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies who ordered that a 
despatch should be sent 'without delay' and expressed 
surprise that this had not been done already. "' 
The circular despatch left the colonial governors in 
no doubt of the importance Creech Jones attached to 
propaganda. He was anxious to 'see greater attention paid 
to information and public relations work both at home and 
in the colonies'. A memorandum on public relations work in 
the colonies was enclosed. The memorandum explained the 
meaning of public relations and how the term had been 
'coined' in recent years to 'dissociate genuine public 
relations work from the stigma attached to "propaganda" and 
"publicity"'. Public relations was 'as old as history' and 
was the 'art of establishing and maintaining within a 
community a spirit of fellowship based on mutual 
understanding and trust'. Indeed, 'public relations may in 
fact be the whole art of politics'. The particular-public 
relations objective of the colonial governments 'is to 
develop a closer association between the people of the 
Colony and the local government, so as to make the people 
accept the government as "their" government'. Political 
reiorm on its own was not enough: 
Much can be done, and much is being done, by the grant 
of broader constitutions, by the development of local 
government, and by the appointment of local officers 
to senior posts in the government service. But these 
measures-alone are not enough. The people of each 
colony have to be brought to realise that the grant of 
a new constitution, the development of a new system Of 
local government, and the appointment of local 
officers to senior posts do in fact mean that they are 
becoming increasingly responsible for their own 
affairs and that the Colonial government is 'their' 
11110 PRO, C0875/23/1, Blackburne to Jeffries, 16 July 1947. 
3-. '--l- PRO, C0875/23/1, minute by Caine, 18 August 1947 
and minute by Creech Jones, undated. 
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government. It is here that a positive public 
relations policy is needed, and such a policy can only 
be introduced if every senior government officer 
realises that he has a responsibility in the execution 
of this policy - that he is in fact a public relations 
officer for his government. "' 
Public relations could also play a particular role in 
Africa in the area of race relations by supporting the new 
empire of 'partnership': 
It is fruitless for a government whose senior officers 
are of European descent to accept as an aim of policy 
the development of closer association between the 
people and the government unless steps are taken to 
break down the barriers caused by racial 
misunderstanding. It is fruitless for the Secretary of 
State to declare that a policy of 'partnership' is 
replacing the policy of 'trusteeship' unless 
government officials in the colonies are prepared to 
accept the colonial peoples as partners in fact as 
well as in name. XX3 
Treasury assent for the reorganisation of the Colonial 
Office's Information Department was received at the end of 
September; Blackburne received finance for the adoption of 
his proposals in full. The Information Department would 
now be equipped to continue day to day work while at the 
same time be able to plan long range policies. 114 
In November 1947 the African governors gathered in 
London to attend a conference on the future of British 
colonial policy in Africa. The economic implications of 
the government's new drive to utilise colonial resources to 
aid Britain in the economic crisis were discussed. As we 
have seen above the conference also discussed the political 
future of Africa centred on the development of local 
government which had formed the substance of Creech Jones' 
Local Government Despatch of February 1947. 
While the Colonial Office's plans for local government 
received a lukewarm response, the governors endorsed the 
proposals for the development of public relations outlined 
in Creech Jones' circular 
11112 PRO, C0875/23/1, 
colonies, 17 September 1947. 
despatch of September 1947. 
circular despatch to all 
113 ibid. 
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Creech Jones, expressed his concern to the governors about 
the 'appalling ignorance' in the United Kingdom about the 
colonies. He insisted that 'a great effort was wanted if 
we were to get the people of this country keyed up and 
interested in what was happening in the Colonies'. In the 
colonies themselves public relations was of 'immense 
importance' to secure 'goodwill and cooperation'. The 
governor of Kenya, Sir Philip Mitchell, agreed and stated 
that an active public relations policy had the full backing 
of the government of Kenya; 'in such a colony as Kenya 
public relations and race relations were the same 
1115 thing'. 
In order to maintain the momentum for a positive 
public relations policy, another circular despatch was sent 
to the colonies, emphasising the importance of public 
relations as 'an integral part of modern administration'. 
The work of information departments was not to 'bamboozle' 
the public, but the reverse: 
British policy in the field of information has always 
been based on the belief that the public should know 
the truth at the earliest possible moment, for the 
progress of a country will obviously suffer if 
ignorance and mistrust develop through the failure of 
the government to take the public into its confidence. 
The people of the colonies 'should understand Britain's 
difficulties and achievements'. Ignorance of government 
intentions should be dispelled; 'the key to ignorance is 
understanding, the key to understanding is knowledge, and 
the key to knowledge is the supply of information'. "' 
In October 1948 the Colonial Office Information 
Department was re-organised to reflect the decision to 
adopt an offensive anti-communist propaganda campaign. The 
organisation of the Information Department remained 
unchanged throughout the 19501s. A fourth Cold War 
objective was added to the terms of reference of the 
Department's activities in addition to the projection of 
Britain to the colonies, the projection of the colonies to 
113-' PRO, C0875/23/1, Conference of African Governors, 
minutes of meeting held on 19 November 1947. 
1116 PRO, C0875/23/1, circular despatch to all 
colonies, 15 July 1948. 
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the United Kingdom and the projection of the colonies to 
the world to carry out the programme established by the 
Colonial Information Policy Committee. Anti-communist 
propaganda had become necessary because of the 'alarming 
spread of Communism in the world' and 'Soviet attacks on 
British colonialism'. In this area the Information 
Department departed from purely long-term educative 
propaganda. In order to counter 
the immediate Communist menace, we must undertake 
positive and dynamic propaganda. We must not confine 
ourselves to the production of material of an 
informative nature designed to promote friendship 
between the people of Britain and the people of the 
Colonies; we must also undertake definite short-term 
propaganda - 'destructive' propaganda to show to the 
peoples of the Colonies the evils of Communism; 
'constructive' propaganda to undermine Soviet 
propaganda and to show to the people of the Colonies 
and of the world the advantage of the British way of 
life and of British colonial policy as contrasted with 
the shortcomings of Communism; and 'defensive and 
explanatory' propaganda designed to explain to the 
colonial peoples why the British Government has 
followed various lines of action which provoke 
criticism in the Colonies. 117 
The Information Department was re-organised to meet the new 
objective. The Information Services Branch would be 
concerned with long-term information work with five 
sections, the projection of the colonies to Britain, the 
projection of Britain to the colonies, the projection of 
the colonies to foreign countries, including work related 
to the British Council, broadcasting, and the development 
of public relations in the colonies. The News Branch was 
responsible with day to day work of the Information 
Department and was divided into two sections, the press and 
reference sections. The Publications Branch was 
responsible for the preparation of all official printed 
material. "' 
The Colonial Film Unit continued to provide films for 
African audiences and in 1947 it took over the role of the 
COI, s films division by producing films projecting the 
1111'7 PRO, C0875/42/7, memorandum by Blackburne on the 
work and policy of the Information Department, 16 October 1948. 
3-11*3 ibid. 
458 
colonies to Britain in addition to its functions of 
projecting Britain to the colonies and producing 
educational films. In 1947-48 the Colonial Film Unit sent 
two units to East Africa which filmed material for the 
production of Introducing East Africa, The Groundnut 
Survey, Dar es Salaam, Zanzibar and Nairobi. -"'ý The 
Colonial Film Unit was to continue until the colonies 
established their own film units. In 1948 the Central 
African Council obtained Colonial Development and Welfare 
funding for a Central African Film Unit which in its first 
year produced Mulenza Goes to Town, Muienii Builds a Bridge 
and a film about soil erosion. -L20 The British Council 
extended its work in Africa and by the end of 1948 it had 
established an office in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam while 
exploring the possibilities of opening Institutes in the 
other East and Central African territories. -L23- 
In Africa the territorial Information Officers 
continued to be linked through the office of the PIO which 
became the Regional Information Office in 1947 until its 
closure in 1950. The main objective of the RIO was to 
provide publicity material to illustrate the practical 
benefits of 'partnership', developments and progress in the 
colonies like the groundnuts scheme, the mining industries 
in Central Africa, and projects to combat soil erosion in 
order to show Britain and the world that 'our colonial 
policy and administration is good'. 3-22 The RIO continued 
to supervise the East African Photograph Unit and in 1948 
it produced photographs on subjects as varied as the 
Williamson Mwadui Diamond Mines in Tanganyika, the Kariba 
2-119 PRO, C0875/26/1, the Colonial Film Unit's 
programme, 2 September 1947; Colonial Film Unit Committee 
meeting, 5 August 1948. 
-1-20 PRO, C0875/25/3, meeting of the Colonial Welfare 
and Development committee, 12 February 1948; Izod to 
Blackburne, 16 November 1948. 
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Dam Hydro-Electric Scheme in Uganda and over a thousand 
photographs on the groundnuts project alone. 12-3 
East African Groundnuts was the development'project 
which attracted the most government and public attention. 
In its inception, presentation and ultimate failure we can 
see the collision of Colonial Office good intentions and 
British economic requirements. -It is hard to see how any 
amount of propaganda and public relations could succeed in 
continuing to support 'partnership' when the policy pursued 
by the Labour government was driven by Britain's economic 
considerations. 
The Groundnuts project was of course only one of the 
many projects which was the result of the legislation which 
created the Colonial Development Corporation and the 
overseas Food Corporation in 1947. It is perhaps ironic 
that the idea of a development corporation, in theory free 
from the taint of exploitation attached to private 
enterprise"' became identified with socialist state 
capitalism. As originally conceived the Colonial 
Development Corporation was to increase colonial output and 
to save dollars. It had nine commercial operating 
divisions: equipment and supply, animal products, crops, 
forestry, fisheries, minerals, engineering and works, 
factories. and marketing and hotels. However it soon 
dropped many of its original divisions and concentrated on 
food production for the United Kingdom. The CDC had its own 
failures and incurred big losses like the Gambia Poultry 
Farm which precipitated the resignation of Lord Trefgarne, 
the chairman of the CDC. Other projects like the 
production of Tung oil in Nyasaland which began in 1948 
were economically viable but took years before it came out 
of the red (in this case not until 1962, only two years 
before Nyasaland gained independence as Malawi) and was 
hardly a remedy for the economic crisis of 1947/8.125 The 
123 PRO, C0875/23/4, Watkins-Pitchford to Blackburne, 
8 july 1948. 
x24 Butler, op. cit., p. 130. 
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activities of the CDC also provided ammunition for critics 
both of British colonial policy and increased state 
economic intervention. It was described by the pan- 
Africanist George Padmore as: 
a system of State Capitalism, operated on behalf of 
the Labour Government by salaried executives working 
for a semi-official Corporation rather than for 
shareholders. This constitutes a new form of Economic 
Imperialism. "' 
In the beginning at least East African Groundnuts 
symbolised hopes for British economic recovery, faith in 
socialist planning and the development of Africa. In the 
post-war period there was an urgent shortage of oil and 
fats. The British government hoped to reduce its 
dependence on imported vegetable fats which cost valuable 
dollars and develop its own sources of supply. The project 
intended to be a 'revolution in economic development under 
tropical conditions' with the largest amount of groundnuts 
produced in the shortest possible period of time. The idea 
originated with Frank Samuel,,,, the managing director of the 
United Africa Company, a subsidiary of Unilever. The UAC 
in conjunction with the Department of Agriculture in 
Tanganyika drew up a plan which was presented to the 
Ministry of Food in March 1946. Further investigations, by 
the Wakefield Committee produced a plan which envisioned 
the clearing and planting of 107 farming units with a total 
acreage of 3,210,000 in three colonies, Kenya,, Tanganyika 
and Northern Rhodesia over a five year period. It was 
hoped that 600,000 tons of groundnuts would be produced 
each year up to year five, and 800,000 tons per annum 
thereafter. The project would cost 24 million pounds and 
produce an annual saving of 10 million pounds , 
on the food 
import bill. In December 1946 the plan was presented as a 
White Paper with the recommendation that work should begin 
immediately in Tanganyika with the aim of clearing 150,000 
acres by the end of 1947.1127 
In its desire to save precious dollars and to end food 
rationing it is easy to see how such a project appealed to 
112-6 Quoted in Butler,. op. cit., P. M. 
JL27 Havinden and Meredith, op. cit., pp. 276-8. 
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the British government. The project was operated by the 
Overseas Food Corporation which was responsible to the 
Ministry of Food and not the Colonial Office. There was 
disquiet at lower levels in the Colonial Office over the 
details of the plan, but the plan received support from the 
top by those who chose to see it less as an answer to 
Britain's food situation and more as a means of modernising 
African agriculture. Sir Sydney Caine admired this 'new 
approach' to the problem of low African agricultural 
productivity by the use of massive mechanisation. Andrew 
Cohen thought it was 'the most important single act of 
-11 20 government ever undertaken in British tropical Africa'. 
The initial presentation of the project was, however 
unfortunate, particularly when the Colonial Office was 
trying to project the value of 'partnership' to the 
colonies. The tabloid press, much to the chagrin of the 
Colonial Office's Information Department who had taken no 
steps to put the right spin on the announcement of the ODC 
or the OFC and greeted the news with 'Africa as the larder 
of Britain' and 'End to food rationing' confirming 'the 
widely held belief that Britain was an arch-exploiter of 
129 her colonial peoples'. 
Other commentators did welcome the project as a force 
for progress. The-, Economist heralded it as 'the sort of 
economic planning which is needed to change the face of the 
colonial empire'. -L30 Elspeth Huxley waxed lyrical on the 
prospects of East African Groundnuts to an audience of the 
Royal Empire Society: 
A spirit of hope and confidence, remarkable in this 
day and age, seems to be in the air. Like another 
Sleeping Beauty, Tanganyika is stirring, after years 
of torpidity, at the kiss of Prince Strachey (John 
Strachey, the Minister of Food], and blood 
transfusions from the British Treasury are bringing 
11213 Ronald Hyam (ed. ), The Labour Government and the 
End of Empire, 1945-1951: Part I Hiqh Policy and 
Administration (London, ), p. xivi. 
129 Blackburne, op. cit., P. M. 
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the roses to her anaemic cheeks. 131 
In the Christmas Day broadcast on the BBC in 1947 the 
mutual benefits of the scheme for the British and Africans 
were highlighted. The groundnuts project was described as 
offering 'solid ground for hope, hundreds of miles of 
jungle cleared by science and the bulldozer with a real 
promise of a better life for African and European'. "' 
The results of the project did not live up to the 
expectations of those who thought food rationing would be 
over or those who thought modern farming had come to 
Africa. Until March 1948 the project was run by the UAC 
for the Ministry of Food when it was turned over to the 
OFC. The progress at the first sight chosen, Kongwa was 
held back by a variety of factors. The machinery was poor, 
tractors were second hand and ex-military. There were 
delays in moving equipment. When at last equipment 
arrived, it broke down but there were no repair shops in 
Kongwa. As a result by the end of 1947 only 7,500 acres 
out of the projected 150,000 were ready to planted. 3,400 
acres of this figure had been grassland which had not even 
required clearing in the first place. The harvest was made 
difficult because the ground was baked by the sun. The 
yield was less than half the estimate of the Ministry of 
Food (355-lbs instead of 750 lbs per acre). 133 
In early 1948 Alan Wood an Australian journalist 
became the head of the Information Division of the OFC. 
Wood witnessed the continued failures of the project while 
the Ministers of Food glossed over the problems in any 
public pronouncements. 134 The year 1948 saw the OFC 
proposals for a new ten year plan for the cultivation of 
2,355,000 acres in which sunflowers would be substituted 
1132. Elspeth Huxley, 'Some Impressions of East Africa 
to-Day', United Empire, 28: 5, September-October 1947. 
11: 32 Quoted in MacKenzie, Imperialism and Popular 
Culture, p. 183. 
233 Havinden and Meredith, op. cit., p. 279. 
M34 For his personal view of the groundnuts project 
c. f. his account in Alan Wood, The Groundnuts Affair 
(London, 1950). 
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for groundnuts at a cost of 67 million pounds. The 
Treasury refused to finance this change because the OFC had 
an expenditure limit of 50 million pounds. As result of 
bad rainfall when Kongwals 25,000 acres of groundnuts and 
20,000 acres of sunflowers were harvested in early 1949 
the yield was down to 144 lbs an acre. 11ý15 
In 1951 the Treasury wrote off the debt and the 
project was transferred to the Colonial Office when it 
became an experimental agricultural scheme. It lost the 
taxpayer 36 million pounds and had been of no benefit to 
the British consumer, to the dollar saving Treasury or the 
Africans of Tanganyika. 
Alan Wood felt he could not go on in defending the 
project and had resigned in September 1949. He understood 
there was nothing 'more natural than to try to postpone the 
day of reckoning, always hoping that something better would 
happen'. But in the final analysis he felt that 
the case for public enterprises became untenable if, 
when things went wrong, the public were not 
immediately given the full facts, and those 
responsible removed. JL3G 
Colonial affairs were being covered by the media but 
not necessarily for the 'right' reasons or in the way the 
Colonial Office would have liked. By 1948 therefore the 
Colonial Office Information Department could claim that 
colonial affairs had a 'wider coverage in the Press than 
the affairs of any other Government Department other than 
the Ministry of Food'. However it also felt that the 
'partnership' for progress story had not had a great impact 
on the British public. X37 
In 1948 the COI conducted a Social Survey into the 
extent of public interest in and knowledge of the British 
colonies. The Colonial Office did not regard the results 
13 5 Havinden and Meredith, OP. cit., p. 279. 
x36 Wood, OP. Cit., p. 114. 
137 PRO, C0875/42/7, memorandum by Blackburne on the 
work and policy of the Information Department, 16 October 1948. 
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as very encouraging. JL38 In the survey 1921 adults over 
the age of sixteen were questioned. The following is a 
summary of the results: 
What people know of persons 
a. People who have heard of the recent scheme 
to grow ground nuts 67 
b. That native peoples in the colonies have a 
lower standard of living than ourselves 67 
c. That we are teaching native peoples to 
govern themselves 66 
d. That ground nuts are used to make margarine 
or fats 63 
e. That Colonial inhabitants are mostly coloured, 
not white 62 
f. That Britain assists the Colonies financially 59 
g. People who can name at least one colony 49 
h. People who can name at least one food or raw 
material from the Colonies 37 
i. That our Colonies do not pay taxes to support 
us 33 
j. The difference between a Domi nion and a Colony 25 
k. How our Colonies help to earn dollars for us 21 
l. That the new ground nut scheme is in East 
Africa 16 
The Survey concluded that public opinion was 'inclined to 
be complacent about the work being done in the Colonies'. 
While 19% thought we 'tended to be selfish in the past', 
while 'the great majority of people believe we are doing a 
"better job now"'. It was Judged that only 22% 'were rated 
by our interviewers as showing a high degree of interest in 
the topic of the survey' . 139 Press comments concentrated 
on response g. and that a number of respondents thought 
130 Charles Jeffries remarked 'this is most 
interesting and disturbing', PRO, C0875/72/2, minute by 
Jeffries, 23 November 1948. 
1139 PRO, C0875/72/2, Social Survey conducted between 
17 May and 3 June 1948. 
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Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland were colonies. 1140 
However, the Colonial Office response is far too 
pessimistic. By the evidence of responses to statements a. 
and d. it is clear that the groundnuts story had an impact 
and was recognised by the public. Similarly responses to 
statements b., c., e., f., and g. should not have been 
cause for despair in the Colonial Office as they are high 
percentages, all but the last over fifty which are 
excellent results. 
However, what was supposed to have been the 'good' 
story of colonial development had been badly handled and 
had left the Colonial Office in an exposed position and 
open to criticism. As the case of East African Groundnuts 
showed there was an obvious gulf between the propaganda of 
'partnership' and the reality of exploitation. As 
Blackburne noted: 
When the establishment of the Colonial Development 
Corporation was announced in the House of Commons ... the Information Department did not even know that such 
a proposal was under consideration. No publicity had 
been planned and no precautions had been taken to 
ensure that the measure was not presented to the 
colonial peoples as yet another attempt at 
'exploitation'. The result was that the United Kingdom 
Press got off on the wrong feet ... they were immediately followed by the colonial Press; and I 
cannot but feel that much of the fear of 
lexpl oitation' in the Colonies today is due to the 
fact that adequate steps were not taken to present 
this far-reaching development in the right light. "41 
This lack of publicity sense about colonial development 
continued. Despite the arguments of the Information 
Department, the Colonial Development Corporation was 
adverse to publicity of any kind, preferring to wait for 
concrete results before publicity was given to their 
activities. "' 
In spite of the difference between rhetoric and 
1140 C. f. 'Lincs a Colony Shocks Quizzers', Daily Mail, 
21 December 1948. 
PRO, C0875/42/7, memorandum by Blackburne on the 
work and policy of the Information Department, 16 October 1948. 
1142- PRO, C0875/50/1, minute by Blackburne, 15 November 
1948. 
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reality the Labour government remained committed to 
projecting an image of 'new' empire of partnership for 
progress until the end of its administration in 1951. 
James Griffiths, the successor to Creech Jones as Secretary 
of State for the Colonies, evoked the image of partnership 
in a speech he gave at the opening of the touring 'Partners 
in Progress' colonial exhibition in Newcastle in February 
1951. He said: 
In such times as these, we in the Commonwealth need 
more than ever before to be able to strengthen our 
association one with another; for none can doubt that 
a powerful and united Commonwealth can contribute, 
possibly more than anything else to world peace and to 
bringing of all races together in an effective 
partnership. "' 
With hindsight the writing was already on the wall in 
1948. The riots in the Gold Coast in reaction to the 
economic situation in West Africa and its impact on the 
political development of the whole of Africa, it was clear 
that the transfer of power in Africa would come sooner 
rather than later. Nor would the transfer of power 
necessarily be achieved in accordance with the desired 
objectives of the British government. For some this was 
apparent at the time. Propaganda promoting the benefits of 
'partnership' could not keep calls for self-government at 
bay. In 1948 Kenneth Blackburne observed pessimistically 
the prospects for a continued British-colonial partnership 
in the form of self-government for the colonies within the 
Commonwealth were bleak: 
The British Government have the task of maintaining a 
lasting association between Britain and the Colonies- 
a task which must be successfully achieved if the 
Commonwealth is to survive. Although the declared 
policy of the British Government is to promote self- 
government within the British Commonwealth, it will in 
fact be impossible to prevent a Colony from leaving 
the Commonwealth when it reaches the stage of self- 
government. We must therefore make the colonial 
peoples want to remain within the Commonwealth; and we 
must do our best to see that each Colony on attaining 
self-government follows the lead of Ceylon, and not 
11,13 PRO, C0875/55/8, text of Griffiths' speech in 
Newcastle, 3 February 1951. 
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Burma. 114,4 
As Britain's power in the world diminished it would be 
increasingly difficult to convince the colonial peoples 
that it was to their advantage to remain in 'partnership' 
with Britain even within the Commonwealth: 
This is a difficult task today. In past years it was 
clear to the colonial peoples that it was in their 
interests to remain closely associated with Britain. 
We had economic and military power which was clear for 
all to see. But now the colonial people can see for 
themselves only too plainly that Britain has to look 
to the United States for economic aid, and that paltry 
countries in South America can twist our tails with 
impunity. In the face of this it is difficult to argue 
that Britain is still a leading power in the world and 
that the Colonies derive great economic and strategic 
advantages from association with us. Although we in 
Britain have not lost faith in ourselves, no amount of 
propaganda at the present time will convince the 
leaders of opinion in the Colonies that other 
countries have not become more powerful than 
ourselves. And no propaganda will convince the 
colonial peoples that their economic and strategic 
interests lie wholly in continued association with 
Britain. 
Can we then convince the Colonies that 
association with Britain is in their interests because 
we are good administrators or because we can give them 
skilled assistance? It is doubtful. Those Colonies 
where nationalism is becoming a powerful force- 
Colonies where our efforts to foster closer 
association are most important - are only too ready to 
say (even though they may not believe it) that they 
can take over from British administrators. In the face 
of ardent nationalism the old (and true) belief that 
British administration is the fairest in the world 
cannot be used as an argument to convince the colonial 
peoples of the value of the British connection. And 
who can say that we provide better qualified 
technicians than would be available if the Colonies 
were free to recruit from any country in the world? "' 
In the absence the positive material benefits of 
continued association, argued Blackburne, 'it would seem 
necessary for us to pay attention to other more intangible 
factors which have hitherto helped to maintain the unity of 
the Commonwealth - the ties of tradition and friendship'. 
The links of tradition which bind the Colonies to 
Britain are most clearly shown in the loyalty and 
11-44 PRO, C0875/50/3, note by Blackburne, 'the Royal 
Family and the Colonies', June 1948. 
1145 ibid. 
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respect of all colonial peoples for the Royal family. 
This devotion to the Royal Family is shown by the 
requests which are continually reaching the Colonial 
Office from virtually every colonial territory for 
more photographs of the King and Queen, and for more 
information about every Royal occasion. Even 
* 
those who 
decry British imperialism and demand immediate self- 
government have respect and even loyalty to the Royal 
Family. 146 
The gap between rhetoric and reality was already 
apparent in 1948. But the 'partnership' theme continued to 
be central to British colonial policy and propaganda right 
up to Winds of Change in 1960 and the eventual failure of 
the great experiment in 'multi-racial partnership' of the 
Central African Federation. 
31-46 ibid. 
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CONCLUSION 
Interest in the study of Britain's imperial period has 
considerably revived since the generations of Max Beloff - 
who argued that the British have never really been an 
imperially minded people and have neither possessed a 
theory of empire nor a will to carry it into to practice - 
and of A. J. P. Taylor who regarded the imperial dimension 
as a mere irrelevance to the understanding of the history 
of Britain in the twentieth century. ' During the last 
decade a substantial, and still growing, body of research 
has been published, covering various aspects of British 
imperial history both during the pre-1939 and the post-1945 
period. One aspect of imperial history has not yet been 
explored however: the development and use of propaganda as 
a new method of control and instrument of policy for the 
government of the colonies. 
The history of the development of propaganda agencies 
and the use of modern public relations techniques as an 
increasingly integral part of the working of the twentieth 
century state, in peace and in war, has also been a major 
subject of research and publication in the last two 
decades. Major published studies have covered the history 
of British government agencies and organisations for 
information, publicity and -propaganda for domestic 
political and for diplomatic purposes in the inter-war 
period; for these purposes as well as for maintaining 
morale and for waging psychological warfare during the 
Second World War, and doctoral dissertations and some 
publications have also explored this aspect of the history 
of Britain during the post war decade. Oneýpart of that 
subject too has not yet been covered however: the 
development of official propaganda organisation for 
conducting propaganda in the colonies. 
This thesis therefore sought to fill a gap in both 
subject areas: the propaganda dimension in the history, of 
the British empire and the colonial dimension in the 
2. C. f. MacKenzie, Imperialism and Popular Culture, 
pp. 1-2. 
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history of British propaganda .2 
There is another area where the findings of this 
thesis may also be said to fill a gap. Most of the studies 
of the history of the British empire in the twentieth 
century either end in 1939 or begin in 1945. This was 
based on, and perpetuates the broad assumption that the 
period from the end of the First World War to the outbreak 
of the Second was a period of slow decline with the faith 
in the drive of empire having ebbed away - and that the 
period from 1945 onwards was a period of Idecolonisation', 
the final dissolution of the old empire, initiated by 
Labour coming into power. 
For the Eastern empire - India, Burma, Ceylon - and 
also for the Middle Eastern empire - Palestine and other 
possessions in and around the Arabian peninsula - this 
perspective has much to be said for it. But by missing out 
the war-time period not only is there a gap chronologically 
but also a very important gap in terms of that invigoration 
which the war had brought to many parts of British 
government, society and culture. In the case of the 
imperial part, the Colonial Office, this manifested itself 
in a re-examination and re-formulation of the imperial 
ideal and a burst of new policies, and indeed led to a 
revival of the will to empire itself. The idea of 
Britain's 'new' empire in Africa emerged and with it the 
concept of a multi-racial partnership under British 
auspices as the legitimisation, indeed mission, of Britain 
as an imperial power. Noting these phrases, historians 
who have started from 1945 ascribed these changes in the 
perception and purposes of empire mistakenly to Labour 
coming to power, whereas in fact these were the work of a 
2 The third related area, of course, is the projection 
of the imperial idea in general and of colonial policies 
from time to time to the British public at home. This was 
largely done by semi-official or altogether private 
organisations or individuals - as indeed was the projection 
of anti-imperialist views - as part of the domestic free- 
market of ideas and democratic Politics. The activities of 
these pro-empire propagandists and their impact on the 
popular mind have been the subject of two major studies in 
the past decade: ProRaS[anda and-Empire and Imperiali_smand 
popular Culture both by Professor John MacKenzie. 
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younger generation of Colonial Office officials during the 
war as well as of the wartime ministers for the colonies. 
In no sense was this change and renewal the result of 
Labour coming to power. 
The thesis therefore fills the chronological hiatus of 
the 1939-1948 period; offers a corrective to the 
perspective of linear decline of the British empire in the 
twentieth century, and it is hoped, helps to explain the 
centrality of Africa to post-war British thinking and 
actions in respect of colonialism as well as 
decolonisation. At least it can be said that there was 
between 1943 and 1948 a short period when there was both a 
theory of empire and a will to implement it. Without 
understanding that between the slow ossification of the old 
idea of empire, and the final failure and dissolution of 
the new empire there was such a period of revival of 
idealism and optimism, neither the language of political 
discourse nor at least some of the actions of the 
government during the post-1948 period of decolonisation 
can make full sense. 
It would be tempting to regard the war years and the 
immediate post-war period as a short prequel to the main 
event: the disintegration of the British colonial empire in 
Africa. -With hindsight it can be argued that the warning 
bells were clear and were loudly rung during the Second 
World War. However as we have seen there is a great 
difference between being conscious of the potential dangers 
faced by the empire, and not seeking to do something about 
them. What emerges is a picture of a Colonial Office and a 
Colonial Service conscious of the dangers and their 
unwillingness to be defeated by them. On the contrary, 
particularly after 1943 we have seen a new confidence and a 
new mission and the beginnings of the second colonial 
development of Africa-. Instead of pessimism about the 
future of the empire in Africa we have seen an attempt to 
seize the initiative and create a stable framework for the 
guidance of the colonial partners along the road to self- 
government within a permanent relationship to Britain and 
with the benefits of membership of the British Commonwealth 
of- Nations. This is not a story of an organisation 
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employing public relations palliatives to ease the 
management of decline, but an organisation attempting to 
meet problems head on before the initiative had slipped 
from British hands. That the period animated by a policy 
of colonial reform and renewal had come to be replaced in 
1948 by the beginnings of political decolonisation makes it 
a unique period of imperial history. 
During the period covered by this thesis a brief 
revolution took place in the aims and conduct of Britain's 
colonial policy. Between 1939 and 1948 the whole rationale 
and purpose of the empire changed and for the first time 
public relations became a central method of British 
colonial policy. In the late 1930s with the emergence of 
the colonial question in international diplomacy and the 
unrest in the British colonial empire resulting from 
economic problems, the colonial empire had ceased to be a 
source of British prestige. Critics of Britain's colonial 
policy at home and abroad needed to be answered. The 
Colonial Office and Colonial Service was forced to emerge 
from their complacency of previous eras and could no longer 
enjoy the luxury of allowing 'good' administration to speak 
for itself. The laissez-faire approach to empire and the 
idea of colonial self-sufficiency were abandoned and 
replaced with a new drive to develop the British empire. 
The new policy of colonial development and welfare implied 
government intervention in the colonial empire on an 
unprecedented level. As in Britain, the state became the 
chief agency for public welfare and economic development 
which would create viable colonial states. This new 
version of the imperial relationship and the success of the 
development schemes depended on the active participation 
and cooperation of all those involved, of the colonial and 
British publics. The time had passed when the British were 
powerful enough to govern by the -bayonet. Coercion gave 
way to persuasion; the British would rule the empire by 
consent. 
By 1943 a new definition of this new colonial mission 
was found and publicised which reflected the change in 
theory and practice. A defensive and static conception of 
the old' empire based on the principle of benevolent 
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trusteeship was replaced by the dynamic and positive 
conception of the 'new' empire based on the principle of 
'Partnership'. The British would cooperate with their 
junior partners in the colonies along the road to self- 
government. 'Partnership' then represented a fundamental 
shift in British attitudes towards the empire. Unlike the 
paternalism inherent in the concept of trusteeship, 
'partnership' implied working with and not for the colonial 
peoples. During this long-term effort the British would 
educate the colonial peoples in the tasks of creating 
viable states and provide the means by which this could be 
achieved through the granting of colonial development and 
welfare funds. The colonial empire would again be a source 
of British prestige as Britain regained her reputation as a 
colonial power. The manufacture of consent would be the 
means of realising the new empire. Accordingly, 
'Partnership' was projected both as the means and the end 
of the 'new' empire; even after the achievement of self- 
government in the colonies, 'partnership' would continue 
through the Commonwealth relationship. Public relations 
would increase public knowledge about the British colonial 
policy and its objectives. At home, public relations would 
help the British public understand their responsibilities 
towards the colonial empire. In the colonies, public 
relations would mould the way in which future developments 
would be perceived and optimally would help to bridge the 
awkward gap between the rise of political consciousness and 
the time when political aspirations could be satisfied. 
Public relations also served another purpose in the 
colonies. It was a two-way process whereby the government 
explained their policies but was to be important in gauging 
public opinion in the colonies so that colonial peoples 
could feel that their views were being taken into account. 
The colonial propaganda effort can be assessed on 
several levels and against different criteria. What has 
been done, on what scale, with what consistency of purpose? 
What degree of flexibility was shown in the choice of 
techniques, and what degree of willingness was there to 
learn from experience? How appropriate were the themes and 
the techniques for the intended result and how suitable for 
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the particular audiences? The evidence does not allow each 
of these criteria to be applied to every case but overall 
reasonably firm conclusions can be drawn. In the first 
place it is important to note that propaganda organisations 
were established for the first time both in London and in 
the territories of East and Central Africa. This 
necessarily proved to be a learning process, but the 
Colonial Office and the colonial governments were prepared 
to learn on the job and to improvise in areas of activity 
in which they had little and in many cases no prior 
experience. The wide range of means eventually employed, 
and the change from simple propaganda to broader based 
public relations was a result of the Colonial Office and 
Colonial Service willingness to learn and to be flexible. 
The propaganda effort was continually assessed and there 
were modifications in the vehicles of propaganda and the 
themes employed. There was a great change in both how and 
what was projected in the 1939-1948 period. Colonial 
propaganda changed from supporting the overall war effort 
to the projection of Colonial Office ambitions for the 
long-term future of the empire in which public relations 
was to be a permanent feature as a means of projecting the 
'new' empire. 
In the beginning the colonial propaganda effort 
concentrated on war propaganda in the colonial empire 
itself. The encouragement for the establishment of 
propaganda organisations, in the colonies came from London 
and the initial propaganda plans were also drawn up in 
London. It is also important to note that this planning 
was undertaken by the Empire Division of the MOI as part of 
its overall responsibility for British propaganda in 
general. Unlike the Foreign Office,. the Colonial Office 
did not have any formal propaganda apparatus and its 
initial role was therefore to oversee the preparations made 
by another Department. We have seen how the Colonial 
office slowly developed its own publicity sense and how 
this inevitably brought it into conflict with-the MOI over 
questions of responsibility. While it is possible to 
sympathise with some of the Colonial Office criticisms 
about the amateurism and academic approach of the Colonial 
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Section of the MOI's Empire Division, this attitude did 
little to promote effective cooperation. The inter- 
departmental squabbles persisted until the calmer times 
following Gervas Huxley's appointment in April 1943 and had 
a detrimental affect on the production of colonial 
propaganda resulting inefficiency, delays, abandoned 
projects and a general waste of energy and time. 
Many of the assumptions about the methods of 
projection which formed part of the initial planning for 
this new activity had to be altered. Initially the plans 
for propaganda in the territories of East and Central 
Africa were drawn up on a regional basis. This was soon 
altered to reflect the difference between the territories 
within the regions and also because of the fears of 
dominance of Nairobi in East Africa and Salisbury in 
Central Africa. Instead the territories were to have their 
own Information Offices and were encouraged to cooperate 
with each other in exchange of information and materials, 
with some coordination of activities later on in the war 
through the MOI's officer the PIO in Kenya. The projection 
of the war was a news based effort explaining the nature of 
the war and encouraging a feeling of the unity of the 
empire in a common struggle against' Nazism. Initially 
great emphasis was laid on the press and the written word 
and the colonies were provided with a steady diet of 
general MOI propaganda articles, pamphlets and posters 
which were not designed for the territories in Africa and 
much to the chagrin of the Colonial Office contained 
cliches about Anglo-Saxon democracy. But general 
propaganda was of course cheaper to produce. The Empire 
Service of the BBC was seen as a means of providing 
immediate news and a daily connection -, between the 
territories and Pe Britain. The audiences for this kind 
of propaganda were therefore limited to the European 
settlers and educated Africans and- not a mass African 
audience. Gradually however propaganda appropriate for the 
mass African audience was evolved and the potentials of 
using film and the radio was gradually recognised. It was 
also clear that the colonies did not possess the facilities 
to make films or broadcast themselves as these had been 
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seen as luxury activities in the pre-war period. This gap 
was remedied by the establishment of the Colonial Film Unit 
and by the encouragement of local broadcasting in the 
colonies. 
As the war progressed a gradual improvement took place 
in the range and quality of the propaganda about the empire 
for audiences in the colonies. As the local Information 
Offices were developed the general material produced by the 
MOI in London was increasingly adapted to meet the specific 
needs of the territories and vernacular translations of MOI 
material was produced by the territorial IOs. However 
while the methods of projection had slowly improved the 
simplistic morale boosting theme of imperial unity and 
cooperative war effort largely remained. Coupled with the 
absence of clear war aims about the empire it can be argued 
that these kind of appeals had little to offer in the long- 
run. African audiences could be pardoned for failing to 
see the relevance of the war to their own lives, for 
example when the Colonial Film Unit produced films 
explicitly for Africans with titles like This is a 
Searchlight. As far as the European audiences were 
concerned the appeals to kith and kin to maximise their war 
effort may have reflected London's desire to avoid 
political-controversies during the war, such as the demands 
for amalgamation in Central Africa and closer union in East 
Africa, but it is difficult to see how long Britain could 
hope to play the loyalty card when the position of the 
settler communities had grown in importance as a direct 
result of their valuable war contributions. 
At home the Colonial Office developed its own 
publicity sense and altered its relationship with the MOI 
from being reactive to being pro-active and also making 
suggestions of its own. The appointment of Noel Sabine as 
the Public Relations Officer in July 1940 ensured that the 
Colonial Office was better equipped than it had been 
hitherto to take the initiative. The passive pre-war 
practice of issuing information on demand was altered and 
the evidence shows the beginnings of Colonial office 
cooperation with journalists, publishing houses, the FCB 
and other government departments. The passing of the 
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Colonial Development and Welfare Act in 1940 was also 
important in the development of public relations in the 
Colonial Office. It offered a way to focus attention on 
the positive contribution of Britain to its empire. In the 
absence of specific war aims about the empire it could be 
projected to the colonial empire as a 'carrot'. It could 
help answer critics of British colonial policy. It made 
the projection of the British empire and the empire's 
contributions to the war effort to the British public not 
only desirable but a necessity in order to explain the 
mutually beneficial relationship it had outlined. The 
Colonial Office therefore became more sensitive to these 
needs itself and urged the MOI to make the projection of 
the British empire at home a greater priority. 
The Colonial Office became increasingly concerned 
about the short-term nature of the MOI's 'win the war' 
propaganda. The argument was made, and eventually accepted, 
that efforts should be made whilst the war was being fought 
to 'win the peace' too. Regardless of the war, audiences 
both at home and in the colonies should be prepared for the 
tasks of post-war reconstruction through a long-term 
campaign of education in responsibilities to create mutual 
understanding. Propaganda therefore would be related more 
to the life of the peoples of the empire as well as to the 
necessity of winning the war. But this new propaganda 
policy was not implemented immediately. 
The shattering experience of the collapse of British 
power in South-East Asia and the entrance of the United 
States into the war resulted in a period of introspection 
about colonial policy and its projection, and led-to calls 
for a new articulation of British colonial policy and 
suggestions about a Charter for the Colonies similar to the 
Atlantic Charter. The Colonial Office was subjected to 
American pressures to join with them and issue a statement 
which would promise timetables for the granting of 
independence to British colonial territories. Refusing to 
succumb under the weight of international diplomatic 
pressure, the Colonial Office managed to mount a defence of 
its position. It also found a way of evolving a policy 
statement which would re-articulate Britain's colonial 
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mission without compromising the policy of developing 
colonial empire so as to create viable states which would 
indeed be eventually capable of governing themselves, but 
would remain within the spirit of 'partnership'. The 
Colonial Office emerged re-fortified in itself and armed 
with a statement and vision for the future of the empire 
which could be justified in front of world opinion. It 
represented a change in British colonial policy by 
embodying the development philosophy and provided a theme 
for long-term public relations work about the empire. 
Long-term propaganda for the new empire of 
'partnership' became the theme of all propaganda about the 
empire at home, in the colonies and abroad. It reflected 
the confidence of the Colonial Office and the enthusiasm 
for the tasks of reconstruction. The Colonial Office had 
found the theme and were then to reap the benefits of a new 
head of the Empire Division at the MOI, Gervas Huxley. 
Under the leadership of Huxley the colonial propaganda 
effort of the MOI moved up a gear and exploited every 
opportunity to tell the story of the colonial empire. The 
range and volume of propaganda increased. At home there 
was the happy coincidence of two Huxleys leading the 
campaign to educate the British public, Gervas at the MOI 
and his wife Elspeth as the Colonial Adviser to the BBC. 
Not only did relations between the MOI and the Colonial 
Office improve, the empire content of BBC programme output 
reached its highest levels during the war. Huxley ensured 
that the 'partnership' story was told through a variety of 
media. New pamphlet series were introduced, a touring 
exhibition which attracted enormous crowds was mounted, 
cooperation with publishing houses was intensified and the 
colonial empire featured to a greater extent as the subject 
of talks given by MOI speakers. British youth was targeted 
both directly through regional conferences and scout and 
guide organisations and also through educating the 
educators by targeting school teachers. Women were also 
specifically targeted with specialist material. The Armed 
Forces were targeted through material produced for ABCA. 
The propaganda produced for African audiences and 
produced in the colonies themselves also developed into 
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long-term public relations work around the theme of 
'partnership'. In London the film output of the CFU 
increased and began to reflect development and welfare 
subjects. Local film production was begun in Africa and 
regional broadcasting systems were explored. The British 
Council whose empire activities had been limited to the 
Near East and the production of the newsreel British News 
made plans for a post-war expansion in East and Central 
Africa. As with the activities of the Mobile Propaganda 
Unit, the propaganda produced under the auspices of the PIO 
tended to retain a military flavour mainly because the East 
Africa Command often provided the resources and manpower. 
However progress was made in other public relations areas 
too. Harry Franklin's outfit in Northern Rhodesia, in 
particular had succeeded in breaking out from the limits of 
purely war propaganda. 
In addition to audiences in Britain and in the 
colonies, American opinion received special attention. We 
have seen the potential for American interference in what 
was considered the internal affairs of the British empire 
with American calls for a joint Anglo-American declaration 
on the colonies. To counter and pre-empt such interference 
in the future it was however mistakenly assumed that 
American anti-imperialism was based on ignorance. British 
publicity efforts in the United States were thus designed 
to make a rational appeal to modify what in fact was an 
emotional response. It was an approach which was unlikely 
to get very far either before Pearl Harbour or after. 
While American interference combined with the impact of the 
collapse of British power in the Far East resulted in the 
re-articulation of the British colonial vision in the 
statement by Stanley in July 1943 and which produced the 
theme for colonial propaganda thereafter, sensitivity to 
other American prejudices undermined Colonial Office 
attempts to be radical in its own attitudes to race 
questions. 
The war-time period therefore is integral to the story 
of the projection of the 'new' empire and affected colonial 
propaganda both in Positive and negative ways. The 
projection of the British empire was part of the general 
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British propaganda effort aimed at winning the war and 
brought greater resources and higher skills into play. On 
the other hand, propaganda about the colonial empire became 
caught up in the interests of other departments whose 
priorities were different to those of the Colonial Office. 
Until 1943 the Colonial Office was engaged in a struggle 
with the MOI over control and direction of propaganda about 
the colonial empire. During the 1942-3 period the Colonial 
office also fought off Foreign Office and American 
government attempts to articulate British colonial policy 
in accordance with American wishes. Eventually the 
Colonial Office was able to take the initiative and find 
its own lines of development. While the MOI's short-term 
'win the war' propaganda continued, the projection of the 
colonial empire incorporated long-term educative 
propaganda. 
The war acted as a constraint in a number of ways. On 
a large scale colonial propaganda had to compete for 
resources with other propaganda stories. Colonial stories 
also had to compete with more exciting war news. Personnel 
problems were particularly acute. With many Colonial 
Service officers joining up there were shortages which led 
to combining the role of the education officer with the 
Information Officer. War propaganda was dependent on the 
ebb and flow on the battle field and the immediacy and 
relevance of some of the propaganda material became 
outdated very quickly because of the time it took for 
material to reach the colonies. 
The war also had an important impact on the 
relationship between the centre and the colonies. Policy 
and propaganda initiatives came substantially from London 
and wartime conditions help to explain in part why there 
was metropolitan dominance. In a general sense the 
coordination and management of the war effort and the 
mobilisation of the resources of the colonial empireýwas an 
imperialistic activity necessarily directed from the centre 
in London. The experience of central war planning combined 
with the new attitude to Britain's development 
responsibilities in the colonies created new habits of 
central intervention and which were not relinquished once 
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peace returned. The Colonial Office machinery in London 
also expanded and altered to reflect these new tasks with 
the growth of subject departments, of which the creation of 
the Public Relations Department itself forms a part. The 
centre-periphery relationship reflected the centre's 
confidence in its ability to act as a guide to what was 
happening in the colonies. As a result of practical 
considerations at the time London was also at the centre of 
the story of the development of propaganda in the colonial 
empire. Under urgent wartime conditions and in the absence 
of information organisations in the territories, the 
Colonial Office acted as both the procreator, midwife and 
guardian of this new activity. Starting from scratch, the 
colonies were galvanised into action, in an area of 
activity which had been considered a luxury in the pre-war 
period and had never been a high priority in colonial 
government expenditure. It was London which provided the 
funds to build up information organisations, supplied 
equipment and also the propaganda material. It was cheaper 
to supply the colonies with basic materials which were 
produced in bulk in London. Centralisation of control over 
propaganda also ensured that a necessary condition of any 
propaganda campaign was met, all the more important in 
wartime -when British colonial policy was being 
misrepresented by others: that of speaking with the same 
voice. 
The concept of 'new' empire itself based on the 
principle of 'partnership' also gave a strong role for the 
centre. London would no longer neglect the empire and 
leave it to the men on the spot to oversee the 
administration but would act as the enabler for the 
development of the colonial territories to the point where 
London would accede self-government. As we have seen it 
was in these years, and after 1943 in particular, that 
Colonial Office optimism was most evident. The centre saw 
itself both willing and able to take and hold the 
initiative over future developments in the colonies. As 
far as the particular Political circumstances pertaining in 
the British East and Central Africa it was only by the 
Colonial Office being pro-active that the delicate 
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partnership between the races and thus African interests 
could be protected against domination by white settler 
interests, thus maintaining a balance with the advances 
made by the settlers in the course of the war in the 
government of these territories. 
The location of power was therefore at the centre in 
London. During the war the Colonial Office cooperated with 
the MOI and the MOI was the fundholder of Britain's 
propaganda effort. At the periphery the colonial 
governments implemented propaganda plans devised in London 
and propaganda activities were overseen by the MOI's 
representative on the spot, the PIO located in Nairobi. 
This is not to suggest that the periphery was powerless or 
that it blindly followed diktats emanating from London. 
Indeed the principle of devolution was accepted during the 
war and it was always recognised that the activities at the 
centre would eventually diminish as local information 
organisations developed. The colonial governments were 
encouraged to adapt basic material produced in London to 
suit local requirements and any suggestions which they made 
which helped London to get the type of propaganda right was 
similarly welcomed. The feedback from the territorial 
Information Officers, for example, was invaluable to the 
BBC Empire Service and helped to adjust the emphasis of 
propaganda away from the early propaganda staples of 
posters and pamphlets and the written word to more 
accessible and universal media of sound and vision. The 
negative reaction against the MOVs diet of win the war 
propaganda fortified the arguments of the propaganda 
specialists in the Colonial Office that colonial propaganda 
should also be concerned with long-term pubic relations. 
The initiatives, from London could only achieve so much and 
it was up to the individual colonies to do the rest. 
London then has featured heavily in the story of the 
projection of the 'new' empire. The rapid turnover of 
Secretaries of State for the ColonieS: 3, with seven -in the 
period 1939-48 undoubtedly affected the continuity-at the 
top in London and as has been argued elsewhere meant that 
3 See Appendix 2. 
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Secretaries of State for the Colonies tended to be 
'caretakers' rather than lbuildersl., 4 This rapid turnover 
of office holders did not inspire confidence. The Colonial 
Office was seen as a Cinderella department, a stepping 
stone to higher office .5 However the role of the Secretary 
of State for the Colonies was often decisive in the 
development of the 'new' empire. A crucial role was played 
by Malcolm MacDonald, for it was he who had the political 
will to carry through the new colonial development and 
welfare policies and it was he who first proposed the 
establishment of a Public Relations Department in the 
Colonial Office, but once departed, without his drive the 
suggestion was put on hold for nearly three years. 
Following the collapse of British colonial power in South- 
East Asia Lord Cranborne provided the necessary leadership 
at the moment when the colonial empire faced its severest 
challenge. Oliver Stanley gave voice to the new found 
confidence in the Colonial Office and made the path- 
breaking speech in July 1943 which gave the go-ahead to the 
'partnership' propaganda initiatives. Creech Jones proved 
himself to be enthusiastic for the continuation of the 
Colonial Office role in explaining British colonial policy 
as a means of implementing colonial policy at a time when 
the public relations activities of the department were 
under threat from post-war retrenchment. But due to the 
Colonial Office's relatively weak position within 
Whitehall's hierarchy and Creech Jones' own lack of power 
within Cabinet he failed in to bring realism to bear in the 
debate of 1947-8 over seeing Africa as a panacea for 
British economic ills. 
It is also clear that the role of the officials is 
crucial to this story. It was the permanent officials who 
supplied the continuity within colonial policy-making and 
its implementation. When we talk about the importance of 
4 Cyril Ehrlich 'Building and Caretaking: economic 
policy in British Tropical Africa, 1890-1960', Economic 
History Review, 26 (1973). 
5 Ralph Furse, Aucuparius: Recollections of a 
Recruiting Officer (London, 1962), p. 13. 
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'the official mind' it is necessary to remember that there 
were official minds. The period of change in colonial 
policy and method coincided with the emergence of a new 
'development' generation among the higher ranking civil 
servants in the Colonial Office. A clear generation gap is 
apparent between the older and more conservative senior 
officials like Sir Cosmo Parkinson and Sir John Shukburgh. 
The 'last Victorians' were out of step with the adoption 
both of a more pro-active role by the Colonial Office in 
the development of British colonies and the need to 
publicise colonial policy as part of this new role. The 
'development generation' of senior civil servants like Sir 
Charles Jeffries, Sir Thomas Lloyd, Sir Sydney Caine and 
Sir Andrew Cohen were modernisers and embraced the new 
development philosophy and the changes it had on the 
relationship between the governing and the governed. It 
was these men who learnt to change their administrative 
habits and embraced the modern age by facing up to the 
developments in communication and the opportunities which 
this offered. They realised that the time had passed when 
the work of the Colonial Office was done behind closed 
doors out of the spotlight of public scrutiny. Though 
Caine argued against a permanent role for public relations 
in the activities of the Colonial Office, by the end of the 
war he was in the minority. The consensus which had been 
formed about, the role of public relations was also 
important in providing continuity for the change form war 
to peace and the change from the Coalition to Labour 
government. 
officials at a lower level were also crucial to the 
story of the- projection of the 'new' empire of 
'Partnership'. Noel Sabine the first Public Relations 
Officer in the Colonial Office continually drew the MOVS 
and the Colonial Office's attention to the opportunity of 
using propaganda for constructive purposes in addition to 
war propaganda which would help the tasks of reconstruction 
once peace returned. Lord Hailey was the inspiration in 
the wake of the South-East Asian disasters in translating 
how the new development and welfare legislation would 
affect the colonial empire and discovering the theme for 
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all subsequent colonial propaganda: Opartnership'. Gervas 
Huxley then brought his expertise and enthusiasm to the 
task of projecting the new theme and also managed to 
improve the Empire Division of the MOI's relationship with 
the Colonial Office. In the colonies the achievements of 
the Northern Rhodesian Information Office under Harry 
Franklin stand out as being the model for future 
developments and also how an amateur with flair for public 
relations could try and live the partnership ideal as well 
as publicise it. 
In the post-war period the themes and media employed 
continued along the lines established during the war. The 
task of state building by creating viable units became the 
practical manifestations of 'partnership'. 'Development 
fever', was the result of the implementation of the plans 
produced under the aegis of the Colonial Development and 
Welfare Acts of 1940 and 1945. On the political level the 
new Labour government sought to put meat on the bones of 
political partnership by educating Africans into a state of 
responsibility through the route of local government. The 
calamitous position of the British economy in 1947-8 
however meant Britain was hardly in a position to honour 
her colonial commitments. As the priority became economic 
recovery at home, Britain's empire in Africa was looked to 
to provide a way out of Britain's economic ills. The 
failure of the East African Groundnuts Scheme publicly 
exposed the fallacies on which British policy and 
propaganda were based. By 1948 the 'super-exploitation' 
experienced by the colonies sat uneasily with the professed 
aims of 'partnership': social and economic development and 
progress towards self-government. The propagandists were 
conscious of these contradictions and ceased to have faith 
in their product. 
As we have seen from 1943 there was a dogged adherence 
to the concept of 'partnership' as both the guiding 
principle of the British empire and the theme of propaganda 
about the colonial empire. 'Partnership' was both a 
blessing and a burden. It was progressive enough to mark a 
break with the connotations of a top-downward relationship 
and would encourage everyone to believe the mutual benefit 
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of play in the progress of the empire. 'Partnership' was a 
very vague concept: in its ambiguity lay its acceptability. 
It could mean all things to all people and had the 
advantage of avoiding making the political choices which 
the British government feared would undermine their 
controlling position forever. 
'Partnership' did however imply a change in political 
relationships and the modernisation of the political 
relationship between the British and the local leadership 
in the colonies. The active collaboration of local leaders 
and the mass of the African populations was necessary to 
make the new development polices work. It also meant that 
the days of Indirect Rule were numbered. The acceptance 
that the colonial peoples would no longer be administered 
into a state of responsibility but educated into it meant 
that political institutions would need to be reformed to 
meet the new challenges of building viable states. The 
Native Authorities which had developed according to the 
principles of Indirect Rule was the way in which the 
British used traditional local authorities as agents of 
local rule. But it was recognised that these institutions 
were essentially vehicles for reaction and not progress; 
they were not equipped to perform the tasks of modern local 
government and did not represent the people as the 
authority of traditional rulers, chieftains and Emirs was 
left intact. The impact of the war on African 
administration was assessed as part of the Colonial Office 
exercise which produced the Local Government Despatch of 
February 1947. It found that new conditions applied in 
Africa, among them the growing political consciousness of 
the 'middle classes' and growing demands for improved 
social services which would have to be met by improvements 
in local administration. A way would have to be found to 
increase the power of the emerging intelligentsia who had 
no role in the administration of their territories and it 
was not felt that the traditional Native Authorities would 
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spontaneously evolve into efficient democratic government. 6 
But even by the abandonment of Indirect Rule and the 
recognition of the need to harness the support of the 
educated elites for constructive purposes did not 
necessarily mean that the tribal chiefs had to be 
abandoned. Cooperation between tribal and educated elites 
would be encouraged in the development of local government 
and therefore the British would be in position where they 
would be able to avoid making an irrevocable choice between 
them. 
With hindsight it appears to be audacious indeed for 
the British government to hope that they could contain 
political aspirations. Their hopes of unleashing black 
nationalism for controlled and constructive purposes were 
utterly unrealistic. But at the time the British felt they 
had time on their side. Mass black nationalism had yet to 
become a feature of African life in East and Central 
Africa. The nationalism the British had to deal with was 
white settler nationalism. And through 'partnership' the 
British hoped not only to channel future African political 
developments for constructive purposes but also to channel 
settler energies too. But 'partnership' can be condemned 
as a retrograde step and a sell out to settler nationalism 
for it -seemed to replace the principle of African 
paramountcy by suggesting that the white settlers had a 
permanent role to play in Africa. The doctrine of native 
paramountcy meant that the interests of the majority black 
African populations should not be subordinated to those of 
a minority belonging to another race. On the other hand, 
partnership meant that the interests of either community 
could not be subordinated to those of the other. The 
policy-makers had been conscious of the threat posed by the 
white settlers and hoped to head them off with the idea of 
'Partnership'. 'Partnership' was a way of buying time for 
progress to be made on African representation until they 
' PRO, C0847/38/3, Memorandum by Ronald Robinson, 
'Some recent trends in native administration policy in the 
British African territories', undated 1947, quoted in 
Ronald Hyam (ed. ) The Labour Government ... Part 
I, pp. 153- 
57. 
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could take their place in the governance of their 
territories. If the Colonial Office can be condemned it 
can perhaps be for its naivety in hoping that the 
experience of partnership could be so successful that white 
settler nationalism could be tempered. So while 
partnership replaced trusteeship it also replaced native 
paramountcy. 
In spite of the doubts expressed about the future of 
the empire and the ability of propaganda to hold the line 
when the realities of the 'partnership' came to be seen by 
1948, 'partnership' continued to be the theme of government 
propaganda about the empire in Africa long after doubts in 
private were first expressed in 1948. indeed some of the 
most flowery expressions of it in public came well after 
its failure was generally accepted within Whitehall and 
Westminster. Lord Salisbury's statement in parliament in 
1952 was a particularly clear though not untypical example: 
Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are at 
one with their predecessors in regarding as the aim of 
their policy the advancement of all communities 
without discrimination on the grounds of race, colour 
or creed. Progress must, in our view, be based on 
partnership between the races, not on domination by 
any. When, with our aid, each community has achieved 
a feeling of security in partnership, more rapid 
progress will be possible with our policy of helping 
the- territory to attain self-government within the 
Commonwealth. It is not easy to achieve that security 
and partnership, nor can it be brought about solely by 
governmental action. It will take time, during which 
Her Majesty's Government must retain ultimate 
control. ' 
A draft prepared for a broadcast by Oliver Lyttleton 
in 1953 after partnership was consumed in the flames of the 
Mau Mau uprising in East Africa and Nkrumah's Convention 
People's Party was swept to victory in West Africa, sums up 
the unrealism and hollow rhetoric into which partnership 
had declined by the 1950s: 
The future of Central Africa can only lie in 
partnership. The races of Central Africa are all 
'7 PRO, C01027/7, extract from House of Lords official 
Report given by Lord Salisbury, the Secretary of State for 
Commonwealth Relations, 18 November 1952 sent to all 
African governments as publicity material, 13 December 
1952. 
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essential to one another, none can do without the 
other. But partnership can only grow with prosperity. 
You cannot sharer poverty and uncertainty. A little 
boldness, a little confidence, and the thing is done. 
In a few years after Federation, many of those who 
have fears about it, may look in amazement, and ask 
themselves, 'What was there to be frightened about? 
How could we have got on without it? ' But more likely 
they will be busy making federation work, building a 
happier and a more prosperous British Central Africa. 0 
In her Reith Lectures of 1961 Margery Perham attempted 
to make sense of what was by then the all too visible 
collapse of Britain's 'new' empire in Africa: 
People of my generation were taught from their 
schooldays that our empire was a splendid achievement, 
conducted as much for the good of its many peoples as 
for our own, peoples who, indeed, now owe us the form 
of their existence as national states. The words 
'trusteeship' and 'Partnership' held serious meaning. 
To the generation before us the 'white man's burden' 
was not a rather bitter joke. Then how, we ask, has 
'colonialism' suddenly, as it seems, become such a 
term of abuse? Have we been utterly blind? Was the 
idealism we so often professed merely a cloak in which 
we tried to hid our complete self-interest from the 
world, and indeed for ourselves. Has our rule really 
harmed these peoples, distorted or delayed their 
development? 9 
Commentators like Margery Perham who had spent her life 
devoted to Africa had been sincere in their devotion to 
principles like partnership. Perhaps the problem with the 
'new' empire of 'partnership' was simply that in spite of 
good intentions and a dash of idealism the British 
government had hoped for the impossible that they would be 
able to persuade Africans, black as well as the white 
settlers, to progress along lines laid out by the British. 
The initiative passed from the hands of British attempts to 
control the progress of developments in the colonial empire 
and power was not transferred to the stable and viable 
states which the economic and social development policies 
and political partnership hoped to create. 
It is impossible to provide concrete evidence which 
can show what difference propaganda, isolated from other 
0 PRO, C01027/36, draft broadcast by Oliver Lyttleton, 
February 1953. 
9 Margery Perham, The Colonial Reckoning (London, 
1961), pp. 14-5. 
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factors, made. We can establish what its themes and 
organisation were, its relationship to policy and quantify, 
at least, substantially, its output. We can qualatively 
assess at least in technical terms that output in 
particular contexts and judge its appropriateness for the 
policies it was intended to serve. Some broad conclusions 
can also be drawn however. On a very basic level it can be 
noted that the growth in mass communications meant the 
Second World War presented a very different problem for 
imperial government than the First World War. Colonial 
audiences were vulnerable to enemy propaganda through the 
electronic media which could not be excluded physically and 
did not even require high levels of literacy. At the very 
least therefore the colonial propaganda effort was 
successful in ensuring that the British case did not fall 
by default. In the short-term context of the war it can be 
argued that the colonial propaganda effort contributed to 
winning the war. The Second World War came in fact to 
represent the high point in the history of imperial 
cooperation and unity, which need not have been the case. 
The contributions of Africans and European settlers in 
manpower, monetary gifts and resources were invaluable to 
the British war effort. Public discussions of the divisive 
issues involved political controversy over the future of 
Africa was contained in the colonies. At home the British 
public was encouraged to 'think empire' appreciate its 
contribution and understand their responsibilities to their 
colonial partners. The strength drawn from the empire 
became part of the mythology of England standing alone 
before Pearl Harbour and Barbarossa and confirmed notions 
of British 'otherness'. The potentially damaging divisions 
within Britain had been contained by a re-articulation of 
the British colonial mission and encapsulation of it in 
effective slogans and images so that until the mid-1950s it 
can be claimed that British colonial policy was genuinely 
bi-partisan. The potential disruptiveness of colonial rule 
in Anglo-American relations was also effectively handled by 
similar methods. 
In the long-term a general assessment is more 
problematic. Notwithstanding the utility of the idea of 
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'partnership', and that the Colonial Office and the 
Colonial Service had ensured that they had begun to equip 
themselves organisationally to 'win the peace', these were 
missed opportunities as well as failures of government. 
Time was going to be an essential factor for the success of 
propaganda for the 'new' empire of 'partnership'. But the 
British never faced up to the fact of having an ever 
reducing time-scale in Africa. Propaganda never addressed 
an essential concern of any nationalist movement, be it a 
willing collaborator or uncooperative opponent: the 
question of when self-rule would be achieved. It also 
seems that the British policy-makers and propagandists had 
never faced up to the fact that nationalists would choose 
self-government over good government, that public opinion 
had a life of its own, what Philip Bell has called 'the 
autonomy of public opinion'. 110 
It4also clear however that enough were convinced of 
the continuation of 'partnership', albeit on their own 
terms to help the maintenance of that shadowy but 
nevertheless important post-imperialist link represented in 
the organisation of the Commonwealth, which Kenya, 
Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Malawi have chosen 
to remain. 
In the final analysis the projection was initially 
successful and made a significant contribution to the 
survival of the British empire in Africa during the war and 
helped it to emerge from the war in a much better shape 
than without, on all the evidence, it would have been. 
What it did not achieve was to maintain it after the war. 
But then: 
information services can not produce miracles ... they 
are only an instrument of policy: and that policy must 
be right and the facts favourable before they can 
produce results. " 
After the war, colonial policy went increasingly wrong and 
110 P. M. H. Bell, John Bull and the Bear: British Public 
opinion, Foreign Policy and the Soviet Unio , 1941-1945 
(London, 1990), p. 23. 
3-11 PRO, CO1027/40, Evans to Carstairs, 11 SePtember 
1953. 
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increasingly failed to produce the facts, the investment 
and the control over the white settlers without which the 
propagandists were bound to fail, in the sense of the 
failure of the policy as a whole. 
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Public and Police Service Commissions, Mauritius, 1960-9. 
MORRISON, Herbert Stanley (Baron Morrison of Lambeth) 
(1888-1967). Secretary to London Labour Party, 1915-47. 
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Mayor of Hackney, 1920-1. Member, London County Council, 
1922-45 (Leader, 1934-40). M. P. (Lab. ), South Hackney, 
1923-24,1929-31 and 1935-45; East Lewisham, 1945-51 and 
South Lewisham, 1951-9. Minister of Transport, 1929-31. 
Minister of Supply, 1940. Home Secretary and Minister of 
Home Security, 1940-5. Member of War Cabinet, 1942-5. 
Deputy Prime Minister, 1945-51. Lord President of the 
Council and Leader, House of Commons, 1945-51. Secretary 
of State for Foreign Affairs, 1951. Deputy Leader of the 
Opposition, 1951-5. 
MOYNE, Lord (Walter Edward GUINNESS) (1880-1944). Served 
South Africa, 1900-1. M. P. (Unionist), Bury St. Edmunds, 
1907-31. Member, London County Council, 1907. Served WW1, 
1914-8. Parl. Under-Secretary of State, War Office, 1922- 
3. Financial Secretary to the Treasury, 1923-4. Minister 
of Agriculture and Fisheries, 1925-9. Financial Mission to 
Kenya, 1932. Chairman, Departmental Committee on Housing, 
1933. Chairman, West Indies Royal Commission, 1938-9. 
Joint Parl. Under-Secretary, Ministry of Agriculture, 1940- 
1. Secretary of State for the Colonies, 1941-2. Leader, 
House of Lords, 1941-2. Deputy Minister of State, Cairo, 
1942-4. Resident Minister, Cairo, 1944. (Assassinated). 
NICOLSON, Hon. Sir Harold (George) (1886-1968). Balliol 
College, Oxford. Entered Foreign Office, 1909. H. M. 
Embassy, Madrid, 1910; Constantinople, 1911. Transferred 
to Foreign Office, 1914. Served on British Delegation to 
Paris Peace Conference, 1919. Joined League of Nations, 
1919. Returned to Foreign Office becoming First Secretary, 
Diplomatic Service, 1920. Counsellor, Foreign Office, 
1925. Appointed to H. M. Legation, Tehran, 1925; H. M. 
Embassy, Berlin, 1927. Resigned, 1929. Editorial Staff, 
Evening Standard, 1930. Contested, (New Party) Combined 
Universities, 1931. M. P. (Nat. Lab. ), W. Leicester, 1935- 
45. Parl. Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of 
Information, 1940-1. Governor, BBC, 1941-6. Joined Labour 
Party, 1947. Trustee, National Portrait Gallery, 1948-64. 
President, Classical Association, 1950-1. Chairman, London 
Library, 1952-7. Publications include: Paul Verlaine 
(1921); Sweet Waters (1921); Tennyson (1923); Byron, the 
Last Journe (1924); Swinburne (1926); Some People (1927); 
Development of Encflish Bioqraphy (1928); Lord Carnock 
(1930); People and Thincfs (1931); Public Faces (1932); 
Peacemaking, 1919 (1933); Curzon: the Last Phase (1934); 
Dwiqht Morrow (1935); Small Talk (1937); Helen's Tower 
(1937); Diplomacy (1939); Marqinal Comment (1939); Why 
Britain is at War (1939); The Desire to Please (1943); 
Friday Mornings (1944); Some People (1944); Another World 
Than This (anthology with Vita Sackville West) (1945); The 
Conqress of Vienna (1946); The Enqlish Sense of Humour 
(1947); Comments (1948); Benjamin Constant (1949); Kinq 
George V: His Life and Reign (1952); Evolution of 
Diplomatic Method (1954); Good Behavior (1955); Sainte- 
Beuve (1957); Journey to Java (1957); The Aqe of Reason 
(1960) and Monarchy (1962). 
NORTHCOTE, Sir Geoffrey Alexander Stafford (1881-1948). 
Balliol College, Oxford. Assistant Collector of Taxes, 
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East African Protectorate, 1904. District Officer, East 
Africa, 1909. Assistant Colonial Secretary, East Africa, 
1921. Chief Secretary, Northern Rhodesia, 1928-30. 
Colonial Secretary, Gold Coast, 1930-4. Governor and 
Commander-in-Chief, British Guiana, 1935-6. Governor and 
Commander-in-Chief, Hong Kong, 1937-41. Principal 
Information Officer, East Africa, 1941-5. 
NORWICH, (Ist Viscount of Aldwick) (Alfred Duff COOPER) 
(1890-1954). New College, Oxford. Served European War, 
1914-9. M. P. (Unionist), Oldham, 1924-9; (Cons. ), St. 
George's Division of Westminster, 1931-45. Financial 
Secretary, War Office, 1928-9 and 1931-4. Financial 
Secretary to the Treasury, 1934-5. Secretary of State for 
War, 1935-7. First Lord of the Admiralty, 1937-8. 
Minister of Information, 1940-1. Chancellor of the Duchy 
of Lancaster, 1941-3. Representative, H. M. Government with 
French Committee of National Liberation, 1943-4. H. M. 
Ambassador to France, 1944-7. Publications include: 
Talleyrand (1932); Haig (1935); The Second World War 
(1939); David (1943); Serqeant Shakespeare (1949); 
Operation Heartbreak (1950) and Old Men Forget (1953). 
OLIVIER, lst Baron (Sydney Olivier) (1859-1943). Corpus 
Christi College, Oxford. Entered Colonial Office, 1882. 
Secretary, Fabian Society, 1886-90. Acting Colonial 
Secretary, British Honduras, 1890-1. Auditor-General, 
Leeward Islands, 1895-6. Private Secretary to the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies, 1896-7. Secretary, 
West India Royal Commission, 1897. Sent to Washington to 
assist in reciprocity negotiations on behalf of West Indian 
Colonies, 1898. Colonial Secretary, Jamaica, 1899-1904 and 
Acting Governor, 1900,1902 and 1904. Principal Clerk, 
West African and West Indian Departments, Colonial Office, 
1904-7. Governor, Jamaica, 1907-13. Permanent Secretary, 
Board of Agriculture and Fisheries, 1913-7. Assistant 
Comptroller and Auditor of the Exchequer, 1917. Retired, 
1920. Secretary of State for India, 1924. West Indian 
Sugar Commission, 1929-30. Published: Jamaica: the Blessed 
Island (1941). 
PARKINSON, Sir Cosmo (1884-1967). Magdalen College, 
Oxford. Entered Admiralty, 1908. Transferred to Colonial 
office, 1909. Assistant Secretary of State, Colonial 
Office, East African Dept., 1925-31. Assistant Under- 
Secretary of State, Colonial Office, Middle East Dept., 
1932 and Middle East and West Indies Depts., 1933-7. 
Permanent Under-Secretary of State, Colonial Office, 1937- 
40. Permanent Under-Secretary of State, Dominions Office, 
Feb. 1940. Acting Permanent Under-Secretary of State, 
Colonial Office, May 1940. Seconded -for special duty in 
colonies, 1942. Retired, Dec. 1944 and re-employed on 
special duty for the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
Jan. -Sept. 1945. Published: The Colonial Offi-cefrOm 
Within, 1909-45, (1947). 
PASKIN, Sir (Jesse) John (1892-1972). St. John's College, 
Cambridge. Served European War, 1914-8. ý Assistant 
Principal, Ministry of Transport, 1920. Transferred to 
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Colonial Office, 1921. Assistant Private Secretary to 
Secretary of State for the Colonies, 1927-9. Principal, 
Colonial Office, 1929. Assistant Secretary of State, 
Colonial Office, East African Dept., 1939. Principal 
Private Secretary to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
1939-40. Assistant Secretary of State, Colonial Office, 
Colonial Development and Social Services Dept., 1941; 
Eastern Dept., 1942-7. Assistant Under-Secretary of State, 
Colonial Office, Hong-Kong and Pacific and South East Asia 
Depts., 1948-54. Retired, 1954. 
PEDLER, Frederick J. (b. 1908). Caius College, Cambridge. 
Entered Colonial Office, 1930. Seconded to Tanganyika, 
1934. Secretary, Commission on Higher Education in East 
Africa and the Sudan, 1937. Secretary to the Lord Privy 
Seal, 1938. Secretary to Lord Hailey in Africa, 1939-40. 
Chief British Economic Representative, Dakar, 1942. 
Assistant Secretary of State, Colonial Office, Economic and 
Finance Department, 1944; Appointments Dept., 1945-7. 
Joined United Africa Company, 1947; Director, 1951 and 
Deputy Chairman, 1965-8. Director Unilever Ltd. and NV, 
1956-68. Chairman, Council for Technical Education and 
Training for Overseas Countries, 1962-73. Treasurer, 
School of Oriental and African Studies, University of 
London, 1969-81. 
PERHAM, Dame Margery (1895-1982). St. Hugh's College, 
Oxford. Lecturer in History, University of Sheffield, 
1917-24. Visited Somaliland, 1921-2. Fellow and Tutor in 
Modern History, St. Hugh's College, Oxford, 1924-30. 
Lectured to Colonial Cadets in Oxford, 1928-63. Awarded 
Rhodes Trust travelling Fellowship and travelled to the US, 
the Pacific and East Africa, 1929-30. Visited Nigeria and 
the Cameroons, 1931-2. Research Lecturer in Colonial 
Administration, University of Oxford, 1935-9. Visited East 
Africa and the Sudan, 1936-8. Vice-Chairman, Oxford Summer 
Courses on Colonial Administration, 1937 and 1938. 
Official Fellow of Nuffield College, 1939-63. Reader in 
Colonial Administration, University of Oxford, 1939-48. 
Member, Colonial Office Advisory Committee on Education in 
the Colonies, 1939-45. Director, Nuffield College, 
Colonial Studies Project, 1941-7. Member, Asquith 
Committee on Higher Education in the Colonies, 1943. 
Member, Irvine Commission on Higher Education in the West 
Indies, visited the West Indies and the US, 1944. 
Director, Institute of Colonial Studies, University of 
Oxford, 1945-8. Member, Executive Committee of the Inter- 
University Council for Higher Education in the Colonies 
(overseas), 1946-66. Member, Inter-University Council for 
higher education in the Colonies (Overseas), 1946-71. 
Attended and spoke at the Colonial office (Cambridge) 
Summer Schools on African Administration, 1947-63. Fellow 
in Imperial Government, Nuffield College, 1948-63. Visited 
Uganda and the Sudan, advised on the training of Sudanese 
administrative officers, 1948. Member, Colonial Office 
Committee of Enquiry into Constitutional Development in the 
Smaller Colonial Territories, 1949. Member, Standing 
Committee of the Colonial Social Science Research Council, 
1949-61. Retired from teaching at Oxford, 1963. Elected 
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first President of the African Studies Association of the 
U. K., 1963. President, Universities Mission to Central 
Africa, 1963-4. Chairman, Oxford University Colonial 
Records Project, 1963-72. Travelled to Nigeria to 
investigate the Nigerian Civil War, 1968. Publications 
include: Major Dane's Garden (1925); Josie Vine (1927); 
(with Lionel Curtis) The Protectorates of South Africa 
(1935); Ten Africans (1936); Native Administration in 
Africa (1937); Africans and British Rule (1941); (ed. 
with J. Simmons) African Discovery: an Anthology of 
Exploration (1942); (with Elspeth Huxley q. v. ) Race and 
Politics in Kenya (1944); The Government of Ethiopia 
(1948); Luqard: the Years of Adventure, 
-1858-1898 
(1956); 
The Diaries of Lord Lugard, vols 1-3 (1959); Luqard: the 
Years of Authority, 1898-1945 (1960); The Colonial 
Reckoning (1962); (ed. with Mary Bull) The Diaries of Lord 
Luqard, 
-.. 
vol. 4 (1963); African Outline (1966); Colonial 
Sequence, 
_.. 
1930-1949 (1967); Colonial Sequence, 1949-1969 
(1970); African Apprenticeship: an Autobioqraphical Journqy 
in South Africa, 1929 (1974); East African Journey, 1929- 
30 (1976) and West African Passage: a Journey throuclh 
Niaeria, Chad and the Cameroons, 1931-2 (published 
posthumously, edited by A. H. M. Kirk-Greene, 1983). 
POYNTON, Sir Arthur Hilton (b. 1905). Brasenose College, 
Oxford. Entered Department of Scientific and Industrial 
Research, 1927. Transferred to Colonial Office, 1929. 
Private Secretary to Minister of Supply and the Minister of 
Production, 1941-3. Assistant Secretary of State, Colonial 
Office, Defence Dept., 1943; Defence and General Dept., 
1944; Defence Dept., 1945 and International Relations 
Dept., 1946. Joint Deputy Under-Secretary of State, 
Colonial Office, 1948. Permanent Under-Secretary of State, 
Colonial Office, 1959-66. Member, Court of Governors, 
London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, 1965-77. 
Member, Governing body, S. P. C. K., 1967-72. Treasurer, 
Society for the Promotion of Roman Studies, 1967-76. 
Director, Overseas Branch, St. John Ambulance, 1968-75. 
RADCLIFFE, Baron Cyril John (1899-1977). New College, 
oxford. Fellow, All Souls College, Oxford, 1922-37. 
Called to Bar, 1924. Kings Council, 1935. Director, Press 
and Censorship, Ministry of Information, 1940. Deputy 
Director General, Ministry of Information, 1941. Director 
General, Ministry of Information, 1941-5. Vice-Chairman 
General, Council of the Bar, 1946-9. Lord of the Appeal in 
the Ordinary, 1949-64. Chairman, Departmental Committee, 
British Film Institute, 1946-7. Chairman, Punjab and 
Bengal Boundary Commissions, 1947. Chairman, Royal 
Commission on Taxation of Profits and Income, 1952. 
Chairman, BBC General Advisory Council, 1952-5. Chairman, 
British Commonwealth International Newsfilm Agency Trust, 
1957-75. Constitutional Commissioner, Cyprus, 1956. 
Chairman, Committee of Inquiry into the Monetary and Credit 
System, 1957-9. Chairman, Committee of Inquiry into 
Procedures and Practices, 1961. Chairman, Tribunal Inquiry 
into the Vassall Case, 1962. Chairman, Privy Councillors' 
Inquiry into the Daily Express and D Notices, 1967. 
Chairman, Privy Councillors' Committee on Memoirs of ex- 
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ministers, 1975. Chairman, Board of Trustees, British 
Museum, 1963-8. Chancellor, University of Warwick, 1966- 
77. Publications include: Not in Feather Beds (1968). 
REITH, John Charles Walsham (1889-1971). Royal Technical 
College, Glasgow. Served five years' engineering 
apprenticeship in Glasgow. London, engineer with S. 
Pearson and Son Ltd., 1913. Served WW1,1914-5. United 
States, in charge of contracts for munitions for Great 
Britain, 1916-7. Admiralty, Department of Civil Engineer- 
in-Chief, 1918. in charge of liquidation of ordnance and 
engineering contracts for Ministry of Munitions, 1919. 
General Manager, Wm Beardmore and Co. Ltd., 1920. first 
General Manager, BBC, 1922; Managing Director, 1923; 
Director-General, 1927-38. Chairman, Imperial Airways, 
1938-9. First Chairman of British Overseas Airways 
Corporation, 1939-40. M. P. (Nat. ) Southampton, 1940. 
Minister of Information, 1940. Minister of Transport, 
1940. first Minister of Works, 1940-2. Extra Naval 
Assistant to 3rd Sea Lord, 1943. Captain, R. N. V. R., 
Director of Combined Operations Material Dept., Admiralty, 
1943-5. Chairman, Commonwealth Telecommunications 
Conference, 1945. Chairman, Commonwealth 
Telecommunications Board, 1946-50. Chairman, New Towns 
Committee, 1946. Chairman, Hemel Hempstead Development 
Corporation, 1947-50. Chairman, National Film Finance 
Corporation, 1948-50. Chairman, Colonial Development 
Corporation, 1950-9. Director, Phoenix Assurance Co. Ltd, 
1953-68. Vice-Chairman, British Oxygen Co. Ltd., 1956-66. 
Chairman, State Building Society, 1960-4. Lord Rector, 
Glasgow University, 1965-8. Lord High Commissioner, 
General Assembly of Church of Scotland, 1967 and 1968. 
Publications include: Into the Wind (1949) and Wearing 
Spurs (1966). 
RICHARDS, Dr. Audrey Isabel (1899-1984). Newnham College, 
Cambridge and University of London. Anthropological field 
work, Northern Rhodesia, 1930-1,1933-4 and 1957; Northern 
Transvaal, 1939-40; Uganda, 1950-5. Lecturer, Social 
Anthropology, London School of Economics, 1931-3 and 1935- 
7. Senior Lecturer, Social Anthropology, University of 
Witwatersrand, 1939-41. Temporary Principal, Government 
Anthropologist, Colonial Office, 1942-5. Reader, Social 
Anthropology, University of London, 1946-50. Director, 
East African Institute of Social Research, Makerere 
College, Kampala, Uganda, 1950-6. Director, Centre for 
African Studies, University of Cambridge, 1956-67. Smuts 
Reader in Anthropology, University of Cambridge, 1961-7. 
Member, Colonial Research Committee, 1944-7. Member, 
Colonial Social Science Research Council, 1944-50,1956-62. 
Member, Committee for Scientific Research in Africa South 
of the Sahara, 1954-6. President, Royal Anthropological 
Institute, 1959-61. President, African Studies 
Association, 1964-5. Publications include: Hunger and Work 
in a Savage Tribe (1932); Land, Labour and Diet in 
Northern Rhodesia (1939); Chisunqu, a Study of Girls' 
Initiation Ceremonies in Northern Rhodesia (1956); East 
African Chiefs (1960); The Multi-Cultural States of East 
Afric (1969); Subsistence to Commercial Farming in Buqanda 
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(1973) and (with Jean Robin) Some Elmdon Families (1974). 
ROBERTSON, Mrs. E. Arnot (Lady TURNER)(d. 1961). Writer, 
broadcaster and lecturer. Publications include: Cullum 
(1928); Three Came Unarmed (1929); Four Friqhtened People 
(1931); Ordinary Families (1933); Thames Portrait (1937); 
Summer's Lease (1940); The Signpost (1943); Devices and 
Desires (1954); Justice of the Heart (1958) and The 
Spanish Town Papers (1959). 
ROBINSON, Prof. Ronald Edward (b. 1920). St. John's College 
Cambridge. Served WW2. Research Officer, African Studies 
Branch, Colonial Office, 1947-9. Fellow, St. John's 
College, Cambridge, 1949-71. Lecturer in History, 
University of Cambridge, 1953-66. Institute for Advanced 
Studies, Princeton, 1959-60. Tutor, St. John's College, 
Cambridge, 1961-6. Member, Bridges Committee, Training in 
Public Administration, 1961-2. Chairman, Cambridge 
Conferences on Problems of Developing Countries, 1961-70. 
Smuts Reader in History of the British Commonwealth, 
Cambridge, 1966-71. Beit Professor of the History of the 
British Commonwealth, and Fellow of Balliol College, 
Oxford, 1971-87. Chairmen, Faculty Board of Modern 
History, Oxford, 1974-6, Vice-Chairman, 1976-87. Director, 
Oxford Development Records Project, 1978-87. U. K. 
observer, Zimbabwe election, 1980. Publications include: 
Africa and the Victorians (1961); Developinq the Third 
World (1971); (joint ed. ) Bismarck, Europe and Africa 
(1988); Railway Imperialism (1991). 
RUGBY, lst Baron (John Loader MAFFEY) (1877-1969). Christ 
Church College, Oxford. Entered Indian Civil Service, 
1899. Served Mohamand Field Force, 1908. Political Agent, 
Khyber, 1909-12. Deputy Commissioner, Peshawar, 1914-5. 
Deputy Secretary, Foreign and Political Office, Government 
of India, 1915-6. Private Secretary to Viceroy, 1916-20. 
Chief Political Officer, Afghanistan, North-West Frontier 
Field Force, 1919. Chief Secretary to Duke of Connaught, 
1921. Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, 
India, 1921-4. Governor-General of the Sudan, 1926-33. 
Permanent Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, 1933- 
7. Director, Imperial Airways, 1937-9. U. K. 
Representative, Eire, 1939-49. Governor of Rugby School, 
resigned, 1939. 
SABBEN-CLARE, Ernest Elwin (b. 1910). New College, Oxford. 
Assistant Master, Winchester College, 1932-4. Assistant 
District Officer, Tanganyika, 1935-40. Seconded to the 
Colonial Office, 1940-7. Colonial Attache, H. M. Embassy, 
Washington and Commissioner of the Caribbean Commission, 
1947-9. Nigerian Government, 1950-5. Permanent Secretary, 
Ministry of Commerce, Nigeria, 1953-5. Assistant Master, 
Marlborough College, 1955-60. Editor, Wilts Archaeological 
and Natural History Magazine, 1956-62. Headmaster, Bishop 
Wordsworth's School, Salisbury, 1960-3. Headmaster, Leeds 
Grammar School, 1963-70. 
SEEL, Sir George Frederick (1895-1976). Corpus Christi 
College, Oxford. Served European War, 1914-8. Transferred 
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from Air Ministry to Colonial Office as Assistant 
Principal, 1922. Principal, Colonial Office, 1929- 
Secretary, Rhodesia-Nyasaland Royal Commission (Bledisloe), 
1938-9. Colonial Office Liaison Officer to Ministry of 
Information, 1939. Assistant Secretary of State, Colonial 
Office, East Africa Department, 1939-41. Seconded to 
Ministry of Supply, 1941-2. Assistant Secretary of State, 
Colonial Office Tanganyika and Colonial Service Depts., 
1942; East Africa Dept., 1944-5 and Colonial Service Dept., 
1946. Assistant Under-Secretary of State, Colonial Office, 
West Africa, East and Central Africa and General Depts., 
1947; Eastern , General and West Indies Depts., 
1948; 
Defence and General and West Indies Depts., 1949-50. 
Comptroller, Development and Welfare, West Indies and 
British Co-Chairman of Caribbean Commission, 1950-3. 
Senior Crown Agent, Oversea Governments and 
Administrations, 1953-9. Chairman, British Leprosy Relief 
Association, 1962-71. 
SELLERS, William (b. 1897). College of Technology, 
Manchester. Served 1914-8 war. Senior Sanitary 
Superintendent, Nigeria, 1926. Propaganda Officer, 
Nigeria, 1935. Producer and Head of Colonial Film Unit, 
Colonial Office, 1939. Expert, U. N. E. S. C. O. seminar, 
Fundamental Education, 1953. 
SCOTT, Sir Herbert Septimus (1873-1952). Hertford College, 
Oxford. Inspector of Schools, Transvaal, 1902. Secretary, 
Transvaal Education Department, 1911. Director of 
Education, Transvaal, 1924. Director of Education, Kenya, 
1928-35. Retired, 1935. Member, Committee of Economic 
Advisory Council on Nutrition in the Colonial Empire. 
Member, Colonial Office Advisory Committee on Education. 
SHUCKBURGH, Sir John (Evelyn) (1877-1953). Kings College, 
Cambridge. Entered India Office, 1900. Private Secretary 
to Permanent Under-Secretary of State, India Office, 1902. 
Secretary, Political Department, India Office, 1917. 
Acting Assistant Under-Secretary, Colonial Office, 1921. 
Assistant Under-Secretary, Colonial Office, 1924; Middle 
East Dept., 1927-8; Middle East, Ceylon, Mediterranean, 
1929-30. Deputy Under-Secretary, Colonial Office, General, 
West Indies, Eastern, Pacific and Mediterranean Depts., 
1931-2; General, Eastern, Pacific and Mediterranean Depts., 
1933-7; General, Defence, Pacific and Mediterranean, 
Colonial Development and Social Services and Middle East 
Depts., 1941. Retired, 1942. Narrator, Historical 
Section, Cabinet Office, 1942. Publications include: The 
India Office List (ed., 1901); An Ideal Voyaqe and Other 
Essays (1946) and Colonial Civil History 
_of 
the War, 
(unpublished manuscript). 
SIMNETT, William Edward (1880-1958). Assistant Editor and 
Librarian, Institution of Civil Engineers, to 1916. Served 
European War 1914-8, Royal Engineers and Major, General 
Staff. Attached to British Delegation, Paris Peace 
Conference. Director, Ministry of Transport, 1919-21. 
Secretary, Railways Amalgamation Tribunal, 1921-3. Founder 
and Editor, Technical Review of the Foreiqn Pres , 
1918-20. 
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Chairman, Colonial Empire Union, 1938-9. Editor, Crown 
Colonist. Sent by British Government on a special mission 
to the United States, 1940. Publications include: The 
British Colonial Empire (1942) and Emergent Commonwealth 
(1954). 
SMUTS, Field Marshal Rt. Hon. Jan Christiaan (1870-1950). 
Victoria College, Stellenbosch and Christ's College, 
Cambridge. Practiced at Cape Town Bar, Johannesburg, 1896. 
State Attorney, South African Republic, 1898. Served Boer 
War; supreme command of Republican Forces, Cape Colony, 
1901. Colonial Secretary, Transvaal, 1907. Commanded 
troops in British East Africa, 1916-7. Minister of 
Interior and Minister of Mines, Union of South Africa, 
1910-2. Minister of Defence, Union of South Africa, 1910- 
20. Minister of Finance, Union of South Africa, 1912-3. 
South African Representative, Imperial War Cabinet, 1917 
and 1918. Plenipotentiary (with General Botha) for South 
Africa at Paris Peace Conference, 1919. P. M. and Minister 
for Native Affairs, Union of South Africa, 1919-24. 
Minister of Justice, Union of South Africa, 1933-9. P. M. 
and Minister of External Affairs and Defence, Union of 
South Africa, 1939-48. Field Marshal, 1941. G. O. C. Union 
Defence Forces in the Field, 1940-9. 
STANLEY, Oliver Frederick George (1896-1950). Served WW1, 
1914-18. Called to Bar, 1919. Contested Edgehill Division 
of Liverpool, 1923. M. P. (Cons. ) Westmoreland, 1924-50. 
Parl. Under-Secretary of State, Home Office, 1931-3. 
Minister of Transport, 1933-4. Minister of Labour, 1934-5. 
President, Board of Education, 1935-7. President, Board of 
Trade, 1937-40. Secretary of State for War, 1940. 
Secretary of State for the Colonies, 1942-5. 
THOMAS, Ambler Reginald (b. 1913). Corpus Christi College, 
Cambridge. Appointed, Assistant Principal, Ministry of 
Agriculture and Fisheries, 1935. Transferred to Colonial 
office, 1936. Assistant Private Secretary to Secretary of 
State for the Colonies, 1938-9. Principal, Colonial Office 
Tanganyika Department, 1939. Deputy Public Relations 
Officer, Colonial Office, 1943. Assistant Secretary of 
State, Colonial Office, Colonial Service Dept., 1946. 
Chief Secretary, Government of Aden, 1947-9. Assistant 
Secretary of State, Colonial Office, Establishment Dept., 
1950-2. Assistant Under-Secretary of State, Colonial 
Office, Colonial Service, Student and Coronation Depts., 
1952-3; Colonial Service and Students Depts., 1954; 
Overseas Service and Students Depts., 1955-9; West Indies, 
Pacific and Indian Ocean, Falkland Islands and Antarctic 
Depts., 1960-63. Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of 
Overseas Development and Overseas Development 
Administration, 1964-73. Member, Executive Committee, 
British Council, 1965-8. Chairman, Commission of Inquiry 
into Gilbert Islands Development Authority, 1976. 
TOMLINSON, Sir George John Frederick (1876-1963). 
University College, Oxford. President, Oxford Union. 
Transvaal Education Department, 1903-4. Nigerian 
Administrative Service, 1907-28. Seconded to Gold Coast, 
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Director of Education, 1910-11. Acting Secretary, Native 
Affairs, Nigeria, 1925-7. Lecturer in Hausa, School of 
Oriental Studies, 1928-30. Member, Committee on Colonial 
Appointments, 1929-30. Assistant Under-Secretary of State, 
Colonial Office, Personnel Dept., 1930-9. Temporary Clerk, 
House of Commons, 1940-4. Member, Governing Body, School 
of Oriental and African Studies, 1940-57. 
VERNON, Roland Venables (d. 1942). Balliol College, Oxford. 
Entered Colonial Office, 1900. Special Service, West 
Indies, 1903. Private Secretary to Lord Denham, Governor- 
General, Australia, 1911-13. Member, Anglo-French 
Commission on New Hebrides, 1914. Assistant General 
Secretary, Ministry of Munitions, 1915-18. Assistant 
Secretary, Irish National Convention, 1917-8. Deputy 
Accountant-General, Board of Education, 1920-1. Returned 
to Colonial Office, 1921. Special Service, Egypt and 
Palestine, 1921-2. At Lausanne for Turkish Treaty 
negotiations, 1922-3. British Agent, Permanent Court of 
International Justice, the Hague, 1925. Financial mission 
to Iraq for British and Iraqi governments, 1925. 
Representative of British and Iraqi governments, Ottoman 
Public Debt negotiations, Paris, 1925. Financial Adviser, 
Government of Iraq, 1925-8. Member, British Delegation, 
International Labour Conference, Geneva, 1929,1930,1935 
and 1936. Retired from Colonial Office, 1937. Chairman, 
Advisory Committee for East London of Assistance Board, 
1938. Member, Governing Body, Imperial College of Science 
and Technology, 1941. 
WADDINGTON, Sir Eubule John (1890-1957). Merton College, 
Oxford. Cadet, Kenya, 1913. Senior Assistant Secretary, 
Kenya, 1923. Provincial Commissioner, Kenya, 1928. 
Colonial Secretary, Bermuda, 1932. Colonial Secretary, 
British Guiana, 1935. Governor, Barbados, 1938-41. 
Governor, Northern Rhodesia, 1941-7. Retired, 1947. 
WILLIAMS, Sir Edward John (1890-1963). Labour College, 
London. Secretary, Great Western Collieries, 1909-13. 
Secretary, Labour College, 1913-5. Member, Glamorgan 
County Council, 1928-31. Miner's Agent, Garw District, 
South Wales Miner's Federation, 1919-31. M. P. (Lab. ) 
Ogmore Division of Glamorganshire, 1931-46. Parl. Private 
Secretary to Under-Secretary for the Colonies, 1940-1. 
Parl. Private Secretary to Financial Secretary to the 
Admiralty, 1942-3. Parl. Private Secretary to Parl. Under- 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1943-5. Minister 
of Information, 1945-6. High Commissioner in Australia, 
1946-52. Member, National Industrial Disputes Tribunal, 
1953-9. 
WILLIAMS, Owen Gwyn Revell (1886-1954). Hertford College, 
Oxford. Entered Inland Revenue, 1910. Transferred to 
Colonial Office, 1911. Assistant Secretary of State, 
Colonial Office, General Dept., 1926-9; Middle East Dept., 
1930-7; West African Dept., 1938-46. Retired 1946. 
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APPENDIX 2 
THE COLONIAL OFFICE 
SECRETARIES OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES 
1939-1948 
16 May 1938 
13 May 1940 
8 February 1941 
23 February 1942 
24 November 1942 
3 August 1945 
7 October 1946 
Rt. Hon. 
Rt. Hon. 
Rt. Hon. 
Rt. Hon. 
Rt. Hon. 
Rt. Hon. 
Rt. Hon. 
Malcolm MacDonald 
Lord Lloyd 
Lord Moyne 
Viscount Cranborne 
Oliver Stanley 
George Hall 
Arthur Creech Jones 
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